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
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








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


**THE**  
**HISTORY OF GREECE.**

**VOL. VI.**

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THE  
HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY  
CONNOP THIRLWALL, D.D.  
BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S.

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IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

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1855.





# ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL

## TABLE.

### CHAPTER XLV.

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# HISTORY OF GREECE.

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## CHAPTER XLV.

FROM THE END OF THE SACRED WAR TO THE RENEWAL  
OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE ATHENIANS.

*State of Public Feeling at Athens. — Philip's Policy. — Pythian Games. — Embassy from Philip to Athens. — Oration of Demosthenes on the Peace. — Negotiations in Peloponnesus. — Second Philippic. — Affairs of Thessaly. — Philip's Attempt on Megara. — His Invasion of Epirus. — Parties at Elis. — Athenian Negotiations. — Disputes with Philip. — Parties at Athens. — Æschines and Demosthenes. — Timarchus. — Philip's Expedition to Thrace. — Diopithes. — Oration on the Chersonesus. — Third Philippic. — Athenian Embassies. — Siege of Selymbria. — Siege of Perinthus. — Siege of Byzantium. — Athenian Expedition to Eubæa. — Philip's Manifesto. — Byzantium relieved. — Regulation of the Trierarchy.*

THE state of public feeling in Athens at the close of the Phocian war, may be easily conceived. It was a struggle between fear and resentment. Fear of an enemy who had been irritated by a long conflict, had become more powerful than ever, and, while his forces had been brought nearer to the confines of Attica than they had ever before advanced, had given a fresh specimen, in the political extinction of another Grecian state, of the fearful lengths to which his animosity might be carried, or to which he might even be led by the cool calculations of his ambitious policy.

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B. C. 346.  
State of  
public  
feeling at  
Athens.



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Resentment, which was so much the keener, because the injury that provoked it was one which afforded but slight ground for remonstrance, or even for complaint. One of the consequences of this state of feeling was, that the peace just concluded, though almost universally admitted to be necessary, became generally odious, and its authors and promoters—the orators who proposed and recommended it, and the negotiators who brought it about—extremely unpopular.<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, as one of the ambassadors who had been engaged in this business, must have shared the odium to which his colleagues were exposed, if he had not been able to separate his case from theirs, and if the whole tenor of his past public life had not exempted him from all suspicions of a leaning toward the Macedonian interest. But the part which he had hitherto taken in opposition to Philip had been so decided, and his conduct throughout the negotiation, as to the main points, so clearly patriotic, that the unfortunate issue seemed to afford fresh proof both of his integrity and sagacity, and served to raise him in the favour and esteem of the people.

Philip's policy.

Philip's policy during the ensuing period is much more difficult to explain. There can be no question, as we have already seen, that the project of an expedition against Persia had by this time been formed in his mind into a settled plan; and we cannot but ask, Why he did not immediately proceed to execute it? The only reason that can be assigned seems to be, that the state of affairs in Greece was not yet, in his judgment, ripe for such an undertaking. It may seem presumptuous for any one, with our limited means of information, to raise a doubt as to the sufficiency of the grounds which determined the measures of so

<sup>1</sup> For this we may believe Æschines, when he says (Ctes. p. 65. § 80.), *ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἦσαν αἰτίας οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ τὴν εἰρήνην πρεσβεύσαντες*: though not when he adds, *πολὺ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως Φιλοκράτης καὶ Δημοσθένης*.

great a statesman and general as Philip. Yet when we consider the extent to which his influence prevailed in Peloponnesus—where, if not absolutely predominant, it was at least strong enough to counteract all hostile movements—and that in the north of Greece there was no state of any moment, except Athens, with which he had just made peace, that was not devoted to his interest, none that would be expected actively to thwart it, we can hardly refrain from thinking, that it would not have been difficult for him, before he withdrew his forces from Phocis, to have procured the title which he afterwards obtained, to be conferred on him with a fair appearance of unanimity, and that he might afterwards have embarked in his enterprise without fear of a more formidable opposition from the enemies whom he left behind him, than he must have reckoned on in any case that it was possible to foresee. We may at least venture to believe that his son, if he had found himself, on his accession to the throne, in just such a position, would not have waited for more favourable circumstances in the state of Greece: as we know that those under which he actually invaded Persia were by no means free from difficulty and danger. Either Alexander was rash—which the event seems to disprove—or Philip needlessly cautious.

So to pronounce would in fact be to call his sagacity very little in question. His apprehensions, however ill-founded they may have been, would only prove the great weight which the name of Athens retained, after she had lost so much of the substance of power: for it is clear that she was the only enemy he had in Greece, formidable enough to occasion the delay which cost him so many precious years. It is less difficult to account for the course which under this supposed necessity he adopted in the next period of his contest with her. We shall find that he did

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not for a long time attempt to bring it to an issue by a direct attack, but sought to compass his object by intrigues and negotiations, designed to strengthen his footing in her neighbourhood, and to insulate her more and more from the other states of Greece, or by blows aimed at her distant possessions, her commerce, and necessary supplies. His motive for preferring this slow and laborious process, even when he stood with a powerful army within a few days', or rather hours', march of her border, was probably not any scruple about breaking the peace just concluded, or the difficulty of finding a decent pretext for an immediate renewal of hostilities, but a sober calculation of the risk he should run, if he invaded her territory, and laid siege to the city, of rallying the other Greeks around her, and of being at length compelled to retire with loss and dishonour. But by this winding policy a new and wide field was opened for the exertions of Demosthenes, where he was able to display his energy and talents in a manner the most glorious to himself, and the most useful to his country. For to baffle Philip's machinations, to keep him at a distance, and constantly occupied, were objects within the reach of the orator's activity and eloquence, and by these means he might postpone, and perhaps avert, the commencement of an undertaking, which, if successful, would surely prove fatal to the liberties of Greece.

Pythian  
Games.

Within a few weeks, as it seems, after the end of the war, two transactions occurred, which throw light on that state of feeling which has been described as prevailing at Athens, and on the growing influence and the political views of Demosthenes. The Pythian Games were celebrated under the presidency of Philip or his ambassadors, by virtue of the Amphictyonic decree, which conferred that honour on him, the Thessalians, and Bœotians, to the ex-

clusion of all the other Amphictyonic states.<sup>1</sup> On this occasion the Athenians—perhaps the most superstitious people of Greece, who moreover prided themselves on their peculiar mythical connection with the Delphic god<sup>2</sup>—withheld the solemn deputation composed of members of the Five Hundred, and of the six archons called Thesmothetæ, which they had been always used to send to represent them at the spectacle. The second transaction was this: an embassy was sent to Athens, consisting of Macedonian, Thessalian, and Bœotian envoys, to demand from the Athenians a formal sanction of the decree by which the king of Macedon had been admitted a member of the Amphictyonic league.

So imperfect is our acquaintance both with the history of this period, and with many public usages of the Greeks which were universally notorious, that we are not sure whether these two occurrences took place in the order in which they have just been related: for we know neither the exact date of the embassy, nor the precise time of the year at which the Pythian Games were held.<sup>3</sup> It is however at

<sup>1</sup> Brueckner (Philipp. p. 195. n. 84.) conjectures that the presidency may have been exercised by the Amphictyonic states in rotation, and that this may account for the statement of Diodorus (xvi. 60.) about the Corinthians, which perplexed Wesseling so much, and on which I have offered a guess, Vol. V. p. 477. Brueckner's would hardly explain the language of Diodorus, who evidently meant to speak in each case of a permanent institution. But it agrees extremely well with the passages of Demosthenes in which Philip is mentioned as if he had been the sole ἀγωνοθέτης, which he would have been in his turn. It is difficult to say where Vogel (Philippus, p. 153.) found authority for his assertion, that the presidency had been previously exercised by the Athenians.

<sup>2</sup> Τὸν Ἀπόλλων τὸν Πύθιον, ὃς πατρώος ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει. Demosth. de Cor. § 180. See a little tract by Bæhr, *De Apolline Patricio*.

<sup>3</sup> It may, however, now be considered as certain that the Games were celebrated in the first quarter, or at any rate not later than the fourth month of the Attic year. Among the writers who have come to this conclusion, each of the first four months has found its advocates. Dr. Arnold (Thuc. vol. ii. App.) is in favour of the first, Hecatombæon; Mr. Clinton (F. H. ii. App. C. 1.) of the second or third, Metageitnion or Boedromion (not, as is incorrectly stated by K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer*, § 49. n. 12. Pyanepsion); Böhnecke (Forsch. i. p. 310.) fixes on Metageitnion; K. F. Hermann (u. s.) on Boedromion; Klene (in Zimmermann's Zeitschrift, 1842, p. 1128.) on Pyanepsion. Böhnecke has three arguments for his opinion, two of them, however, applicable only to the season in general; one grounded on the ripe apples, which were (not exactly as

least the most probable conjecture, that the omission of the Athenians to send their envoys to the Games, was the very occasion which gave rise to the embassy<sup>1</sup>: and it must be owned, that this affair is one

Dr. Arnold says, *offered to Apollo*) given as a prize in the Games. This is his *firmissimum argumentum*; and, indeed, the others are less convincing. The second rests on the date assigned by Dionysius (ad Amm. c. 12.) for the pleadings in the cause of the Crown (*ὁ γὰρ ἐνιαυτὸς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην*); but all the force of this argument seems to be destroyed by the admission, that the eighth year may have been either current or complete. The third argument is derived from the probability that the Ætolian month Panamus, which corresponded to the Delphic month Bucatius, also — like the other Greek months of that name — answered to the Attic Metageitnion. How late the Games may be placed in the Attic year will depend partly on the time which must be allowed for the news of the death of Darius to have reached Athens, and partly on the interpretation of Thucydides, v. 1., τοῦ δ' ἐπιγεγονόμένου θέρους αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπουδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων. As to the construction of this passage, I entirely agree with Dr. Arnold, that it marks the period preceding Cleon's expedition to Amphipolis. It is not at all necessary for this interpretation, as Mr. Clinton in reply to Arnold seems to suppose, that διελέλυντο should be rendered *were continued*, and certainly nothing was farther from Arnold's meaning. He saw that here, as in the passages cited by Gölter, i. 71., (μέχρι τοῦδε ὥρισθω ἡμῶν ἡ βραδύτης; and iii. 108. ἡ μάχη ἐτελείετο ὥς ἔφη,) διατελέσασαι, or something equivalent, must be supplied. According to this view, it is necessary to place the Games early in the year, in order to allow sufficient time for the campaign which followed it. On the opposite supposition, that Thucydides meant to say that hostilities were carried on until the season of the Pythian Games, it is hardly possible, consistently with the narrative of Thucydides, to place the Games earlier than Pyanepsion. And so Kiene (u. s.) was led — very rightly on his premises — to fix them in that month. Both Hecatombæon and Metageitnion are too early on that hypothesis. But with reference to the other condition, the death of Darius, Pyanepsion appears to me too late. Kiene observes that two months is the utmost time that can be allowed for the news of this event reaching Athens; and he supposes that it may have happened toward the end of Hecatombæon, and the oration on the Crown have been delivered toward the end of Boedromion. But to me it seems hardly credible that the transmission of such intelligence can have occupied so long a time as two months. Böhnecke too (p. 317.) thinks a month sufficient. On that which I regard as the true construction of Thucydides, the Games cannot be made to fall later than Metageitnion; and between this and Hecatombæon, Böhnecke's argument from the Ætolian Panamus may, perhaps, be permitted to turn the scale in favour of the second month. Brueckner (Philipp. p. 201. n. 106.) rightly remarks, that the manner in which Demosthenes (De Pace, § 22.) alludes to Philip's celebration of the Games, strongly suggests the impression that it had already taken place. Perhaps we may add that the same supposition affords the most natural explanation of the fact, that Thesallian and Theban (called Boeotian) ministers accompanied those of Macedonia in the embassy.

<sup>1</sup> Brueckner (Philipp. p. 198.) conceives that the occasion of the embassy was, that the Athenians, according to Demosthenes (F. L. p. 381. § 145.), had refused to take any part in the Amphictyonic assembly. But I doubt whether the expression of Demosthenes, μήτε τῶν ἐν Ἀμφικτύοσι κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν, refers to any thing more specific than the absence of their Theoria from the Games; especially as Æschines, in three passages, to which Brueckner himself refers, p. 197. (F. L. p. 40. § 100., p. 46. § 146., p. 47. § 149.) speaks of his third embassy as sent to the Amphictyons — ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀμφικτύοντας, ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων — and even describes his colleagues (p. 46. § 147.) as τοὺς Ἀμφικτύοντας πρέσβεις. But at all events Flathe commits a palpable mistake, into which he was probably drawn by Demosthenes (De F. L. § 140, 141.), who however does not warrant such

of the examples which tend to confirm the opinion that the Games were celebrated either in summer, or autumn; since it seems most likely that this departure of the Athenians from their ancient custom was the first intimation they had given of their disposition to reject the acts of the Amphictyonic council, partial and violent as its proceedings had been.

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It was evidently necessary to come to a common understanding on this point as soon as possible, and therefore there is no need to suppose that Philip had any further views in this embassy; yet it is probable enough that he would not have been displeased, if the Athenians had resisted his demand, and had thus embroiled themselves in a fresh quarrel with their northern neighbours, and had afforded a pretext for treating them as contumacious offenders against the majesty of the Amphictyonic council. It was well understood at Athens, that the question imported nothing less than peace or war. Yet so strong was the indignation felt against Philip, that not only were opinions divided in the assembly, but the general sentiment appears to have been in favour of a direct refusal. Indeed, if we may believe Demosthenes<sup>1</sup>, the only speaker who ventured to support Philip's claim was Æschines, and he could hardly obtain a hearing, and descended from the bema amidst a tumult of opprobrious clamour: but he was overheard remarking to the Macedonian ambassadors, that there were many voices to brawl, but few hands to fight.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand there were orators who represented the

Embassy  
from Philip  
to Athens.

an inference, when (l. p. 210.) he represents the embassy which gave occasion to the oration, *De Pace*, as preceding that of the Athenians, in which Æschines interceded, according to his own account (*De F. L.* § 149.), in behalf of the Phocians. It seems clear that their fate had been decided when Demosthenes made his speech.

<sup>1</sup> *De F. L.* § 123. συνέειπε μόνος τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντων ἀνθρώπων.

<sup>2</sup> πολλοὺς τοὺς βορυβοῦντας εἶναι, ὀλίγους δὲ τοὺς στρατευομένους.

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Oration  
of Demo-  
sthenes  
"On the  
Peace."

required concession as a disgrace, to which the people ought never to submit on any terms: and it seems that this language was received with applause. Demosthenes himself concurred with Æschines in his practical conclusion, though, it must be supposed, on widely different grounds. His own we know from his oration, *On the Peace*, which he delivered on this occasion.<sup>1</sup> In this speech we find him assuming a tone of authority and confidence which we do not observe in any that preceded it. He appeals to the proofs of foresight and penetration which he had given in the affair of the Eubœan Plutarchus, in the debates which led to the opening of the negotiation with Philip, and in his warnings against the delusion which had been practised on the people, when they were made to believe that the war would be terminated according to their wishes: claiming however no higher merit, than that his judgment had never been biassed by corrupt motives. As to the subject then under discussion, he premised, that, if he recommended the maintenance of the peace, it was not because he thought it advantageous or honourable: but it might sometimes be ill to undo what it would have been better

<sup>1</sup> The assertion quoted in the last note, compared with the oration, *On the Peace*, raises a difficulty which has perplexed critics from the time of Libanius, who thought it impossible that the speech could have been delivered, since its inconsistency with the charge against Æschines would have been too glaring. Later writers seem to have been generally inclined to believe, that the contradiction is only an apparent one: but the solutions they propose are various. There are probably many more than I know of; but none that I have seen satisfy me. Downes, for instance (*Dunæus ad Demosth. de Pace*, p. 112. ed. Beck. Lips. 1799) observes that there is a wide difference between supporting a measure, after it has been carried and first proposing it, as Æschines perhaps (*ut ille fortasse!*) had done. Jacobs (*Demosthenes, Staatsreden*, p. 241.) imagines that though Demosthenes mentions no other object of the embassy than the demand about Philip, the envoys may have made other claims which were advocated by Æschines. For, he asks, though Æschines had been imposed upon by Philip, why should this have prevented him from maintaining the expediency of recognising Philip as an Amphictyon? It must be owned that this would depend entirely on the manner in which the thing was done. Demosthenes certainly did not adopt the arguments of Philip's envoys, as, if we believe his account, Æschines probably did. But it is hard to conceive, that he would have described the business of the embassy by a reference to any other subject than that on which Æschines spoke so as to offend his audience.

not to have done. If ever they renewed the war, they should take care that it was not on an occasion like this, which would unite other Greek states in a common interest with Philip against them. To stand out against the decree of the assembly, which had usurped the title of an Amphictyonic council, would be to challenge the hostility of all who were parties to it; especially as the Thessalians and Thebans were already exasperated by the shelter which Athens had afforded to the Phocian and Bæotian exiles. Were they then, it might be asked, through fear of war, to submit to commands? They must remember that they had made much more important sacrifices for the sake of peace with particular states; and that it would be strangely absurd to go to war now with a whole confederacy about *the shadow at Delphi*. This simple and statesmanlike view of the question appears to have enlightened and calmed the public mind: the assembly decided for peace.

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The scanty notices remaining of the history of this period, being chiefly rhetorical allusions—which are often extremely vague, and were seldom meant to convey the simple truth—do not permit us to follow Philip's movements step by step. We perceive however very clearly, that he was constantly endeavouring to extend his power and influence, either by arms or negotiation, on every side of his dominions. We hear of expeditions or intrigues directed toward the north, and the south, the east, and the west: and though their immediate objects were apparently widely remote from each other, they seem all to have tended toward one end: that of weakening and curbing Athens, which, if these projects had succeeded, would at length have found herself completely inclosed in the toils, before she had received a wound. It is probable that Philip's eye embraced all these points at one view, and that he was con-



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tinually prosecuting his designs in opposite quarters, though we happen to find them mentioned only in succession. It is to Peloponnesus that our attention is first directed, as the scene of a diplomatic contest, which portended a fiercer struggle. Here Philip had succeeded, almost without an effort, to the sway which Thebes had won through the victories of Epaminondas. For Sparta, weakened as she was, was still an object of jealousy to her neighbours, whose independence she viewed with a malignant eye; and since Thebes, having in her turn sunk from the height of her power, was no longer able to afford protection to her Peloponnesian allies, they naturally transferred their confidence to the king of Macedonia, on whose aid even Thebes had been forced to cast herself. We are not informed of any new occasion of hostilities that arose between them and Sparta immediately after the close of the Phocian war. Yet it appears that they found, or thought themselves in danger, so as to be led to cultivate Philip's friendship. He espoused their cause without reserve, declared himself the protector of Messenia, and called upon the Spartans to renounce their claims upon her; and when his demand was rejected—as it seems to have been in a somewhat contemptuous tone<sup>1</sup>—both supplied his allies with troops and money, and announced his intention of leading a much larger force into Peloponnesus in person.<sup>2</sup> It may easily be supposed, that these favours and promises rendered him highly popular throughout the confederacy of which Messene, Megalopolis, and Argos were the leading members, and that he was extolled as the friend of

<sup>1</sup> That is to say, if there is any foundation for the anecdotes related by Plutarch (De Garrul. p. 511. A.): for this should be the occasion to which the second belongs. Philip is there made to write to the Spartans, *Ἄν' ἰ invade Laconia I will destroy you.* (Ἄλ' ἐμῶν εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἀναστάτοις ἐμῶν ποιήσω.) The laconic answer was, *Ἄλκα, Ἄν' ἰf.*

<sup>2</sup> Philipp. ii. § 15—17.

liberty, the champion of the oppressed. Demosthenes himself, in a speech delivered about three years after the end of the war<sup>1</sup>, mentions, with indignation, that many of the Arcadian commonwealths had decreed brazen statues and crowns in honour of Philip, and had resolved, if he should enter Peloponnesus, to admit him into their towns: and that the Argives had followed their example.

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These proceedings, of course, soon became known at Athens, and excited no little anxiety there. An embassy was sent into Peloponnesus, with Demosthenes at its head, to counteract the progress of the Macedonian influence. He went to Messene, and, it seems, to Argos: perhaps to several other cities. In one of his extant speeches he has given a specimen of the manner in which he endeavoured to rouse the jealousy of the Peloponnesians against Philip. He referred to Philip's conduct in the case of Olynthus, as a proof that no reliance could safely be placed on his professions, or even his acts of friendship, which were all meant to inveigle those who trusted to them into bondage or ruin. Whether he appealed to the example of the Thessalians for the same purpose, must remain doubtful: since the principal fact, which he represents himself to have stated concerning them, certainly occurred later. But it appears that he dwelt much on the bad faith which Philip had shown in his dealings with Athens, either in his promises about Amphipolis, or in those by which he had deceived the people through their ambassadors in the negotiation for peace. The natural and necessary hostility between a monarch—whether king or tyrant—and all free and legal governments, was also a topic by which the orator strove to alarm republican prejudices. But though he affirms that he was heard with applause,

B. C. 345.  
Negotiations in  
Peloponnesus.

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he admits that his warnings had produced no practical effect, and that Philip continued after, as before, to enjoy the confidence of his Peloponnesian allies: and some embassies, which were afterwards sent with the same view, were attended with no better result. Philip did not let these attempts pass unnoticed. Even if he did not deem it necessary for his honour to repel the charge of perfidy which had been so publicly brought against him, he may have thought it a favourable opportunity for displaying and thereby strengthening his connection with Peloponnesus. He sent an embassy to Athens, which seems to have been headed by Python, whose eloquence could sustain a comparison with that of Demosthenes himself<sup>1</sup>: and it was no doubt at Philip's instigation that his envoys were accompanied by those of Messene and Argos. The Macedonians were instructed to expostulate on the groundless accusations which had been brought against their king, and formally to deny that he had ever broken his word to the Athenians: the Peloponnesians were to complain of the countenance which Athens had given to the attempts of Sparta against their liberty.

B. C. 344.  
Second  
Philippic.

This embassy gave occasion to the second Philippic of Demosthenes, which seems to have been the speech with which he prefaced a motion for the answer which he proposed to give to the ambassadors. It is possible that more than one assembly was held on the business—one perhaps to consider each subject—and that on one of these occasions Python vindicated his master's conduct in a speech which Demosthenes afterwards describes as bold and vehement, though he himself met it with a reply which extorted tokens of approbation even from the ministers of Philip's allies.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 85.

<sup>2</sup> De Cor. § 173.

But this was evidently not the occasion of the second Philippic.<sup>1</sup> That is addressed to the people, not in reply to the foreigners, but to the Macedonian, Philippising faction at home, and more particularly to Æschines, who, it seems, had recently taken Philip's part, and had supported Python's arguments with his testimony. Its main object is to excite the suspicion and resentment of the Athenians, on the one hand against Philip, and on the other against the orators who had served as his instruments to overreach them. He contends that the motive which had induced Philip to prefer the interest of Thebes to that of Athens at the end of the war, was not the presence of a force which restrained him, still less any regard to justice—for he who maintained the independence of Messenia against Sparta could not consistently aid the Thebans in reducing the other Bœotian towns to subjection—it was, that he expected the one state, if its own interests were but secured, would be readily subservient to his designs against the liberties of Greece, while he knew that no prospect of selfish advantage would ever bribe Athens to resign her glorious inheritance, the foremost post of resistance to foreign attacks on the national independence. There were rumours afloat of a breach between Thebes and Philip, and that he intended to restore the fortifications of Elatea: but it was not likely, when he adopted their quarrel with Sparta as his own, that he should thwart their views nearer home. All this however is but subordinate and introductory to the concluding passage, in which the orator reminds his hearers of the disappointment they had suffered, and points their

<sup>1</sup> Winiewski (p. 140.) is of a different opinion: *Ipsa fortasse hac oratione adv. Phil. II. refutasse Pythonem Demosthenes videatur*. But Böhnecke justly observes (i. p. 298.), that the reply which Demosthenes boasts of, must have been made on the spur of the moment. This indeed appears clear from the orator's language (De Cor. § 173.), 'Εγὼ μὲν τῷ Πύθωνι θρασυνομένῳ καὶ πολλῶν βέροντι καθ' ἡμῶν οὐκ εἴχα οὐδ' ὑπεχώρησα, ἀλλ' ἀναστὰς ἀντείπον.

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indignation against its authors. He does not name either Philocrates or Æschines; but alludes, in a manner which could not be mistaken, to the ribaldry with which the one had silenced his warnings, and to the solemn assurances, or dexterous insinuations, by which the other had quieted the people's apprehensions. "The men who had thus involved the state in its present embarrassment, ought," he says, "to be charged with the task of defending its conduct against those who questioned it. But at least it was fit that the language by which they had caused so much mischief, which was not yet ended, should not be forgotten." It is to be regretted, that the proposed reply has not been preserved: it probably contained a manifesto which would have thrown some light on the history of this period. The tone of the speech leads us to suppose that it made no material concession; there is rather, as we shall see, reason to believe that it advanced some new claims; yet it so far satisfied Philip and his allies, as to avoid an open rupture.

Affairs of  
Thessaly.

Philip indeed may at this juncture have been the more easily satisfied, because he was engaged in an expedition against the Illyrians, for which we hear of no motive, save the inveterate enmity between the two nations. His invasion of Illyria, however provoked or coloured, seems to have been completely successful, though not attended with any very important result: he ravaged the country, made himself master of several towns, and returned laden with booty. (B. C. 344.)<sup>1</sup> It appears to have been not long after that a fresh occasion arose to call for his presence in Thessaly. We gather from the statements of Demosthenes and Diodorus<sup>2</sup>, that either the family of the tyrants, or the party which supported them in Pheræ, had re-

Diodor. xvi. 69.

<sup>2</sup> U. s. Demosth. Philipp. iii. § 17.

covered their power there, and perhaps in other towns, and that Philip once more marched to dislodge them. This he seems to have effected with as much ease as at any former time: but he also found the circumstances of the country more favourable than they had ever been before for a new settlement of its affairs, which was calculated to render it more thoroughly subservient to his interests, and indeed reduced it nearly to a Macedonian province.

It was probably not long after the end of the Phocian war, that he fulfilled the promise which he had made during his contest with Olynthus, of evacuating Magnesia.<sup>1</sup> There was indeed no further pretext left for delay: yet this step may not have been purely voluntary; and it may have been by some signs of impatience appearing among the Thessalians, that he was induced to gratify them by a boon which seemed more spontaneous, the cession of Nicæa, one of the frontier towns near Thermopylæ, which had been surrendered to him by Phalæcus. We find an intimation, which probably rests on good authority<sup>2</sup>, that the Thebans had hoped to be put in possession of this place; and their disappointment in this affair was perhaps one of the first causes that alienated them from Philip. But though he granted it nominally to the Thessalians, it seems that he continued to occupy it with a Macedonian garrison.<sup>3</sup> The great families in the north of Thessaly, who had been his most active partizans, cannot have wished to sacrifice their country's independence more than was necessary to purchase their own security: and if, after the subjugation of Phocis, they had not been threatened with any fresh danger, they might have begun to resist the foreign ascendancy to which they

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. V. p. 401.

<sup>2</sup> Though in an oration which is justly suspected: *Ad Philippi Epist.* § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Demosth. ad Epist. u. a.*

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had so long submitted. But the revolution at Pheræ forced them again to seek aid from Philip, and afforded him means of establishing his sway on a firmer basis. After the expulsion of the tyrant dynasty, he did not, as before, leave the place open to new attempts of the same kind, but garrisoned the citadel with his own troops.<sup>1</sup> This measure was probably very unwelcome to those of the Aleuads, who were clear-sighted enough to perceive that it implied the permanent subjection of Thessaly: and it was followed by another, which seems not to have been carried without strong opposition, nor without the help of corruption and intrigues. Yet it was one which must have worn a popular aspect; for it was professedly a restoration of an ancient order of things, which was ascribed to Aleuas, the celebrated prince, from whom the house of the Aleuads derived its name. The division of the country into four districts, each of which was called a *tetras*<sup>2</sup>, subsisted indeed still, but rather as a geographical, than a political, arrangement. Philip revived the distinction of the *tetradarchies*. How far he endeavoured to restore the old institutions connected with them, cannot be ascertained: but the principal object which he had in view seems to be disclosed in a statement of Theopompus, which informs us that he placed some of the chiefs of the Aleuad faction—of course his most devoted adherents—at the head of the four governments.<sup>3</sup> Three of these persons may be named with tolerable certainty: Eudicus, Simus<sup>4</sup>, and Thrasydæus. The first two are branded by Demosthenes as traitors to their country; and this seems to have been the main

<sup>1</sup> Hegesippus De Haloneso, § 33.

<sup>2</sup> Hellanicus Harpocrat. *Tetrapχία*.

<sup>3</sup> Harpocr. u. s.

<sup>4</sup> Simus, being coupled by Demosthenes with Eudicus, was probably as well rewarded. As to Eudicus and Thrasydæus there is express testimony of Harpocr. *Εὐδικος*; and of Theopompus in Athenæus (vi. c. 55.), where Thrasydæus is said to have been appointed τῶν δημοθνήων τύραννος.

work for which, if the charge is well founded, they sold their services to Philip. There is an anecdote in Polyænus<sup>1</sup>, that, during his stay at Larissa, he attempted, under pretence of sickness, to draw the Aleuads to the house where he lodged, that he might make himself master of their persons: but that, having received timely notice of his designs, they avoided the snare. The story may belong to this period, and would accord very well with the other intimations which we meet with of the state of things at this time in Thessaly. The final result is described by Demosthenes, perhaps with no great exaggeration, as the total subjection of the land to Philip, whom it supplied both with excellent troops, and it seems also with a considerable addition to his revenues; for, beside the harbour duties and customs which had been formerly granted to him<sup>2</sup>, and which he no doubt retained, we find that he took possession of the tribute which Larissa had received, ever since the conquest, from her subject Parrhæbian cantons.<sup>3</sup>

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It seems to have been while he was still occupied with the affairs of Thessaly, or at least before he withdrew from the country, that he made an attempt in another quarter, which, if it had succeeded, would have brought him nearer by a great step to one of his principal objects. Megara was at this time, as it had probably never ceased to be, divided between rival factions, which however seem not to have been so turbulent as to prevent it from enjoying a high degree of prosperity<sup>4</sup>, and there are indications that its form

B. C. 343.  
Philip's at-  
tempt on  
Megara.

<sup>1</sup> IV. 2. n. But there is no reason for supposing with Buttmann (Mythologus, ii. p. 288.) that the Aleuads here mentioned were Eudicus and Simus. If so, at least, they would not afterwards have been entrusted—as Buttmann himself states—with authority by Philip.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. § 23.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, ix. p. 440.

<sup>4</sup> Isocrates, de Pace, § 143. Μεγαρείς . . . μεγίστους οἶκους τῶν Ἑλλήνων κείνηνται κ. τ. λ. Cf. Demosthenes, Aristocr. § 256.



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of government was not unhappily tempered.<sup>1</sup> The old animosity against Athens had perhaps now in a great measure subsided: Philip indeed had his adherents; but there was a strong party which opposed them, and which looked to Athens for protection. The contending interests however seem not to have been exactly those of democracy, and aristocracy, or oligarchy: Philip's leading partizans appear to have been some of the most powerful citizens, who hoped with his aid to rise to sovereign power, which they would have been content to hold under him. Ptæodorus, the foremost man in Megara, in birth, wealth, and reputation, was, according to Demosthenes<sup>2</sup>, at the head of a conspiracy for the purpose of placing the city in Philip's hands, and had opened a correspondence with him, in which he employed another Megarian, Perilaus, as his agent. Perilaus was brought to trial for his unauthorised dealings with a foreign court, but was acquitted through the influence of Ptæodorus, who sent him again to obtain a body of Macedonian troops, while he himself staid to prepare for their reception at Megara. The plot appears to have been baffled by some unusually vigorous measures of the Athenians. It is difficult to determine whether an expedition which they made about this time to their frontier on the side of Drymus and Panactus<sup>3</sup> was connected with these movements at Megara<sup>4</sup>; and equally uncertain, though perhaps

<sup>1</sup> There was a Council of Three Hundred, which possessed judicial authority. Demosth. de F. L. § 327.

<sup>2</sup> De F. L. § 337.

<sup>3</sup> Dem. F. L. § 374.

<sup>4</sup> This is Winiewski's conjecture, p. 147. But the language of Demosthenes, *περὶ Δρύμου καὶ τῆς πρὸς Πανάκτου χάρας*, would rather incline one to suppose that the expedition was sent to resist some aggressions of the Thebans on the debatable frontier. Both Winiewski (p. 146.) and Voemel (in Orat. de Halonneso, p. 46.),—who also believes that these forces were sent to oppose the passage of Philip's troops to Megara—conceive that this Drymus lay on the confines, not of Attica and Bæotia, like Panactus, but of Phocis and Doris. Their only reason for this opinion seems to be the accent. *Δρύμος* is mentioned by Herod. viii. 33. as a Phocian town on the Cephissus. Whether a town of that name existed there in

more probable, that it was on this occasion Phocion was sent, at the request of their Megarian partizans, to guard the city. Though he could not secure it from treachery within, he took the most effectual precautions against a surprise from without: he fortified Nicæa, and again annexed it to the city by two long walls. However this may be, the attempt of Ptæodorus failed, and Philip's hopes in this quarter were for the time frustrated.

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The object for which he desired to obtain possession of Megara was undoubtedly not merely to gain a position which would enable him to annoy Athens, but also, and perhaps principally, to open a communication with Peloponnesus. Having been defeated on this side, he turned his attention to another, where he saw a prospect of accomplishing this and several other important purposes at once. Alexander, the brother of his queen Olympias, was, it seems, already at this time (B.C. 343), in possession of a part of Epirus, where his uncle Arymbas, or Arybas, reigned over the rest of the dominions which they inherited from their common ancestor, Alcetas, the father of this Arybas, and of Neoptolemus, the father of Alexander and Olympias.<sup>1</sup> But the district of Cassopia, which contained three half Greek cities, said to have been founded at a very early period by Elean colonists, Bucheta, Pandosia, and Elatea<sup>2</sup>, did not acknowledge

His invasion of Epirus.

the time of Demosthenes, is doubtful. The place seems then to have been called *Δρυμάλαια*. Paus. x. 3. 2. But Harpocration has *Δρυμνός, πόλις μεταξύ Βοιωτίας καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Δημοσθένους ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς παραπροσέχους*. Even independently of this authority, it seems hard to believe that Demosthenes would have coupled the name of a place in Phocis with that of one on the Attic frontier, as Win. and Voern. suppose him to have done.

<sup>1</sup> See a note of Bongarsius on Justin, xvii. 3. 9. Justin (viii. 6.) relates that Philip expelled Arybas from his kingdom, and bestowed it on Alexander. This is probably a mistake, and there appears to be no reason for questioning — with Winiewski, p. 156. — the accuracy of Diodorus, who states (xvi. 72.) that Arymbas, king of the Molossians, died Ol. cix. 3. (a year after Philip's expedition to Epirus), and was succeeded by Alexander.

<sup>2</sup> So this name was written by Theopompus (Harpocrat. 'Ελάνεια). It is at least convenient thus to distinguish it from the Phocian Elatea. Strabo (vii. p. 324.) adds *Βαρία* to the number of the Cassopian towns.

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Alexander's authority, and he had perhaps sought Philip's aid to reduce it to subjection. This at least was, it appears, the main avowed object of an expedition which Philip made from Thessaly into Epirus. He ravaged the Cassopian territory, took the three towns, and gave them up to his kinsman.<sup>1</sup> But his own views stretched much farther. He found a pretext — whether in succours given by the Ambracians to the Cassopian towns, or in some other provocation, we know not — for marching against Ambracia. The possession of this place would have opened the way for him into Acarnania and Ætolia, for he had entered into negotiation with the Ætolians, and had won them over by an engagement ratified with an oath to aid them in wresting Naupactus from the Achæans<sup>2</sup>; he might thus have been enabled to cross over to the western side of Peloponnesus at his pleasure: and there the troubled state of Elis at this time afforded an excellent pretext for his intervention.

Parties at  
Elis.

The oligarchical party in Elis had, as we have seen<sup>3</sup>, maintained its ascendancy, notwithstanding the efforts of its adversaries, in the struggle which took place not long before the battle of Mantinea. We do not hear of any subsequent revolution which restored the exiled faction before the time at which we have now arrived; but it seems that here, as elsewhere, the contest of parties had changed its character since the power of Macedonia had risen to its new height. At Elis also Philip had gained partizans, several of whom perhaps cherished hopes similar to those which appear to have animated his adherents at Megara. The

<sup>1</sup> Orat. de Halonneso, § 33.

<sup>2</sup> Philippi. iii. § 44. Οὐκ Ἀχαιῶν Ναύπакτον δώμοκεν Αἰτωλοῖς παραδόναι; so Strabo, xi. p. 427. ἔστι δὲ νῦν Αἰτωλῶν, Φιλίππου προσκρίναντος — probably after the battle of Chæronæa. The Achæans had — we know not exactly how long before — acquired it from the Locrians, to whom it had been restored after the battle of Ægospotamos. Paus. x. 38. 10. The Achæan occupation was only for a short time interrupted by Epaminondas. Diodor. xv. See Boeckh, C. J. i. p. 857.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. V. p. 185.

struggle henceforth was not so much between oligarchy and democracy, as between Philip's party and those who were jealous both of it and of him. Hence it is probable many citizens had been forced into exile, who did not belong to the democratical party, while the government at home fell into fewer hands. After the death of Phalæcus in Crete, a body of his mercenaries were brought over to Peloponnesus by the Elean refugees, to make war on the oligarchical rulers. And they would perhaps have been the stronger side, if the democratical Arcadians, who only saw in them Philip's enemies, had not thrown their weight into the opposite scale. A battle was fought, in which the exiles were defeated, with great slaughter of the mercenaries, 4000 of whom were taken and distributed between the allies. The Arcadians sold their prisoners: the Eleans, more irritated as they had more to fear, massacred theirs in cold blood, under the pretence of punishing them for sacrilege.<sup>1</sup>

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Notwithstanding this event, which established Philip's predominance at Elis, affairs still continued so unsettled there—perhaps through the growing ambition of his principal partizans—as to afford an additional occasion for his presence in Peloponnesus. From this motive chiefly he coveted the acquisition of Ambracia, and of Leucas, which he likewise hoped to gain either by arms or intrigues. It is probable that his expectations were, in a great measure, grounded on the support of a faction devoted to his interests in both places. They were however disappointed, through the energy which now displayed itself in the counsels of Athens. An embassy, in which a principal part was borne by Demosthenes, who mentions Polyeuctus, Hegesippus, Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, as his colleagues, was sent both into Peloponnesus

Athenian  
negotiations.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 63.

and Acarnania.<sup>1</sup> They were aided in their negotiations by Callias the Eubœan, whose motives will be explained hereafter. Their aim was to form a league to repel Philip's encroachments; and they brought back large promises of contributions, both in men and money, from some of the Peloponnesian states, from Megara, and Acarnania. As to Megara, this was a natural consequence of the turn which events had lately taken there. In Peloponnesus these assurances of support came chiefly, if not exclusively, from the Achæans, who were doubtless alarmed by the prospect of losing Naupactus. In Acarnania, jealousy of the Ætolians, and fear of Philip, probably combined to dispose the whole people to enter heartily into the proposed alliance; and to encourage them, a body of troops was sent from Athens, chiefly perhaps for the defence of Ambracia, or to secure it against domestic treachery.<sup>2</sup> We do not know whether it was for the sake of a diversion that another Athenian force, under the command of Aristodemus, marched as it seems, about the same time, into Thessaly, and made an attempt on Magnesia, which was strongly censured by the orators of the Macedonian party, as an infraction of the treaty with Philip. Aristodemus however, though apparently unsuccessful in this enterprise, was honoured on his return with a crown, on the motion of Demosthenes.<sup>3</sup> He might have deserved it, if his

<sup>1</sup> Philipp. iii. § 85., where Winiewski (p. 172.) would substitute 'Ακαρνανίας for κατ'ηγούμενοι. But the present text seems sufficiently defended by a passage in Demosthenes de Cherson. § 37. τί οὖν προσέειπε καὶ κατ'ηγούμενοι; though the embassy to Acarnania is attested by Æsch. in Ctes. § 97.

<sup>2</sup> This fact, which is mentioned incidentally by Demosth. in Olympiodor. § 27. was, I believe, first noticed in connection with Philip's expedition by Winiewski, p. 157. The date (of the archon Pythodotus) is fortunately known from the context.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines in Ctes. § 83. This is Winiewski's opinion (p. 157.) which certainly derives some confirmation from the fact of the expedition to Acarnania. Brueckner however (p. 277.) supposes this expedition of Aristodemus to have been the same which Philip mentions in his Letter (§ 5.) as directed against the towns on the coast of the gulf of Pagasæ, but which was conducted by Callias. But beside the difference in the name of the general, it seems clear that the expedition of Callias was a naval one, which does not so well suit the term ἐπιστρατεύσας in

expedition served to hasten Philip's retreat from Epirus.<sup>1</sup> It is certain that he was obliged to drop his designs against Ambracia and Leucas.

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Disputes  
with Philip.

Such proceedings as these, however they might admit of a diplomatic vindication, manifestly tended to put an end to all friendly relations between the two powers: and the negotiations which were carried on between them during the same period, had no other effect than to aggravate their mutual resentment and distrust. We are unable to determine whether the answer given by the Athenians to Philip's remonstrances induced him to send Python on a fresh embassy, to propose an adjustment of their differences, or whether this minister had been instructed on the former occasion, while he complained of the ill-treatment his prince had suffered from the licence which the Athenians gave to their orators, to declare his willingness to accede to any reasonable proposal for a revision of the last treaty. Python certainly executed such a commission, and the offer which he made in Philip's name was received with great applause in the Athenian assembly.<sup>2</sup> The result was that an embassy, of which Hegesippus, an active orator of the anti-Macedonian party<sup>3</sup>, appears to have been the leading mem-

*Æschines.* His expression, *τὴν συμφορὰν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον παρεσκεύασεν*, does not prove, as Brueckner seems to infer, that this expedition took place shortly before the war broke out. Yet it must be owned that the coincidences between this and that of Callias are striking enough to render the question very doubtful.

<sup>1</sup> But it may have been sent earlier, while Philip was engaged in reducing Phœæ, to support the tyrants; only we hear no complaint from Philip on this subject.

<sup>2</sup> Orat. de Halon. § 23.

<sup>3</sup> He was also nicknamed *Crobylus*, in allusion, it is said, to the fashion in which the Athenians anciently tied up their hair—*κροβύλος*, Thuc. i. 6. What might be the force of the allusion in this case we do not know. It seems as if it must have been aimed at some kind of affectation, either in his habits or his language. But of the latter there is no trace in his extant oration. A different explanation of the nickname, more conformable to the usual tone of the Attic orators, is suggested by the character of the person to whom it is applied in Plutarch. Alex. 22. Compare Dio Chrys. i. p. 76. *κομῶν ἐπισθεν ἀφελὲς, ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἀπαλοῦς*, with Reiske's note: the singular observation of Heraclides Ponticus in Athenæus, xiii. p. 512. c., and the verses of Arius, p. 525. r.; Xenophanes, p. 526. u.; Æschylus and Agathon, p. 528. c and d. Hegesander, who is repeatedly stigmatised in the *Timarchea* on the like ground (*Λευδῶμαντος γυνή*,

ber, was sent into Macedonia, to communicate the demands, or at least the wishes, of the people to the king. They fell under various heads. One related to the old dispute about Amphipolis. The Athenians were advised to claim it on what seems a grossly sophistical construction of the article in the treaty, which provided that each party was to keep all that it *had* at the time. The orators contended that this did not entitle Philip to *have* what was not his own, which Amphipolis had never been, since it had always belonged of right to the Athenians; an argument, which would sound much more plausible in the Pnyx, than in the audience chamber at Pella: and they proposed, instead of the clause *that each have what he had*, to substitute the more correct phrase, *that each have his own*. Another object was to recover the property which their citizens had lost when they were expelled from Potidæa. There were other grounds of complaint of more recent origin. One concerned the places in Thrace conquered by Philip after the ratification of the treaty at Athens: another the Thracian Chersonesus. Not long after the end of the war, a colony of cleruchial settlers had been sent thither under Diopithes<sup>1</sup>, who remained there invested with a military command for their protection. Disputes soon arose between them and the people of Cardia, about the limits of their territory. The Athenians indeed maintained that Cardia itself belonged to them, as included in the Chersonesus; while Philip acknowledged both the independence of the Cardians, who were his allies, and the validity of their claims. Another topic of controversy arose out of the little island of Halonnesus, situate in the north of the Ægean, between Scopelus and Peparethus. It was one of the frag-

§ 111.), was — as the orator takes care frequently to remind the court — the brother of Crobylus.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes de Cherson. § 6. Philipp. iii. § 20. Vol. V. p. 303. n. 1.

ments which the Athenians preserved of their maritime empire, until a pirate chief, named Sostratus, took possession of it, and made it the head-quarters of his piratical excursions. Philip, whose coasts and shipping he infested, expelled the pirates from their nest, and kept it in his own hands. The Athenians conceived that these transactions could not affect their right to the island, and that as soon as the hostile force was removed, it ought to have been restored to its legitimate sovereign. Finally, the ambassadors were to require that an article should be inserted in the treaty, recognising the liberty and independence even of those Greek states which were not included in it by name, and pledging all who were parties to it to defend them if they should be attacked. The main object of this demand was clearly to restrain Philip's enterprises, more particularly against the Greek cities in the north and the west. But it is probable that the application of the principle to the Bœotian towns was not overlooked.

Philip, when he professes his readiness to consent to an amendment of the treaty, could hardly have expected to receive such proposals as these: and it seems that he did not attempt to conceal his displeasure, but vented it in a manner remarkably opposite to his usual mildness and moderation—for he is said to have banished the Athenian poet Xenocides from his dominions, because he entertained the envoys in his house<sup>1</sup>; and this is mentioned by Demosthenes as only one notorious instance, among many, of the rough treatment they met with at Pella. Philip however sent an embassy to Athens in return, charged with a letter, in which he discussed the Athenian demands, and stated the concessions which he was willing to make. This embassy gave

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes de F. L. § 380.



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occasion to a speech, which has come down among the works of Demosthenes, as the one *on Halonnesus*, but is now, on very satisfactory evidence, generally attributed to Hegesippus, to which we owe all our knowledge of the contents of Philip's letter. Philip, it appears, first addressed himself to the question of Halonnesus, which thus suggested the title of the oration. He declared himself willing to make a present of the island to the Athenians, but contended that they had lost their right to it, when they suffered it to be taken from them by Sostratus; that he had made it his own by a fair conquest from an open enemy; and was ready, if his claim was disputed, to submit it to arbitration. The orator endeavours to expose the fallacy of this argument by a supposed case. If it had been a place on the coast of Attica that had been seized by the pirates, and Philip had dislodged them, would he have been entitled to retain a part of the Attic territory? It was a mere pretence; and the king's real object was to show to all Greece, that the Athenians were fain to owe even their maritime possessions to Macedonian generosity. It would be little less dishonourable and unwise to consent to the arbitration which had been insidiously proposed with a similar view—even if there were no danger that the arbitrators might be corrupted by Philip's bribes.

There can be no doubt that this language expressed a strong popular feeling of jealousy, on a point which touched Athenian pride most sensibly: and that the distinction, which became so celebrated as to furnish the comic poets with a fertile topic for playful allusions<sup>1</sup>, that the island should be not *given*, but *restored*, not *accepted*, but *recovered*<sup>2</sup>, was not a cavil suggested

<sup>1</sup> Athenæus, vi. p. 223.

<sup>2</sup> Μὴ λαμβάνειν ἀλλ' ἀπολαμβάνειν: μὴ λαμβάνειν, εἰ δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀποδίδωσιν.

by the orators. And so, when the speaker rejects, with equal scorn, and on like grounds, another proposal contained in the letter, for a combination between Philip and the commonwealth to guard the seas against pirates, he no doubt had all the natural prejudices of his audience on his side.

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It would seem that Philip made no mention of Potidæa. But it was understood to be with reference to this subject that his ambassadors were instructed to propose certain terms as the basis of a commercial treaty<sup>1</sup>, under which the disputed question might be judicially decided: and the orator contends that, as these terms were to be sanctioned by Philip, they would certainly be so framed as, by implication, to exclude the claims of the Athenian citizens on the property they had lost at Potidæa, which after the fall of Olynthus had passed into the conqueror's hands.

With regard to Amphipolis it may be collected, that Philip denied he had ever authorised his ambassadors to promise for him that he would consent to alter the treaty in so material a point. He insisted on the right he had acquired by the plain language of the article in question, as it then stood. From the orator's reply, one might conjecture that the Macedonian envoys had either spoken indiscreetly, or had overlooked the slight change proposed by the Athenians, or had not perceived its scope. The orator endeavours to prove that the original words could not have the effect of making any thing to be Philip's which had not been so before; and refers, among other arguments, to Philip's previous declarations and promises in confirmation of the Athenian title to Amphipolis.

The letter gave a full assent to the proposition concerning the liberty and independence of the

<sup>1</sup> Σύμβολα.

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Greeks; but the orator, to prove the insincerity of these professions, compares them with Philip's recent treatment of Pheræ and the Cassopian cities. Philip repeated the complaint which he had before made through his ambassadors, about the charge of bad faith with which he was so often assailed by the Athenian orators; and again professed that nothing but the people's want of confidence in his friendly disposition prevented him from proving it by signal benefits. The orator reminds his hearers of the promises contained in a letter preserved in the state archives, which Philip had written before the peace, and of the manner in which he had performed them.

The affair of the Thracian towns, which, as the Athenians maintained, he had taken after the peace was ratified, Philip offered to refer to arbitration. But the orator will not listen to the proposal of debating a question which he considers as clearly settled by the simple comparison of dates. So too he rejects as an insult Philip's recommendation, that they should bring their differences with the Cardians before an impartial tribunal, and his offer to compel Cardia to submit to this mode of decision: as if, he observes, Athens was not able to force the Cardians to do her justice. Yet he admits that there was a decree of the people unrepealed, which recognised the title of the Cardians to their territory, and that he himself had impeached its author Callippus on this ground without success.

Parties at  
Athens.

The nature of the motion which was introduced by such a speech may be easily imagined; and this most probably contained the official reply that Philip received. It did not so much widen, as lay open the breach; for all the sentiments which the orator delivered had long been familiar to the people, and were well known to Philip. Yet the frequent discussion of such topics tended to inflame the public irritation;

and this was the effect of the struggles that had been carried on ever since the peace between the two parties, which were divided chiefly on the policy to be observed toward Philip. Yet it was not until two years had elapsed from the end of the war that they began to try their strength on the question, who was to be held accountable for its disastrous termination. The public feeling of disappointment and mortification was no doubt eager to find an object to vent itself on, and Demosthenes and Æschines were no less anxious to shift the whole blame on one another. Yet it is easy to conceive that each might hesitate long before he struck the first blow. It has been seen, however, that a great part of the second Philippic was distinctly pointed against Æschines and Philocrates, and that the main object of the whole was probably to rouse the public indignation against them. Philocrates, it appears, made no secret of his corruption,—as to which Demosthenes and Æschines are agreed<sup>1</sup>,—and not only accepted large sums of money and grants of land in Phocis from Philip, but displayed his new resources with scandalous ostentation, in the increased splendour of his style of living.<sup>2</sup> He was therefore selected as the first object of a legal prosecution, which was undertaken by Hyperides, an orator of great ability, who was long closely attached by political sentiments, and perhaps by private friendship, to Demosthenes. The Athenian law afforded many common ways of bringing such an offender to justice; but Hyperides adopted a species of indictment<sup>3</sup>, which was in the first instance submitted to the cognizance either of the council of Five Hundred, or—which was

<sup>1</sup> Æsch. in Ctes. p. 65. § 81. Dem. F. L. § 124. φιλοκράτης μὴ μόνον ὁμολόγει, παρ' ὧν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ πολλάκις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδείκνυν ὧν; and § 129. εἰ χρήματα ὁμολόγει λαβεῖν ἐκ τῆς πρεσβείας ὥσπερ ὁμολογεῖ. Afterwards, indeed, he seems to attribute the like confession to Æschines also, § 319. ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁμολογοῦσιν, § 335. τοὺς δὲ ἔχοντας, ὁμολογοῦντας.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. F. L. § 124. 158. 254.

<sup>3</sup> Εἰσπγγελία.

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the course he took—of the people in assembly, and always suggested the notion of an offence either wholly unheard of, and not yet provided for, or peculiarly aggravated in its circumstances. The assembly entertained the indictment, and, according to the ordinary practice, the next step was, unless it chose to sit in judgment on the case itself, to appoint another tribunal, and to fix the day of trial.<sup>1</sup> The accused in the meanwhile was either committed to prison, or compelled to find sureties for his appearance. Which of these courses was taken with Philocrates we are not informed; probably the latter; for it seems that notwithstanding his uncommon assurance, and the strength of the party from which he might have looked for protection, he avoided the trial by a voluntary exile.<sup>2</sup>

Æschines  
and De-  
mosthenes.

When this indictment was brought before the assembly, Demosthenes openly declared, that there was only one thing in it with which he was dissatisfied; and this was that it had been brought against Philocrates, who was certainly not the sole criminal among the ambassadors: and he called upon those of his colleagues who disapproved of his conduct to come forward and declare themselves. No one thought fit to answer to this summons. The expressions which the orator reports himself to have used on that occasion strongly intimate, that he had then already conceived the design of bringing a formal charge against some of them; but they no less plainly imply that he had not yet done this against any of them.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps he was only waiting for the opportunity which would be afforded, whenever Æschines should appear before the

<sup>1</sup> See as to the whole course of proceeding, Meier u. Schömann, *Attische Process*, p. 268.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines adv. Ctes. § 79. Φιλοκράτης . . . . . φυγὰς ἀπ' εἰσαγγελίας γεγενηται.

<sup>3</sup> De F. L. § 127. Ἦν οὖν μήτ' ἀφ' ᾧ μήτ' αἰτιάσθαι μηδένα, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶγμ' αὐτὸ τοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ μετεσχηκότας ἀφῆ.

proper court<sup>1</sup> to render an account of his conduct in the embassy. The time of doing this was left by the law — strange as it seems — to his own discretion.<sup>2</sup> Indeed it appears to have been a disputable point of law whether the ambassadors, who had been sent twice to Philip on the affair of the peace, were liable to give a separate account of each embassy. Demosthenes at least asserts, that when he himself tendered his account of his own conduct in the second embassy, Æschines contended that it ought not to be received, because he had already obtained a legal discharge on the first.<sup>3</sup> When however this objection was overruled, he probably thought it necessary to encounter the like trial. The proceeding was, in effect, a public challenge to any citizen who wished to impeach the conduct of the responsible magistrate. On this occasion a bill of indictment was brought in against Æschines; and among those whose names were subscribed to it were Demosthenes and Timarchus.

It was fortunate for Æschines to be assailed by such an enemy as this last. For Timarchus in his youth had laid himself open to the strongest suspicions of a loathsome profligacy, which, even according to Athenian law, disqualified him for the exercise of all political rights, particularly that of speaking in the assembly. He is charged by his adversary with having wasted an ample patrimony in riotous living.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless he had not only taken a very active part in public affairs, but, according to Æschines, had

<sup>1</sup> The *λογιστάς*. Meier u. Schömann, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. F. L. § 118. *νῦν δὲ διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰσθέραιαν καὶ πράγματα εὐθύναις διδῶσι, καὶ ταύτας ἀπηνίκα βούλεται*. Brueckner (p. 227.) observes that Æschines could not be impeached, like Philocrates, by *eisangelia*, because it was necessary to wait until he gave account of his second embassy. But it does not appear why this was more necessary in his case than in that of Philocrates: and when Demosthenes says, that this would have been the proper course of proceeding against Æschines (u. s. *εἰ γὰρ τι τῶν προσηκόντων ἐγίγνετο, ἐν εἰσαγγελίᾳ πάλαι ἦν*) he seems clearly to imply that there was no legal obstacle.

<sup>3</sup> *γραφῇ*. See Meier u. Schömann, p. 221.

<sup>4</sup> Timarch. p. 7. § 42.

filled every office in the state<sup>1</sup>: and we should require some more credible testimony to satisfy us that he had, as his accuser asserts, obtained them all through bribery. He had been employed in many embassies<sup>2</sup>, and had been twice a member of the Council of Five Hundred. In the course of the second of these years of office, which was that in which the war with Philip ended<sup>3</sup>, he had distinguished himself by a motion, which he appears to have carried, for a decree forbidding the exportation of arms and marine stores for Philip's service under pain of death: and Demosthenes even represents this display of his anti-Macedonian spirit as the real offence, which had first roused the animosity of Æschines against him.<sup>4</sup> But there can be little doubt that the stronger, as well as the more immediate provocation was that which he offered by joining Demosthenes in the impeachment of their common adversary, and that it was partly in revenge for this attack, and partly in self-defence, that Æschines brought him to trial.<sup>5</sup> Demosthenes was

<sup>1</sup> Timarch. p. 15. § 106. οὐκ ἔστιν ἥτινα πάποτε' οὐκ ἤρξεν ἀρχὴν, οὐδὲ μίαν λαχὼν οὐδὲ χειροτονηθεὶς, ἀλλὰ πᾶσας παρὰ τοὺς νόμους πριαμένους. Auctor Argum. ad Timarch. διδωσκός ὢν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, καὶ πλέον ἢ ἑκατὸν ψηφίσματα γεγραφώς.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 17. § 120. Τίμαρχος ὁ τοῦ δήμου σύμβουλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολυῶν πρεσβείας πρεσβεύειν.

<sup>3</sup> The first time was in the archonship of Nicophemus, Ol. civ. 4. (Timarch. p. 15. § 109.) Relske, forgetting the example of Demosthenes, rashly lays down that no one could be a member of the Five Hundred more than once: *Consulat Athenis neminem, nisi semel per vitam, boulevrην fuisse*; and so with amazing thoughtlessness he comes to the conclusion: *Habita igitur est hæc oratio anno primo Olympiadis cv.* — the year of Philip's accession. The year in which Timarchus was councillor a second time seems to be marked by the allusion in Æschines (Timarch. p. 11. § 60.) καὶ ἡ βουλὴ δτε ἐβούλευσε πέρυσιν, though the text here is too doubtful to admit of any certain conclusion. But independently of this, the date assigned in the text seems clearly deducible from the manner in which Demosthenes speaks of the decree forbidding the exportation of arms for Philip.

<sup>4</sup> F. L. p. 433. § 327, 328. It seems clear that this is only a rhetorical contrast, meant to bring out the patriotism of Timarchus and the Philippism of Æschines in stronger relief by comparison with one another, and that it does not at all affect the conclusion to be drawn from the numerous passages in which Demosthenes attributes the ruin of Timarchus to the accusation which he had brought against Æschines.

<sup>5</sup> Böhnecke (p. 294.) believes that he has finally settled the long debated question as to the date of the oration against Timarchus, and that he has proved it to have been delivered, Ol. cviii. 3. His proof is founded on two notes of time

one of those who appeared in his behalf. The speech delivered by Æschines on this occasion is still extant,

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furnished by the speech itself. The first is contained in the allusion which Æschines is supposed to make to the year in which Timarchus was a second time councillor. This, as we have seen, cannot well have been earlier than OL. CVIII. 2. But Æschines seems to say that it was the year before the trial (p. 12. § 80. *ὅτε ἐβούλευσε πέρυσι*), which therefore must have taken place in OL. CVIII. 3. The second note of time is supplied by the speaker's reference to the *διαψήσεις*, which took place, as we have seen, in the archonship of Archias, OL. CVIII. 3., and which is described as if it was just over (p. 11. § 77.) *γεγόνاسι διαψήσεις ἐν τοῖς δήμοις*. Böhnecke thinks that his conclusion is confirmed by the manner in which Æschines, in the speech on the embassy, reminds his hearers of the trial of Timarchus, as if some considerable interval had elapsed between the two speeches (p. 52. § 191., *ἀναμνησθέντες ὅτι τὴν τῆς σωφροσύνης παράκλησιν διὰ τῆς περὶ Τιμαρχὸν κρίσεως ἀειμνήστως παραέκλεκα*). This last argument is of too subjective as well as indefinite a character to admit or repay discussion. As to the two others it cannot be denied, that they have considerable weight, sufficient, if they stood alone and unopposed, to render Böhnecke's opinions highly probable. But he seems to me to have overrated their force, and he has taken no notice of other indications, which point, I think, more clearly to a different conclusion. No reliance can be safely placed on the first for two reasons: first, because of the doubt which has been noticed in a former note about the reading and the meaning of the words, *καὶ ἡ βουλὴ ὅτε ἐβούλευσε πέρυσι*, which at present stand quite insulated from the context; and next, because *πέρυσι* is not more definite in the language of the orators than *χθές*, or *πρόην*, or *ἑναγχος*. The second of Böhnecke's arguments is the most specious, and he has not done it full justice. For Æschines, in speaking of the recent *διαψήσεις*, not only uses the perfect *γεγόνاسι*, but he had said immediately before: *θεωρήσατε τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἐκ πολιτικῶν τινῶν παραδειγμάτων, καὶ μάλιστα ἐκ τούτων ἃ νυνὶ μετὰ χείρας ἔχετε*. But as to the tense, that cannot determine the time more precisely than the perfect *παραέκλεκα*, which Böhnecke supposes to refer to an event three years earlier than the speech in which it occurs. And as to the expression, *ἃ νυνὶ μετὰ χείρας ἔχετε*, it is clear that the business which the people are said to have in hand, is that of the judicial proceedings arising out of the *διαψήσεις*, which might be very numerous, and occupy a period of more than a year. It remains then to consider, whether there are not other less ambiguous indications which point to a different date for the Timarchea. And such I find in the allusions which Demosthenes so frequently makes to the prosecution of Timarchus, as having been set on foot in retaliation for the charge in which he had joined against Æschines. Now Böhnecke himself (p. 295.) admits, that when Demosthenes delivered the second Philippic, no indictment had been preferred against any of the ambassadors. It was subsequently, in the year OL. CIX. 1., after the *εἰσαγγελία* brought against Philocrates, that the *γραφὴ* was put in against Æschines on his appearing before the *λογισταὶ* to render his account. And the only question is, whether it is to this judicial proceeding that Demosthenes refers in the passages of the speech on the embassy, where he speaks of Timarchus as the accuser of Æschines. Böhnecke seems to think, though he does not notice any of them, that they do not require such an interpretation. His own account of the matter is, that Timarchus and Demosthenes intended to impeach Æschines, but that he had got the start of them by previously indicting Timarchus. There are no doubt some among the passages in question consistent with such an interpretation. But I do not see how it can be applied to that which occurs at the beginning of the speech (§ 2.), *πρὶν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς ὄμᾶς καὶ λόγον δοῦναι τῶν πεπραγμένων τὸν μὲν ἀνήρκε τῶν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐθύνas ἐλθόντων, τοῖς δ' ἀπειλεῖ περιών*: where, in the first place, it seems clear that the action described by *ἀνήρκε* is represented as not far apart from the present *ἀπειλεῖ*: and next, it is hard to understand how one who had merely intended to accuse Æschines could be classed in the number *τῶν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐθύνas ἐλθόντων*. The phrase *ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐθύνas* may refer either to the original proceeding in the court of the



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but not that of Demosthenes, or of any of the defendant's advocates. If our judgment was to be formed simply on the prosecutor's case, our verdict must be — not proven. Æschines is unable to produce one tittle of direct evidence in support of any of his charges<sup>1</sup>, and endeavours to show that, from the nature of the case, it was unreasonable to require any such proof. He appeals to general notoriety as a sufficient and decisive witness to the infamous character of Timarchus. It is not quite clear how such an appeal was consistent even with Athenian law, which forbade the receiving hearsay evidence.<sup>2</sup> But the result seems to show that the charge was something more than a common-place calumny, to which

λογιστάι, or to the subsequent trial of the indictment; and it is in the latter sense that Æschines speaks of his εὐθύνας (Tim. p. 24. § 168.), ὡς γὰρ τὰς ἐμὰς εὐθύνας βλέπτων, ἃς ὑπὲρ τῆς προσθελας μέλλω δίδόναι. But I am not aware of any third sense that can be given to the word in the passage of Demosthenes, and of course both are alike inconsistent with Böhmcke's opinion. Another passage which, though not at first sight equally distinct, no less clearly requires a like interpretation, is F. L. p. 423. § 291. ἠτίμωσεν ὑπακούσαντά τινα αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῦν, where, as Markland and Schæfer (comparing p. 434. § 332. ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης ψήφου οὐδ' ὑπακούσαι καλούμενος ἤθελες) agree, ὑπακούσαντα must mean at the request of his friends: *Orator dicit Timarchum non sponte sua sed rogatum ab amicis invitatumque a bonis civibus ad accusandum Æschinem proditiisse*. Schæf. But this implies that he had not merely intended or threatened, but had become a party to a formal accusation of Æschines. Either these passages were anciently so understood, or there was an independent authority for the fact. Hence we read, in the second argument to Dem. F. L. (p. 338.), τῶν δὲ τῆς δευτέρας προσθελας μόνος ὁ Δημοσθένης δέδωκεν εὐθύνας· μέλλοντος δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχίνου παρέχειν, ἐπέστη Τιμαρχος καὶ Δημοσθένους κατηγοροῦντες τούτου· καὶ ᾗτησεν Αἰσχίνης ἀνδρίσιν γενέσθαι, καὶ γενομένης ἀνακρίσεως εἰδείξει Τιμαρχον ἡταιρηκότα; and still more explicitly in the first of the Timarchea: ἐπακηκούσης δὲ τῆς προσθελας γράφουσι παραπροσθελας Αἰσχίνην Δημοσθένους καὶ Τιμαρχος . . . ἀποτεθείσης δὲ τῆς γραφῆς, πρὶν τὸν ἀγῶνα εἰσελθεῖν ἐγράψατο Αἰσχίνης τὸν Τιμαρχον. Finally, I consider it as no slight confirmation of this view, that the language of commendation and confidence in which Æschines speaks of Philip in the speech against Timarchus, is such as one can hardly conceive him to have used in Ol. ciii. 3., but which would be intelligible enough after the embassy which gave occasion to the second Philippic (p. 24. § 159.) φίλιππον νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ· ἐὰν δ' ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔργοις γένηται ὅλος νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπαγγέλμασιν, ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βέβαιον τὸν καθ' αὐτοῦ ποιήσεται ἐπαινον. The only promises to which the orator could have been supposed to allude in this passage at an earlier period, must have been those which had been held out in Philip's name, just before the close of the war, and by which the people believed itself to have been cruelly deceived and injured.

<sup>1</sup> To this Demosthenes alludes (F. L. p. 378. § 131.), ἀγῶνας καινοὺς ὅσους δράματα, καὶ τοῦτους ἀμαρτύρους . . . αἰρεῖς δικάων.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. c. Eubul. p. 1300. § 6., οὐδὲ μαρτυρεῖν ἀκοὴν ἑώσω οἱ νόμοι, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πάνυ φαύλοις ἐγκλήμασιν. The reason assigned is better in substance than in form: ὅπου γὰρ εἰδέναι τινὰς ἤδη φήσαντες ψευδεῖς ἐφάρτησαν, πῶς ἄγε μὴδ' αὐτὸς οἶδεν ὁ λέγων, προσήκει πιστεύεσθαι.

all public men were liable at Athens; for Timarchus was found guilty, and disfranchised; and the terms in which Demosthenes alludes to the trial, while it was still recent, plainly indicate that he himself had no very firm belief in the innocence of his political associate.<sup>1</sup> Æschines, when he was put on his own defence, spoke of his prosecution of Timarchus as of an ever-memorable admonition, which he had addressed to the Athenian youth.<sup>2</sup> And it is probable that it not only silenced a hostile voice, but raised him in public estimation; though those who were most fully convinced of the defendant's guilt could not be blind to the personal and party motives of his accuser; and Æschines had no answer to give, when Demosthenes asked why, if he had been impelled, as he professed, by a disinterested concern for private morality, or public decency, he had suffered Timarchus to pass through such a long and conspicuous career before calling him to account for his early misconduct.<sup>3</sup> Æschines anticipates that Demosthenes will endeavour to divert the attention of the court from the real merits of the case to the peace made by himself and Philocrates<sup>4</sup>, and to the fate of the Phocians<sup>5</sup>, and that Philip's name will be frequently introduced to raise a prejudice against him.<sup>6</sup> Yet he does not shrink from avowing, that he commends Philip for his professions of goodwill to the commonwealth. *If his actions correspond to his promises, he will afford solid and ample ground for praise.*<sup>7</sup>

But whatever credit Æschines may have gained from the condemnation of Timarchus, seems to have been

<sup>1</sup> F. L. p. 413. § 258. εἰ τις ὦν ἐφ' ἡλικίας ἐτέρου βελτίων τὴν ἰδέαν μὴ προιδόμενος τὴν ἐξ ἀκείνης τῆς εὐφροσύνης ἐποψίαν, ἱταμώτερον τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐχρήσατο βίῳ.

<sup>2</sup> Timarch. p. 52. § 191. τὴν τῆς σωφροσύνης παρακλήσιν διὰ τῆς περὶ Τιμαρχὸν κρίσεως ἀεμνήστως αὐτοὺς παρακέκληκα. The concluding exhortation of the speech is remarkable as illustrating the highest tone of morality for which the orator could expect the sympathy of his hearers: τοὺς δὲ τῶν νέων ὅσοι βῆδ' ἄλλοσκοῦται θηρευτὰς ὄντας, εἰς τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους τρέπεσθαι κελεύετε, ἵνα μὴτ' ἀκείνοι τῆς προαφίσεως ἀποστερῶνται, μήθ' ὁμῶς ἡμῶς ἡλάττησθε.

<sup>3</sup> F. L. § 328.

<sup>4</sup> § 174.

<sup>5</sup> § 175.

<sup>6</sup> § 166.

<sup>7</sup> § 169.

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nearly lost through a transaction which took place shortly after, and which exposed him to fresh suspicion and obloquy. He had been elected to plead the cause of the commonwealth before the Amphictyonic Council, in a contest with the Delians concerning the superintendence of their temple.<sup>1</sup> His appointment, however — probably because the mission partook so much of a religious character — was made subject to the approbation of the Areopagus. Before this had been obtained, information reached Demosthenes that a man named Antiphon was lurking in Piræus, with the intention of firing the arsenal. Antiphon had been struck off the roll of his demus<sup>2</sup> in a general scrutiny<sup>3</sup>, which was made in the year 345 or 344, the one next following that in which the war ended.<sup>4</sup> He submitted to his disfranchisement, without venturing to appeal — as he might have done at the risk of being sold as a slave, if he failed to make good his claim<sup>5</sup> — to the decision of a court of justice, and went to Macedonia. There, as Demosthenes asserted many years after, he tendered his services to Philip for burning the arsenal, and returned to Athens to execute his engagement. Demosthenes, having discovered his hiding-place, did not hesitate, it appears, to enter the house in which he was concealed for the purpose of arresting him<sup>6</sup>, and brought him before

<sup>1</sup> De Cor. p. 271. § 170. χειροτονησάντων αὐτὸν ὁμῶν σύνδικον ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ ἐν Δήλῳ. — See Dissen. Explicat. p. 305.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. de Cor. § 168. τὸν ἀποψηφισθέντα Ἀντιφῶντα.

<sup>3</sup> διαψήφισις.

<sup>4</sup> The archonship of Archias. Harpocration, Διαψήφισις. Æsch. Tim. p. 11. § 77. γηγόνασι διαψήφισις ἐν τοῖς δήμοις. Winiewski (p. 52.) assumes, without the slightest warrant, that Antiphon could not have formed such a design, unless the Athenians had been at the time at war with Philip. This is, in every point of view, a perfectly arbitrary assumption. But I can as little assent to Böhnecke (p. 290.) when he argues that Philip was more likely to have listened to such a proposal in time of peace.

<sup>5</sup> Meier and Schömann, p. 770.

<sup>6</sup> Dem. u. s. βοῶν καὶ κεκραγούς, ὅτι ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δεῖνὰ ποιῶν . . ἐν οὐκίας βαδίζων ἀνευ ψήφισματος. Plutarch, when he speaks of the proceeding of Demosthenes in this transaction, as σφόδρα ἀριστοκρατικὸν πολίτευμα (Dem. 14.), forgets the account given by the orator himself, and represents his aristocratical violence as having consisted in his arresting Antiphon and bringing him before the Areopagus, after he had been released by the assembly.

the assembly. But it seems that the orator had not collected sufficient evidence to sustain his charge, and Æschines, loudly exclaiming against his aristocratical oppression of unfortunate citizens, and his illegal violence, induced the assembly to dismiss the culprit. Soon after however Demosthenes must have obtained some stronger proofs of Antiphon's guilt, which he laid before the Areopagus: for that grave tribunal caused Antiphon to be again apprehended, and brought before the assembly, by whose decree he was tortured and put to death. It does not appear that he underwent a regular trial<sup>1</sup>, but rather that he was executed after a confession had been wrung from him by the rack. The whole affair is extremely obscure and perplexing. We do not know whether there was sufficient ground to convict Antiphon; much less whether anything came to light, showing that Philip was implicated in the plot. We must rather infer the contrary as to this last point, when we observe that no trace appears of such a charge having been brought against Philip for several years after his death: though, if it had been supported by any tolerable evidence, it seems hardly possible that no allusion to it should have been found in the previous speeches of Demosthenes. While the business was recent, both he and his rival manifestly shrink from approaching the subject. It would seem as if Demosthenes was conscious that he had carried matters at first with too high a hand, and he only ventures once or twice to taunt Æschines with the unfulfilled threats of impeachment which he had thrown out in the first stage of the affair.<sup>2</sup> Æschines in his defence is absolutely

<sup>1</sup> Platner (p. 32.) assumes this, as far as I can see, without sufficient ground. The expression of Demosthenes (§ 169.) *ἡ βουλή ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου . . . τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπατήγαγεν ὥς ὑμῶς*, seems to refer to the preceding, *καταστήσαντος εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*.

<sup>2</sup> F. L. § 231., where he immediately breaks off with the remark, *καίτοι ταῦτα μὲν ἐστὶ μακρῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἀγόνων καὶ λόγων ἀρχή*; and § 291. *καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῇ δέμῃ γραφὰς ἀποτίσειν καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἡπείλει*.

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silent on it. But this is quite intelligible; as to him the result was extremely humiliating and annoying. For the Areopagus—in order, as Demosthenes represents, to brand him with the guilt of a treasonable connivance—refused to sanction the people's nomination to the honourable mission in the Delian cause, and caused Hyperides to be sent in his stead.<sup>1</sup>

This must have appeared to Demosthenes a favourable juncture for bringing his adversary to trial: and the great cause of the embassy seems to have come on not long after. The speeches delivered by the two orators on this occasion—both of which have been preserved, and probably not without the last corrections of their authors<sup>2</sup>—are admirable specimens of Athenian forensic eloquence, as well as among our most valuable materials for the history of the times.

It is in the latter point of view alone that they can be noticed here; and to enter into the argument would be to repeat much of what has been already

<sup>1</sup> But it must be observed that the statement of Demosthenes (de Cor. § 170.), *τοῦτον εἶδὺς ἀπῆλασεν ὡς προδότην*, is not borne out by the deposition of his witnesses: *ὅτι τοῦ δήμου πότε χειροτονήσαντος Ἀίσχυρον σύνδικον ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ ἐν Δήλῳ εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας, συνεδρεύσαντες ἡμεῖς ἐκρίναμεν Ὑπερίδην δίκιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ὢν ἢ τῆς πόλεως λέγειν, καὶ ἀπεσταλῆναι Ὑπερίδης*. Böhnecke (p. 293.) thinks that the condemnation of Timarchus must have preceded this event, because Æschines could not have extolled the justice of the Areopagus as he does (Timarch. p. 13. § 92.), if it had previously inflicted such dishonour upon him. I should not have been satisfied with this argument. But the priority of the trial of Timarchus seems a necessary inference from the order in which the two transactions are placed by Demosthenes (F. L. p. 423. § 291.) *καὶ κατηγορῶν ἐκείνου κακῶς λέγειν προσέλετο ἐμέ, καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γραφὰς ἀπορίσειν καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἡπείλει*.

<sup>2</sup> The arguments with which the contrary opinion has been maintained by Photius (Vit. Demosth.) and Taylor (Præf. ad Orat. de male gesta Legat.) are only such as would be equally valid in proof that the orations were never delivered. But this supposition of Plutarch's (Dem. 15.) is quite unnecessary to account for the absence of allusions to this trial in the speeches on the Crown, while it contradicts both the distinct tradition preserved by Idomeneus (Plut. *ibid.*), and the allusion in Æschines (F. L. § 4.) to the clamour by which Demosthenes had been interrupted in his speech: *ἦσθην δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῆς αἰτίας ὄντα ταύτης ἐξεβάλλεσθαι*. I attach no importance to the anecdotes to the same effect in Ulpius and Photius, which may have been worked out of this passage. But the most extraordinary conjecture is Becker's (*Demosthenes als Staatsmann und Redner*, p. 321.), who conceives that the two speeches were written without any view to delivery—mere pamphlets. Yet if any one after reading them can believe this to be possible, I do not know how he is to be convinced of the contrary.

said on the subject of the two embassies. It only remains to mention the issue. Æschines was acquitted, it is said, by a majority of only thirty votes. This may perhaps on the whole be regarded as a proof that public suspicion was very strong against him. For his party, including the friends of all the other ambassadors who were virtually implicated in the charge, made the most active efforts to save him: the austere Phocion, and Eubulus, the liberal distributor of the public money, united their influence in his behalf. But he probably owed his acquittal less either to them or to his own talents, than to the peculiar difficulties of his adversary's case. Demosthenes felt himself obliged not only to convict Æschines, but to defend himself. He was anxious to clear himself from the suspicion of a connection with Philocrates, whom nevertheless he, as well as Æschines, had supported in the measures which led to the peace: and in his account of the embassies it was necessary, and yet not easy, to represent himself as overreached by his colleagues, notwithstanding his zeal and vigilance, as continuing to act with them when he no longer trusted them, as having witnessed their intrigues and foreseen the result, though he did not disclose his suspicions and forebodings till it was too late to avert the danger. This appears to have been the cause of the perplexity which strikes every reader in his narrative, and which must have produced a no less unfavourable impression on his audience, especially when contrasted with the clearness, and apparent simplicity, of the defence. The event left the two parties opposed to each other as before, with unabated confidence, and redoubled animosity.

We must now return to Philip. The events which had occurred since the end of the war, though they had strengthened his power, had not brought him

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much nearer to the object he had in view in the south of Greece. He had been baffled in his attempts to establish a communication with Peloponnesus, both on the eastern and the western side of Greece, and in that which he made to gain a footing in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens. Only in Eubœa he had been more successful, in an enterprise against Eretria, which it will be more convenient to relate hereafter. In the meanwhile he had been building arsenals and ships of war in his newly acquired ports, and making active preparations for a naval expedition.<sup>1</sup> This enlargement of his marine was no doubt designed to promote his operations in the north, toward which he now began to turn his chief attention. Conquests in this quarter might not only prepare the way for his invasion of Persia, but might enable him to overcome or overawe the resistance of Athens. It appears to have been in the spring of 342 that he set out on an expedition which was professedly directed against Thrace. We are very imperfectly acquainted with the state of that country at this time. It is however certain that Cersobleptes had been gaining strength, and had shaken off his subjection to Philip. We do not know what foundation there may have been for a statement found only in Didorus<sup>2</sup>, that he had begun to annoy the Greek cities on his coasts, and that Philip marched against him to protect them. Philip's subsequent conduct toward the principal of these towns renders this account extremely doubtful. It is possible however that something had happened which afforded him such a pretext for the invasion of Thrace. But it was not against Cersobleptes only that his arms were turned.

A prince, named Teres, who reigned in the more

<sup>1</sup> Orat. de Halon. § 16.

<sup>2</sup> xvi. 71

northern or western regions of Thrace, and who had been his ally in his war with Athens, had, it seems, now become hostile to him<sup>1</sup>: having perhaps been induced by a sense of their common interest to unite with Cersobleptes. Philip was thus led to carry the war into the heart of Thrace, where he is said to have defeated the barbarians in several engagements. But his views were not now confined to victories, ravages, and plunder. He meditated a permanent conquest, and for this purpose not only imposed a tribute of a tenth of the produce on the conquered territory, but also founded a number of new towns, or military colonies, in the interior.<sup>2</sup> But such a situation was one in which few Greeks would have been tempted to settle, even by the offer of lands and houses: it sounded as emigration to the inland regions of Australia would to a Frenchman; and it seems that he was driven to some extraordinary measures for peopling his new colonies. Demosthenes<sup>3</sup> mentions three towns, Drongile, Kabyle, and Mastira, as among the wretched places which Philip had been taking and settling in Thrace. As to one of these, Kabyle or Kalybe, which stood on the river Taxus, and belonged to the Astian tribe, whose land stretched toward Byzantium, we are distinctly informed, that he planted a colony there which was peopled with the refuse of society.<sup>4</sup> And such, we may infer from the nickname it derived from the character of its inhabitants (Ponropolis: Roguetown), must have been the case with another city built at the foot of Rhodope, which he himself honoured with the name of Philippopolis.<sup>5</sup> If we connect these hints with Justin's rhetorical

<sup>1</sup> Phil. Epist. § 8.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, u. 2. *ἐν τοῖς ἐπικαίροις τόποις κτίσας ἀξιολόγους πόλεις.*

<sup>3</sup> De Cherson. § 44 *καὶ ἂ νῦν ἐξαιρεῖ καὶ κατασκευάζεται.* The last word may perhaps allude to Philip's new establishments.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, vii. p. 320. Harpocratio s. v.

<sup>5</sup> Steph. Byz. Pliny, N. H. iv. 11.



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description of the tyrannical violence with which, after the end of the Phocian war, he transported his subjects into new seats as suited his pleasure<sup>1</sup>, we shall be inclined to conclude, that the population of these places was composed partly of needy vagabonds, or even pardoned convicts, but partly too of the inhabitants of conquered Greek cities, whom he tore from their homes, and whose property he distributed among his officers.<sup>2</sup>

These conquests, and still more the measures taken by Philip to secure them, could not but alarm both the Athenians, and the Greek cities on the coast, especially Byzantium, which lay not very far from the borders of the conquered territory. If the barbarians were troublesome neighbours, Philip was much more to be dreaded when he occupied their land. It was manifest to every one that his ultimate object could not be merely to subdue and colonise the wilds of Thrace: that this was but a step toward the reduction of the powerful and opulent maritime towns, which were so important in a contest either with Persia or Athens. At Athens all who were not blinded by prejudice, saw that both the Bosphorus and the Chersonesus, and with them the naval power, the commerce, the very subsistence of the people, were exposed to imminent danger: the more so, as Byzantium, which had been alienated from Athens by the Social War, was still in alliance with Philip. In the meanwhile occurrences had taken place, which rendered the condition of the Chersonesus peculiarly alarming. Diopithes, who appears to have been a well-meaning and zealous officer, but not very discreet or scrupulous, had been engaged

Diopithes.

<sup>1</sup> VIII. 5. *Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores nunc in hibernos nunc in æstivos saltus trajiciunt, sic ille populos et urbes, ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quæque loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transfert.*

<sup>2</sup> Theopompus in Athenæus, VI. 77. *ὁλομαι τοὺς ἑταίρους, οὐ πλείονας ὄντας κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὀκτακοσίων, οὐκ ἐλάττω καρπίζεσθαι γῆν ἢ μυρίους τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ πλείστην χώραν κекτημένους.*

in constant warfare with Cardia, and had collected a body of mercenaries to maintain the conflict, for whom he was obliged to provide, as well as he could, in the manner which had been long practised by Athenian commanders. Philip, after his proposals for an arbitration had been rejected, sent some forces to the aid of the Cardians; and these troops soon found themselves engaged in hostilities with those of Diopithes. The Athenian general, however, did not confine himself to the defence of his colonists, or to aggression against Cardia, but, when Philip invaded Thrace, thought himself at liberty actively to espouse the cause of the Thracian princes, who had both, it seems, been admitted to the Athenian franchise<sup>1</sup>, made inroads into the part of Thrace which Philip had conquered<sup>2</sup>, and in the course of these expeditions committed sundry acts of violence on the property and persons of Macedonian subjects, and even detained an envoy named Amphilochus, who came to treat with him for the release of the prisoners, and forced him to pay a heavy ransom.<sup>3</sup>

Philip sent a letter complaining of these injuries, which gave the signal to the orators of his party at Athens loudly to denounce the conduct of Diopithes, and to press for his recal, and for the dismissal of his mercenaries. Some proposed to send another general with a force sufficient to compel him to obedience. Demosthenes spoke on this occasion, not so much in defence of the general, as against the policy recommended by his adversaries. His oration is that *On the Chersonesus*. His object is to show that the real

Oration  
"On the  
Cherso-  
nesus."

<sup>1</sup> Philippi Epist. § 3.

<sup>2</sup> Argum. Or. de Cherson. But it seems very doubtful whether the inroad mentioned by Philip in his letter (§ 3.) where Diopithes is said to have taken Crobyle and Tiristasis, and to have ravaged the adjacent part of Thrace, ought to be referred to this period. The mention of the Byzantian galleys, which occurs just before (§ 2.) seems to imply that it took place when Philip was at war with Byzantium.

<sup>3</sup> Philippi Epist. § 3.

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question which the people had to consider, was not whether Diopithes had acted well or ill, but how they might best guard against the danger with which they were threatened by Philip's ambition. He wishes to make it appear that Diopithes had as much right to assist the Thracians, as Philip to attack them: for though it was not Attic ground that Philip had invaded, there could be no doubt that he was fighting in Thrace for the mastery of Athens. In other respects Diopithes had only followed the example of all the Athenian generals who had ever commanded mercenary troops; for none had ever scrupled to levy contributions from the cities of the coast of Asia. But even if it were admitted that Diopithes had violated law and justice, the people could at any time both put a stop to his misconduct, and punish him for it; but in the present posture of affairs to disband the troops he had collected, or even to weaken his authority and credit by an expression of their displeasure, would be to inflict an irreparable injury on themselves. Philip was then wintering in Thrace, with a large army: and he was credibly reported to have sent for a great additional force from Macedonia and Thessaly. Next summer, as soon as the periodical North winds<sup>1</sup> set in, he might lay siege to Byzantium, which would then assuredly come to its senses again, and call upon Athens for succour. But if their armament was withdrawn from the Hellespont, and these succours were to be brought at that season from Athens, they might arrive too late. Or, in the same case, what was there to prevent Philip from falling immediately on the Chersonesus—from carrying the war into the neighbourhood of Attica, and renewing his attempts on Megara and Eubœa, where he was already but too powerful? Prudence required that, instead of dis-

<sup>1</sup> The Ἑρηνισαί, Dem. Phil. I. p. 48. φυλάξας τοὺς ἑρηνισαί . . ἡνίκ' ἂν ἡμεῖς αὐτὴν δυναίμεθα ἐκείνῳ ἀφικέσθαι.

banding and disheartening troops of which they had such urgent need, they should raise more to reinforce them, and should supply their commander with money, which would relieve him from the necessity of extorting it elsewhere. They ought to be aware that Philip was the implacable enemy of a state to which all the other Greeks naturally looked up as a champion of freedom; and that, whether far or near, every blow he struck was aimed at Athens. They must make up their minds to great sacrifices and hard struggles: for this was the price of liberty and honour: and not listen to the slavish counsels of those who only calculated the expense of a war. It was high time to make a stand against their insidious and restless foe: if they waited for a declaration of war from him, they might see him first—as had been the case with Olynthus and Pheræ—at their gates. The sum of the orator's advice is, that they should decree a war-tax, keep up their army—correcting nevertheless any abuses which they might discover—and send ambassadors to every quarter, to awaken the other Greeks to a sense of the common danger, and to obtain all the help that could be procured. Above all, they must restrain the venality of their counsellors by rigorous punishments. There might then be a chance of better days: otherwise he saw no possibility of deliverance.

Diopithes retained his command, and it may be presumed, after such a mark of his sovereign's approbation, was not much more circumspect in his conduct. There can be no doubt that he had given cause for just complaint, and that in his invasion of Thrace, at least, if not in his hostilities with Cardia, he had violated both the letter and the spirit of the treaty with Philip. The wisest, as well as the most honourable, course would have been to disavow his proceedings, and remove him from his command. Demosthenes,

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Third  
Philippic.

we may be sure, would have been very willing that an armament should have been sent under another general to supply his place. But he knew that a decree to this effect would probably be only so far executed as to disarm Diopithes, and to leave the Athenian interests near the seat of war unprotected. How far he was misled by the fallacy of his own reasoning, which appears to a modern reader flagrantly sophistical, we cannot determine. His view however of the perilous position of his country is not the less sound, and may be admitted as an excuse for some indistinctness of ideas as to the precise line of separation between offensive and defensive measures. No visible change appears to have taken place in the state of affairs, when Demosthenes made another appeal to the people, similar to that which had been occasioned by the affair of Diopithes, but in a tone of still graver warning, and more stirring exhortation. The object of this speech—the third Philippic—is simply to rouse the Athenians to action. What may have been its immediate occasion—whether an application which had been made by their citizens in the Chersonesus for protection<sup>1</sup>—we do not know. The orator would be sufficiently urged by the intelligence of Philip's warlike preparations, and by the approach of the season for a new campaign.

He sets out with the startling assertion, that though, in every assembly they had held since the peace, Philip's enterprises had been the grand subject of discussion, and none could deny the necessity of curbing and humbling him, their affairs could not have been in a worse condition, if it had been the express object of all their deliberations to ruin them. For this

<sup>1</sup> As Winiewski (p. 176.) suspects, on account of § 87. Droysen (Urk. p. 94.) rejects the order in which the oration de Chers. and the third Philippic are placed by Dionysius ad Amm. § 10., and conceives that de Chers. was delivered in the spring of 341, some months later than the third Philippic; but, as it appears to me, on very slight and precarious grounds.

there might have been many causes; but it was to be ascribed chiefly to the orators, who, either because their influence depended on the continuance of peace — an allusion probably to Eubulus — or, through party malice and jealousy, laboured to defend Philip, and represented those who endeavoured to counteract his designs as the authors of war. If the people looked at actions rather than words, they would be convinced that Philip had in fact been waging war against them from the very beginning of the nominal peace; and they had seen but too many examples — as in the case, among others, of Olynthus and the Phocians — how little dependence was to be placed on his pacific professions. With Athens it was much more his interest to dissemble as long as their patience or credulity lasted. Wonderful indeed had been the growth of his power; and, in that distracted state of Greece, what remained for him to do, to make himself master of the whole, was less than he had already done. But still more wonderful was the licence which had hitherto been granted to him, as if by universal consent — such as had never been assumed by either Athens or Sparta in their most flourishing period — of dealing with the lives, fortunes, laws, and liberty of Greeks, as he would; and this, which would have been intolerable even in a Greek state, was permitted to a barbarian, whose people had always been accounted vile even among barbarians. This could never have happened if the ancient spirit of honour and patriotism had not so far degenerated, that it had almost ceased to be a reproach to public men, to sell and be sold. Again, attempts were made to under-rate Philip's power, which had been represented as less formidable than that of the Lacedæmonians, when they were at the head of the Peloponnesian confederacy. These reasoners forgot the difference of the times, and the modes of warfare: the difference be-

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tween the military operations of a league which could only keep its forces, all heavy-armed citizens, together during a short summer campaign, and those of a monarch, who could take the field at all seasons, with a host of light troops, and who pushed his conquests by means of gold and intrigues, engines unknown to the ancient simplicity and virtue. From such an enemy they could only be safe while they kept him at a distance, and took advantage of the nature of his country, which lay so peculiarly open to the attacks of a maritime power. They should take warning, while it was yet time, from the fate of so many cities, which had perished through the readiness with which the people had lent an ear to dishonest counsellors. If they asked what was to be done, his reply was, that they must try to unite the Greeks in a general league against Philip. They must send embassies, not only to Peloponnesus — where the last had not been fruitless — but to Rhodes and Chios (the old allies of Byzantium), and even to the Persian king, who was likewise concerned in checking Philip's progress. But, above all, it was necessary that, while they called upon others for this purpose, they should set them an example by their own preparations, and should spare neither money, nor ships, nor personal service, in a struggle in which they had most to lose, and in which it became them to take the lead.

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embassies.

One part at least of this advice appears to have been taken. We do not know what other embassies were sent: though it is probable that Demosthenes was employed at this time in some of his many missions: but a negotiation was certainly opened with the Persian court, most likely through some of the satraps of western Asia<sup>1</sup>: a measure which afforded

<sup>1</sup> Philipp. iv. § 36. Though this oration is generally admitted to be spurious, it is not without historical value. Winiewski (p. 169.) observes of it, *Fere orationis Demosthenica partes aliquas continet, sed aliarum orationum laciniis consarcinatas.*

a topic for much plausible declamation to the orators of the Macedonian party, who affected to talk of the Persian king as the common enemy of Greece.<sup>1</sup> A passage in a letter, which we shall soon have to notice again, of Philip to the Athenians, renders it not improbable that Philip was induced by these diplomatic movements to send another embassy to Athens, which was attended at his request by the ministers of all his allies, for the purpose, as he professed, of coming to an agreement about the Greeks—that is, perhaps, on all matters as to which he was at variance with the Athenians: and this may have been the occasion on which Demosthenes boasts of having extorted the approbation even of the foreign ministers by his confutation of Python.<sup>2</sup> Philip might hope by this step to gain credit with the Greeks at large for good intentions, and to counteract the efforts of the Athenian envoys. Possibly it may have led him to delay the opening of the next campaign. If so, Demosthenes accomplished one of the objects which he mentions in the third Philippic, as likely to be attained by the proposed negotiations: that of gaining time; which, as he observes, in a contest between a state and one man was not useless.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, as it was easy to foresee that these discussions would end as so many had ended before, there can be no doubt that Philip continued his preparations without intermission. In the meanwhile he seems to have sent a fleet under the command of Alcimus, to recover Halonnesus from the Peparethians, who had taken possession of it, and to ravage their own island by way of punishment for the

It is of little importance for our purpose, whether we adopt this opinion, or Brueckner's, who (p. 276.) thinks it contains traces of historical sources now lost. He has given a critical analysis of it in an appendix.

<sup>1</sup> u. s. § 38.

<sup>2</sup> This is Brueckner's opinion, p. 271.

<sup>3</sup> p. 129. χρόνους γε ἐμποιοῖτε τοῖς πράγμασι ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ οὐχὶ συνειστώσης πόλεως ἰσχύον ὁ πόλεμος, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἔχρηστον.



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obstinacy with which they had refused to restore the other, and the prisoners they took in it. They complained at Athens of the treatment they had suffered, and an Athenian general was ordered to make reprisals on Macedonia.<sup>1</sup>

While Philip was occupied in Thrace, the Athenians were gaining some important advantages nearer home. About the same time that the Macedonian party was overpowered in Megara, a similar faction at Eretria prevailed over its adversaries, and expelled them from the city. It seems that they then made a stand in Porthmus, the Eretrian Piræus; for a Macedonian general, Hipponicus, who was sent with 1000 mercenaries to the aid of their enemies, razed its walls to the ground. Three of Philip's partizans, Hipparchus, Automedon, and Clitarchus, then shared the government for a while among them. But repeated attempts were made to dislodge them, which induced Philip to send first Eurylochus, and afterwards Parmenio, with fresh reinforcements.<sup>2</sup> The supreme power seems to have remained at last with Clitarchus alone.

It has been already mentioned, that when Philip was threatening Ambracia, the Athenian negotiators in Peloponnesus were supported in their attempts to bring about a confederacy against him by Callias of Chalcis. Callias, it appears, aimed at reducing Eubœa under his own authority; and, as he could not expect Philip's concurrence in this design, planned a league among all the cities of the island for the protection of their independence. They were to send their deputies to a congress in Chalcis, where he might expect that they would be in a great measure subject to his influence. Demosthenes entered into this scheme, which held out a prospect of a permanent barrier

<sup>1</sup> Philippi Epist. § 12.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. Phil. iii. p. 125. foll.

against the Macedonian ascendancy, and induced the people not only to consent to it, but to transfer the yearly contributions which they received from Eretria and Oreus to Chalcis. Clitarchus, it seems, wished, notwithstanding his connection with Philip, to keep on good terms with Athens, and was so far considered as her ally, that an embassy was sent to him as well as to the people of Oreus, to obtain his compliance. The project however—which *Æschines*<sup>1</sup> represents as a signal proof of dishonesty in Demosthenes, because the Athenian treasury was to lose a revenue of ten talents through it—fell to the ground: perhaps partly in consequence of a revolution which took place not long after in Oreus, where the Macedonian faction, with the help of Parmenio, became predominant. Their most active opponent was that Euphræus, Plato's scholar, who has been already mentioned<sup>2</sup> as a favourite of Perdiccas, and as having given great offence to the Macedonian nobles and generals by his injudicious zeal for learning. He ventured to impeach Philistides, the leader of the adverse faction, and some of his friends, for treason; but they were already so powerful, that they were able to throw him into prison as a mover of sedition. Soon after Parmenio appeared with his forces before the gates: they were opened to him by treachery; and Philistides with four colleagues assumed the government. The disaffected were banished, or put to death. Euphræus, according to Demosthenes<sup>3</sup>, killed himself: another account states, that he fell a victim to Parmenio's inveterate hatred.<sup>4</sup>

Thus two of the principal cities of the island—one of great importance with a view to Attica itself, the other threatening Sciathus and other insular posses-

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<sup>1</sup> Ctes. § 100.

<sup>2</sup> u. s. p. 127.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. V. p. 220.

<sup>4</sup> Carystius in *Athensæus*, xi. c. 119.

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expedition  
to Eubœa.

sions of Athens<sup>1</sup>—were in the hands of Philip's creatures, when he set out on his Thracian expedition. Demosthenes, in his speech on the affair of Diopithes, reproaches the Athenians, in the name of the other Greeks, with supineness, for allowing this state of things to continue so long, even while Philip was engaged at a distance. In the course of the next autumn (341) he carried a decree for an expedition to Eubœa. Clitarchus and Philistides, despairing of timely aid from Philip, endeavoured to avert the danger by an embassy to Athens, where Æschines entertained their envoys in his house, and perhaps pleaded their cause.<sup>2</sup> But the expedition was sent, and under the command of Phocion, who expelled the tyrants from both cities. Yet the chief merit of this success seems to have been ascribed to Demosthenes, for he was honoured with a golden crown; and Æschines himself, by the pains he takes to exhibit the affair of Callias in the worst light, seems tacitly to acknowledge the value of his rival's services toward the recovery of the island. This stroke was followed up by another. A squadron under the command of Callias—whether the Chalcidian, or an Athenian general of the same name, is not known<sup>3</sup>—sailed into the gulf of Pagasæ, took all the towns on the coast, seized the merchant-ships bound for Macedonia, and sold the crews as slaves. Decrees were passed by

<sup>1</sup> Dem. Chers. § 37. δύο ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατέστησε τυράννους, τὸν μὲν ἀπαιτικὸν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐπιτερχίσας, τὸν δ' ἐπὶ Σκιάθῳ. F. Jacobs translates in *Sciathus*, and observes in his note: *Sciathus is a small island to the north of Eubœa. Nothing is known of a tyrant there from other passages.* But it is clear that ἐπὶ Σκιάθῳ has the meaning expressed in the text, though I have not met with any other instance of ἐπιτερχίζειν ἐπὶ followed by a dative, nor is any given in the large collection in Hemsterhul's note on Lucian, i. p. 63. But it is quite in analogy with the use of ἐπὶ observed by F. Jacobs himself, in his note on the Anthol. Pal. p. 468., where he remarks, ἐπὶ etiam cum verbis motus dativum adquiret interdum. The meaning of Demosthenes is correctly explained by L. v. Jan, in *Zimmermann's Zeitschrift*, 1845, p. 801.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. de Cor. § 102.

<sup>3</sup> Philip. Epist. (§ 5.) Καλλίας δ' παρ' ὁμῶν στρατηγός. I cannot say that it appears to me quite so clear as it did to F. Jacobs (Dem. p. 418.), that this can be no other than the tyrant of Chalcis.

which the people praised him for these proceedings; but it does not seem that they had been previously authorised, even if Callias was indeed the general, and not simply an independent ally of the commonwealth.

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It appears to have been about the time that the Athenians were making their preparations for the expedition to Eubœa (the summer of 341) that a transaction took place at Athens, which, though of little importance in itself, deserves notice, as marking the temper of the people and the spirit of Athenian parties. The facts, so far as they may be gathered from allusions of Demosthenes and Æschines in speeches delivered some eleven years after the event, were nearly as follows. On some former occasion, no doubt, during the sojourn of the Athenian embassy at Oreus<sup>1</sup>, Demosthenes was entertained, whether alone or together with his colleagues we know not, by a citizen of Oreus named Anaxinus.<sup>2</sup> In 341, Anaxinus came to Athens, ostensibly, it would seem, on mercantile business connected with the Olympic festival of the year (Ol. cix. 4.), or it may be simply on his way home from the Games.<sup>3</sup> But during his stay at Athens, he excited suspicions which led to his being arrested, put to the torture, tried, and condemned to death, as a secret emissary of Philip. In these proceedings, Demosthenes took a leading part. Æschines asserts, that he tortured the prisoner with his own hand, and moved the decree under which he suffered capital punishment.<sup>4</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Vol. v. p. 462.

<sup>2</sup> Æsch. Ctes. p. 85. *παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν Ὀρεῷ κατήγον, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς τραπέζης ἔφαγες καὶ ἔπιες καὶ ἔσπεισας, καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν ἐνέβαλες, ἑνὲρα φίλον καὶ ξένον ποιοῦμενος.*

<sup>3</sup> Æsch. u. s. τοῦ τὰ ἀγοράσματα Ὀλυμπιάδι ἀγοράζοντος. This description seems to render it probable that he came to Athens not long either before or after the Olympic festival, and so far to confirm the genuineness of the document in Dem. de Cor. p. 273., bearing date in Hecatombæon.

<sup>4</sup> Æsch. u. s. *διοστρέβλωσας τῇ σαντοῦ χειρὶ, γράψας αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ζημῶσαι . . καὶ τοῦτον ἀπέκτεινας.* Droysen (Urk. p. 128.) thinks that ἀπέκτεινας may only signify an attempt which did not take effect. Vit. x. Or. Dem. (Westermann,

first of these statements may be reasonably suspected of rhetorical exaggeration ; but there seems to be no ground for questioning the other. Nor is it at all improbable that Demosthenes, when reproached in the assembly for his conduct toward his host, should have declared, *that he valued the salt of the city more than the hospitable board*.<sup>1</sup> If, as Æschines represents, this avowal excited the indignation of the hearers, it must have been, we should think, less on account of the sentiment itself, than of the circumstances to which it was applied. According to Demosthenes, Anaxinus was justly convicted of being Philip's spy, and was proved to have had a nocturnal interview with Æschines at the house of a third person.<sup>2</sup> Æschines alleges that the whole charge was forged by Demosthenes, for the purpose of averting an accusation with which he was threatened by his rival.<sup>3</sup> Which of these statements, or whether any one of them, is true, it is impossible now to decide. But it appears that no confession could be wrung from Anaxinus<sup>4</sup>, and that no evidence could be found sufficient to ground a formal impeachment against Æschines.<sup>5</sup> What is most difficult to understand in the affair, is the principle upon which a private agent of a prince, at peace and in alliance with Athens<sup>6</sup>, even if detected

p. 289.) 'Ανάξινον τινα Ὠρεΐτην, ξένον αὐτοῦ γεγονότα, συλλαβὸν ἐβασάνειεν ὡς κατασκοπον, οὐδὲν δ' ἐξειπὸντα ἐψηφίσαντο τοῖς ἰὰ παραδοῦναι; which rather favours the readings in Æschines rejected by Bekker. δις στρεβλώσας . . ἔγραφας.

<sup>1</sup> Æsch. u. s. ὅπ' ἐμοῦ κληθεὶς ξενοκτόνος, οὐ τὸ ἀσέβημα ἠρήσω, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίνω ἐφ' ᾧ ἀνεβόησεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ὅσοι ξένοι περιστάσαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐφησθα γὰρ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄλλας περὶ πλείονος ποιήσασθαι τῆς ξενικῆς τραπέζης.

<sup>2</sup> That the interview took place by night rests on the document in Dem. de Cor. p. 273. Demosthenes himself only says, *μόνος μόνῃ συνήει καὶ ἐκουλογεῖτο*.

<sup>3</sup> u. s. εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι μέλλων ὅπ' ἐμοῦ, τὴν Ἀναξίνου σύλληψιν τοῦ Ὠρεΐτου πατεσκεύσας.

<sup>4</sup> Vet. x. Or. u. s. οὐδὲν ἐξειπὸντα.

<sup>5</sup> Boeckh and Winiewski endeavour to explain the singular document in Dem de Cor. p. 273., by the supposition that Demosthenes had taken steps for bringing an indictment against Æschines as an accomplice of Anaxinus ; but it is certain that if it was instituted at all—which Droysen (p. 130.) thinks highly improbable—it fell to the ground at a very early stage.

<sup>6</sup> It is therefore only by a very bold rhetorical exaggeration that Demosthenes u. s. speaks of Anaxinus as ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων πεμφθέντι.

in prying into state secrets, or in intriguing with Athenian citizens, could have been lawfully tortured and put to death. So far as we are acquainted with the facts, the proceeding seems no less foreign to Greek usage, than repugnant to common equity and humanity.<sup>1</sup>

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Philip's personal movements in the year 341, after the delivery of the third Philippic, are involved in great obscurity. It seems certain that he made no attempt on Byzantium at the season when Demosthenes anticipated one<sup>2</sup>, and we find no distinct trace of his presence elsewhere.

Diodorus concludes his short account of Philip's expedition to Thrace with the words: *Wherefore the Greek cities (on the Thracian coast), having been released from their fears of Cersobleptes, entered with the greatest readiness into alliance with Philip.*<sup>3</sup> In any other writer one might be surprised to find that the transaction in Philip's history, which he relates next, is thus described:—*Philip growing more and more powerful, marched against Perinthus, which was beginning to oppose him, and to lean toward the Athenians.*<sup>4</sup> It is indeed certain that, after the conclusion of his Thracian expedition, he turned his arms

<sup>1</sup> Droysen (p. 135.) thinks that it might be more excusable after the end of the campaign in Eubœa, when it must have been generally felt at Athens that a declaration of war was near at hand, than half a year earlier. But if it was believed that the mission of Anaxinus was intended to prevent the Athenians from recovering their ascendancy in Eubœa, while they were preparing their expedition to the island, their treatment of him, though certainly not excusable, would be intelligible enough.

<sup>2</sup> Droysen (u. s. p. 96. foll.) stands, I believe, alone in his conjecture, that Philip began the siege of Byzantium in the autumn of 341, but raised it before his attack on Perinthus in the following year. To this supposed first siege he refers, Polyæn. iv. 2. 21., Justin, ix. 1., and Frontin. i. 3. 4. But all these passages may be at least as well adapted to what is known of the siege, which began in 340. He also thinks that the allusions in Dem. Phil. iii. § 35. *ἐπὶ Βυζαντίου πορεύεται*, and in Chers. § 68. *καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζαντίου παρίστροφος*, require the supposition, that the siege began in the course of the same year in which those speeches were delivered. These passages, indeed, prove that it was regarded as then impending, but cannot help to determine when it actually began. And whatever presumption they raise is more than rebutted by the silence of the orators, of Philochorus, and in fact of all our authorities, on the supposed expedition of 341.

<sup>3</sup> xvi. 71.

<sup>4</sup> xvi. 74.

against the Greek cities north of the Hellespont. But whether Perinthus was the first of these which he attacked, is very doubtful. There seems on the whole more reason to believe, that he first laid siege to Selymbria, which lay on the coast of the Propontis, between Perinthus and Byzantium, and that he was occupied with this siege in the autumn of 341, when otherwise we should be at a loss to account for his inaction. But we are not informed what was the occasion or pretext of his hostilities against either Selymbria or Perinthus.<sup>1</sup> Both were in alliance with

<sup>1</sup> The fact that Selymbria was ever besieged by Philip depends, so far as it is known to us, entirely on the genuineness of a letter of Philip to the Athenians, which is cited (de Cor. p. 250.). Droysen rejects this letter in common with all the other documents which purport to have been produced by the orator in that speech; and he has no doubt shown that there are several things, both in the form and the matter, which are hard to understand, and perhaps will never be fully explained. Böhnecke, who vindicates the genuineness of all these documents—laying down as a fundamental principle that they must all stand or fall together—has not condescended directly to notice any of Droysen's arguments. He has, however, attempted to meet one objection, which is perhaps the gravest of all which Droysen has urged; but in a way which will hardly be thought to remove it. Droysen (p. 115.) contends that the terms of the extant letter are inconsistent with the orator's remarks on that which was actually read. Demosthenes observes that Philip in the letter brings no charge against him, but accuses other persons of endeavouring to draw the people into a fresh war with Macedonia (§ 76.) οὐδὲν αἰτιάται ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου, ἄλλοις ἑγκαλῶν; and § 79. ἐνταῦθα οὐδαμοῦ Δημοσθένην γέγραφε, οὐδ' αἰτίαν οὐδεμίαν κατ' ἐμοῦ). Yet in the letter no other persons are accused by name, or under any description, which might not include Demosthenes himself (ταῦτα συνετάχθη . . . ὑπὸ τινων ἀρχόντων καὶ ἑτέρων, ἰδιωτῶν μὲν νῦν ὄντων, ἐκ πάντων δὲ τρόπου βουλευμένων τὸν δῆμον . . . τὸν πόλεμον ἀναλαβεῖν). Böhnecke's solution of this difficulty is to suppose that these words contain an innuendo so plain, that Demosthenes might refer to it just as he would have done if the names of the persons signified had been given (p. 485. *eos autem oratores qui postea decreta de repetendis navigiis conscripserunt, etiam mandata illa de auxilio Selymbrianis ferendo navarcho dedisse perquam verisimile est; hos igitur regem innuere Demosthenes contendit*). In this explanation there are two glaring defects. Even if that which is said to be *perquam verisimile* was not merely probable, but certain, it would not be at all the clearer that Philip meant to allude to this fact; and even if it was certain that he meant to allude to the authors of the decrees, his language would nevertheless include Demosthenes also. This difficulty, therefore, remains unmitigated by Böhnecke's remark. On the other hand, it may be questioned whether the difficulty would have been likely to arise, if the letter had been a forgery, and whether the contents of the letter would not in that case have been better fitted to the text of the speech. But in any case I should be slow to believe that the allusions in the decrees and the letter to persons and places are mere fabrications, and therefore think it safe to assume the siege of Selymbria as a fact, and it only remains to ascertain its date. Boeckh places it in the autumn of 341, arguing mainly from the silence of Philochorus, on which I should not be disposed to lay so much stress. Mr. Clinton and Böhnecke refer it to the autumn of 340. But Böhnecke entirely rejects the ground on which Mr. Clinton rests his conclusion, which is Ulpius's opinion that the last Philippic was delivered in answer to the letter in which Philip alludes to the siege of Se-

Byzantium; and Philip had not yet come to an open rupture with the latter city, if we may rely on a CHAP.  
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Selymbria. The arguments, however, with which he combats Boeckh's opinion, do not appear to me to have much force, either severally or collectively. I will briefly notice them according to his own enumeration.

1. Böhnecke, with Mr. Clinton (App. p. 223.), conceives that Boeckh's opinion is contradicted by the testimony of Philochorus in Dionys. Ep. i. ad Amm. 11., who says that in the archonship of Theophrastus, Philip first attacked Perinthus, and falling in that attempt laid siege to Byzantium (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀναπλεύσας Περὶνθον προσέβαλεν, κ. τ. λ.). But I do not see how this is at all inconsistent with the fact of his having besieged Selymbria in the autumn of the preceding archon. Nor do I understand Mr. Clinton's reasoning when he says, *Now if Philip, ἀναπλεύσας, sailing northwards, attempted Perinthus after midsummer 340, he was not engaged in besieging Selymbria eight months before, in autumn 341.* It seems to me an unwarrantable inference from the term ἀναπλεύσας, even if it was necessary to interpret it *sailing northwards*, to collect that Philip's fleet had not been in the same waters and north of Perinthus the year before. The τὸ μὲν πρῶτον merely describes the order of events in the year of Theophrastus.

2. Philip's silence as to the siege of Selymbria in his long letter of complaint received at Athens in the spring of 340. Böhnecke argues that, if this letter had been subsequent to the siege of Selymbria, Philip would not have failed to upbraid the Athenians with the injury they had offered him in sending succour to the Selymbrians (*sane auxilium Selymbrianis latum non silentio praterisset*), and with his own magnanimity in restoring their triremes. But he seems to have overlooked the fact, that no succours were actually brought to Selymbria on this occasion; that the ostensible object of the Athenian expedition was entirely different and harmless; and that Philip could only defend his own proceeding in the intercepting of the squadron, on the ground of his belief that the Athenian commander meant to act, not according to his official instructions, but on an illegal and criminal engagement which he had entered into with a party at Athens. Under such circumstances it does not appear surprising that Philip should have abstained from alluding to a transaction in which—at Athens at least—the wrong was supposed to be clearly on his side, and to amount to an open breach of the treaty; while, on the other hand, the restoration of the triremes enabled him to say with substantial truth (§ 18.), τῶν τριήρων ἀπεσχόμην, especially as the seizure was represented as a simply precautionary, not a retaliative measure. And hence the correspondence which Böhnecke finds between this measure and the threat at the end of the letter, ὑμᾶς ἀμνησθῆναι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου, appears to me very questionable.

3. Demosthenes (de Cor. p. 250.) produces Philip's letter on the siege of Selymbria, to prove that Philip himself did not charge him with having been the author of hostile proceedings; and accounts for Philip's silence as to himself from the fact, that the king could not have alluded to the public measures of Demosthenes without reminding the Athenians of his own aggressions; and he then proceeds to illustrate his assertion by recalling to mind how he had counteracted Philip's aggressive attempts in Peloponnesus, in Eubœa, in Chersonesus, and at Byzantium (τοὺς ἀποστόλους ἀπέστειλα καθ' οὓς Χερρόνησος ἐσάθη καὶ Βυζάντιον). Hence Böhnecke infers that the deliverance of Byzantium must have preceded the siege of Selymbria. To me it appears that there was no reason why, in the enumeration of such cases, the orator should have confined himself to those which occurred before the date of the letter. His main object was to show that his own policy throughout had been defensive, opposed to a series of aggressions on Philip's part; and he wished to make it appear that Philip himself was conscious of this being the case. But this was only an incidental corroboration which could not be allowed to limit the extent of his argument, which is proposed in the words (§ 98.), τούτων γὰρ (τῶν ἀδικημάτων αὐτοῦ) εἰχόμεν ἐγὼ καὶ τούτοις ἠναντιούμην.

4. The seizure of the Athenian squadron, which gave occasion to Philip's letter, is, as Böhnecke thinks, represented by Demosthenes as having occurred at no long



statement of Demosthenes, which implies that he only declared war against it just before he besieged

interval before Philip's expedition to Greece, which is connected with it by the words (de Cor. § 177.), ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ φανερώς ἤδη τὰ πλοῖα ἐσεσύλγητο, Χερβόνητος ἐπορεύετο, ἐπὶ τῇν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύεθ' ἀνθρώπος. Böhnecke conceives the two events first alluded to to have been nearly simultaneous, and only about six months prior to the last. Without laying any stress on the tense of ἐσεσύλγητο, I would observe that the relative distance of the events was wholly immaterial to the orator's purpose, which was merely to mention some of the most conspicuous acts of hostility committed by Philip. But I also doubt that the words τὰ πλοῖα ἐσεσύλγητο refer exclusively, or even principally, to the seizure of the squadron under Laomedon. I believe that they were at least meant to comprehend an allusion to those piratical operations, by which Philip is said to have recruited his finances when exhausted by the siege of Byzantium, and in which he collected 170 prizes of merchant vessels (Justin, ix. 16.), no doubt in great part belonging to Athens. Böhnecke himself (p. 481.) supposes that the object of the expedition of Laodamas was to protect the Athenian corn ships, while the sea was thus infested by Philip's cruisers. But if so, it seems strange that the Athenians should have addressed no remonstrance to Philip on that subject; and still more so that Philip, while conscious of such violent proceedings, should have addressed them in such a tone of magnanimous forbearance, and have made complaints which he must have known might so easily and justly be retorted upon himself.

5. There is evidence (Böhnecke thinks) that Philip, after he had begun the siege of Byzantium, and when he was on the point of raising it, attacked several of the smaller towns in alliance with Byzantium: thus confirming the supposition that the siege of Selymbria took place at this time. The inference would be precarious even if the premises were certain. But the supposed evidence consists of two passages which are totally foreign to the purpose. One is Diodor. xvi. 77., where we read that Philip καταπλεῖν τῇ συνδρομῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὴν πολιορκίαν τῶν πόλεων ἔλυσεν — clearly alluding to Perinthus and Byzantium, whose affairs Diodorus had dismissed in the preceding chapter with the words, τὰ μὲν περὶ Περιθίου καὶ Βυζαντίου ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἦν. The other is what he calls *Polyani notitia*, being an account of a stratagem (Polyæn. iv. 2. 21.) by which Philip induced the allies of the Byzantians to withdraw their forces from Byzantium. By the reports of deserters sent among them for the purpose, he led them to believe that he was besieging and on the point of reducing their own cities; and to confirm the report he made a show of sending detachments of troops in various directions (φανερὸς ἦν διαπέμπων μέρη τῆς στρατίας ἕλλο ἑλλαχῇ εἰς δόκησιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν): that he actually laid siege to any of these cities is neither said nor intimated. But if he did, it would seem that Selymbria could not have been one of them, as it was to all appearance attacked in earnest.

6. *Si Selymbriae obsidionem ad annum Ol. cix. 4. (341 B. C.) retrahas, maxime offendit, quod Athenienses huic urbi, quæ Byzantiis obnoxia erat, auxilium tulerunt, tunc enim Philippus Byzantios ipsos nondum adortus erat, necdum hi cum Atheniensibus societatem inierunt.* This is also one of Droysen's objections to the genuineness of the letter and the decrees (p. 103. *Bedenklicher ist, dass Athen der von Byzantiern besetzten Stadt sollte Hilfe geleistet haben, bevor der Krieg erklärt und mit Byzanz Verbindung geschlossen war*). It is really surprising that neither he nor Böhnecke should have observed that Athens sent no succours on this occasion to Selymbria. It was only a surmise of Philip's that the commander of the expedition, sent avowedly for a different purpose, intended to make an attempt to relieve Selymbria; but at any rate this was no more than a private unauthorised undertaking, which Philip himself attributed not to the state, but to the intrigues of a party.

Böhnecke's 7th and last argument is reproduced from Corsini, who had pointed out (F. A. i. p. 352.) that one of the decrees contemporaneous with the siege of Selymbria bears date in a year in which the tribe Hippothoontis presided in the month Boedromion, and that this was likewise the case in the year in which the trierarchic law of Demosthenes was passed. Now this law was passed in 340.

it.<sup>1</sup> It seems most probable, that, as his expedition was undoubtedly viewed by the Greek cities in this

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OL. cx. 1. Unless therefore, by a most singular chance, the tribe Hippothoontis presided in the same month in two successive years, the decree, and consequently the siege of Selymbria, must be referred to the same year, 340. This is undoubtedly the strongest of all Böhnecke's arguments, or rather the only one which has some weight; and Boeckh does not appear to have justly appreciated its force. It cannot be denied that it raises a difficulty in the way of his opinion; but still not, I think, one so great as those which beset the supposition of any other date than that which he assigns to the siege of Selymbria. Mr. Clinton (p. 223.) cites with approbation the following statement of the course of events: — *Philip laid siege to Perinthus, &c. Meanwhile observing that supplies reached Perinthus principally through the Selymbrians, whom he had not before treated as enemies, he sent a body of troops to blockade their town.* To me this explanation appears very unsatisfactory on two grounds: 1st, the fact on which it rests — that "supplies reached Perinthus principally through the Selymbrians" — is itself a mere conjecture, for which there is not a shadow of authority, though it is stated by the writer as a notorious fact; and 2ndly, if Philip was engaged in the siege of Perinthus when he intercepted the squadron under Laomedon, it is strange that he should have justified that proceeding on the ground that the expedition was really destined to relieve Selymbria; as if it was not much more likely to have been directed to Perinthus, which was both nearer and more important. So Winiewski justly observes (p. 190.): *Simul cum Selymbria Perinthus etiam obsessam non concesserim, quippe tum Perinthis potius auxilia ab Atheniensibus ferenda fuissent ea, quæ Selymbrianis missa esse Philippus contendit in epistola.* The silence of Diodorus and Philochorus as to any siege between those of Perinthus and Byzantium, is also of some moment. But still, improbable as this conjecture is, I would adopt it in preference to Böhnecke's, who supposes the siege of Selymbria to have been undertaken after Philip's defeat before Byzantium. This seems to me absolutely inconceivable, if the letter and decrees relating to the seizure of the squadron under Laomedon are genuine. If the Athenians had already sent succours to Byzantium, how could Philip write as if they would not avow a design of relieving Selymbria? and how, under such circumstances, could the Athenians complain of the capture of their galleys, or expect them to be restored? It seems evident that this transaction belongs to a time when they had no reason to apprehend such an act of hostility. And this appears to me to be most in accordance with the manner in which Demosthenes introduces his allusion to it (De Cor. p. 249.). He had spoken a little before of Philip's enterprises in Eubœa and the Hellespont, and finally of the siege of Byzantium, as violations of the treaty (*πρότερον ταῦτα πάντα ποιῶν ἡδίκηε καὶ παρῆσπύνδει καὶ ἔλυσεν τὴν εἰρήνην ἢ οὐ*); then, after urging the necessity of resistance, he proceeds: *καὶ μὴν τὴν εἰρήνην γ' ἐκείνος ἔλυσεν τὰ πλοῖα λαβὼν, οὐχ ἡ πόλις, Αἰσχίνῃ.* If that had been a later occurrence, this would have amounted to an admission, that the preceding assertion was an exaggeration, and the orator would probably have taken care to add a few words (*εἰ καὶ μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλ' οὖν*) to indicate that this was only a concession made for argument's sake, to give his adversary every possible advantage. It is after this that he enters at large on the history of the siege of Byzantium (p. 254. *ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, κ. τ. λ.*), and relates that Philip called on the Byzantians to join him in his war with Athens (*ἡξίου συμπολεμεῖν τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον*): which seems to imply that *ἔλυσεν τὴν εἰρήνην* was then a past event. But Droysen unduly presses these words, when he infers from them that war was declared immediately after, and hence concludes (p. 115.) that Philip's letter could not have contained a promise to restore the ships. Here, as before in *ἔλυσεν τὴν εἰρήνην*, Demosthenes is only describing the hostile character, not the immediate effect, of Philip's acts. Böhnecke (p. 490.) thinks it unlikely that Philip should have begun with an attack on Selymbria. But this is only an argument from our ignorance of the circumstances. The state of our information does not enable us to judge of Philip's motives.

<sup>1</sup> De Cor. § 109. *παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θράκης Βυζαντίου . . . ἡξίου συμπολεμεῖν τὸν*

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quarter with very different feelings from those which Diodorus attributes to them, they did not rest mere passive spectators of his progress, but endeavoured in some way or other to oppose it, either by succours furnished to the Thracian princes, or by some co-operation with Diopithes. It appears that while the siege of Selymbria was proceeding, an Athenian squadron of twenty ships was sent under the command of Laomedon, with the avowed object of conveying the corn-ships coming from the Euxine<sup>1</sup> to Lemnos. Philip was apprised of its approach, and suspecting — perhaps with good ground — that it was designed to carry succours to Selymbria, ordered his admiral Amyntas to intercept it; and it was accordingly carried into a Macedonian port. As

πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον, ὡς δ' οὐκ ἤθελον . . . χαράκωμα βαλόμενος πρὸς τῇ πόλει καὶ μηχανήμασ' ἐπιστήσας ἐπολιόρκει.

§ 90. ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου παρακομὴν εἰς Ἑλλάσποντον — more definitely in Philip's letter (§ 95.), τὸν σίτον παραπέμψοντα ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου εἰς Λήμνον. That a squadron sent for such a purpose should have been directed to proceed no farther than the Hellespont, appeared to Droysen (p. 116.) both strange in itself, and hard to reconcile with the supposition that the real object of the expedition was to relieve Selymbria. Böhnecke (p. 481. n. 4.) observes: *Nota Hellespontii notionem apud Tzetzem, Chil. i. 837. qui dicit* (I subjoin the text of Tzetzes), Ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου τῶν στενῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν μέσῳ πάντων Μέχρι γεφύρας Βλαχερνῶν (in the Golden Horn) Ἑλλάσποντος καλεῖται. But it would have been more to the purpose, if he had shown that Ἑλλάσποντος was used in this sense in the time of Demosthenes. The very name of Blachernæ might suggest a suspicion that this extension of the original meaning belongs to the times of Constantinople, not of Byzantium, and there is great reason to doubt that it was generally recognised even in the age of Tzetzes. For Eustathius, writing a little later in the same century, seems not to have been aware of this usage. He only raises the question (ad Dion. Per. p. 111. Bernhardt), εἴτε τὸν Ἑλλάσποντον καὶ τὴν Προποντίδα εἰς ἓν τι συναλειπτέον, ἢ μᾶλλον μετὰ τὸν πλατὺν Αἰγαῖον τρία ταῦτα Βορείοτερα ῥητέον (the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Bosphorus), ἔχει γὰρ ἀμφιβόλως ταῦτα διὰ τοὺς παλαιούς, ὧν οἱ μὲν μόνα τὰ κατὰ Σηοτὸν καὶ Ἀβυδὸν Ἑλλάσποντον εἶπον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλην τὴν Προποντίδα, οἱ δὲ μέρος τι αὐτῆς τὸ ἐντὸς Περίσθου τῇ Ἑλλησπόντῃ ἀπέριψαν. But Bernhardt (p. 867.) observes: *Quod autem ait, ὅλην τὴν Προποντίδα, in eo testem idoneum (nisi Lydus de Magg. Rom. III. 62. οὐ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τῇ πόλει πορθμοῦ οὐχ Ἑλλησπόντου σύμπαντος, sufficit) desideramus: nam Polybii quidem narratio libro IV. (44.) istam non admittit interpretationem.* Polybius says: *Whether you are sailing with a south wind from the Hellespont, or with the Etesians from the Euxine towards the Hellespont, the navigation is both direct and easy along the coast of Europe from Byzantium to the straits of the Propontis at Abydos and Sestos, and thence in like manner back to Byzantium.* The expansion of the Hellespont into the Propontis (and the Ægean) was suggested — as Eustathius indicates u. s. — by a misconception of the epithet which Homer applied to the Hellespont as a river, πλατὺν Ἑλλάσποντον, and was probably little heard of before the Alexandrian period, and then only in literature.

the decree under which Laomedon had sailed, related only to the professed purpose of his expedition, it is probable that the seizure appeared to the people an unprovoked outrage, and excited vehement indignation. An embassy was decreed to be sent to Philip, to demand restitution. But the decree, if that which we have is genuine, was drawn up with great caution and moderation, and with an evident desire to avoid a rupture. It directed the envoys to inquire, whether Amyntas had acted in ignorance, and in that case to assure the king that the people was willing to overlook the mistake; and, if it appeared that Laomedon was in fault, to punish him as he might deserve. On the other hand, if there had been a wilful aggression on the part of Philip or his admiral, the envoys were to write home for farther instructions, that the people might deliberate on the course which it became it to adopt. The author of this decree was one Eubulus, a person otherwise totally unknown to history; but its contents were such as might very well have proceeded from the celebrated statesman of the same name.<sup>1</sup> The envoys brought back a letter from

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<sup>1</sup> The celebrated Eubulus was of the deme Anaphlystus; the author of the decree, of Coprus (Εὐβούλος Μησιθέου Κόπριος), a deme very rarely mentioned, though well ascertained (see Boeckh, C. I. I. p. 216.), and so by its rarity helping to confirm the genuineness of the document. Droysen, however (p. 104.), thinks it perfectly clear, that when Demosthenes (§ 92.) says, τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα Εὐβούλος ἔγραψεν, οὐκ ἐγώ, he can have meant no one but the celebrated Eubulus. But as the decree containing the description of its author had just been read, the orator had no need to distinguish him by the addition of his deme. Böhnecke (p. 479.) gives a different reason for the omission: *Demosthenes demoticum nomen non addidit, nemo autem audientium de celeberrimo Anaphlystio cogitare potuit, quoniam hic Philippi partibus favit*. But this appears to me a very unsatisfactory reply to Droysen's objection; for the pacific character of the decree is quite in harmony with the political sentiments of the Anaphlystian. By a singular coincidence, the second decree bears the name of Aristophon as its author. Yet this again was not the renowned Aristophon δ' Ἀθηναῖος, but δ' Κολλυταῖος, a person who is nowhere else expressly mentioned with this addition, though Ruhnken (Hist. Crit. Orr. Gr. p. xlv.) believes him to be meant in other passages. Droysen, on the other hand, contends (p. 114.) that the decree is the only authority for his existence, and that Demosthenes, when he speaks of two decrees moved on this occasion by Aristophon (τὸ ἐφεξῆς Ἀριστοφῶν, εἰθ' Ἡγήσιππος, εἴτα Ἀριστοφῶν πάλιν), means the Asenian, and consequently that the decree is a forgery. Böhnecke (p. 432. n. 3.) observes: *Celeberrimus Azeniensis etiamsi hoc tempore non futo functus erat, tamen propter aetatem nimis grandem non amplius respublicas*

Philip, in which he told the people, that they must be very simple if they supposed he was not aware that the ships had been sent for the relief of Selymbria, though Laomedon had received no public orders to that effect, and had only acted in secret concert with some individuals — magistrates and private citizens — who desired to kindle a war by which they hoped to profit. He would restore the ships, and, if the Athenians would no longer allow their leading men to pursue a tortuous policy, but would visit it with marks of their displeasure, would endeavour on his part to preserve the peace.<sup>1</sup> This letter exhibits a remarkable contrast to the tone of the Athenian decree, and it is difficult to understand how, with such a proof of the people's pacific disposition before his eyes, Philip could have used such language<sup>2</sup> — since the

*administravit.* Droysen (u. s.) thinks that his age (he was then about ninety), need not have prevented him from taking part in public business, as other Athenian statesmen continued to do at a very advanced period of life. At least we may venture to say, that it would not account for Demosthenes using his name, without any addition, to describe a much less notable person, unless where the circumstances of the case plainly precluded the possibility of a mistake. But here, as before, since the decree in which the Colyttian is named was immediately about to be read, the addition might seem superfluous.

Ἐὰν βούλησθε μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς προστηκόσιν ὑμῶν κακοῦθως πολιτεῦσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιτιμᾶτε, πειράσασθαι κατὰ διαφυλάττειν τὴν εἰρήνην.

<sup>1</sup> Böhnecke appears to have felt this difficulty; but the conjecture by which he tries to get rid of it, is not only violent and improbable in itself, but, even if admitted, does not answer his purpose. He recognises the cautious character of the decree of Eubulus, but supposes that the people was afterwards induced to use peremptory and threatening language. He observes (p. 483.): *Eubuli de navibus repetendis pæphisma cautius scriptum erat; hoc legatis primum regi perferendum erat; oratores autem Aristopho, Hegesippus, Philocrates, Cephisopho, alii rem acriter persequuti sunt; et populus legatis alia decreta mandasse videtur, regi tradenda, si non continuo postulationi satisfaceret, aut eam omnino denegaret, hæc autem infestius scripta fuisse non dubito; videtur populus regi exprobrasse, quod raptis navigiis pacem violarit, et minatus esse: se vi recepturos esse quam jure iis denegaret: simul legati (legatos) mandata accepisse conjicere licet duci copiis in Hellesponto præfecto perferenda.* This appears to me too much like turning history into a romance. The conjecture is perfectly needless, as the other decrees may very well have related to precautionary measures, to be taken with a view to the contingency of an unsatisfactory answer from Philip. But it is also glaringly inconsistent with the language and argument of Demosthenes. His object is to show that in this affair measures of a warlike tendency were moved by others, while he had no share in them. Now it is certainly singular enough that with this view he should have read a decree such as that of Eubulus, and the other perfectly neutral document which he calls the decree of Aristophon. But it is quite incomprehensible that he should have done this, if the other decrees, whose authors he names without citing the documents themselves, were of the character announced by Böhnecke.

restitution of the ships proves that he did not wish to precipitate an open breach — unless we suppose that he was conscious of having committed an unprovoked aggression, and sought to justify it by a groundless imputation.

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With information so scanty as that which we possess with regard to the siege of Selymbria, leaving, as it does, no light doubt on the fact itself, it seems useless to offer any conjecture as to its duration or result, or as to the way in which it was connected with that of Perinthus. It appears to have been early in the following spring (340), that Philip began the siege of Perinthus.<sup>1</sup> He expected perhaps that Perinthus would prove an easier conquest than Byzantium, and would aid him greatly in the reduction of the more powerful city. It was however extremely strong by nature — being built on an isthmus, in the form of a theatre, on a series of terraces rising from the sea, which washed it on two sides — and well fortified.<sup>2</sup> The co-operation of a fleet was necessary for the siege, and the Macedonian admiral was ordered to sail into the Propontis. It was however discovered, or suspected, that the officer, probably Chares, who commanded an Athenian squadron in the Hellespont, was preparing, in concert with Diopithes, to oppose his passage through the streights, and had called upon the Byzantians for aid.<sup>3</sup> In this intelligence, or surmise, Philip found a pretext for sending a body of

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Siege of  
Perinthus.

<sup>1</sup> So Diodorus (xvi. 76.), referring the beginning of the sieges both of Perinthus and Byzantium to the archonship of Nicomachus. Philochorus (Dion. ad Amm. c. 11.) apparently places both in the year of the following archon, Theophrastus, Ol. cx. 1. But Boeckh (St. der Ath. iv. 14.) shows that Philochorus may very well have meant the same thing as Diodorus. Mr. Clinton, when he remarks (p. 223.), *Philochorus determines the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium to the year of Theophrastus, which refutes Mr. Boeckh, who places the commencement of those sieges at the preceding year*, takes no notice of Boeckh's reasons. Böhnecke likewise places the commencement of both sieges early in the spring of Nicomachus; certainly not because he either overlooked or undervalued the testimony of Philochorus.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 76.

<sup>3</sup> Philippi Epist. § 17.

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troops into the Chersonesus, to protect the passage of his fleet; and of course did not withdraw them after this had been effected. Perinthus however made an obstinate resistance. Though Philip's army was too strong to be met in the field, it appears that the besieged were not driven within their walls without a hard struggle<sup>1</sup>; and when the engines had made a breach in the outer inclosure, which admitted the Macedonians into the town, they had only reached the foot of a new rampart, loftier and more solid than the last, formed by a line of houses standing on higher ground, and connected together by walls carried across the intervening streets; and this but the lowest range in a series of similar barriers. Nevertheless Philip's superiority in numbers, and, perhaps we may add, in engines of the newest invention, might have enabled him to overcome all these obstacles, if the city had been left to its own resources. But it was supplied with troops and ammunition by the Byzantians; the Persian court, roused perhaps by the representations of Athens, ordered the satraps of the western coast to make the most strenuous exertions in its behalf: and Philip could not prevent them from introducing a body of mercenaries, under the command of an Athenian named Apollodorus<sup>2</sup>, together with arms, money, provisions, and stores of all kinds. He now found the difficulties of the undertaking so much increased, that he was obliged to abandon all hope of immediate success, and turned his views toward another quarter. This was quite natural: but the step which he took next was one which could so little have been expected, that, if it was not so fully attested, it would hardly have been thought credible. He divided his forces, and leaving

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch (Alex. 70.) mentions a sally and a battle in which Antigonus lost an eye.

<sup>2</sup> Paus. i. 29. 10.

one half, under some of his ablest generals, to carry on the siege, or at least the blockade, of Perinthus, led the other in person against Byzantium. He had probably excellent reasons for this movement; but for us it is not easy to perceive or conjecture them. It has been asked whether, if he had been detained several months by the resistance of Selymbria, he could have hoped to overcome that of Perinthus and Byzantium?<sup>1</sup> But it is at least as difficult to explain how, when his forces had proved inadequate to the conquest of Perinthus, he could have expected that one half would suffice for that of the larger and more powerful Byzantium, the sovereign of the confederacy, a city strongly fortified<sup>2</sup>, with a double wall of uncommon height and solidity on the land side, and possessing a navy only second to that of Athens, and decidedly superior to his own.<sup>3</sup> But an anecdote has been preserved, which, whether trustworthy or not, may suggest one not improbable mode of accounting for Philip's conduct. When he was finally compelled to raise the siege, he is said to have sent a letter, in which he informed the Byzantians, that he could have taken their city at the first assault, if he had been willing to pay the price demanded by Leon, the citizen in whom at this time they placed their chief confidence. The charge, lightly believed by the multitude, excited, we are told, a popular tumult against Leon, and drove him to lay violent hands on himself.<sup>4</sup> That Leon was guilty of such treason is, from all we know of his character, less probable than

<sup>1</sup> Böhnecke, p. 490. *Quum rex potentissimas Hellesponti (?) civitates Perinthus et Byzantium subigere vellet, quo jure hoc sperare potuisset, si circa parvi oppidi muros sex menses hævisset?*

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias (iv. 31. 5.) classes the walls of Byzantium with those of the Phocian Ambrysus and Rhodes, as the strongest he had seen, next to those of Messene.

<sup>3</sup> *Classe Byzantiis par non fuit multo mari imperantibus*, quoted from Dionys Byz. (or Gyllius), ap. Hudson Geogr. Min. iii. p. 7. by Böhnecke (p. 470.), who in this part of his work has collected several interesting details relating to this siege of Byzantium.

<sup>4</sup> Suidas, *Λέων*. Böhnecke, p. 471.



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that Philip should have descended to a false accusation. But it is not at all unlikely that the king may have received offers from some other quarter, which encouraged him to believe, that, if he appeared suddenly before Byzantium, he might make himself master of it at a blow, or at least might enable his partizans in the assembly to gain the consent of the people to his overtures, in which he called upon the Byzantians to enter into an alliance, both defensive and offensive, with him against Athens.<sup>1</sup> This proposal however was rejected, and he then proceeded to invest the city on the land side, and conscious of his naval inferiority, threw a bridge across the harbour to secure his communication with the northern shore.<sup>2</sup> It appears that he once very nearly succeeded in effecting an entrance, under cover of a dark night, through a mine carried under the wall, and was only repulsed through the occurrence of an extraordinary meteoric radiance, apparently northern lights, which revealed the danger while there was yet time to avert it. We also hear of a victory in a sea-fight gained over Philip's admiral Demetrius by the Byzantians; but whether before or after they had been reinforced, as will presently be related, by succours from Athens and other allied cities, we are unable to determine.

Philip's  
manifesto.

Between two powers whose mutual relations and measures were so decidedly hostile, peace had manifestly become a mere empty name. Philip was probably convinced that a war with Athens was unavoidable: and he can hardly have supposed that reasonings or expostulations could now alter the course of the Athenian policy; yet, as it appears,

<sup>1</sup> Dem. de Cor. (§ 109.).

<sup>2</sup> For this and the following particulars preserved by Hesychius Milesius in Origg. Constantinop. and Dionys. Byz. ap. Hudson, III. p. 14., and Steph. Byz. *Βόστωπος*, I am indebted to Böhnecke, u. s.

soon after he had laid siege to Byzantium, he sent a manifesto in the form of a letter to the Athenians, complaining of the acts by which they had violated the treaty. There can be little doubt that his object in this remonstrance was partly to impress the whole of Greece with a favourable opinion of his own good faith, patience, and moderation, but chiefly to afford materials and arguments for the orators who would plead his cause at Athens, whose efforts, even though they should not avert the war, might procure a delay, which at this juncture would have been extremely convenient to him.

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The genuineness of this paper has been questioned, but, it seems, without any good ground. It was very likely drawn up by Philip himself, and may be considered as a fair specimen of the correctness and elegance with which he wrote the language: nor does it contain anything unsuited to his circumstances, or unworthy of his reputation as a statesman.

He begins with a complaint, that the many embassies which he had sent for the maintenance of the peace had all proved fruitless, and assigns this as the reason which had determined him to exhibit the injuries he had suffered from them in one clear statement. He first alleges that a herald named Nicias had been carried off from his dominions to Athens, and that the people, instead of punishing this outrage, had detained Nicias ten months in custody, and had ordered the letters with which he was charged to be read from the bema.<sup>1</sup> They had permitted the Thasians to harbour the galleys of the Byzantians, and even pirate vessels. They had sanctioned the inroads made upon his territory by Diopithes, the seizure of Amphilochous, and the aggressions of Cal-

<sup>1</sup> Among them may have been that directed to Olympias, which the people would not suffer to be opened; Plutarch, *Præc. Ger. Relp.* 3.: but it is not certain that the anecdote belongs to this occasion.

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lias on the coasts of Thessaly:—all breaches of the treaty and in part of the law of nations, such as they themselves had made a capital ground of implacable resentment in their quarrel with Megara.

His next head of complaint is the embassy which had been sent to invite the Persian king into a league against him. He reminds them that not many years before, when rumours were spread of a Persian invasion, they had resolved, if it should be needful, to call upon him for aid against the barbarian. He attempts to shame them by the example of their forefathers, who had treated the application which the Pisistratids made for Persian succours, as one of their gravest offences.

He vindicates his right to make war on Teres and Cersobleptes, and shows that they had no claim on the Athenians for assistance; since Cersobleptes had not been included in the treaty—had in fact been rejected by their own generals when he wished to be admitted into it—and Teres had been then in alliance with Macedonia. They might as well have expected that those who expelled Evagoras from Cyprus, and Dionysius from Syracuse, should have consented to restore them to power, because each had received the Athenian franchise, as that he should give up his conquests in Thrace, merely because they had chosen to adopt Teres and Cersobleptes.

Having defended his conduct in the affairs of Cardia and Peparethus, he proceeds to complain of the hostilities by which he had been compelled to send his troops into the Chersonesus for the protection of his fleet, and takes credit to himself for the forbearance he had nevertheless shown to them, when it was in his power to invade their territory, and to inflict great damage on their navy, if not to take their city.

The instance in which they had perhaps displayed the most shameful disregard even of the appearance

of equity, was when they rejected the proposals made by his ministers and those of all his allies, to secure the independence of the other Greek states. And in this instance it was evident how widely the interests of the people differed from those of their orators. To the people it would have been advantageous to have come to an amicable settlement of this question: not so to the orators. To them, as he had been informed on good authority, peace was war, and war peace: for they drew an unfailing revenue from the generals, whom they either supported or threatened with calumnious charges: and gained popularity as friends of democracy by incessant abuse of their most eminent fellow-citizens, and of the most illustrious foreigners. He could indeed at a small expense easily have stopt the invectives of these men against himself, and have turned them into praise. But he scorned to purchase the goodwill of the people from such persons — men who were even shameless enough to lay claim to Amphipolis, notwithstanding the title which he inherited from his ancestor Alexander, who had conquered the site of the city during the Persian invasion, and that which he himself had acquired by the fortune of war, and which they themselves had confirmed by the last treaty.

“These,” he concludes, “are the charges I have against you: and since my forbearance has only encouraged you to persevere more actively in your aggressions, and to do all the harm you can to me, I will assert my just cause by force of arms, and appealing to the gods as my witnesses, will bring our controversy to an issue.”

This language might be considered as equivalent to a declaration of war, but yet it did not absolutely preclude fresh negotiations. It was not however followed by any such, but on the contrary by proceedings on both sides of a decidedly hostile character.

Still it is a doubtful question, whether war was at this time formally declared. There is evidence which, taken by itself, would seem nearly conclusive of the fact. Diodorus states that, Philip being engaged in the siege of Byzantium, the Athenians judged him to have broken his treaty with them, and forthwith dispatched a considerable naval armament to the aid of the Byzantians.<sup>1</sup> This indeed would not of itself prove that the Athenians expressed their judgment of Philip's conduct otherwise than by the expedition itself. But the statement seems to be at once confirmed and explained by the weightier testimony of Philochorus, as reported by Dionysius, according to which the cause of the war, by which what is called the peace of Philocrates was broken, was Philip's attack on Byzantium, and the immediate occasion which gave rise to the renewal of hostilities was a letter of complaint addressed by Philip to the Athenians; after which, on the motion of Demosthenes, the people decreed, that the column on which the treaty with Philip was inscribed should be taken down, a fleet equipt, and the war in all other respects prosecuted with vigour.<sup>2</sup> This account tallies per-

<sup>1</sup> xvi. 77. Φιλίππου Βυζάντιον πολιορκούντος, Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ἔκριναν τὸν Φίλιππον λευκέναι τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς συντεθείσαν εἰρήνην, εὐθὺς δὲ καὶ δύναμιν ναυτικὴν ἀξιόλογον ἐξέπεμψαν, βοηθοῦσαν τοῖς Βυζαντίοις. On this passage Böhmcke observes (p. 474. n. 2.), *Non dicit ἐψηφίσαντο: pax enim Philocratea tunc nondum ab iis dirempta est. Philippus autem ipse pacem violavit eo, quod Byzantium adortus est; hi enim ejus socii in columna pacis inscripti erant.* But the remark on the word ἔκριναν seems to me wholly beside the question. If Diodorus had written ἐψηφίσαντο, it might still have been said with equal propriety, *non dicit ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν στήλην καθελεῖν.* But the question is, whether it is likely that he would have written what we now read; if, by the words ἔκριναν τὸν Φίλιππον λευκέναι τὴν εἰρήνην, he only meant that they manifested such a judgment by the acts which he relates, and not by a formal declaration of war? And here the testimony of Philochorus comes in to confirm an antecedent probability.

<sup>2</sup> In order fully to appreciate this testimony, the passage must be exhibited entire, and not, as Böhmcke has done (p. 520.) in such a way as to divert the reader's attention from one very important portion of it. Dionysius says (ad Amm. 11.), Μετὰ τὴν Ὀλυνθίων ἄλωσιν, ἔρχοντος Θεμιστοκλέους, συνθήκαι Φιλίππου πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐγένοντο περὶ φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας. αὗται διέμειναν ἑπταετῇ χρόνον ἄχρι Νικομάχου. ἐπὶ δὲ Θεοφράστου τοῦ μετὰ Νικομάχου ἄρξαντος, ἐλύθησαν, Ἀθηναίων μὲν Φίλιππον αἰτιωμένων ἔρχειν τοῦ πολέμου, Φιλίππου δ' Ἀθηναίους ἐγκαλοῦντος· τὰς δ' αἰτίας, δι' ἃς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν, ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγοντες

fectly with that of Diodorus, and the letter in question, unless it has been lost, can hardly have been any other than that the substance of which has been just described. All this raises a very high degree of probability, that the taking down of the column, or formal declaration of war, preceded the succours sent by the Athenians to Byzantium. On the other hand we are perplexed by indications which will be noticed hereafter, which it is not easy to reject or explain away,

ἀμφότεροι, καὶ τὸν χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ τὴν εἰρήνην ἔλυσαν, ἀκριβῶς δηλοῖ Φιλόχορος ἐν τῇ ἑκτῇ Ἀτθίδος βιβλίῳ. Δῆλον δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα. Θεοφράστος Ἀλαίεύς. (Then follow the words of Philochorus, which Böhnecke has omitted as if they had clearly nothing to do with the matter; merely observing: *sub hoc Philochorus primum expeditionem contra Perinthus et Byzantium commemoravit.*) "ἐπὶ τοῦτου Φίλιππος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀναπλεύσας, Περὶνθον προσέβαλεν ἀποτυχὼν δ' ἐντεῦθεν Βυζάντιον ἐπολιόρκει, καὶ μηχανήματα προσήγεν." Ἐπειτα διεξελθὼν ὅσα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὁ Φίλιππος ἐνεκάλει διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, καὶ [ὡς ὁ δῆμος] Δημοσθένους παρακαλέσαντος αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ψηφίσματα γράψαντος, χαιρετόνησε. "Τὴν μὲν στήλην καθελεῖν τὴν περὶ τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνης καὶ συμμαχίας σταθεύσας, ταῦς δὲ πληροῦν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνεργεῖν τὰ τοῦ πολέμου." Ταῦτα γράψας κατὰ Θεοφράστον ἄρχοντα γεγονέναι τῷ μετ' ἐκείνου ἐνιαυτῷ τὰ πραχθέντα μετὰ τὴν λύσιν τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπὶ Λυσιμαχίδου ἄρχοντος διεξίρχεται. On the word *ἔπειτα*, which immediately follows those which he omits as immaterial, Böhnecke observes: "*scil. post Byzantii obsidionem et expeditionem Scythicam, quam an Philochorus commemoraverit nescimus, Dionysius autem necessaria tantum afferens præterit;*" and to the whole passage he subjoins the remark: *Manifesto igitur in fine anni (Ol. cx. 1.), pax soluta est, quum quæ post fœdus ruptum ab Atheniensibus acta essent, statim sub incunte sequenti anno (Ol. cx. 2.) narraverit Philochorus.* But how little the inference which appears to Böhnecke so manifest is warranted by the connection of the whole passage, will appear when we consider that Dionysius, having mentioned the intercrimination of Philip and the Athenians, proceeds to say, that the causes on account of which they went to war with one another are accurately stated by Philochorus in the 6th book of his *Atthis*, from which he will extract what is most necessary for his purpose (τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα); and then follows the quotation which Böhnecke omits as irrelevant. But if it really was so, and if it did not on the contrary contain the very cause of the war, not only will Dionysius have introduced as τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα, what might just as well have been omitted, but he will have altogether omitted what was most material, and what he had prepared the reader to expect. For on this supposition he will not have assigned any cause for the war, though the cause had been so accurately stated by Philochorus, whom for that reason he proposed to quote. This deficiency is not in the slightest degree supplied by the subsequent allusion to the occupation of Elatea, which is mentioned as if it had occurred in the year of Lysimachides, and only in connection with the treaty between Athens and Thebes. Böhnecke is also obliged to suppose that Dionysius was altogether mistaken about Philip's letter to the Athenians, that he found no notice of that letter in Philochorus, and erroneously referred to it what Philochorus related as to the mutual complaints of the two parties. Not only is this very hard upon Dionysius, but it is extremely difficult to conceive how he could have made such a mistake, if the account of the causes of the war which he found in Philochorus agreed with Böhnecke's. For then the transactions subsequent to Philip's letter, particularly those immediately preceding the occupation of Elatea, must have filled the most room and the chief place in it.

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that at a later period the peace of Philocrates was considered at Athens as still subsisting in form, though in fact repeatedly violated by Philip. But at least there can be no doubt, that henceforward nothing but a formal declaration was wanting to a state of open war between the two powers, and that the Athenians were persuaded by Demosthenes to pledge themselves to exert their most strenuous efforts for the deliverance of Byzantium. But so deep had been the alienation produced by the Social War between the two cities, that it was doubtful, as Demosthenes intimates<sup>1</sup>, whether the Byzantians would consent to accept succours from Athens. He himself, it appears, headed the embassy sent for the purpose of forming an alliance with them.<sup>2</sup> Yet, when he had effected this object, the fruit of his negotiation had wellnigh been lost, through factious intrigues and mismanagement. Chares had so much interest as to procure himself to be appointed to the command of the expedition. It was scarcely possible to have made a more unhappy choice. For, beside his general defects of character and capacity, he was the very man who above all others had provoked the enmity of the Byzantians, and contributed to kindle the Social War.<sup>3</sup> The consequence was that all his operations failed: the allies to whose aid he was sent dreaded him scarcely less than they did the enemy, and refused to receive him; and he employed his forces to exact *benevolences*,—that was the Attic term for this kind of robbery<sup>4</sup>—from the defenceless.

B. C. 340.  
Byzantium  
relieved.

It may easily be supposed that Chares in his despatches laid the blame of his miscarriages on the

<sup>1</sup> De Cherson. § 14.

<sup>2</sup> De Cor. § 304. Though the embassy here mentioned may have taken place a little earlier.

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. V. p. 303.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. de Cherson. § 25. φασὶ δ' εὐνοίας δίδοναι, καὶ τοῦτο τοῖσιν ἔχει τὰ λήμματα ταῦτα.

distrust of the Byzantians; and the Athenians were at first almost as indignant at the affront, as when their troops were dismissed by the Spartans from the siege of Ithome. They were inclined to recal their forces, and to leave the Byzantians to their fate. But Phocion pointed out the real cause of their failure, and the just motives which their allies had for suspicion. The people was still capable of listening to truth, though harshly expressed. It decreed a fresh armament, and appointed Phocion himself to the supreme command. This appears to have been very expeditiously fitted out, and when it joined the other, they amounted together to 120 sail. They carried heavy-armed troops, who were Athenian citizens, arms, and provisions. Phocion, on his arrival at Byzantium, encamped without the walls, and did not demand admittance for his men. His fame however had gone before him, and it chanced that Leon had been his bosom companion at Athens, when they studied together in the groves of Academus. He undertook to answer for Phocion's good faith, and the Athenians were admitted into the city, where they won universal good-will and esteem, as well by their zeal and bravery, as by their orderly behaviour.<sup>1</sup> It seems to have been the example of Athens that brought succours from other allied states, among which were Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, to Byzantium.<sup>2</sup> And we gather from a stratagem related by Polyænus, that Philip found himself unable to cope with their united forces. He is said to have drawn several away from Byzantium by circulating reports in their camp, that he was laying siege to their own cities.<sup>3</sup> His

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phocion, 14.<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 77.<sup>3</sup> iv. 2. 21. Böhnecke (p. 481.) supposes that the siege of Selymbria was undertaken on occasion, and as a part of this stratagem; which appears to me both highly improbable in itself, and at variance with the statement of Polyænus. Φίλιππος φανερός ἦν διαπέμπων μέρη τῆς στρατιᾶς ἄλλο ἀλλαχοῦ εἰς δόκησιν οὐκ ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν.



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finances too were so exhausted by the expenses of the siege, that he was obliged, as we are informed, to recruit them by indiscriminate piracy.<sup>1</sup> In the end he was forced to raise the siege both of Byzantium and Perinthus<sup>2</sup>: his troops were driven out of the Chersonesus<sup>3</sup>; and Phocion not only captured several of his ships, but landed on many parts of the coast, expelled the Macedonian garrisons from some of the towns, and made destructive inroads into the interior. In one of these he was so severely wounded as to be obliged to return home.

It was long since Athens had seen herself standing in so proud a position. Her restless enemy, notwithstanding his victorious campaigns, had been baffled in his main attempts, at Megara, in Eubœa, and in the west of Greece, and had now been completely defeated in the most important enterprise he had yet undertaken. The glory was almost all her own, though Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and some other states had sent succours to Byzantium. Byzantium and Perinthus expressed their gratitude by a joint decree, which conferred the amplest privileges of isopolity on the Athenians, and directed that a group of three colossal statues should be erected in Byzantium, representing the Athenian People receiving a crown from each of the rescued cities; and that a solemn deputation should be sent to each of the four public

<sup>1</sup> Justin, ix. 1. 5. *Longa obœdionis mora exhaustus, pecuniæ commercium de piratica mutuatus.* Böhnecke (u. s.) connects this with the expedition under Leodamas: *Quum itaque mare infestum esset, ab Atheniensibus viginti armata naves duce Leodamante in Hellespontum missæ sunt, &c.* But is it credible that Philip, when so exhausted by the siege of Byzantium, should have undertaken that of Selymbria?

<sup>2</sup> Flathe (i. p. 226.) surely places this event in a false light, when he says that Philip withdrew his forces, to show the two cities that he did not aim at an immediate possession of them. The decree in Demosth. de Cor. § 112. expresses that his object was their destruction.

<sup>3</sup> It is not quite clear how this fact, which is proved by the decree of the Chersonesians (Dem. u. s.), is, to be reconciled with Justin's assertion (ix. 1., that Philip marched from Byzantium into the Chersonesus, and took many cities there.

Games of Greece, to proclaim the benefits they had received, and the honours with which they had requited them. A golden crown of the value of sixty talents, and an altar consecrated to Gratitude and the Athenian People, were decreed by the colonists of Sestus, Elæus, Madytus, and Alopeconnesus.

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The merit of this success was due in a great degree to the activity and eloquence of Demosthenes: and in the autumn of the same year (October, 340) he rendered a perhaps not less important, though not equally brilliant, service to the commonwealth, by a legislative enactment, which, while it corrected a mischievous abuse, enabled the state to avail itself of resources, which previously had been unemployed for public purposes. Down to this time a regulation had subsisted, which affords a remarkable instance how, even under the most purely democratical institutions, the grossest injustice may be authorised by the laws in favour of the wealthy. The citizens who were liable to the charges of the trierarchy were distributed into classes, each of sixteen members, without any respect to difference of fortune. By the existing law these sixteen were made to contribute equally to the expense of one galley. Demosthenes had attempted at an earlier period to remedy this abuse, which was of course cherished by many powerful patrons. We do not know whether his proposal was rejected, or whether means were found to evade the execution of it. The evil seems at least to have been as crying as ever, when the renewal of hostilities on the occasion of the siege of Byzantium probably lent an additional force to his arguments, which enabled him to carry his plan. Its object was to distribute the whole burden of the trierarchy with reference not to persons, but to property: so that the part which fell on each contributor should be in exact proportion to his means. Demosthenes himself spoke

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of the Tri-  
erarchy.

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with exultation of the success of his measure<sup>1</sup>; and the charges by which his adversaries endeavoured to detract from his merit are hardly intelligible, and are the less deserving of notice, as they do not seem to impeach the equity and utility of the reform.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> De Cor. p. 262. πάντα γὰρ τὸν πόλεμον τῶν ἀποστάλων γιγνομένων κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν ἐμὸν: no complaint was made by a single trierarch, nor was any one of them put under arrest, nor a single galley either lost or left behind, because not ready to sail; cases which, under the old law, were of frequent occurrence. I quite agree with Boeckh (St. d. A. iv. 14. p. 117.) against Corsini (F. A. i. p. 352.), whose opinion is adopted by Böhnecke (p. 479.), that the words πάντα τὸν πόλεμον do not prove that the trierarchical law preceded the beginning of the war. On the other hand, I do not admit, what Boeckh appears to intimate, that because Demosthenes speaks of this law as subsequent to the measures by which he effected the deliverance of the Chersonesus and Byzantium (§ 115. τὸ Χερσόνησον καὶ Βυζάντιον σῶσαι; § 127. ἃ τούτων ἐξῆς ἐπολιτευόμεν), it follows that the siege of Byzantium had been raised before the law was passed.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines in Ctes. § 223. Unless indeed this passage — as the expression νομοθεήσας περὶ τῶν τριακοσίων νεῶν inclines me strongly to suspect — alludes to the proposal contained in the oration *De Symmoriais*. Dinarchus, in Dem. § 43., charges Demosthenes with having repeatedly procured his own law to be altered, so as to suit the interest of those who bribed him.

## CHAPTER XLVI.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN PHILIP  
AND THE ATHENIANS TO HIS DEATH.

*Philip's expedition to Scythia. — Proceedings of the Amphictyonic Council. — War with Amphissa. — Philip General of the Amphictyons. — Theban Politics. — Philip seizes Elatea. — Measures of Demosthenes. — Treaty between Athens and Thebes. — Negotiations at Thebes and at Athens. — Battle of Chæronea. — Preparations at Athens. — Conditions of Peace. — Congress at Corinth. — Philip's Expedition in Peloponnesus. — Philip's Marriage with Cleopatra. — His domestic Troubles. — Pixodarus. — Festival at Ægæ. — Philip murdered. — Suspicions against Olympias and Alexander. — Philip's Character.*

A GREEK, who had been watching the course of Philip's movements must have been surprised to hear, that, after having raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, on which he had spent so much time and money, if not many lives; after having been driven out of the Chersonesus; and when his own territories were suffering from the enemy's inroads; instead of making any attempt to retaliate on the Athenians, as he had boasted it was always in his power to do, his next enterprise was an expedition against the Scythians. The motives assigned for this expedition by Justin<sup>1</sup> seem by no means urgent. Atheas, king of the Scythians, pressed, as it is generally supposed, by the Greek colonists of Istria<sup>2</sup>, on the Euxine, had sought aid, through

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Philip's expedition to Scythia.

<sup>1</sup> ix. 2. Droysen (p. 45.) invites attention to a letter of Atheas to the Byzantians, preserved by Clemens Al. (Strom. v. 5.) as throwing important light on our history. In it the Scythian king warns the Byzantians not to injure his revenues, lest his mares should drink their water (μη βλάπτετε προσόδους ἐμὰς, ἵνα μὴ ἐμαὶ ἵπποι ἐμὲντρον ὕδαρ πίνωσι). It certainly shows that Atheas might be inclined to make common cause against them with Philip.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, u. 8. *Cum bello Istriarum premeretur.* These Istriani are referred by all the commentators to the city of Istria, or Istros, a Milesian colony (*quondam potentissima civitas.* Amm. Marcell. xxii. 8. 43. But it is strange to find a

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the mediation of the Greeks of Apollonia, from Philip, and a body of troops had been sent to support him. That the Scythian promised, in return for his help, to adopt him as heir to his throne, sounds hardly credible. The danger however which threatened the Scythians had ceased before their allies arrived; and Atheas sent them back with an insulting message, by which he disclaimed all connection with Philip. Philip, it is said, then demanded a subsidy to enable him to carry on the siege of Byzantium, by way of compensation for the expenses of the recent expedition; but this was likewise scoffingly refused. He was now bent on revenge, raised the siege of Byzantium, and sent an embassy to Atheas, with a request that he might be allowed to erect a statue of Hercules at the mouth of the Danube, which he had vowed during the siege. The sagacious barbarian replied, that if the statue was brought to him he would set it up, and would engage to protect it; but he would not let an army cross his border: and if Philip should come and erect it by force, he should find on his return that the brass had been melted down to point the Scythian arrows. On this challenge Philip led his army across the Danube, defeated the Scythians by stratagem, and carried away an immense booty of flocks, herds, brood-mares, and male and female captives.

The plain between the Danube and the Balkan was at this period occupied by the Triballians, who had been not long before forced out of their ancient seats in the interior by the irruption of the Celts<sup>1</sup>, and were themselves at war with Atheas.<sup>2</sup> Seeing

Greek city of this age governed by a king, as the Istriani are in Justin's narratives, and invading the Scythians. I cannot help suspecting that they have taken the place of the Triballians.

<sup>1</sup> Niebuhr, *Kl. Schrift.* p. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Frontin, *ll.* 4. 20. This appears to me to confirm the conjecture on which I have ventured in a preceding note. The Triballians would then have been aware that Philip's first expedition had been directed against themselves.

that Philip's march was encumbered by the spoil, they demanded a share as the price of his passage through their country. This he refused, and a battle ensued, in which he was so severely wounded, that a report spread through the field of his death; and the consternation thus caused in his army, enabled the enemy to carry off all the booty.

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The motive to which Justin attributes this campaign, may probably enough have had some weight with Philip. It is, that the expense of the siege had drained his coffers, and that he sought to replenish them, partly by piracy, and partly by the plunder of the Scythians. What Justin terms piracy, may have been open and legitimate warfare against the maritime states, particularly the islands, which had sided with Byzantium. It is said to have recruited his finances with the sale of 170 prizes. But there is reason to believe that this was at least not the only or the chief motive of his Scythian expedition. Events which took place in Greece while he was thus engaged, raise a very strong suspicion that his principal object was to divert the attention of the Greeks for a while from himself, and to lull them into security as to his designs.

We have no direct evidence either as to the duration of the siege of Byzantium or the date of the Scythian expedition. It is only by an inference from the time apparently required for Philip's subsequent movements, that we are brought to the conclusion, that he had returned to Macedonia either before the end of 340, or very early in 339. In the autumn of 340, Æschines had been sent to represent Athens, as a Pylagoras, in the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi. Among his colleagues, who were three in number, one bearing the title of Hieromnemon, was that same Meidias who has been already mentioned as a violent enemy of Demosthenes. The office seems always to

Proceedings  
of the Am-  
phictyonic  
Council.

have been accounted of little importance; and it was probably not difficult for any party to fill it with their own adherents. Demosthenes, who had himself held it some time before, intimates that the election of Æschines was effected by some such intrigues. Diognetus was the Hieromnemon: Thrasyclus, the third Pylagoras: nothing further is known of their political bias. Æschines informs us, that on their arrival at Delphi, Meidias and Diognetus were prevented by illness from attending the council; but that he himself had received notice from persons well disposed towards Athens, that it was the intention of the deputies from Amphissa to charge the Athenians with a profane neglect of a religious ceremony, and to demand that they should be punished with a fine of fifty talents. A new chapel, it seems, had been built at Delphi, and before it was finished or consecrated, the Athenians had dedicated there some golden shields—perhaps in the place of others which had been removed during the Sacred War—with an inscription commemorating their ancient victory over the Persians and Thebans.<sup>1</sup> Æschines insinuates that the Thebans, who were affronted by this inscription, had instigated the Locrians of Amphissa to seize this pretext for gratifying their revenge. Why they should have chosen them as their instruments, instead of directly exerting their own influence, does

<sup>1</sup> Droysen (p. 38.) says that the charge was, that the Athenians had transgressed a law, which forbade the erection of a durable trophy over an Amphictyonic state; and refers to Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* 37. and Cic. *de Invent.* ii. 23. I doubt that either of these passages warrants the supposition, that the law or rather the usage (*cum ferè mos esset Graiis*, Cic. οὐδὲ γὰρ παρ' Ἑλλήσιν οἱ πρῶτοι λίθινον καὶ χαλκοῦν στήσαντες τρόπαιον εὐδοκιμοῦσιν, Plut), to which they allude, was applicable to the case. But at least this does not seem to be the charge reported by Æschines (§ 116.), *ὅτι χρυσῆς ἀσπίδας ἀνέθεμεν πρὸς τὸν καινὸν νεὼν πρὶν ἐξεργάσθαι*. The point of the charge is certainly not quite clear; but it seems to have lain in the *πρὶν ἐξεργάσθαι*, or whatever the word may be which should be substituted for *ἐξεργάσθαι* (see Harpocr. *ἐξαρδάσασθαι*), though neither Relske's *ἐξηρᾶσθαι*, nor Taylor's *ἐξαρδάσασθαι*, is quite satisfactory. Otherwise those two words would be merely irrelevant and superfluous. But Æschines had a good reason for citing the inscription which commemorated the victory gained over the Medes and Thebans, though this was not the gist of the accusation.

not appear. But there was, according to Æschines, a very strong motive to withhold the Locrians from making such an attack on Athens; since, as he asserts, they were themselves conscious that they had incurred the penalties of sacrilege, and had even bribed Demosthenes, when he was sent as pylagoras, and some of his colleagues, to hush up the matter, and to espouse their cause at Athens, if they should be threatened with a prosecution.

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It seems that after the subjugation of the Phocians, the Locrians had taken possession of the land which had afforded the pretext for the Sacred War, and continued to cultivate it for their own benefit; relying perhaps on the connivance of the states with which they had co-operated against the common enemy. If they still dreaded the enmity of Athens, it seems strange that they should have wantonly provoked it, and no less so that they should have thought to screen themselves by bribing a few of her Amphictyonic deputies. Æschines however himself, according to his own statement, had not at first intended to denounce their impiety, but was only induced to take this step by an unexpected provocation. The Hieromnemon, to whose office perhaps it would have more properly belonged to vindicate the conduct of the Athenians in the business of the shields, sent for him, and begged him to undertake the task. He had himself purposed to do so, and had begun to plead with great earnestness when he was interrupted by an Amphissian deputy, in rude and intemperate language, telling the assembly that they ought not to tolerate the name of the Athenians, but to exclude them from the holy ground, as laden with the same curse as their allies the Phocians. Then, Æschines says, he could no longer contain himself, and it occurred to him to direct the attention of the audience to the sacrilegious cultivation of the devoted plain,



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studded with rural buildings, and to the state of the harbour of Cirrha, which, though it had been solemnly doomed to perpetual desolation, was in complete repair, and frequented by ships; objects which were within view from the place of meeting. He reminded them of the dreadful curses which had been pronounced, after the first Sacred War, on all who should either do what the Locrians had done, or should connive at it. Roused by this appeal, the Council became impatient to punish the offenders. A decree was immediately passed, directing a solemn perambulation of the bounds of the devoted tract<sup>1</sup>, for the purpose of destroying all the labours of that impious industry; and, in pursuance of this decree, a proclamation was made that very day, summoning all the Delphians who were of military age, and not only the freemen but slaves, to meet the next morning at daybreak, with spades and pickaxes: and notice was given to all the members of the Council, to lend their aid in behalf of the god and his land.

The next day this motley crowd, headed by the Amphictyons, marched down to the seaside, demolished the mole of the harbour, and set fire to the adjacent houses. But as they returned from this pious work, they were met by the Locrians, who had issued with their whole force from Amphissa for the protection of their property, and narrowly escaped from their vengeance by a precipitate flight to Delphi.<sup>2</sup> The day after, Cottyphus the president of the Council—a Pharsalian<sup>3</sup> either by birth or settlement—convoked

<sup>1</sup> Dem. de Cor. (p. 277.) *πείθει ψηφίσασθαι περιελθεῖν τὴν χώραν*. The distinction between *περιελθεῖν* and *ἐπελθεῖν* in these matters is sagaciously observed by Böhmcke (p. 499. n. 2.), and had escaped Boeckh, C. i. l. 809.

<sup>2</sup> So Æschines adv. Ctes. § 123., an eye-witness, who was not disposed to soften the violence of the Locrians. The Amphictyonic decree in Demosthenes de Cor. p. 279. has, *τινὰς δὲ καὶ τετραμυρῆτας*.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Ctes. § 128. The Amphictyonic decree, u. s., calls him an Arcadian—a singular description, even if correct—not to mention that the Arcadians had no voice in the Council.

the Amphictyonic ecclesia, an assembly composed nearly of the same persons whose lives had been so recently threatened. There, says Æschines—and this we can easily believe—many accusations were brought against the Amphissians. The conclusion was a decree which fixed a day before the regular time of the next meeting, when the deputies were to assemble at Thermopylæ with proposals, sanctioned by the states which sent them, for bringing the Amphissians to justice.

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Such is the account which Æschines gave of this transaction, in a speech delivered several years later in his own defence. It seems to have been his wish to inspire his hearers with a pious horror for the profaneness of the Locrians, and yet to represent his own impeachment of them as the sally of the moment, when indignation had thrown him off his guard. As to the sincerity of his piety, and his patriotic sensibility, we are unable to judge: but Demosthenes assigns a reason drawn from the absence of the citation of the accused party required by the ordinary procedure in Amphictyonic prosecutions, for rejecting the story of the charge which the Locrians meant to bring against Athens as a mere fiction.<sup>1</sup> It is at least an assertion which, like the others, rests entirely on the authority of Æschines. Nor was it easy to disprove his statement as to the provocation he received from the Locrian deputy. All that is certain is, that the consequences were such as Philip must have desired very much to bring about, and that Æschines had previously incurred a strong suspicion of being ready to act as his instrument. Nor was it difficult to fore-

<sup>1</sup> Droysen (u. a.) thinks this argument fallacious, because it appears from the example of the Amphissians, that, when the transgression of the law was manifest to the senses, no citation was needed. But that example only proves, that the shields might have been removed, not that a fine might be inflicted for the offence, without a previous citation. The fine imposed by the Amphictyonic law (C. L. 1588. l. 16.) on offenders taken in the fact, is inapplicable here.

see them: since they were partly predicted by Demosthenes. It may indeed be pleaded in behalf of Æschines, that the dispute with the Locrians which he had excited, might have been terminated without Philip's intervention. But this would only prove that, if there was a plot to call in Philip, he was not the only agent employed in it.

Æschines and his colleagues, on their return to Athens, laid the decree of the Amphictyons before the people. He wishes it to be supposed that the measure, and his account of his own proceedings, were received with general approbation, and that the only dissentient voice was that of Demosthenes. From Demosthenes indeed we learn that he immediately exclaimed in the assembly: *You are bringing war into Attica, Æschines, an Amphictyonic war.* The result is only related by Æschines, who asserts that Demosthenes got a bill to be clandestinely passed by the Five Hundred, which he then huddled through the assembly, just as it was breaking up, so that it became a decree, before any one was aware of its contents: enacting that the deputies sent by Athens to the Amphictyonic Council should proceed to Thermopylæ and Delphi at the seasons prescribed by hereditary usage. He adds that there was a clause, which forbade them to take any part in the deliberations, acts, and proceedings of the other deputies who were to assemble at Thermopylæ. Though however his statement may prove that an important measure might be so carried at Athens, it is certain that it might be repealed by a criminal prosecution of its author, which is not said to have been instituted on this occasion.

In obedience to this decree, however obtained, the Athenian deputies remained at Athens, while the Council held its extraordinary meeting. It was attended by those of all the other states, except Thebes<sup>1</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ctes. § 128.

which was neither hostile to Amphissa, nor desirous of a new Sacred War. War was decreed against the Amphissians, and Cottyphus was appointed to the command of an Amphictyonic army, destined to reduce them to obedience. He accordingly marched with all the troops he could collect against their city. Demosthenes asserts that several of the Amphictyonic states kept back their contingents, and that the united forces effected nothing. But perhaps he may only have alluded to the final result.<sup>1</sup> The campaign, according to Æschines, was prosperous, but it seems as if Cottyphus owed his success more to the intestine discord of the Amphissians than to the strength of his army. They appear to have offered little resistance, and submitted to a fine which the Amphictyons laid on them, to be paid by instalments. But at the same time one party, which was charged with the sacrilege, was forced to go into exile, and another, called by Æschines the Pious, was restored. Perhaps this was merely a feint, made to gain time: for the Amphictyonic forces had not long withdrawn before the exiles were recalled, the Pious sent into banishment. The fine remained unpaid.

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Amphissa.

During these transactions Philip was still engaged in his Scythian expedition; but he had returned to Macedonia before the next regular meeting of the Amphictyons, which appears to have been held at Thermopylæ in the spring of 339.<sup>2</sup> He was there

B. C. 339.  
Philip general of the  
Amphictyons.

<sup>1</sup> De Cor. p. 277. *ὡς δ' οἱ μὲν οὐκ ἦλθον, οἱ δ' ἐλθόντες οὐδὲν ἐποίησαν*; not, as Böhmcke interprets him (p. 505.): *expeditio negligenter gesta est*; for these words comprise the orator's account of all that happened between the expedition under Cottyphus and the meeting in which Philip was appointed to the command.

<sup>2</sup> The Amphictyonic meetings are generally supposed to have been held alternately at Delphi and Thermopylæ, but there is no direct evidence to show at which place they were held at either season. Boeckh (C. I. I. p. 808.) collects, with great probability, from the above-mentioned Amphictyonic law, that the autumnal meeting was held at Delphi. In this opinion he is followed by K. F. Hermann, *Gr. Staatsalt.* (p. 32.); and Droysen only rejects it (p. 41.), because he cannot make it square with his chronology. Heeren (*Id.* III. I. p. 168.) is inclined to infer from Strabo, IX. p. 429. (*Δήμητρος ἱερὸν, ἐν ᾧ κατὰ πάσαν Πυλαίαν θυσίαν ἐτέλουν οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες*), that the meetings were not held by turns at

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elected general of the Amphictyons, with unlimited powers<sup>1</sup>; and Cottyphus himself was directed to proceed as ambassador to his court, with the announcement of his election, and a request *that he would march to the aid of Apollo and the Amphictyons, and not permit the rights of the god to be invaded by the impious Amphissians*.<sup>2</sup> That the commission was readily undertaken, and the petition willingly granted, may be easily supposed. Demosthenes states that Philip forthwith collected his forces, and marched into Greece.<sup>3</sup> And though, without other evidence, we could not draw any safe conclusion from this language as to the exact time at which he began his expedition, some documents which have come down to us with the oration on the Crown, if we acknowledge them as genuine, compel us to admit that statement as strictly correct, and to believe that Philip had arrived at Thermopylæ with his army before the end of March. Unhappily these same documents, questionable as their authority is, furnish almost every particle of the information we possess, with regard to the transactions of the period which intervened between his arrival in Greece and the occupation of Elatea, which we shall have shortly to relate: a period, according to them, of very near three months. And this information is in many respects extremely perplexing. One of the difficulties which it raises concerns the diplomatic relations which were subsisting between Philip and the Athenians at the time of the expedition.

We have been led to the conclusion, that during the siege of Byzantium the Athenians were persuaded by Demosthenes to remove the column which recorded

Delphi and Thermopylæ, but that the deputies first assembled at Thermopylæ, to sacrifice to Demeter, and then proceeded to Delphi to transact their business.

<sup>1</sup> αὐτοκράτορα, De Cor. p. 279.

<sup>2</sup> ἀξιοῦν ἵνα βοηθήσῃ τῷ τε Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοσι, ὥπως μὴ περιῖδῃ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀσεβῶν Ἀμφισσέων τὸν θεὸν πλημμελούμενον.

<sup>3</sup> De Cor. § 195. πρέθη γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἡγεμῶν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' εὐθὺς δύναμιν συλλέξας καὶ παρελθὼν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Κιρράϊαν, ἐρρώσθαι φράσας πολλὰ Κιρραίοις καὶ Λοκροῖς, τὴν Ἐλάτειαν καταλαμβάνει.

their treaty with Philip: an act which must have been regarded on both sides as a formal declaration of war.<sup>1</sup> Yet the documents in question represent a treaty as still existing between the two powers, after Philip had invaded Greece. There is indeed one way of reconciling this statement with our supposition. Diodorus relates, that, after the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus were raised, Philip made peace with the Athenians, and the other Greeks who had opposed him in the war. But the reader is by this time aware, that such a statement, when confirmed by no other testimony, must be regarded as extremely questionable. And in fact none of the other writers from whom we derive our knowledge of the history of these times, takes any notice of this transaction. Philochorus<sup>2</sup> was apparently ignorant of it. The two orations of Æschines and Demosthenes, in which they profess to review all the leading occurrences of this period, are silent about it, though they must both have taken an active part in the deliberations concerning it, and it would seem that it must have supplied them with many topics for mutual crimination. It can scarcely be reconciled with Plutarch's account, which we have no other reason to question, of Phocion's operations after the relief of Byzantium. The fact is in itself improbable. It is not likely that, at the juncture mentioned by Diodorus, either party should have made proposals for peace. The Athenians and their allies were probably too much elated with their success; and for this very reason Philip would

<sup>1</sup> Flathe's view of the subject is singular, and I believe solitary. He states (l. p. 227.): *It is true no formal rupture with Macedonia had taken place, for else Athens could not have appealed to the still subsisting treaties: the column, however, had been taken down and broken, and occasion given to the king, if he chose, to consider the peace as no longer subsisting.* What farther act was necessary on the part of the Athenians to constitute a formal rupture, so as to deprive them of the right of appealing to the treaty as still subsisting, he has not intimated, and it is not easy to conceive.

<sup>2</sup> In Dionys. Ep. l. ad Amm. 11.

have been unwilling to make the first advances. The orators too are not only silent as to this treaty, but their language seems plainly to imply, both that the war which followed the peace concluded in 346 had begun before Philip's expedition, and that it continued without interruption until the battle of Chæroneæ.<sup>1</sup> Still these allusions may admit of a different explanation. The statement of Diodorus, though resting on such slight authority, and in itself improbable, cannot be pronounced incredible. The difficulty therefore is not such as would warrant us in rejecting the disputed documents; and it is of course no difficulty on the supposition that war was not formally declared by the removal of the column, before the occupation of Elatea.

But the contents of these state papers raise other difficulties still more embarrassing. They represent Philip as having remained nearly three months within a few days march of the frontier of Attica, without taking any decisive step, and the whole of this time as consumed in fruitless intrigues and negotiations. The first of them, a decree bearing date the seventh of April<sup>2</sup>, after premising that Philip had forcibly occupied some of the neighbouring towns, and was treating some with hostile violence<sup>3</sup>, and was preparing to invade Attica, regardless of the existing treaties, and designing to break his oaths and the peace, directs that envoys should be sent to remonstrate with him, and exhort him to observe the treaty,

<sup>1</sup> Æsch. § 55. *τρίτον δὲ ἐπολεμοῦμεν χρόνον μέχρι τῆς ἀτυχίας τῆς ἐν Χαιρώνειᾳ.* Dem. § 185. *οὐκ ἦν τοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολέμου πέρας οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγὴ Φιλίππου, κ. τ. λ.* Böhncke takes no notice of this passage, which it is certainly not easy to reconcile with his assertion (p. 519. n. 2.), *jam ab OL. cix. 4., utrique invicem se infestaverant, nec tamen apertum bellum gesserant.*

<sup>2</sup> De Cor. p. 282. *ἐλαφροβολίωνος ἔκτῃ φθίνοντος.*

<sup>3</sup> *ὅς μὲν κατέλιπε πόλεις τῶν ἀστυγείτων, τινὰς δὲ πορθεῖ.* The construction is singular, the epithet strange, when applied to towns in northern Locria, though Æschines calls Thebes πόλις ἀστυγείτων; and above all it is almost equally difficult to believe the conduct imputed to Philip, and that he should have been falsely charged with it at the time.

or at least to give the city time for deliberation, and conclude an armistice to last a little more than a month.<sup>1</sup> We are led to suppose that Philip granted this request, and suspended his military operations, and that during this interval of apparent inaction he was labouring to gain Thebes over to his side. For a second decree, dated on the eve of the day on which the armistice would expire<sup>2</sup>, premising that Philip was attempting to alienate the Thebans from Athens, and was ready to march with his whole army to the confines of Attica, in violation of the existing treaties, directs that envoys should be sent to him with a herald, to request and exhort him to grant a truce, so that the people might have time for deliberation, as it was still determined not to resort to arms if peace might be preserved on any reasonable conditions.<sup>3</sup>

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That Athens, while Demosthenes took the lead in her counsels, should have stooped to this depth of humiliation; that she should have thrown herself, with an almost childish confession of her weakness, on the forbearance of an enemy, whom at the same time she taxes with the grossest perfidy and violence, is very difficult to believe.<sup>4</sup> But at least it can only be explained on the supposition that the people was cowed by the conviction that it was in imminent danger of being overwhelmed by the united forces of

<sup>1</sup> οἵτινες αὐτῷ διαλέξονται, καὶ παρακλεύσουσιν αὐτὸν, μάλιστα μὲν τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁμόνοιαν διατηρεῖν καὶ τὰς συνθήκας· εἰ δὲ μὴ, πρὸς τὸ βουλευσασθαι δοῦναι χρόνον τῇ πόλει, καὶ τὰς ἀνοχὰς ποιήσασθαι, μέχρι τοῦ θαρρηλιῶνος μηνός.

<sup>2</sup> μηνὸς Μουνυχιῶνος ἔτη καὶ νῆα.

<sup>3</sup> οἵτινες ἀξιόσουσι καὶ παρακλεύσουσιν αὐτὸν ποιήσασθαι τὰς ἀνοχὰς (the article here and in the former decree is hard to account for) ὅπως ἐνδεχομένου ὁ δῆμος βουλευσῆται· καὶ γὰρ νῦν οὐ κέρρικε βοηθεῖν ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν μετρίων. These last words must have been meant in the sense given in the text. But they properly imply that the people had resolved to go to war, because Philip's terms were unreasonable.

<sup>4</sup> This appears to me a stronger objection to these decrees than those which Droysen has founded on a variety of details, as to which we are perhaps not sufficiently informed to pronounce decidedly. Böhnecke treats them as if they presented no difficulty, either on this or on any other ground.



Macedon and Thebes. Yet it is clear from the sequel, that Demosthenes at least did not share this alarm; that he did not believe that Thebes would be so blind to her own interests, as to lend herself to Philip's designs; and that he hoped, as the event proved with good reason, that, when it came to the point, she would declare herself on the side of Athens. It is no less strange that he should have produced these records of the public dishonour without a word of censure on their authors, or the slightest intimation that he had offered any opposition to them. And it is perhaps still more surprising, that, during the respite obtained by this humiliating deprecation, no embassy should have been sent from Athens to enlighten and conciliate the Theban government.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand Philip's policy, as it is represented by these documents, is almost equally hard to comprehend. If he consented to the delay besought by the Athenians, it was no doubt not for their sake, but because it suited his own interest. And we can understand that, so long as he retained the hope of being able, by means of his agents or partizans at Thebes, to draw the Thebans into an alliance with him against Athens, or even to secure their neutrality, he might not think it advisable to place himself in a threatening attitude, by which they might be alarmed and irritated. But it appears from two other papers, which purport to have been produced by Demosthenes, at the same time and for the same purpose with the two already noticed, that, when he received the second Athenian embassy, he had exhausted all the resources of secret diplomacy, and could no longer hope to bring the Theban government to a decision without some

<sup>1</sup> p. 283. Droysen (p. 69.) thinks it impossible that a letter of Philip himself could have been produced among the papers by which he is said to have been emboldened (*επαρθεῖς*). But the letter contained evidence of the relations then subsisting between Athens and Thebes, which were the ground of Philip's confidence.

fresh military demonstration. The first of these two papers is his answer to the second Athenian application for a truce. It is drawn up in a strain of bitter contempt, which however we must admit to have been provoked by the two Athenian decrees. He informs the people that he is aware how they have been affected toward him from the first, and what pains they were taking to gain over the Thessalians and Thebans, and the rest of the Bœotians beside<sup>1</sup>: and that it was only after they had failed in this attempt, that they had turned round, and sent envoys, with a herald, to remind him of the treaties, and to request an armistice<sup>2</sup>, though they had suffered no aggression from him.<sup>3</sup> He was ready however to grant the armistice, if they would dismiss their evil counsellors with the merited stigma of disfranchisement.<sup>4</sup> The second paper purports to be an answer to a letter which he had received from the Thebans, evidently about the same time, in which they had assured him of their friendly sentiments toward him, and of their desire to maintain peace with him. He tells them that he was the more rejoiced to receive these assurances, and the more commended their prudence and goodwill, because he had heard of the efforts which the Athenians had been making to gain them over to a

<sup>1</sup> τίνα σπουδὴν ποιῶσθε προσκαλέσασθαι βουλόμενοι Θεττάλους καὶ Θηβαίους, ἔτι δὲ καὶ Βοιωτοὺς. It is unlikely that Philip should have written thus without some foundation of fact; and yet that any public embassy had at this time been sent from Athens either to Thessaly or Thebes, since Philip's arrival in Greece, would be inconsistent with the proceedings which followed the occupation of Elatea. It seems therefore as if the allusion must have been pointed at some secret missions of private and unauthorised agents. But then we should have expected this to have been noticed, as in the case of the private instructions supposed to have been given to Leodamas during the siege of Selymbria. But that Athens should either publicly or privately have negotiated with the Bœotian towns, as powers independent of Thebes, is, as Droysen justly observes (p. 77.), hardly credible.

<sup>2</sup> νῦν ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς, ἀποστέλλαντες πρὸς ἐμὲ πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκα, συνθηκῶν μνημονεύετε καὶ τὰς ἀνοχὰς αἰτεῖσθε; again the article before ἀνοχὰς, while it is omitted before συνθηκῶν, so as to suggest the meaning, that the embassy was sent to make overtures for a treaty.

<sup>3</sup> κατ' οὐδὲν ὅφ' ἡμῶν πεπλημμελημένοι.

<sup>4</sup> ὥστε τοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς συμβουλευόντας οὖν παραπέμψαντες τῆς προσήκουσας ἀτιμίας ἀξιώσῃτε.

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league against him, and had feared that they were on the point of yielding to these persuasions<sup>1</sup>: and he admonishes them that they would best consult their own interest, if they persevered in the same peaceful and friendly policy.

His answer to the Athenians manifestly pledged him to nothing: and if he was not perfectly satisfied with the result of his correspondence with Thebes, it seems clear at least that he could not hope to gain any farther advantage there by prolonged delay and military inaction. And accordingly Demosthenes represents the decisive blow as struck immediately afterward. Yet according to other evidence, which must stand or fall with the documents we have been just considering, Philip appears to have remained in the same position without any movement, military or political, five or six weeks longer.<sup>2</sup> The observation of Demosthenes on the documents which he produced—whether they were the same with those which have been just described, or these have been substituted for them—is at least an authentic statement of the view which the orator took of Philip's policy. *Philip, he says, having, by means of his partizans, brought the two cities into such a state of feeling toward one another, and being encouraged by these decrees and answers, came with his army and took possession of Elatea, in the assurance that, whatever might happen, there would never more be harmony between us and the Thebans.*<sup>3</sup> And we have no reason to doubt that this was a correct view of the case. Philip was aware that the occupation of Elatea would be regarded, both at Thebes and at Athens, as a decisive intimation of

<sup>1</sup> πρότερον ἡμῶν κατεγγράσκον ἐπὶ τῷ μέλλειν πείθεσθαι ταῖς ἐκεῖνων ἐλπίσιν.

<sup>2</sup> The decree purporting to have been moved by Demosthenes immediately after the occupation of Elatea, *Ἀκροφοριῶνος* ἔκτῃ καὶ δέκῃ.

<sup>3</sup> p. 284. Οὕτω διαθείς ὁ Φίλιππος τὰς πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας διὰ τούτων, καὶ τούτοις ἐπαρθεὶς τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν, ἤκεν ἔχων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἑλάνειαν κατέλαβεν, ὥς οὐδ' ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι συμπνευσόντων ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θεβαίων.

his real designs. But he trusted that the jealousy and ill-will which had hitherto prevailed between the two cities, and which he had not failed to foster as much as he could, would prevent Thebes from interposing in defence of her neighbour; and he might even hope that his new position would add so much weight to the arguments of his friends in the Theban councils, that he might be joined by a Theban force for the invasion of Attica.

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But in these calculations he seems to have overlooked an important fact, though it had apparently not escaped the observation of Demosthenes.

Since the Phocian war a great change had taken place in the sentiments with which he was regarded at Thebes. He had indeed been a useful ally: but he was something more; he was a powerful protector. They had received an obligation, which humbled them, and therefore inspired them rather with jealousy than with gratitude. They could not but feel that they had sunk, and that he had risen into their place. Out of Bœotia they were powerless; within it, they owed their sovereignty to his favour. In such a mood men easily take offence, and are deeply wounded by slight provocations. The Thebans had expected that Nicæa would have been ceded to them: Philip, as we have seen, had annexed it to Thessaly. They had a claim to Echinus, a town on the Malian gulf, or, as Demosthenes intimates, were actually in possession of it: Philip took it away from them.<sup>1</sup> These injuries might not have been so grievous to them, if they had not been inflicted by the hand of their benefactor. But, independently of these, they were not at all disposed to contribute to his further aggrandisement. Their old grudge against Athens, though still rankling, began to appear trifling in

Theban  
politics.

<sup>1</sup> Philipp. ii. § 44.

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comparison with these grounds of alarm and resentment. They had already given some intimation of the policy which they meant to pursue, when they kept aloof from the extraordinary meeting held on the affair of Amphissa. They had no wish to provoke his resentment, but they were not prepared to become his instruments for the subjugation of Greece, nor to remain passive spectators of an enterprise directed to that object. Even the Thessalians, as Demosthenes asserts<sup>1</sup>, and probably knew, shared these sentiments.

Philip seizes  
Elatea.

Elatea was the chief town in the east of Phocis, as Delphi in the west, and so situate as to command the defiles which are the principal entrance to Phocis and Bœotia from the north.<sup>2</sup> And Philip, when he took possession of it, immediately began to strengthen its fortifications. The impression produced by this movement, both at Athens and at Thebes, was very different from that which he appears to have expected. A lively picture has been left by Demosthenes of the manner in which the news was received at Athens, where it probably arrived the next evening. The prytnes, to whom it was first brought, were at table in their council-hall. They instantly rose, and gave orders betokening a crisis of extraordinary and imminent danger. The market-place was forthwith cleared of the hucksters who exposed their wares there, and the officers even set fire to their wicker stalls. The generals were summoned, the trumpeter was ordered to be in attendance: but he was hardly needed to sound an alarm through the city.<sup>3</sup> The precise nature of the danger was probably understood by few: the general opinion was perhaps that Philip was in full march for Attica. All waited impatiently for the morning. At day-break the Five Hundred

<sup>1</sup> De Cor. § 187. foll.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, ix. p. 418.

<sup>3</sup> As Diodorus (xvi. 84.) says was done all night long.

were assembled, while the people flocked to the Pnyx; and the seats were already filled by a curious and anxious multitude, before the Council had gone through the preliminary forms required to introduce the business. At length the Council entered: the bearer of the news was produced, and made to repeat his story: then followed the herald's invitation: Who will speak? An unusually long pause ensued: the herald reiterated his question; but no one came forward out of the crowd of orators and official persons present, until at last Demosthenes mounted the bema.

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He himself has preserved some fragments of the speech which he made on this occasion, or rather an outline of its contents. His first object was to calm the people's worst fears, which arose from the suspicion, that Philip was acting in concert with the Thebans. He pointed out that, if such a concert had existed, the seizure of Elatea would have been unnecessary; he would already have been on the borders of Attica. There was however a faction at Thebes subservient to his interests, and the object with which he had taken up his threatening position, was to animate his partizans, and to strike terror into those whom he could not corrupt or deceive. The course then which it became Athens to pursue was clear: all feelings of rivalry and ill-will towards Thebes must be laid aside: they must consult as if less for their own safety than for hers, which was in more immediate danger. And first of all they must make a display of strength, which would encourage the friends of liberty at Thebes, as much as its enemies were elated by the neighbourhood of the Macedonian camp. He proposed that their whole force, infantry and cavalry, should march out as far as Eleusis, and that ten ambassadors should be appointed to go to Thebes, who should likewise have a voice in the council of the

Measures  
of Demo-  
sthenes.

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generals with respect to the movements of the army. And the language of the ambassadors, when they came to Thebes, should be that of men who were not asking a favour, but offering a benefit.

The decree, which has been preserved as that in which he embodied his proposal, is so different in its character from the ordinary state-papers of this and indeed of every age, as to raise great doubt of its genuineness.<sup>1</sup> If it is not a rhetorical exercise, it shows that Demosthenes deemed it advisable to excite the enthusiasm and to flatter the pride of the Athenians, by reminding them of the generous protection which their ancestors had granted to the Heracleids and to Œdipus.

The proposal of the embassy at least was unanimously adopted<sup>2</sup>; and the orator himself was elected one of the envoys. We hear of two other decrees which he appears to have carried either at this time or a little earlier, when it was known that Philip was on the point of invading Greece. The works which were going on about the docks and the arsenal were suspended, that the money employed on them might be devoted to purposes of more pressing importance: and this measure introduced that which Demosthenes had so long had at heart: the surplus which had hitherto been swallowed up by the theoric fund was now at last appropriated to the maintenance of the troops.<sup>3</sup>

Treaty  
between  
Athens and  
Thebes.

The envoys no doubt repaired to Thebes without delay: but they found an adverse embassy already

<sup>1</sup> Its tone presents a suspicious contrast to the sobriety of the speech reported by Demosthenes himself. It is also singular that in this report not a word should be said of any naval preparations, though the decree directs that a fleet of 200 ships should be manned, and should sail into the Malian Gulf (*ἐπὶ τὸς Πυλῶν*): a measure, the urgency of which is far from evident, particularly when we consider that the works at the docks and the arsenal were suspended on account of the war. Philochorus, u. s. How it is that only five envoys are named in the decree, may perhaps more easily admit of conjectural explanation.

<sup>2</sup> De Cor. § 230. *συνεπαυσεῖσθαι πάντων καὶ οὐδενὸς εἰσδόντος ἐνδοντιον οὐδέν.*

<sup>3</sup> Philochorus in Dionys. Ep. i. ad Amm. 11.

there, composed of Macedonian and Thessalian ministers<sup>1</sup>, with those of some other states, probably the little tribes north of Phocis, which had displayed so much zeal in the last Sacred War, and still regarded Philip as the champion of religion.<sup>2</sup> They demanded either the co-operation of the Thebans against Athens, or at least a free passage through Bœotia. It was a difficult question; and the friends of Athens had to defend a bold step, when they proposed to defy a king who was within one or two days' march of the city, with an army of nearly 30,000 men. We may well believe that opinions were so nearly balanced in the Theban assembly, that the eloquence of Demosthenes may have contributed not a little to turn the scale. But perhaps the intelligence which he brought of the vigorous preparations which Athens was making may have weighed still more on the same side. The terms also of the alliance proposed were very favourable and honourable to Thebes. Æschines—who has probably not reported them quite correctly—makes them a topic of reproach to his adversary.<sup>3</sup> But perhaps nothing more was conceded than was imperatively required: and certainly it was no time for haggling, either about the expenses of the war, or about claims of precedence. Æschines asserts that the Thebans were allowed by the treaty to share the command of the naval force, though Athens was to bear all the charges; and that the army was placed entirely at their disposal: evidently a gross exaggeration, which however shows that Thebes was to pay her own troops. A more important article was one which guaranteed the sovereignty of the Bœotian towns to the Thebans, and pledged the aid of Athens to reduce any that might revolt from them to obedience.

<sup>1</sup> The Macedonians, Amyntas and Clearchus; the Thessallians, Daochus and Thrasydæus. Plut. Dem. 18, from Marsyas.

<sup>2</sup> Philoch. ap. Dion. u. s.

<sup>3</sup> Ctes. § 142, foll.



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XLVI.Negotiations at  
Thebes and  
at Athens.

Philip was alarmed by the issue of these negotiations, and, in the hope of dissolving the newly formed league, made overtures of peace both at Thebes and at Athens. His party at Thebes, though it had been forced to give way, was still powerful, and might be strengthened as long as an avenue was kept open for bribes or persuasions. Some of the Bœotarchs leaned to his side, or at least began to waver as to the expediency of proceeding to extremities. The Athenian troops sent to Thebes were directed by the Theban government to return home.<sup>1</sup> At Athens, Philip's proposals were strongly seconded by Phocion, who had recently arrived with the squadron under his command<sup>2</sup>; and all the energy and influence of Demosthenes were required to induce the people to reject them. He urged the policy of removing the theatre of war as far as possible from Attica. Phocion observed, that the question was, not where they should fight, but how they should conquer. The event justified his fears, but did not prove that the hopes of Demosthenes were ill-founded. Æschines describes his adversary as protesting against peace, even before it had been proposed, with outrageous violence<sup>3</sup>: and though he denies with scorn that the eloquence of Demosthenes had any share in bringing about the alliance with Thebes, would have it believed that his clamour deterred the Theban government from listening to Philip's overtures. When this attempt had failed, Philip did not think it advisable immediately to advance into Bœotia, but resolved first to strengthen himself with such reinforcements as he could draw from Peloponnesus. He sent a summons to his Peloponnesian allies, in which he represented

<sup>1</sup> Æsch. Ctes. p. 75.<sup>2</sup> Plut. Phoc. 16. *ὡς κατέπλευσεν ἀπὸ τῶν νήσων*. This circumstance agrees very well with the supposition that these proposals preceded the summons sent to the Peloponnesian allies to meet in Boedromion.<sup>3</sup> Threatening to drag any one who should speak in favour of peace with Philip, to prison, by the hair,

the cause of religion as the only one that had moved him to take the field, and called upon them to assemble their forces in Phocis with provisions for forty days in the course of October.<sup>1</sup> His application seems to have been but coldly received, and few Peloponnesian auxiliaries joined his army. On the other hand, Athens and Thebes did not fail to send their ministers into Peloponnesus and elsewhere, to counteract his efforts, and to obtain succours for themselves. They appear to have been rather more successful, since we hear of a body of Corinthian troops among their forces<sup>2</sup>; and Demosthenes boasts that Eubœa, Achaia, Corinth, Thebes, Megara, Leucas, and Corcyra together furnished a mercenary force of 15,000 foot and 2,000 horse, besides the civic contingents, and pecuniary contributions.<sup>3</sup>

Our information as to the events of the ensuing campaign is very scanty, and merely fragmentary. We find that Philip moved westward as far as Cytinium in Doris, which he occupied in like manner as Elatea.<sup>4</sup> He was then within a day's march of Amphissa, the ostensible mark of his expedition. Yet it appears to have been long before he proceeded farther in that direction. He may have been prevented, or have been furnished with a welcome pretext for delay, by the movements of the Theban-Attic army, which seems to have advanced into the upper vale of the Cephissus. The cloud of mutual distrust which had been raised between the two cities by the Macedonian diplomacy, had now wholly passed away, and had been succeeded by a degree of confidence and cordi-

<sup>1</sup> τοῦ ἐνεστώτος μηνὸς Ἀφου ὡς ἡμεῖς ἄγομεν ὡς δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι Βοηδρομιῶνος. De Cor. p. 280. Mr. Clinton is compelled by his arrangement of the events to adopt Corsini's violent substitution of Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος for Βοηδρομιῶνος.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo (ix. p. 414.) speaks of them as if they were the only Peloponnesian auxiliaries. Philip, he says, at Chæronea defeated Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ Κορινθίους.

<sup>3</sup> De Cor. § 296.

<sup>4</sup> Philochorus ap. Dion. u. s. Φιλίππου δὲ καταλαβόντος Ἑλάντειαν καὶ Κυτίνιον.

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ality without example in their previous history. The Athenian troops had been received within the walls of Thebes, and quartered in the houses; and here, as at Byzantium, they showed themselves worthy of this confidence by their orderly behaviour.<sup>1</sup> The fruits of this brotherly feeling became visible when they took the field. Philip was worsted by the allied forces in two engagements, one of which appears to have taken place in the autumn of 339, and the other in the following winter.<sup>2</sup> Though it is probable that he suffered no great loss in either, the result was to check his progress, to lower the reputation of his arms, and to inspire the allies with unbounded hope and self-confidence. The victories were celebrated at Athens with sacrifices and processions, and the people received applause and congratulation from other cities.<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, as the chief author of this brilliant success, was honoured with a crown by two decrees on the motion of Demomeles and of Hyperides: and though the decree of Hyperides was impeached, the accuser Diondas did not obtain one vote in five.<sup>4</sup> The allies felt themselves strong enough to set about restoring several of the Phocian cities, and gathering the scattered population within their walls.<sup>5</sup> Ambrysus in particular, though far removed from the scene of the recent military operations, was fortified with a double wall of uncommon strength.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. de Cor. p. 300.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. u. s. τὰς πρώτας μάχας, τὴν τ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ, καὶ τὴν χειμερινήν.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. u. s. ἐφ' οἷς παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἑλλων ὁμῶν ἐγίνοντο ἔπαινοι, παρὰ δ' ὁμῶν θυαίαι καὶ πομπαὶ τοῖς θεοῖς.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. u. s. p. 302. In Vit. x. Or. The name of Aristonicus is interposed between those of Demomeles and Hyperides (p. 363.), ἵστεφανώθη, πρότερον μὲν ὑπὸ Δημομελοῦς, Ἀριστονείκου, Ὑπερίδου χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ.

<sup>5</sup> Paus. x. 3. 3. ἀνὰ χρόνον μέντοι τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν αἱ πόλεις ἀνακίσθησαν καὶ ἐς τὰς πατρίδας κατήχθησαν ἐκ τῶν κομῶν, πλὴν εἰ μὴ ἀνοικισθῆναι τινὰς ἐκάλυσεν ἀσθιναῖα τε ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ἐν τῷ τότε ἔνδεια· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Θηβαῖοι σφᾶς ἦσαν οἱ κατὰγοντες, πρὶν ἢ τὸ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ συμβῆναι πταῖσμα Ἑλλήσι.

<sup>6</sup> Paus. x. 36. 3. Θηβαῖοι ἐς τὸν Μακεδόνων καὶ Φιλίππου καθιστάμενοι πόλεμον περιέβαλον τῇ Ἀμβρύσῳ διπλοῦν τεῖχος· . . . κατασκευὴ δὲ πυργῶν ἡ ἐπάλξεων ἡ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐς εὐπρέπειαν τεύχους, παρεῖται τὰ πάντα σφίσιν ἔτε τευχίζουσιν ἐπὶ μόνῃ τῷ ἀντίκῳ ἀμύνεσθαι. The fortifications of Ambrysus are classed by Pausanias (iv.

THE  
END

We can easily believe that Demosthenes does not much exaggerate, when he describes Philip as confounded by these reverses, and as betraying his uneasiness by the language in which he renewed his application for aid to his Peloponnesian allies.<sup>1</sup> It must have seemed doubtful whether he should be able even to accomplish his nominal object, and to execute his Amphictyonic commission. Toward this however his thoughts were at last seriously bent; and in the spring of 338 he prepared to invade the territory of Amphissa. The Amphissians sought assistance from Athens, and Demosthenes exerted his influence in their behalf. Æschines charges him with having from corrupt motives deprived Athens of 10,000 mercenaries whom she afterwards needed for her own defence, to place them at the disposal of Amphissa.<sup>2</sup> It does not however appear that at the time they could have been more advantageously employed. They were placed under the command of Chares; and another smaller body of mercenary auxiliaries was commanded by the Theban general Proxenus.<sup>3</sup> We learn from Polyænus<sup>4</sup>, that the two generals occupied a defile leading to Amphissa in an impregnable position. But Philip contrived that a despatch should fall into their hands, directed to Antipater in Macedonia, in which the king expressed his intention of postponing his enterprise against Amphissa, and

31. 5.) with those of Byzantium, Rhodes, and Messene, as the strongest of Greek cities. Böhnecke (p. 533. n. 2.) has justly drawn attention to these passages of Pausanias as strongly confirming his calculation of the time which must have intervened between the occupation of Elatea and the battle of Chæronea.

<sup>1</sup> De Cor. § 277. *ὅσας τότε ἤφειε φωνὰς ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ἐν οἷσιν ἦν ταραχαῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τῶν ἐκείνου μαθήσεσθε ὅν εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἔπεμπεν.*

<sup>2</sup> Ctes. § 146.

<sup>3</sup> Droysen (Urk. p. 50.) observes that the Proxenus who commanded the mercenaries was an Athenian, though described by Polyænus as a Theban; and he refers to Dinarch. c. Demosth. (§ 75.) as if in proof of his assertion. But Dinarchus there distinctly classes Proxenus with the two other Theban traitors, Timolaus and Theagenes.

<sup>4</sup> iv. 2. 8. The position of the defile is not ascertained. But I do not understand why Böhnecke considers the passes to the north of the city as out of the question (p. 538. note).

of marching to quell an insurrection in Thrace. The credulous commanders, who did not remember that he had practised an exactly similar stratagem at Byzantium<sup>1</sup>, abandoned their position, and soon after learnt that he had passed the defiles. It seems that he met them as they were returning, perhaps in disorderly haste, to recover their lost vantage ground, that he gained a complete victory, and made himself master of Amphissa. The city, under the decree of the Amphictyons, was razed to the ground, all the abettors of the sacrilege were punished with exile, and the Crissæan plain was restored to the ownership of Apollo, and to the sanctity of perpetual desolation.

Philip had thus accomplished the professed end of his expedition, and in a manner which must have revived his hopes of compassing that to which this was subordinate. But before he attempted to penetrate into Bœotia, he appears to have sent for a reinforcement from Macedonia, which was probably brought by Antipater and his son Alexander.<sup>2</sup> The pass of Parapotamia, between the roots of Parnassus and Mount Hedylium, through which the Cephissus flowed out of Phocis into Bœotia, leaving a narrow passage on each side<sup>3</sup>, was held by a body of Bœotian troops. But they were unable, it is said, to endure the sight of the ravages committed by the Macedonian army in the adjacent region<sup>4</sup>, and having been drawn from their position, enabled Philip to advance without

<sup>1</sup> Frontin, l. 4. 13. That the scene should have been transferred to the Bosphorus, seems hardly less strange than that the stratagem should have been tried and have succeeded twice. Yet Böhnecke (p. 481. 537.) appears to take no offence at the repetition.

<sup>2</sup> The stratagem just related implies that Antipater, at least, was then in Macedonia.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo (ix. p. 424.) from Theopompus; thus elucidating and corroborating the account of Polyænus.

<sup>4</sup> Polyæn. iv. 2. 14. οὐχ' ὑπομένοντες ὁρᾶν τὰς πόλεις πορθουμένας. Yet if Philip was marching down the upper vale of the Cephissus, these ravages must have been committed in Phocis; not, as Polyænus evidently means, in Bœotia.

resistance into the plain of Chæronea. After this, a general engagement became morally inevitable. It was not to be expected that the Thebans should look passively on, while their territory was laid waste, and the Bœotian towns were restored to independence. Athens must have feared to be left to maintain the contest single-handed. If the question was debated, as there is some ground to believe, in the Athenian assembly, Demosthenes would not find it difficult to convince the people, that the decisive struggle was unavoidable, and that it could never be risked with a fairer prospect of success. It is less easy to explain how it was delayed so as not to take place before August 338. But Philip himself is said to have shrunk from the crisis, and to have been finally determined by the ardour and impatience of his son.<sup>1</sup> At Athens there were many forebodings of disaster, and attempts were made to arrest the march of the army by superstitious scruples. A fatal accident had occurred during the mysteries which had been recently celebrated. It was proposed to consult the Delphic oracle on so sinister an omen. Demosthenes resisted the motion with an expression which disgusts Æschines by its homeliness, but which seems to have

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<sup>1</sup> Dio Chrys. i. p. 73. τῆς ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχης τε καὶ νίκης φασὶν αὐτὸν αἰτίαν γενέσθαι, τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκνούτος τὸν κίνδυνον. Mr. Clinton (F. H. ii. p. 354. n. f. ed. 3.) justly calls to mind *the narrow limits of the field of action*. There can be no doubt that fifty days afford ample time for all the military operations of Philip's campaign, so far as they are known to us. But, on the other hand, we can very easily conceive the crisis to have been retarded by political intrigues and negotiations, by the nearly even balance of the antagonist forces, and by the hesitation of both parties to bring the contest to a decisive issue. The supposition that no more than fifty days elapsed between the occupation of Elatea and the battle of Chæronea, is at variance with many indications, which show, at least, that a winter must have intervened between the two events. It requires, as we have seen, a violent change of the reading Βοηδρομιῶνος in Philip's letter to the Peloponnesians. It deprives the epithet χειμερινή, applied to the second battle, of its natural meaning. It is inconsistent with the proclamation of the crowns decreed to Demosthenes at the Dionysia of the following spring, and with the fortification and repeopling of the Phocian towns. I have therefore no doubt on this head. And this conclusion is quite independent of any opinion that may be formed as to the genuineness of the documents which, as I have endeavoured to show, suggest so many grounds for grave suspicion.

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Battle of  
Chæronea.

conveyed a very notorious fact: *the priestess philippises*. Unquestionably the oracle was in Philip's power. The sacrifices, too, preceding the march were pronounced unpropitious. Demosthenes is said to have cited Homer's verse, and the examples of Pericles and Epaminondas, and to have urged the departure of the troops.<sup>1</sup> He himself served on foot, in the ranks. The two armies met in the plain of Chæronea: a temple of Hercules, on the banks of the little river Hæmus, a tributary of the Cephissus, marked, while it stood, the encampment of the Greeks; as an aged oak, on the banks of the Cephissus, was believed, in Plutarch's time, to have overshadowed Alexander's tent.

The really bad omen for the cause of Athens and Thebes was, that they had neither a Pericles nor an Epaminondas at the head of their army. Thebes possessed at this time no general of sufficient note to be even mentioned, except Theagenes, who is named only to be branded as a traitor<sup>2</sup>; and the names of Chares, Lysicles, and Stratocles, who commanded the Athenians, could inspire little confidence. In numbers they appear to have at least equalled the enemy<sup>3</sup>; but though the Sacred Band still preserved its excellent discipline and spirit, the Athenians, who had now for many years been little used to military service, were ill matched with the Macedonian veterans, led by their king, and by the able officers formed in his school, and animated by the presence of the young prince Alexander, whom his father entrusted with the command of one wing, where

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dem. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Dinarchus in Dem. § 75. Yet it appears from Plutarch (Alex. 12.) that Theagenes fell in the battle. But compare the passage in Polyænus (viii. 40.), which will be mentioned again in a subsequent note.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 85.) says that Philip, whose army consisted of more than 30,000 foot, and not less than 2000 horse (this last number is probably wrong), was superior in numbers. Justin (ix. 3.), on the contrary, says that the Athenian army was far more numerous. Droysen (Alex. p. 15.) fixes the number of the allies at 50,000, but neglects to state either his authority or the elements of his calculation.

however some of his best generals were stationed at his side. We know very little more of the causes which determined the event of the battle: and these are amply sufficient to account for it. If we may believe Polyænus, Philip at first restrained the ardour of his troops, and even feigned a retreat, until the Athenians had spent much of the vigour and fury with which they made their onset.<sup>1</sup> Then it appears Alexander made a charge, which broke the enemy's ranks, and decided the fortune of the day.<sup>2</sup> The Thebans seem to have kept their ground longest, and probably suffered most. The Sacred Band was cut off to a man, but fighting where it stood. Demosthenes was not a hero of this kind: but he was certainly reproached with cowardice, because he escaped in the general flight, only by those who wished that he had been left on the field. Of the Athenians not more than 1000 were slain, but above 2000 were taken prisoners<sup>3</sup>: among these Demades fell into the enemy's hands. The loss of the Thebans is not reported in numbers: but the prisoners were probably fewer than the slain.

It was not the amount of these losses that gave such importance to the battle of Chæroneia, that it has been generally considered as the blow which put an end to the independence of Greece<sup>4</sup>, any more than it was the loss sustained by Sparta at Leuctra, that deprived her of her supremacy. But the event of this day broke up the confederacy which had been formed against Philip, as it proved that its utmost efforts could not raise a force sufficient to meet him,

<sup>1</sup> iv. 2. 7., viii. 40., where he says that Theagenes was asked, how far he meant to pursue? and answered, *As far as Macedonia*. In iv. 2. 2., the like language is attributed to Stratoclea.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 86. Alexander was in the wing opposed to the Thebans, and first charged the Sacred Band.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. Fr. lib. xxxii. ὑπὲρ δισχιλίων.

<sup>4</sup> So Lycurgus, c. Leocr. § 50. ἀμα οὗτοι τε (the slain at Chæroneia) τὸν βίον μετήλλαξαν καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς δουλείαν μετέπεσαν· συνετάφη γὰρ τοῖς τούτων σώμασιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερία.



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with any chance of success, in the field. Each of the allied states therefore was left at his mercy. The consternation which the tidings of this disaster caused at Athens was probably greater than had ever been known there except after the loss at Ægos-potamos. Two remarkable instances have been preserved, which may serve to illustrate the effect which they produced on different minds. A citizen of good condition, named Leocrates, who had no doubt made preparations for flight, when the news arrived, collected his movable effects and transported them on board a vessel which was lying off the coast bound for Rhodes. On his landing there he spread a report, which he probably expected would be soon confirmed by the event, that the city was taken, and Piræus besieged. This was not a solitary case: for we find that the Areopagus, exerting the extraordinary authority which it had often assumed in similar cases, arrested and put to death several persons who had attempted to quit the city; and one Autolycus was brought to trial and condemned, because he had removed his family to a place of safety. It was even thought necessary to pass a decree, subjecting emigration to the penalties of treason<sup>1</sup>: and Leocrates, when he returned home seven years afterwards, was capitally impeached for his flight.

Isocrates was still living at Athens, in good health and in full possession of his faculties, although in his ninety-ninth year, when he heard of the battle. The tidings went to his heart, and induced him to put an end to his life by voluntary abstinence.<sup>2</sup> He was a sincere patriot, notwithstanding the pains he took to forward Philip's ambitious designs. The event which had now established a new relation between his

<sup>1</sup> Lycurgus, c. Leoc. § 52, 53. Autolycus was a member of the Areopagus; Plutarch, Vitæ, x. Or. Lycurgus, p. 843. D.

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias, l. 18. 8. Plutarch, Vit. x. Or. Isocrates, p. 838. B.

country and Macedonia, dissolved the bright vision on which his fancy had so long dwelt, of a Greek war against Persia, under a Macedonian leader. The tomb of the wealthy rhetorician was adorned with a lofty column, surmounted by a colossal figure of a Siren<sup>1</sup>: an emblem meant by his friends to signify the fascinating power of his eloquence, and which was no less appropriate with respect to the fatal tendency of his political counsels.

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Athens however was not yet deserted by the ancient spirit which had borne her up under so many disasters. In the first dismay of the ill news an extraordinary assembly was summoned, and a decree passed, on the motion of Hyperides, directing a series of measures for the defence of the city.<sup>2</sup> That the Five Hundred should go down in a body, armed, to Piræus, to provide for the security of the ports. That the women and children, and certain sacred treasures, should be lodged in Piræus.<sup>3</sup> That the generals should have power to exact the service of all persons, whether citizens or foreigners, to keep guard, as they thought fit.<sup>4</sup> That the slaves should be emancipated, the resident aliens admitted to the franchise, and the citizens who had been degraded restored to their privileges.<sup>5</sup> The military duty—at least before the fugitives had begun to flock in from Chæronea—fell almost entirely on the old men; and envoys were sent to Andros, Ceos, Træzen, and Epidaurus, as the nearest friendly places, to implore succours.<sup>6</sup> Demosthenes took an active part in these missions, but certainly not, as his enemies afterwards insinuated<sup>7</sup>, because he was afraid of remaining at Athens. At his instance new intrenchments were thrown up

Prepar-  
ations at  
Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, u. s. C.

<sup>2</sup> Lycurgus, c. Leocr. § 37.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. Vit. x. Or. Hyperides, p. 849. A.

<sup>4</sup> Lycurg. u. s. § 16.

<sup>5</sup> u. s. § 41.

<sup>6</sup> u. s. § 43.

<sup>7</sup> Dinarch. c. Dem. § 81. αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πρεσβευτὴν κατασκευάσας, ἵν' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδράῃ.

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round the city, and the walls were put in the best repair that the time permitted. The expense was defrayed by private contributions, in which he bore his share; for the public treasury was quite exhausted. The work was carried on in a spirit of patriotic devotion: no hand was idle, no property was spared: timber was taken from the adjacent groves or olive grounds: stones from the tombs, arms from the temples.<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes had infused his own energy into the people. He and his friends, though he might naturally have been considered, and was loudly denounced by his political opponents, as the author of the calamity, had never exercised greater influence than in this season of alarm and distress. He was indeed assailed with repeated prosecutions, but passed triumphantly through all.<sup>2</sup> And not long after, he received the most signal token that could be given of public confidence and esteem: he was appointed to deliver the funeral oration at the solemn obsequies which were celebrated over the citizens who fell at Chæroneæ. On the other hand, Lysicles, the general, was brought to trial, and put to death, for his conduct in the battle. We do not know why he was singled out for punishment, or whether his colleagues did not venture to return. But that his life was not sacrificed to a blind resentment, seems sufficiently proved by the character of his prosecutor, the upright and noble-minded Lycurgus.

As long as it remained unknown what use Philip would make of his victory, there was certainly reason to fear the worst: and if it be true that, at first, he rejected the application of the heralds who came from Lebadea to ask leave to bury the slain<sup>3</sup>, we might suppose that he wished to keep the vanquished awhile in suspense as to their fate. That he should even

<sup>1</sup> Lycurgus, u. s. § 44.<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes de Cor. § 209, 210.<sup>3</sup> Plut. Vit. x. Gr. Hyperides, p. 849. A.

have forgotten himself for a time, on the scene of his triumph, intoxicated by the complete success which had suddenly crowned the plans and labours of so many years, would not be at all inconsistent with his character. He is said to have risen from the banquet to visit the field of battle, and, as he passed among the slain, though the sight of the Sacred Band drew from him an exclamation of sympathy, to have sung a verse in derision of the decrees of Demosthenes.<sup>1</sup> This anecdote is more credible, than that he exposed himself to the rebuke of Demades by his behaviour to his prisoners.<sup>2</sup> It would be absurd to suppose, with Diodorus, that such a man as Demades, however the king might be pleased at such a moment with his freedom and his wit, could have had any influence over him: but it seems that Philip did not disdain to gain him for his own ends, and to communicate his designs to him, and employ him as his agent.

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The manner in which he finally treated his conquered enemies excited general surprise, and has earned perhaps more praise than it deserves. He dismissed the Athenian prisoners without ransom, several of them even newly clothed, and all with their baggage; and sent Antipater, accompanied, Justin says, by Alexander, with the bones of their dead, to whom he had himself paid the last rites<sup>3</sup>, to Athens, to offer peace, on terms such as no Athenian would have ventured to propose to him. The commonwealth was required indeed to resign a great part of its foreign possessions, perhaps all but the Chersonesus, Lemnos, Imbros, and Samos<sup>4</sup>, where a fresh cleruchial colony had been planted after the Social War, which rendered it an object of prime import-

Conditions  
of peace.

<sup>1</sup> Δημοσθένους Δημοσθένους Παιανιεύς τὰδ' εἶπεν. Plut. Dem. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 87.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, v. 10. Diodor. Fr. xxxii.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Al. 28.

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ance: but it was left in undisturbed possession of all its domestic resources, and its territory was even enlarged by the addition of Oropus, which Thebes was now forced to resign.<sup>1</sup> The value of these concessions was greatly enhanced by comparison with the conditions on which peace was granted to the Thebans. They were obliged to ransom not only their prisoners but their dead. Not only Oropus, but the sovereignty of the Bœotian towns was taken from them. Plataea<sup>2</sup> and Orchomenus<sup>3</sup> were restored to as many as could be found of their old inhabitants; at least filled with an independent population implacably hostile to Thebes. But this was the lightest part of her punishment. She lost not only power, but freedom. She was compelled to admit a Macedonian garrison into the citadel: and to recal her exiles. The government was lodged in their hands: a council of Three Hundred selected from them was invested with supreme authority, both legislative and judicial.<sup>4</sup> Some of their adversaries had, it appears, been put to death by Philip's orders before their return. But the rest might safely be committed to the mercy of such a tribunal. The scenes which took place after the former occupation of the Cadmea were no doubt daily renewed.<sup>5</sup> But it was now more difficult to find a place of refuge, and there was less room for a hope of deliverance.

Philip's treatment of the Athenians has been commonly accounted magnanimous. It may indeed be

<sup>1</sup> Paus. L. 34. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Paus. iv. 27. 10., ix. 1. 8. Plutarch (Alex. 34.) says, that it was Alexander who gave the Plataeans leave to rebuild their city. Both accounts may be true. Philip's decree may not have been executed until some years later. Yet we find troops of Plataea and Orchomenus at the capture of Thebes.

<sup>3</sup> Paus. iv. 27. 10., ix. 37. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Justin, ix. 4. Trecentos exules iudices rectoresque civitati dedit.

<sup>5</sup> Dinarch. c. Demosth. p. 92. The Thebans rise, τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γινόμενα φέρειν οὐκ ἐτι δυνάμενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν δουλείαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὑβρεῖς ὑρᾶν τὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλεύθερα σώματα γινόμενας.

said, that in them he did honour to the manly resistance of open enemies, while in the case of the Thebans he punished treachery and ingratitude, and knowing the people to be generally hostile to him, crushed the power of the state, and used the faction which depended on him as the instrument of his vengeance. On the other hand it must be remembered, that, when this was done, he had the less reason to dread the hostility of Athens: he might safely conciliate the favour of the Greeks by a splendid example of lenity and moderation. It is not improbable that this was the course to which he was inclined by his own prepossessions.<sup>1</sup> But had it been otherwise, there were reasons enough to deter so wary a prince from violent measures, which would have driven the Athenians to despair. He had probably very early intelligence of the preparations for defence which they had begun while they expected an invasion. He might indeed have ravaged Attica, and have carried on a Decelean war: but it was by no means certain that he could make himself master of the city and Piræus: and nothing but a very clear prospect of immediate success could have rendered the attempt advisable. The danger of a failure, and even the inconvenience of delay, was far greater than the advantage to be reaped from it. For he had now more brilliant objects in view: time was doubly precious to him; and it would have been wantonly to tempt his fortune, if by too grasping a policy he had raised unnecessary hinderances to his own designs.

His offers were gladly, if not thankfully, accepted at Athens. Demades, who had there the credit of having disposed the king towards peace, and who appears to have been sent with Æschines to conclude it, rose high in popular favour, though not so as to

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. V. p. 224.

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Corinth.

counterbalance the influence of Demosthenes.<sup>1</sup> Philip now saw his road open to Peloponnesus, and he proceeded to Corinth<sup>2</sup>, whither he had invited all the states of Greece to send their deputies, to hold a congress as in the time of the ancient league against Persia. The avowed object of this assemblage was indeed to settle the affairs of Greece, and to put an end to intestine feuds by the authority of a supreme council. But it was well known that Philip meant to use it for the purposes of his enterprise against Persia. It was attended by ministers from every Greek state, except Sparta, which could not expect that any measures would be carried there, but such as were opposed to her interests.<sup>3</sup> At Athens, when Demades proposed that they should take part in the congress, some opposition was made from a quarter in which it could hardly have been looked for. Phocion, who, as a moderate adherent of the Macedonian party, had gained increased authority from the new turn of affairs, advised the people to wait until they knew what demands Philip would make on the members of the confederacy. His objections however were overruled. The people regretted, when it was too late, that they had not listened to his warnings.<sup>4</sup>

Their absence, however it might have displeased Philip, would not have thwarted his plans. The congress would have been neither more nor less ready to comply with his wishes. As it was, all his proposals were adopted. War was declared against Persia, and he was appointed to command the national forces with which it was to be waged: each state was to contribute a fixed contingent of ships or

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes de Cor. § 352. Δημόδην, ἔσσι πεπονηκότα τὴν εἰρήνην.<sup>2</sup> An anecdote of an interview which he had at Corinth with the younger Dionysius is preserved by Plutarch, Timol. 15.<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 1.<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Phoc. 16.

men, according to the nature of its resources.<sup>1</sup> One object only now remained to detain Philip in the south of Greece: to fulfil the promises which he had made some years before to his Peloponnesian allies, to animate them by his presence, and to make Sparta feel the effects of his displeasure. His march through Peloponnesus was for the most part a peaceful, triumphal progress. Hence it may be that so few traces of it are left in our historical fragments. It is chiefly by some casual allusions in Polybius and Pausanias that the fact itself is ascertained. By their light we are just enabled to track his course through Arcadia into Laconia, and then back again along the western coast. The site on which he had encamped not far from Mantinea, was remembered in the time of Pausanias<sup>2</sup>, when a spring near which the royal tent had been pitched was still named after him. In Laconia he made a longer stay, and had to encounter some resistance. The Eleans, though they had not joined him at Chæronea, were induced either by fear or resentment to co-operate with him in this invasion.<sup>3</sup> About the time of the battle of Chæronea, according to some accounts on the same day, king Archidamus, who had been sent to the aid of Tarentum against the Lucanians, was slain in Italy: an event which, though he died fighting with Spartan valour, was attributed to celestial vengeance, because the auxiliaries whom he took with him were mostly Phocian mercenaries, and shared his fate.<sup>4</sup> Sparta was perhaps a little the weaker for his absence, though he could not have made any stand against the Macedonian army, which was probably reinforced by all the hostile neighbours of the state. Philip however

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Philip's expedition in Peloponnesus.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 89. Justin (ix. 5, 6.) states the whole amount of the promised auxiliaries, 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horse. The exaggeration seems so monstrous, that one suspects a mistake in the numbers.

<sup>2</sup> viii. 7. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Paus. v. 4. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 88.



appears not to have made any attempt against the capital. His object undoubtedly was not to crush this power, which strengthened his own by the jealousy it inspired, but to humble it, and to secure his allies against its encroachments. He advanced therefore ravaging the country as far as the seacoast near Gythium, where Pausanias saw a trophy which had been erected for a victory obtained over a detachment of his army.<sup>1</sup> It appears however that in the end Sparta submitted to the terms which he prescribed. According to one account, he did not evacuate her territory before he had contracted its limits by concessions which he forced her to make on three sides, to Messene, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos: but it seems that he used the congress as his instrument in this partition.<sup>2</sup> He then pursued his march through Olympia and Elis to the isthmus. There can be little doubt at least that it was on this occasion that he founded a circular building, called the Philippeum, which was long adorned with statues of the Macedonian princes, within the sacred precincts in which the Olympic games were celebrated<sup>3</sup>, as the Megalopolitans gave his name to a portico in their market-place.<sup>4</sup> The western states beyond the isthmus likewise acknowledged his authority: the leaders of the anti-Macedonian party in Acarnania were driven into exile, and Ambracia consented to receive a Macedonian garrison.<sup>5</sup> Byzantium also, it seems, entered into an alliance with him, which was little more than a decent name for subjection.<sup>6</sup> Thus crowned with new

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, III. 24. 6. This seems sufficient evidence that the expedition was not conducted in so peaceable a manner as Lyciscus found it convenient to represent. Polybius, ix. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the statements of Chlæneas and Lyciscus in Polyb. ix. 22. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Paus. v. 17. 4., 20. 10. Φιλίππου ἐποιήθη. He observes of the στυὰ at Megalopolis, οὐ Φιλίππου ἐποίησεν.

<sup>4</sup> Paus. VIII. 30. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 3.

<sup>6</sup> This supposition seems necessary to explain the assistance afforded to Alexander in his expedition to the Danube. Arrian, I. 3.

honours, having overcome every obstacle, and established his power on the firmest foundation in every part of Greece, he returned in the autumn of 338 to Macedonia, to prepare for the greater enterprise on which his thoughts were now wholly bent.

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This brilliant fortune however was before long overcast by a cloud of domestic troubles. Philip, not less from temperament than policy, had adopted the oriental usage of polygamy, which, though repugnant to the ancient Greek manners, did not in this age, as we find from other examples, shock public opinion in Greece. Thus, it seems, before his marriage with Olympias, he had formed several matrimonial alliances, which might all contribute to strengthen his political interests. An Illyrian princess, a Macedonian lady, apparently of the Lyncestian family, which had some remote claims to the throne, and two from Thessaly, one a native of Pheræ, the other from Larissa, are mentioned before Olympias in the list of his wives. After his marriage with Olympias, he did not reject the hand of a Thracian princess, which was offered to him by her father. In each of these cases however there was an apparent motive of policy, which may have rendered the presence of so many rivals more tolerable than it would otherwise have been to Olympias, a woman of masculine spirit and violent passions, and who, as a daughter of the house of Epirus, which traced its pedigree to Achilles, no doubt regarded herself as far superior to them all in rank, and as Philip's sole legitimate consort. But after his return to Macedonia from his victorious campaign in Greece, perhaps early in the following spring, he contracted another union, for which it does not appear that he had the same excuse to plead. Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, one of his generals, had, it seems, attracted him by her beauty. He sought her hand, and their nuptials were celebrated

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Philip's  
marriage  
with Cleo-  
patra.

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with the usual festivities, in the palace at Pella, where perhaps Olympias was residing. This would not be stranger than it is that Alexander was present at the banquet, which, according to the custom of the court, was prolonged till both Philip and his guests were very much heated with wine. Attalus had secretly cherished the presumptuous hope, that his niece's influence over the king might induce him to alter the succession, and to appoint a child of hers heir to the throne. When the wine had thrown him off his guard, he could not refrain from disclosing his wishes, and called on the company to pray that the gods would crown the marriage of Philip and Cleopatra by the birth of a legitimate successor to the kingdom. Alexander took fire at this expression; and exclaiming, *Do you then count me a bastard*, hurled the goblet out of which he was drinking at Attalus. The hall became a scene of tumult. Philip started from his couch, and instead of rebuking Attalus, drew his sword, and rushed at his son; but before he reached him, stumbled and fell. Alexander, before he withdrew, is said to have pointed to his father, as he lay on the floor, with the taunt: *See the man who would pass over from Europe to Asia, upset in crossing from one couch to another.*<sup>1</sup>

His domestic troubles.

The quarrel did not end with the intoxication of the evening, as the offence which had been given to the prince was much deeper than the momentary provocation. He and his mother quitted the kingdom; she found shelter at the court of her brother Alexander, who after the death of Arybas had succeeded, through Philip's intervention, to the throne of Epirus, having supplanted Æacides, the lawful heir. Alexander took up his abode in Illyria. It seems as if both the mother and the son had endeavoured to

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Alex. 9. Athen. xiii. 5.

kindle a war in these countries against Philip. Of Olympias it is expressly related<sup>1</sup>, and may be easily believed, that she instigated her brother to avenge her wrongs with the sword. As to the motive of Alexander's sojourn in Illyria, there may be more room to doubt: but it clearly seems to have been connected with the occasion of a battle in which Philip was about this time engaged with the Illyrians.<sup>2</sup> He was obliged at last to employ the good offices of a Corinthian, named Demaratus, to induce his son to return to Macedonia.<sup>3</sup> It was not so easy to appease Olympias: and it was most likely with a view to baffle her intrigues, that Philip negotiated a match between his brother-in-law and their daughter Cleopatra. When the Epirot king had been thus pacified, his sister saw that she must defer her revenge, and returned, apparently reconciled, to her husband's court. Her resentment was implacable; Alexander too, after his return, still harboured suspicions of his father's intentions with respect to his inheritance.

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These unhappy differences, and perhaps the continued apprehension of hostile movements on the side of Illyria and Epirus, may have been the causes which prevented Philip from crossing over to Asia in person in 337: though, if he waited for the arrival of his Greek confederates, their tardiness might fully account for the delay. But in the course of this year he sent over a body of troops under the command of Parmenio, Amyntas, and Attalus<sup>4</sup>, whom perhaps he was glad to remove in this honourable manner from his court, to the western coast of Asia, to engage the Greek cities on his side, and to serve as a rallying point for all who were disaffected to the

<sup>1</sup> Justin, ix. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. Alex. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 93.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 9. Justin, ix. 5. 8.

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Pixodarus.

Persian government. This measure was the more expedient, because the Persian court, which had been for some time aware of its danger, might be expected, and had in fact begun, to take some steps to avert it: though its hope seems to have been rather to detain Philip in Europe by means of gold and intrigues, which might raise fresh enemies to keep him occupied at home, than to stop his passage into Asia by its military or naval force. The beneficial consequences of this movement soon appeared in the prospect which it opened of detaching a very important province from the Persian empire without a blow. Ada, the sister, and, according to a widely prevalent Asiatic usage, wife of Idrieus, who had succeeded his sister Artemisia, the widow of his elder brother Mausolus, in Caria, survived her husband, and was appointed by him his successor: an arrangement which might somewhat displease her Greek subjects, but was not at all repugnant to the ideas of the Carian population.<sup>1</sup> Ada however seems not to have inherited the masculine energy of the elder Artemisia: she was deprived of her dominions, only retaining the strong fortress of Alinda, by her brother Pixodarus. Still the usurper felt his footing insecure, and looked about him for foreign support. He had to choose between submission to Persia and an alliance with Philip, as the price of protection. He decided on the latter measure, probably as that which held out the fairest prospect of independence, and proposed to give his eldest daughter to Arridæus, Philip's son by his Larissæan wife, Philinna<sup>2</sup>, a youth of imbecile intellect.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, I. 23. Compare Vol. IV. p. 386.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch's description of Philinna (Alex. extr.), *γυναικὸς ἀδόξου καὶ κοινῆς*, is confirmed by Ptolemæus in Athenæus, XIII. 40., where she is said to have been a dancing-girl (*Φιλίππου αὐξήσαντος Φιλίνναν τὴν ὀρχηστρίδα*); but it is hardly consistent with the political object assigned to the marriage by Dicaearchus in Athenæus, XIII. 5., who says that Philip married Philinna, *οἰκειώσασθαι θέλων τὸ τῶν Θετταλῶν ἔθνος*. He would scarcely have chosen a woman of such a condition with that view.

Olympias was, or affected to be, alarmed by this negotiation; several of Alexander's young companions shared her suspicions, and their insinuations persuaded him that the intended marriage was a step by which Philip designed to raise his half-brother to the throne. Under this impression he dispatched Thessalus, a Greek player, who was exercising his profession at the Macedonian court, on a secret mission to Caria, to induce Pixodarus to break off the match with Arridæus, a half-witted bastard, and to transfer his daughter's hand to Alexander himself. Pixodarus joyfully accepted the prince's offer. But Philip, having discovered the correspondence, shamed his son out of his suspicions by an indignant expostulation, which he addressed to him in the presence of his young friend, Parmenio's son, Philotas, on the unworthiness of the connection which he was about to form with a barbarian who was not even an independent prince, but a Persian vassal. Alexander dropt the project; but it so strongly excited his father's resentment, that he wrote to Corinth to demand that Thessalus should be sent to him in chains, and banished five of Alexander's companions, Harpalus, Nearchus, Erigyius, Laomedon, and Ptolemæus, from Macedonia<sup>1</sup>: to one of them the beginning of a wonderful elevation. So passed the year 337.

Toward the end of the next spring Philip's preparations for his Asiatic expedition were far advanced. He had summoned the Greek states to furnish their contingents, and, as became the general of the Amphictyonic Council, had consulted the Delphic oracle on the event of his enterprise; and it is said had received an answer worthy of its ancient reputation for politic ambiguity: *Crowned is the victim, the altar is ready, the stroke is impending*<sup>2</sup>: though the event

<sup>1</sup> ARR. III. 6. Plut. Alex. 10.

<sup>2</sup> "Ἔσονται μὲν ὁ ταῦρος, ἔχει τέλος, ἔστιν ὁ θύων. Diodor. XVI. 91.

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B. C. 336.  
Festival at  
Ægæ.

renders this anecdote somewhat suspicious. It only remained to take the precaution which he had meditated for securing the peace of his dominions in his absence, by a closer alliance with the king of Epirus, which might also soothe Olympias. The day of the marriage was fixed, and Philip determined to celebrate the event with the utmost splendour. It afforded an opportunity which he never let slip, of attracting Greeks from all parts to his court, of dazzling them by his magnificence, and winning them by his hospitality. A solemn festival—either the national one of the Muses, or the Olympic games instituted by Archelaus—was proclaimed to be held in the ancient capital, Ægæ. Musical and dramatic contests were announced, for which artists of the greatest celebrity were engaged. When the time arrived the city was crowded with strangers; not only guests invited by the king and his courtiers, but envoys deputed by most of the leading cities of Greece, to honour the solemnity, and to offer presents, chiefly crowns of gold, to the king. Among the rest Athens sent a crown, and with it a decree which was publicly read by the herald, enacting that any one who should form a design against Philip, if he fled to Athens, should be given up. In the banquet which followed the nuptials, Philip desired the player Neoptolemus to recite some piece of poetry, appropriate to his approaching expedition against the Persian king. The player chose a lyrical piece, which seemed strikingly applicable to the power, the pride, the wealth, and luxury of the monarch who was now threatened with a sudden fall: it also spoke of death, which, approaching unseen, by hidden paths, with rapid step, cuts off in a moment far-reaching hopes.<sup>1</sup>

On the morrow an exhibition was to take place in

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 92.

the theatre: it was filled at an early hour with spectators. The entertainments began with a solemn procession, in which, among other treasures, were carried images, of exquisite workmanship, and gorgeously adorned, of the twelve Olympian gods: a thirteenth, which seemed to be somewhat profanely associated with them, represented Philip himself. The shouts of an admiring, applauding multitude then announced the king's approach. He advanced in white robes and festal chaplet, with his son and the bridegroom on either side a few paces behind him. His guards he had ordered to keep at a distance, that all might have a view of his person, and that it might not be supposed he doubted the universal good-will of the Greeks. This was the moment when a young man stepped forth from the crowd, ran up to the king, and drawing a Celtic sword<sup>1</sup> from beneath his garments, plunged it into his side. Philip fell dead. The murderer rushed toward the gates of the town, where horses were waiting for him. He was closely pursued by some of the great officers of the royal body-guard, but would have mounted before they had overtaken him, if his sandal had not been caught by the stump of a vine, which brought him to the ground. In the first heat of their passion his pursuers dispatched him.

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Philip murdered.

His name was Pausanias: the motive that impelled him to the deed, was that he had suffered an outrage from Attalus, for which Philip had refused to give him satisfaction. So much we know with certainty from the unquestionable authority of Aristotle<sup>2</sup>, who

<sup>1</sup> One much longer than the common Greek sword: *μάχαρα μακρά*, Strabo, iv. 4. Niebuhr (ii. p. 525.) compares the Highland claymore. The hilt of the one used by Pausanias was, it seems, adorned with the figure of a chariot. So there was a story, that Philip had been warned by the oracle of Trophonius, to beware of a chariot, and never mounted one. *Ælian*, V. H. iii. 45. *Cicero de Fato*, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Pol.* v. 8. 10. Schn. Mr. Williams, in his entertaining *Life of Alexander the Great* (2nd ed. in the Family Library, p. 22.), seems not to have been aware of this decisive passage, and tells his readers: *We have no account of the conspiracy*



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may have been an eye-witness of the scene. Whether Pausanias filled a post in the royal guards, as Diodorus relates, is not so certain, and is a point of little moment. It appears that he was a youth of noble family.<sup>1</sup> The preparations made for his escape seemed to imply that he had accomplices, and grounds were discovered for suspecting that two or three members of the Lyncestian family were privy to his intention. It was also remembered that he had once asked the sophist Hermocrates, how one might become most conspicuous? and had been answered, that the surest way was to take the life of the man who had achieved the greatest things. But the gravest suspicions rested on persons nearer to the throne, on Olympias and Alexander. Of the guilt of Olympias there could be no doubt, if we were to believe all the stories reported by Justin, which appear to have been current not long after the murder: that it was she who provided horses for the assassin's flight: that she placed a

*against Philip's life from any author of credit. The authorities followed by Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin were evidently some low writers of Southern Greece, totally ignorant of the very constitution of the Macedonian court. According to them, the death of Philip was an act of private vengeance, perpetrated by the youthful Pausanias, whom a denial of justice, under the most atrocious injuries, had driven to the act of assassination. It is instructive to observe how directly every one of these assertions is contradicted by Aristotle's short sentence: 'Ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου ἐκ Πανσάνου, διὰ τὸ ἔλασαι ὁρίσθηναι αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν περὶ Ἀργύρου. It seemed worth while to quote them as another instance, how dangerous it may be to take it for granted, that these low writers drew their statements from the worst sources, even when we do not possess the earlier authors. Perhaps even as to the constitution of the Macedonian court, some of these low writers were not quite so ignorant as Mr. Williams believes. They might have been able to give him some information on the subject, which he himself would have found useful. They could perhaps have told him, that the term *σωματοφύλαξ* was not confined to the great officers in the Macedonian army, whose rank answered nearly to that of field-marshal; and that Pausanias might have been a young man, and yet a *σωματοφύλαξ*. (See Arrian, i. 6. 8., iii. 17. 4. (with Ellendt's note), iv. 30. 6.; Diodor. xvi. 93.; Plut. Alex. 51.; Schmieler on Q. Curtius, iv. 13. 19., vi. 8. 17.) One can hardly help considering it as a just retribution, that Mr. Williams, through his eagerness to fix an indelible stain on the moral character of Demosthenes, should have been led into oversights and mistakes which a little damage his own reputation as a critic and a scholar.*

<sup>1</sup> For the assertion that he was an *Orestian prince*, we should require better authority than that mentioned in the last note. Diodorus (xvi. 93.) only says, *Μακεδών, ἐκ τῆς Ὀρεστίδος καλουμένης*. Justin (ix. 6.), *nobilis ex Macedonibus adolescens*.

golden crown on his head, as he hung on the cross; that she caused his body to be burnt on the spot which contained her husband's ashes, and even honoured his memory with yearly rites, and dedicated the sword with which he had stabbed the king to Apollo. But the first of these alleged facts, which would be the only unequivocal proof of a criminal participation, can never have rested on any thing more than a vague suspicion: and the rest only prove, what may indeed be easily believed, that this vindictive woman made no secret of the joy she felt at her husband's death. It was indeed an event which she must have ardently longed for: since it afforded her the means of sating her thirst for revenge in the blood of persons who were the objects of her still deadlier hatred. She seized the earliest opportunity of Alexander's absence, to murder her rival Cleopatra and an infant which she had borne to Philip.<sup>1</sup>

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Suspicion  
against  
Olympias  
and Alex-  
ander.

But if we inquire how Alexander incurred the like suspicion, we find that Pausanias was said to have complained to him of his wrongs, and that he quoted a verse of Euripides, which might be construed as an exhortation to revenge.<sup>2</sup> If the anecdote were authentic, the quotation might have been pointed at Attalus and Cleopatra. Beyond this, it can only be said that Alexander, as well as his mother, had been deeply provoked: slight ground for such a presumption even against Olympias, but which, with respect to a character like his, which instinctively recoiled from every species of baseness, we are hardly permitted to mention.<sup>3</sup> That he was jealous of his father's conquests, and never regarded him, either

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Alex. 10. Pausanias (viii. 7. 7.) says, that she roasted them alive. Justin (ix. 7.) only relates, that she made the mother hang herself, after having killed her child (according to him a girl, according to Pausanias a boy) in her lap.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. Alex. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Yet Niebuhr in his Lectures expresses a suspicion, almost amounting to a full conviction, of Alexander's guilt.

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during his life, or after his death, with much affection or reverence, may be true: but Philip had not taken any great pains to secure his filial duty. We read among Plutarch's anecdotes, that he one day told the prince, that the more rivals he met with among his other children for the throne, the more he might owe it to his own merit: but he bade him attend to Aristotle's precepts, which would teach him to avoid many things which he himself repented of.

Philip's  
character.

Thus, in the forty-seventh year of his age, the twenty-fourth of his reign, perished Philip of Macedon: at the end of one great stage of a prosperous career, near the outset of another which opened immeasurable room for hope. A great man certainly, according to the common scale of princes, though not a hero like his son, nor to be tried by a philosophical model. But it was something great, that one who enjoyed the pleasures of animal existence so keenly, should have encountered so much toil and danger for glory and empire. It was something still greater, that one who was so well acquainted with the worst sides of human nature, and who so often profited by them, should yet have been so capable of sympathy and esteem. If we charge him with duplicity in his political transactions, we must remember that he preferred the milder ways of gratifying his ambition, to those of violence and bloodshed: that he at least desired the reputation of mercy and humanity. If he once asked whether a fortress was so inaccessible, that not even an ass laden with gold could mount to it, we may as well believe the anecdote which relates of him, that he replied to his counsellors who urged him to treat Athens with rigour — they were advising him to destroy the theatre of his glory.<sup>1</sup> The many examples of generous forbearance reported in Plutarch's collection of his apophthegms,

<sup>1</sup> Plut. R. et I. Apophth. xi.

cannot be all groundless fictions: and the less restraint he set on many of his passions, the more amiable appears, by contrast, the self-control which he exercised, when he was tempted to an unjust or harsh use of his power. He is one of the men of whom we wish to know more, whose familiar letters and conversation must have been worth preserving. But even the history of his outward life is like an ancient statue, made up of imperfect and ill-adjusted fragments.

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He left the task of his life unfinished, and his death must have appeared to his contemporaries premature. We must rather admire the peculiar felicity of the juncture at which he was removed to make room for one better fitted for the work. What he had done, his successor would perhaps not have accomplished so well. What he meditated, was probably much less than his son effected, and yet more than he himself would have brought to pass. If he had begun his enterprise, he would most likely have done little more than mar some splendid pages in the history of the world.

## CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM ALEXANDER'S ACCESSION TO THE TAKING OF  
THEBES.

*Alexander's Education. — Leonidas and Lysimachus. — Aristotle. — Period of his Intercourse with Alexander. — Alexander's Studies. — Difficulties of Alexander's Position. — Executions in Macedonia. — Movements in Greece. — Demosthenes. — Movements at Athens. — Alexander's Advance. — Congress at Corinth. — Alexander's Expedition to Thrace. — Operations on the Danube. — The Celts. — Pellion. — Revolt of Thebes. — Capture of Thebes. — Destruction of Thebes. — Alexander demands the Athenian Orators.*

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FROM the remotest ages of Pelasgian antiquity down to the time of the Roman empire, the holy island of Samothrace, the seat of an awfully mysterious worship, accounted equal to Delphi in sanctity, and an inviolable asylum, continued to be visited by pilgrims, who went to be initiated into the rites which were believed to secure the devotee against extraordinary perils both by sea and land, and, in the later period, to fix his destiny after death in some brighter sphere. It had probably been always held in great reverence by the Macedonian kings, as it was here that the last of them sought refuge in the wreck of his fortunes. Here it is said Philip first saw Olympias, when they partook at the same time in the Cabirian mysteries, and resolved to seek her hand.<sup>1</sup> For him such a scene may have had little other interest: but Olympias seems to have taken delight in such ceremonies, and to have given herself up with fervour to the impres-

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Alex. 2.

sion they produced. She loved the fanatical orgies celebrated by the Thracian and Macedonian women in honour of their Dionysus; and is even said to have introduced some of the symbols of this frantic worship, the huge tame snakes, which the Bacchanals wreathed round their necks and arms, into her husband's palace. It is a stroke which agrees well with the other features of her wild impetuous character. Who can estimate the degree in which this irritable, uncontrollable nature may have contributed one element toward that combination of ardent enthusiasm with the soberest forethought, which distinguishes Alexander, perhaps above every man that ever filled a like station?

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The anecdotes related of Alexander's boyhood are chiefly remarkable as indicating what may be fitly called a kingly spirit, which not only felt conscious that it was born to command, and was impatient of all opposition to its will, but also studied how it might subject all things and persons around it to its own higher purposes. This inborn royalty of soul could hardly have failed to find its way to fame, had it even been originally lodged in an obscure corner. But Alexander grew up with the full consciousness of his high rank and his great destiny. There is no reason to believe that Philip ever wavered in his choice of his successor, so far as this depended on himself. Indeed he must have been well aware that he could not deprive Alexander, if he survived him, of his birthright. The utmost he could have done would have been to make such dispositions as would have kindled a civil war after his death. But we are informed that he announced the prince's birth in a letter to Aristotle, in terms which implied that he looked on him as his heir.<sup>1</sup> When the boy tamed

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education.

<sup>1</sup> Aul. Gellius, ix. 3.

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Leonidas  
and Lysimachus.

the brave horse, Bucephalus, which afterwards bore him through so many battles, and which no man in the court had been able to mount, Philip is said to have embraced him with tears of joy, bidding him seek a kingdom worthy of him: Macedonia had not room for him.<sup>1</sup> He advised him to cultivate the favour of the people, while he was not responsible for any acts that might displease them<sup>2</sup>; and did not even take it ill, when he heard that the Macedonians called Alexander their king, Philip their general.<sup>3</sup>

The education of the prince in his childhood was placed under the superintendence of one of his mother's kinsmen, named Leonidas, a nobleman of austere and parsimonious character, who carefully retrenched the luxuries which his pupil would have enjoyed through his mother's indulgence, and inured him betimes to Spartanlike habits of hard exercise and simple fare—Leonidas, he once said, when an Asiatic table was spread for him, had provided him with the best cooks; a night's march before breakfast, a scanty breakfast to season his supper<sup>4</sup>—and checked his inclination to excess in his expenditure; yet it seems so as rather to spur than curb his ambition. *Wait* he said to him one day, when he threw more frankincense than seemed needful into the censer, *until you are master of the land where it grows*. When Alexander became lord of Asia, he sent a hundred talents' weight of aromatics to Leonidas, with a request that he would no longer grudge incense to the gods.<sup>5</sup> Under Leonidas, whose discipline was thought by a philosophical observer to have left injurious traces in his character<sup>6</sup>, he had another governor of a different

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Alex. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. R. et I. Ap. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. Alex. 9. One may add R. et I. Alexander I.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. Alex. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. Alex. 25.

<sup>6</sup> Diogenes of Babylon, according to the report of Quintilian, i. 1. 9. Sainte Croix's suspicion (Ex. p. 194.), that Leonidas is here confounded with Lysimachus, is utterly groundless, and sprang only from his schoolboy notion of Alexander. It

turn, an Acarnanian, named Lysimachus, who recommended himself to the boy by a peculiar species of flattery, which touched the right chord in his fancy: calling himself Phœnix, the king Peleus, Alexander Achilles. That the most skilful masters to be found in Greece were procured to instruct him in all liberal exercises and studies, may be safely presumed. Of his taste for music and poetry we have some early intimations. Philip himself somewhat valued himself on his knowledge of music<sup>1</sup>: and when he entertained the Athenian ambassadors, among whom Demosthenes and Æschines were present, Alexander, who was then about eleven years old, played on the lyre, and sung or recited in concert with another boy of the same age, for the amusement of the company.<sup>2</sup> How much he lived in Homer's poetical world, may be partly inferred from the story of Lysimachus just mentioned. It was above all, as we know from more distinct evidence, the image of Achilles that captivated his boyish fancy. But it was no common interest that he took in the poet's creation: Achilles—according to the traditions of his mother's house—was his own ancestor. He felt the hero's blood in his veins. He too preferred glory to length of days: he too knew the delight of a glowing and constant friendship. At an age when it would not have been surprising if these bright visions had so occupied his imagination as to leave little room for the realities of life, he found an opportunity, in his father's absence, of conversing with some ambassadors who had been sent from Persia to the court of Macedonia. They could have told him of many wonders of the gorgeous East, which were celebrated in Greece; of the hanging gardens and

seems not improbable that the pernicious tendency of the rough discipline of Leonidas is indicated by Plutarch (Alex. 7.): a passage, by the way, which seems to overthrow Mr. Williams's conjecture about the share taken by Aristotle in Alexander's early education. See Blakesley, *Life of Aristotle*, p. 45.

<sup>1</sup> Plut. R. et I. Ap. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Timarch. § 268.



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golden plane-tree, and all the state and splendour of the Great King. His curiosity was directed to subjects of quite another kind: it was about the roads, the distances, the force of the armies, the condition of the provinces, about their master's skill in arms, that he questioned them, with an eagerness which alarmed them, it is said, more than Philip's sagacity, of which they had heard so much.<sup>1</sup>

Aristotle.

But the prince who was destined to effect so great a change in the state of the world, was to be committed to the care of the man whose spirit was not less active and ambitious, who also in the range of his intellectual conquests had never been equalled, and who founded a much more lasting empire in the sphere of thought. Never, before or since, have two persons, so great in the historical sense of the word<sup>2</sup>, been brought together—above all in the same relation—as Alexander and Aristotle. It is difficult to repress a curiosity, which it is nevertheless hardly possible to satisfy, as to the influence which the philosopher exerted on his pupil's mind and character. The inquiry however would be fruitless, unless we first endeavour to ascertain the limits of their intercourse with each other.

Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, a native of Stagira, one of the towns destroyed by Philip in the Olynthian war, was a physician, employed in that capacity, but also honoured as a friend, by Philip's father, Amyntas. Aristotle and Philip were nearly of the same age: a few years only before Philip was sent as a hostage to Thebes, Aristotle settled at Athens to pursue his

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Alex. 5. It must however be observed, that there is hardly any other period to which this anecdote can be assigned, than that during which Philip was absent from his dominions on his expedition to Thrace when he left Alexander regent, who was then sixteen years old: at least if we may take the term *ἐνίσχυν* in the literal sense.

<sup>2</sup> The reader who may think this epithet not sufficiently definite, will find it very instructively explained in an article by Gervinus entitled: *Ueber die historische Grösse*, in Schloesser's *Archiv*. v. p. 422. foll. There is an academic oration by Schleiermacher (among those which he delivered in honour of Frederic the Great), in which he handles the same subject in his own manner.

studies under the guidance of Plato. It is not improbable that they were acquainted with each other in Macedonia, and that while they lived so near to one another in Greece, some intercourse took place between the prince and the young client of his house. This would be the most natural explanation of a fact otherwise strange, that on the birth of Alexander, Philip, in the letter by which he communicated the tidings to him, declared that he thanked the gods less for the son they had given him, than that he had been born when he might have Aristotle for his teacher.<sup>1</sup> The genuineness of this letter is indeed very suspicious<sup>2</sup>: but the fact it implies—that Philip had very early designed to place his son under Aristotle's care,—is not the less credible. Aristotle's change of residence, from Athens to Asia Minor, where he spent some years before he returned to Macedonia, may have delayed the execution of this purpose. But still Alexander was but thirteen years old when he became the philosopher's pupil<sup>3</sup>; and perhaps this was an earlier age than in any other case would have been ripe for such instructions. For surely what Aristotle was called to impart, was not what might have been learnt from ordinary masters. This relation appears to have subsisted between them for no more than three successive years. It is a pleasing, and not an improbable conjecture<sup>4</sup>, that during this period they spent most of their time at Stagira, which Philip had been induced by Aristotle's request to restore, and where he had laid out a kind of Lyceum, with shady walks, and stone seats, on

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Period of  
his inter-  
course with  
Alexander.

<sup>1</sup> A. Gell. N. A. ix. 3.

<sup>2</sup> It is suspected even by Böhnecke (p. 366.), on the ground, which I do not think sufficient: *Fama enim Aristotelis hoc tempore non tanta erat, quanta in hac epistola apparet.* Nor am I quite satisfied with Mr. Blakesley's argument, *Life of Aristotle* (p. 45.), grounded on the long absence of the philosopher from his charge. That might be consistent with Philip's determination, though not strictly so with Aristotle's principles.

<sup>3</sup> Apollodorus, ap. Diog. Laert. Aristot. Stahr, *Aristotelia*, p. 86.

<sup>4</sup> Of Stahr, p. 105.

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ground belonging to a temple of the Nymphs. But Alexander was only sixteen, when Philip set out on his expedition to Thrace, from which he only returned in the autumn of 339, and he was entrusted with the regency of the kingdom—probably under the direction of a council—during his father's absence. He was then of course occupied with affairs of state; and in the course of this time, a revolt of one of the conquered tribes, probably on the Illyrian frontier, afforded an occasion for his first essay in the art of war. He reduced the insurgents, took their chief city, expelled its inhabitants, and planted a new colony there, to which he gave the name of Alexandropolis.<sup>1</sup> In the interval between the battle of Chæronæa and his father's death, he was engaged, as we have seen, in transactions quite alien from philosophical or literary pursuits. It is very doubtful whether he saw Aristotle again before he came to the throne. Their personal intercourse must at least have been confined to occasional interviews.

When we consider the shortness of the time, and the early age to which this part of Alexander's education was limited, we might be inclined to think that Aristotle's influence over his mind and character can scarcely have been very considerable. Nevertheless, it is at least certain that their connection lasted long enough to impress the scholar with a high degree of attachment and reverence for the master—of whom he used to say that he loved him no less than his father; for to the one he owed life, to the other the art of living—and even with some interest in his philosophical pursuits.<sup>2</sup> It must be remembered, on the one hand, that Alexander's faculties ripened with extraordinary rapidity, as seems to be proved by the trust which his father reposed in him. and the affairs

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Alex. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 8.

in which he was engaged at the age of sixteen: on the other hand, that Aristotle also was capable of doing much in a short time with such a pupil, to whom he devoted his whole attention; that his method of teaching was probably calculated to convey much knowledge in a narrow compass; and that no time was consumed in those merely preliminary studies which occupy so large a part of a modern course of liberal education.

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If we inquire what were the peculiar advantages which Alexander was likely to derive from such a teacher as Aristotle, and which could not have been expected from any other of that day, we are led to remark, that, as none of his contemporaries had taken in so wide a compass of knowledge, as none, like him, had ranged over every intellectual field then open to human curiosity, with as lively an interest in each as if it had been the object of his undivided attention, there was none who was less likely to give any partial bias to his pupil's studies. And, again, as there was no man who better understood what belonged to every station of life, none less inclined to exaggerate the importance of his own occupations, it may safely be concluded, that all the instruction he gave was adapted with the most judicious regard to Alexander's station and prospects. The boy came into his hands already formed by the attainments which were deemed indispensable for every ingenuous youth of his years. It was not certainly from Aristotle that he learnt to love Homer, though the copy of the *Iliad* which he used to place under his pillow, and which he deposited in the precious casket which he found amid the spoils of Darius, had been corrected by Aristotle's hand. Yet his strong taste for reading, which made him feel the want of a library in the midst of his conquests<sup>1</sup>, may

Alexander's  
studies.

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Alex. 8.

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have been both cherished and directed by the man who, so many centuries after, gave laws to the poets and critics of some of the most polished nations of Europe, as his talent for speaking was, no doubt, carefully cultivated by this great master of scientific rhetoric.<sup>1</sup> If Aristotle himself had any scientific bias, it was perhaps a hereditary one for the studies connected with medicine: and accordingly we find it expressly stated, and indeed proved by facts, that the prince caught some measure of this predilection from him, so that he afterwards thought himself qualified to give his opinion to physicians on matters belonging to their art.<sup>2</sup> So he seconded Aristotle's researches in natural history with an expenditure for the purpose of collections, which is remarkable even among the examples of his munificence.<sup>3</sup> These facts suggest an interesting question, which however we can but propose; whether a passion for discovery, an eagerness to explore the limits of the world, was not combined as a distinct motive with his thirst for conquest and dominion, and whether for this he may not have been largely indebted to Aristotle's conversation. If we might depend on the genuineness of two letters which appear at least to have been early current under the names of Alexander and Aristotle<sup>4</sup>, we should conclude that Aristotle admitted his pupil even to a knowledge of his more abstruse speculations, which related to subjects that lay the farthest of all from any practical application to human affairs. Alexander complains, that Aristotle had published some works which until then had been reserved for the use of his hearers, and had thereby deprived him of a

<sup>1</sup> Though the treatise on the subject addressed to Alexander, among Aristotle's works, is probably by a different hand.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. Alex. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Athenæus, ix. p. 398. E. Pliny, N. H. viii. 17. *Alexandro magno rege inflammato cupidine animalium naturas noscendi*, &c. Indeed the fact seems to imply personal curiosity.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. Alex. 7. Aul. Gell. xx. 5.

distinction which he had before enjoyed. The reply is at least not unworthy of the philosopher: he remarks that the books he had published were still in one sense unpublished; inasmuch as they were intelligible to none but his hearers. It is perhaps difficult to believe that Aristotle wished to turn his pupil's attention so early to the highest and most subtle results of investigations, which had no doubt occupied the greater part of his own life. But it would not be incredible that the ambitious youth should have desired to be initiated in these philosophical mysteries, and have listened with eager curiosity to his master's solutions of some of the difficulties which he found in the nature of things. It would then still be doubtful whether these questions led to any inquiries concerning the objects of religious belief: whether Aristotle thought it expedient to give his pupil any hints of his own theory as to the divine nature, or taught him to reconcile a devout adherence to the traditional forms of worship with the notion of a single eternal fountain of life.<sup>1</sup> We may more safely adopt the opinion, that the study of man and of society was that which the royal youth was led most assiduously to cultivate. We may indeed smile at Plutarch's rhetoric, when he enumerates Aristotle's divisions of virtue, as if they were so many qualities which Alexander acquired from his instructions<sup>2</sup>: but still we need not deny that the striking contrasts through which Aristotle endeavours to unfold the nature of moral excellence might not only enlarge his pupil's knowledge of mankind, but might aid him in the regulation of his passions. And who shall pretend to estimate the value of the theories and precepts of go-

<sup>1</sup> The philosopher's observation on the pre-eminence of theology over mathematical and physical science (*Metaph. v. (vi.) 1.*) bears on this question, though, on account of the unhappy parenthesis, not decisively. Compare, in the same work, *i. 2. x. (xi.) 7.* and *xi. (xii.) 7.*

<sup>2</sup> *De Alex. Fort. l. 4.*

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vernment which fell into such ears from the author of the Politics, illustrated by such a stock of examples as he had at his command, in the history and constitution of 158 states, which he had described in their minutest details?<sup>1</sup> It is pleasing to find it recorded that still he wrote a book on the office of a king expressly for Alexander. Nevertheless we have unquestionable proof that even on this head the force of nature was stronger than that of education. Aristotle's national prejudices led him into extravagant notions as to the superiority of the Hellenic race over the rest of mankind: as if the distinction between Greek and barbarian was nearly the same as between man and brute, person and thing: hence slavery appeared to him not a result of injustice and cruelty, but an unalterable law of nature, a relation necessary to the welfare of society. Hence too he deduced a practical maxim, which he endeavoured to inculcate upon the future conqueror of Asia, that he should treat the Greeks as their chief, the barbarians as their master.<sup>2</sup> The advice was contrary to Alexander's views and sentiments: it did not suit the position which his consciousness of his own destiny led him to assume. He acted, we know, on a directly opposite principle.

Difficulties  
of Alex-  
ander's  
position.

We have at least reason to believe that Alexander, though he was but twenty years old at his father's death, had learnt, thought, seen, and done more to fit him for the place he was to fill, than many sovereigns in the full maturity of their age and experience. Like his father, he found himself on his accession to the throne, in a situation which called forth all the powers of his mind, and all the energies of his character. Macedonia, though nominally at peace with

<sup>1</sup> Diog. Laert. Aristot.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. de Alex. Fort. l. 6. τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήσιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς. Mr. Blakesley, *Life of Aristotle* (p. 52.), translates, *to treat the Greeks as a general, but the barbarians as a master*. I doubt that ἡγεμονικῶς was meant to imply any reference to military command.

all its European neighbours, was surrounded by enemies, who had only been forced by the success of Philip's arms to dissemble their hostility, and might be expected eagerly to seize the opportunity, which seemed to offer itself now that the crown had devolved on a stripling, to shake off a yoke which they had endured with ill-disguised impatience. In the kingdom itself there were powerful families, which, though they had submitted to the ascendancy of Philip's ability and fortune, had not forgotten the times when they aspired to independence, if not to the possession of the throne. Amyntas too, the son of Perdiccas, was still living, and might be tempted to assert his claim. There was ground to apprehend that, as at Philip's accession, if these or any other pretenders should start up, they might be enabled by the support of foreign powers to involve the country in a civil war. It was known that the court of Persia was on the watch to avert the peril with which it was threatened by Philip's preparations, and would spare no cost for the purpose of throwing new obstacles in his successor's way.

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The young king's first object was to secure himself at home: the next to overawe his hostile neighbours, and to extort from them such an acknowledgment of his superiority, as would place him in the position which his father was occupying at the time of his death. In Macedonia, though there might be some ambitious and disaffected nobles, the mass of the people both recognised his title, and were attached to his person. He had won their hearts in his father's lifetime by his munificence, which was perhaps a simple effect of his natural disposition, though it had incurred Philip's censure, and possibly excited his jealousy.<sup>1</sup> They had also seen sufficient proofs of his

<sup>1</sup> In a letter which is reported with a slight variation by Cicero de Off. ii. 15. and by Val. Max. vii. 2. Ext. 10.



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Executions  
in Mace-  
donia.

extraordinary genius, to satisfy them that he was worthy of the throne. Nevertheless, it appears that there were some grounds for apprehension, which for a time disquieted Alexander himself, and probably still more his most faithful friends and counsellors. As long as the motives which had impelled Pausanias were unknown—and it may have been some time before they were ascertained—there was apparently reason to suspect that he was only the chief actor or instrument of a conspiracy which might not yet have accomplished all its objects. An inquiry was instituted, and the result is said to have been that proofs were discovered, which implicated Heromenes and Arrabæus, two of the sons of Aeropus the Lyncestian, and it seems some other persons, in the plot. It would be rash to decide on the weight of evidence which we have not seen. But it is difficult to resist a suspicion that it was not much stronger than that on which, as we shall find reason to believe, several very innocent lives were sacrificed in the course of Alexander's reign. Alexander, the brother of the two Lyncestian nobles, was the foremost, after the murder, to offer his services to the young prince. He instantly buckled on his armour, and conducted him as his sovereign to the palace. Therefore, it is said, though his innocence was not clearly established, his life was spared. But, beside the presumption which this fact raises in his favour, and consequently in favour of his brothers, it seems almost incredible that Pausanias, whose motive was revenge for a personal injury, and who had resolved to seek it at the risk of his life with his own hand, should have disclosed his design to persons who might betray, but could scarcely further it. Yet it was given out that the murder had been preconcerted, not only with these accomplices, but with the Persian court or its emissaries. The fact may have been that the Lyncestians had been engaged in some intrigues.

with the Persian government, and this may have appeared a sufficient ground for charging them with a share in the guilt of Pausanias. Whatever may have been their crime, their punishment answered several useful purposes: it satisfied the multitude, vindicated Alexander's own character, awed the discontented, and inflamed popular resentment against the treacherous and cowardly barbarian. It seems that about the same time Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, was put to death on a charge of a plot against Alexander's life.<sup>1</sup>

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After these acts of justice, and after the last honours had been paid to his father, the king showed himself in a general assembly of his people, and declared his intention of prosecuting his predecessor's undertakings with like vigour, and, it is said, granted a general immunity from all burdens except military service.<sup>2</sup> He dismissed the Greek envoys to their homes with gracious language, and with messages by which he requested each state to maintain the friendly relations in which it stood to his house. But as he could not place much reliance on the effect of such an exhortation, his chief care was to keep up the martial spirit of the army by frequent reviews and assiduous training. Soon indeed it appeared that this was his only security.

The news of Philip's death had excited a general ferment throughout Greece. The gloomy prospect

Movements  
in Greece.

<sup>1</sup> Droysen (Alex. p. 55.) seems to think that Amyntas was executed as one of those who had conspired against Philip; and refers to Polyænus (viii. 60.) who does not even give any hint that he came to a violent death. In Curtius (vi. 9. 17.) Alexander only mentions his cousin's plot against himself. Photius (cod. 92.), from Arrian's work, τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον (p. 70. Bekk.), says of Cynane, that she was the wife of Amyntas, ὃν ἔφθη Ἀλέξανδρος κτείνειν, ὁπότε εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβαινον. He proceeds (and this decisive testimony should have been added to those produced, Vol. V. p. 220. note 2.), οὗτος δὲ Περδίκκου παῖς ἦν, ἀδελφὸς δὲ Φιλίππου Περδίκκας, ὡς εἶναι Ἀμύνταν τὸν ἀγερημένον Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀνεψιόν.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xi. 1. *Macedonibus immunitatem cunctarum rerum, præter militiæ rationem, dedit.* But it is hardly possible to believe this statement in its literal sense: nor would it be consistent with the exemptions bestowed on the families of the slain at the battle of the Granicus. Arrian, i. 16. The truth may be that the Macedonians in actual service were declared to be exempt from all taxes.

which, since the battle of Chæronea, must have saddened so many hearts: the thought that the flower of the Grecian youth were henceforth to shed their blood for the execution of projects which threatened their country with perpetual subjection, was suddenly exchanged for the liveliest hopes of deliverance from the foreigner's power. In all the principal states language was heard, and preparations were seen, denoting a disposition to take advantage of the unexpected opportunity. In Peloponnesus, not only Sparta, but Argos, and Elis, and almost all Arcadia, showed themselves ready to renounce their forced alliance with Macedonia. Perhaps Messene and Megalopolis alone adhered to it. In the west more decided movements took place. Ambracia expelled the Macedonian garrison, and re-established its democratical institutions. The Acarnanian exiles who had taken refuge in Ætolia, prepared to return, and the Ætoli-ans in their congress voted succours to reinstate them. Even Thebes, notwithstanding the presence of the garrison in the Cadmea, rose against the oligarchical government. An assembly was held which passed a decree by which it resolved to recover the citadel, and to resist Alexander's claims to the title and authority which the congress at the Isthmus had conferred upon his father. Athens however took the lead in these movements, and indeed seems to have been the centre from which they proceeded.

Demo-  
sthenes.

Among the Athenian envoys who had been sent to congratulate Philip was Charidemus; whether the Eubœan adventurer, or the Athenian general of the same name, is a doubtful point. He was, it seems, an intimate friend, or at least a political ally, of Demosthenes, and, being at Ægæ at the time of Philip's death, lost no time in despatching a courier, who was directed to carry the news to Demosthenes before he communicated it to any one else. It happened that

the orator was at this juncture mourning the loss of an only daughter, who had died but seven days before; but his private sorrow gave way to public cares. He undertook to publish the intelligence himself; and though the time prescribed by custom for the rites due to the deceased had not yet expired, he immediately laid aside his weeds, came out dressed in white, with a festive wreath on his head, and a joyful countenance, and was seen performing a solemn sacrifice at one of the public altars. In order to give greater effect to the momentous tidings, the orator appears to have resorted to a stratagem, which proves that he knew his countrymen to be still as superstitious, and almost as credulous, as they were in the days when Pisistratus rode into Athens with the goddess by his side. He appeared before the council of Five Hundred, and declared that it had been revealed to him in a dream by Zeus and Athene, that some great good was about to happen to the commonwealth.<sup>1</sup> Messengers soon after arrived with the news which fulfilled the divine announcement. It was apparently the object of Demosthenes, by this artifice, to impress the people with his own view of the change which Philip's death had made in the situation and prospects of Athens. It was at least as harmless an imposture as was ever practised; and, if fraud could ever be pious, might deserve that epithet. The same purpose appears in the measures which he afterwards proposed in the assembly. The Council had, it seems, already appointed a sacrifice to celebrate the glad tidings: he now moved that the people should proclaim its joy by the like ceremony, and moreover that

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<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. 22. *ὡς ὅναρ ἑωρακὼς, ἀφ' οὗ τι μέγα προσδοκᾷν Ἀθηναίοις ἀγαθόν.* Æschines indeed (Ctes. § 77.) seems to assert that he announced Philip's death: but this is probably rhetorical exaggeration. Still Æschines was not sagacious enough to see that his rival must have been in the plot against Philip's life; though indeed that he should have announced it before he had heard that it had taken place would have been not impudence, but folly.

religious honours should be decreed to the memory of Pausanias.<sup>1</sup>

This conduct of Demosthenes was strongly censured by his contemporaries on various grounds; though not on those which render it most repugnant to the maxims and feelings of civilised society in modern times. Yet we know that even under the better light which we enjoy, not only the massacre of the Huguenots was celebrated with public rejoicings and thanksgivings in the capital of Christian Europe, but the assassination of the Prince of Orange, and that of Henry III. of France, were openly applauded, and Balthasar Gerard and Clement treated as heroes.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps, however, the plea of political fanaticism cannot properly be alleged in behalf of Demosthenes. It is much more probable that he acted on a sober calculation of expediency. But the head of his offending is still that he suffered patriotic motives to overpower every other consideration. It is remarkable that the only thing which Æschines reprehends in his adversary's behaviour on this occasion, beside the forgery of the dream, is that he had betrayed such unnatural insensibility to his domestic loss: a reproach which Plutarch justly repels with the remark, that it had always been accounted praiseworthy to bury private affliction in concern for the public welfare. He himself condemns Demosthenes on the score of ingratitude toward a prince who had used his victory with such magnanimous forbearance. We might perhaps observe, that generosity and gratitude are terms which, when applied to the transactions of states and princes with one another, belong rather to the style of a manifesto than to that of a history.

<sup>1</sup> *ἐπὶ θρόνῳ Πανσανίου*. Æschin. Ctes. § 160. This is more intelligible than Plutarch's statement (Demosth. 22.) that the people decreed a crown to the dead murderer.

<sup>2</sup> Ranke, *Geschichte der Päbste*, II. p. 106. 171. The oration of Muretus, xxii. (ed. Ruhnken, I. p. 177.) hardly needs to be referred to.

Phocion objected to the proposed demonstrations of joy on two accounts: first, because such exultation over an enemy's death was dastardly, and then, because the force which had won the day at Chæronea had only been diminished by the loss of a single life.<sup>1</sup> The last of these objections was surely sophistical, and tended to weaken the first, which in itself was certainly well-founded. He might indeed fairly argue that the joy which the Athenians might express would betray the fears which they had hitherto felt, their aversion for the power to which they had submitted; would prove that their late presents and compliments to Philip were nothing but hollow flattery, covering real hatred. But who had ever doubted that this was the case? They had not even attempted to disguise their displeasure at the contributions laid on them by the congress. On the other hand, that the loss which Macedonia had sustained by Philip's death, was only to be reckoned as that of a single soldier, was manifestly false: and the best excuse that can be offered for Demosthenes is, that he wished to place the event in a different light: one which he might well believe to be the true one. We cannot indeed be sure that he entertained so low an opinion of Alexander's abilities as he thought it expedient to profess: though it appears that the impression made on him by the young prince when he saw him at his father's court was not favourable; and on his return from his embassy he turned his boyish performance into ridicule.<sup>2</sup> It was true that Alexander had at least acted the part of a man better than himself at Chæronea: but his real character, and the promise of greatness which he held out, could not yet be known at Athens. Perhaps some report of his multifarious studies and attainments had been heard there, which

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<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phoc. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Timarch. § 268.

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afforded a handle for Demosthenes to compare him with Margites, the hero of a burlesque poem attributed to Homer, who knew many things, but none well<sup>1</sup>: and the orator now ventured to assure the Athenians, that they had nothing to fear from the young king, who would never stir from Macedonia, but would remain at Pella, dividing his time between his peaceful studies and the inspection of victims, which would never permit him to undertake any dangerous expedition.<sup>2</sup>

Such insinuations would undoubtedly have been as presumptuous as they were fallacious, if they had contained the whole ground on which Demosthenes rested his hopes. But however he might be mistaken as to the character of Alexander, he had seemingly good reason for the inferences he drew from the facts which were known of him, his age, and his position. That a youth of twenty, who had succeeded to a throne vacated by a murder, and who had so many enemies and rivals to fear both at home and abroad, would be able to maintain the ascendancy which his politic father had with so much difficulty acquired over Greece, might well seem improbable enough to justify the most sanguine expectations from a vigorous well-concerted resistance. There were beside engines which the orator was able to set at work against him, which were known only to himself, and which he was obliged to keep secret, but which might reasonably strengthen his confidence. He was in correspondence with the Persian court, and had, it seems, already received sums of money from it to be distributed at his discretion for the purpose of thwarting Philip's enter-

<sup>1</sup> Πόλλ' ἤπιστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ' ἤπιστατο πάντα. Compare Aristotle, Eth. vi. 7. The story told by Eustathius, on Od. K. p. 1669. 47., can hardly have been taken from the poem, or even have belonged to the character of the hero; but it corresponds with the sample given by Tætes, Chil. iv. 870. and vi. Hist. 62.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Ctes. § 160.

prise against Asia.<sup>1</sup> The conduct of Demosthenes in this transaction—if we consider that he was carrying on a clandestine negotiation with a foreign state against which his own had declared war, to injure a prince who was the ally of Athens—cannot be vindicated on the principles which regulate the intercourse of civilised nations in modern times. But how little were such scruples heeded when Napoleon's disasters opened a prospect of restoring the independence of Germany!

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The people however seems to have retained too lively a recollection of the consternation which had followed the battle of Chæronea, to pledge themselves hastily to a renewal of the contest with Macedonia. The language of Æschines inclines us to believe, that they did not adopt the motion of Demosthenes with respect to Pausanias.<sup>2</sup> But he prevailed on them to send envoys to many of the Greek states, with secret instructions, which were probably dictated by himself; and to these agents we may ascribe a large share in the proceedings hostile to Macedonia which have been already related. The Persian gold, or the promise of subsidies, may have opened the way, and have overcome many obstacles. There was another quarter in which the Athenian emissaries might still more safely reckon on a friendly reception. Attalus, Alexander's personal enemy, was commanding a body of troops in Asia. Little encouragement could be necessary to induce him to revolt against the sovereign whom he had unpardonably offended. A negotiation

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at Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. 20. Droysen (p. 81.) affects to consider this fact as involving an imputation on the integrity of Demosthenes. Yet he does not pretend to show that the orator did not apply the money to the purposes for which he received it. On the change effected in the relations between Greece and Persia by the growth of the Macedonian power, see the remarks of Grauert, *Analect.* p. 225. n. 37.

<sup>2</sup> u. s. *eis aitiān eūaggeliōn dusias tēn boulēn katēsthsen*: not therefore the people also.



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Alexander's  
advance.

was opened with him by means of a letter from Demosthenes, and nothing probably but want of time prevented its success.<sup>1</sup>

But all these plans and preparations were disconcerted and suppressed by the rapidity of Alexander's movements. It seems as if his elder counsellors, who had been long used to Philip's cautious policy, advised him to leave the Greeks for the present to themselves, and not to make any attempt to force them to obedience, until he had established a good understanding with the barbarian tribes on his northern frontier, which after Philip's death had begun to assume a threatening aspect.<sup>2</sup> Alexander however saw, that if he should adopt such a course, the work of his father's reign might be undone in a few months: he saw that his presence was immediately necessary in Greece, and he set his forces in motion without delay. In his passage through Thessaly, he endeavoured to conciliate the ruling families by promises, and by flattering allusions to the twofold relation by which he was connected with them through his paternal and maternal ancestors, Hercules and Achilles. This appeal to their vanity, seconded by a formidable army, could not be withstood. All the concessions that had been made to Philip were renewed to him: their revenues and troops were placed at his disposal.<sup>3</sup> At Thermopylæ he assembled the Amphictyonic Council, perhaps before the ordinary time of the autumnal meeting, with a view to secure the adherence of the northern tribes which had votes in it: and from them it seems he received the title which had been conferred on his father in the Sacred War.<sup>4</sup> He then advanced by rapid marches to Thebes, where, as no preparations had yet been made to execute the resolution which

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 3.  
<sup>2</sup> Justin, xi. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. Al. 11.  
<sup>4</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 4.

had been precipitately adopted, his presence awed the disaffected into entire submission. His approach produced a like effect at Athens. The people hastened to appease him by an embassy, which they sent to apologise for their late proceedings, and to offer him all the honours they had conferred on Philip. Demosthenes himself was appointed one of the envoys, perhaps through the intrigues of his adversaries; and he even proceeded as far as Cithæron, on his way to the Macedonian camp. We do not know whether it was his own reflections on the dangers of his mission, or some hints which he received as to Alexander's intentions, that induced him to find some excuse for turning back. The rest of the ambassadors however found the king ready to accept their excuses and promises, perhaps were led to believe that he had never suspected the commonwealth of any hostile designs. Yet, according to Diodorus, it must have been about this time that Attalus—possibly disheartened by the intelligence he received from Europe—determined to attempt to make his peace with him, and as a proof of his sincerity sent him the letter of Demosthenes. Alexander however does not appear to have made any complaints to the Athenians on the subject; but he despatched a trusty officer, named Hecatæus, over to Asia, with orders either to arrest Attalus, and convey him to Macedonia, or to put him to death. It seems that Attalus had so won the affections of his troops, that Hecatæus thought it safest to have him secretly killed.

Alexander had sent envoys before him to summon a fresh congress at Corinth. He found this assembly as obsequious as that which had been called by his father: and was invested by it with the same title and authority for the prosecution of the war with Persia, as had been bestowed on Philip. Sparta alone either

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refused to send deputies to the congress, or instructed them to disavow its proceedings. She had been used — such was still her language — herself to take the lead among the Greeks, and would not resign her hereditary rank to another.<sup>1</sup> Alexander perhaps smiled at these pretensions of a state which was hardly able to protect itself, but did not think it worth while to put its resolution to the test, by an invasion of its territory. So too the revolt of Ambracia did not appear to him important enough to detain him so long as would have been necessary to crush it. He even condescended to assure the Ambracians that they had only forestalled his intentions: that he should of his own accord have restored their democratical institutions.<sup>2</sup> It was a concession which his commanding posture enabled him to make with dignity, and therefore without danger. Having thus in the course of a few weeks settled the affairs of Greece, he returned to Macedonia, with the hope that in the following spring he might be able to embark for Asia.

B. C. 335.  
Alexander's  
expedition  
to Thrace.

But when the season for military operations drew near in 335, reports were heard of movements among the Thracian tribes and the Triballians, which seemed to render it necessary for the security of his kingdom during his absence, that he should spread the terror of his arms in that quarter, before he began an expedition which would carry him so far away from it. The Triballians had not only resisted Philip's passage through their territory with impunity, but had deprived his army of the booty collected in the Scythian campaign. The Thracians, in whose land he had planted his colonies, were no doubt impatient to ease themselves of the tribute which he had imposed on them, and of the foreign settlers whose presence made

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, I. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 4.

the yoke more galling: and those whose independence had only been threatened, were admonished by the fate of their neighbours to secure themselves against like attacks. The Illyrians too, hereditary enemies of Macedonia, had begun to entertain hopes of recovering the districts which had been wrested from them by Philip. Early in the spring Alexander set out on his march toward the Danube. A small squadron of ships of war was ordered to be fitted out at Byzantium, and to sail up the river to meet the army. In ten days, having crossed the Hebrus at Philippopolis, it reached the foot of the Balkan. Here the Thracians had collected their forces to guard the defiles, and were seen intrenched behind their waggons on the summit of the pass. As the road which led up to it was extremely steep, they had formed the plan of rolling their waggons down on the enemy as they advanced, and then falling on their broken ranks. Alexander perceived the object of their preparations, and provided against the danger. The heavy infantry was ordered, where the ground permitted, to open their files and make way for the waggons: where this was not practicable, to throw themselves forward on the ground, and link their shields together over their heads, so that the descending masses might bound over them. The shock came and passed in a few moments, leaving the men unhurt: they closed their ranks, and rose from the ground with heightened courage. The enemy were soon dislodged from their position by a skilful and vigorous charge, leaving 1500 slain: the fugitives easily escaped: the camp, in which were their wives and children, fell into the hands of the victors.

Having crossed the mountains without further interruption, Alexander descended into the Triballian country to the river Lyginus<sup>1</sup>, at a point three days'

<sup>1</sup> Its modern name is not known; but it must have been a tributary of the Danube.

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march from the Danube. Syrmus, the king of the Triballians, had sent the women and children of his tribe to an island of the Danube which our authors call Peuce, and on the enemy's approach himself took refuge there with his immediate followers, and several of the neighbouring Thracian hordes. But the bulk of his own people, when Alexander moved forward to overtake him, fell back upon the Lyginus, where the woods near the river offered a secure shelter. Alexander however, who was apprised of their motions, and was only a day's march in advance, suddenly retraced his steps, and encamped on the plain skirted by the forest. The manœuvres of his light troops drew the enemy out of their lurking-place, and they were then easily routed: 3000 were slain: the fugitives were mostly able to reach the forest, into which their pursuers, as it was growing late, did not venture to follow them.

Operations  
on the  
Danube.

Alexander now resumed his march, and in three days reached the right bank of the Danube, where he found the galleys which he expected from Byzantium. If the Danube was not navigable for the ancient galleys of war above the modern port of Galatz<sup>1</sup>—which lies between the Sereth and the Pruth, where the river makes its sudden bend eastward—it would be difficult to understand his previous movements unless we suppose that before he met the ships he had marched for several days along the river. On the other hand, the island, or network of islands, formed by the Danube just above Galatz, would seem to have presented a very suitable place of retreat for the fugitives whom Alexander was pursuing.<sup>2</sup> In the galleys however he embarked with a body of heavy-armed infantry and bowmen, and endeavoured to effect a landing on Peuce.

<sup>1</sup> As Niebuhr conceived, Kl. Schr. p. 376.

<sup>2</sup> I am referring to a map of Turkey in Europe (according to its condition in 1828) published by Cotta at Munich, which I believe may be trusted.

But the current was strong, the banks were steep and lined with enemies, who far outnumbered the detachment which his little squadron could contain: after some fruitless attempts he found himself forced to abandon the undertaking. He had also another more interesting object in view. He wished to cross the great river, the boundary of so many warlike tribes, and to make an incursion into the land of the Getes, who were now seated either in Walachia, or, if Peuce lay lower down, in Moldavia or Bessarabia, and whose forces, 10,000 foot and 4,000 horse, were drawn up, as in defiance of him, on the opposite side. He himself, and a part of his troops, embarked in the galleys: the rest found a passage either in canoes used by the natives, of which he collected a great number, or on hides stuffed with straw. Under favour of night they crossed over unmolested, and landed in fields of standing corn. This the phalanx levelled, as it marched through, with its spears, the cavalry following until they reached the open ground, where the enemy, astonished and dismayed by their unexpected appearance, did not even wait for the first charge of the horse, but took refuge in their town which lay but a few miles off. Even this — for it was poorly fortified — they abandoned at Alexander's approach, and taking as many as they could of the women and children on their horses, retreated into the wilderness. The town was sacked and razed to the ground, and Alexander, having sacrificed on the right bank of the Danube to the gods who had granted him a safe passage, returned to his camp on the other side.

Here he received embassies, with submissive or at least pacific overtures, from Syrmus, and from many of the independent nations bordering on the river. His chief object was attained in the proof thus afforded of the terror inspired by his arms. Among the tribes which had been agitated by the report of

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The Celts.

his expedition were the Celts who had migrated to the east of the Adriatic.<sup>1</sup> They came professedly to seek his alliance; perhaps in fact rather to ascertain what they might have to apprehend from him. Alexander was struck with their gigantic forms; and, with some self-complacency, asked them, what they feared most in the world. Their pride was equal to his ambition: they answered, *Lest the sky should fall*.<sup>2</sup> All were dismissed with assurances of friendship.

He now turned his march westward, to reach the borders of Illyria, through the country of the Agrianians and Pæonians, on the western side of the mountains which contain the springs of the Hebrus and the Nestus. On his road he received advice that Cleitus king of the Illyrians, the son of his father's old enemy Bardylis, was up in arms, and had leagued himself with Glaucias, king of the Taulantians. The Autariates too, through whose land he had to pass, were ready to fall on him in his way. From this last hinderance however he was relieved by his faithful ally, Langarus, king of the Agrianians, who had formed a personal attachment to him in Philip's lifetime, and now came to join him with a body of his choicest troops, and undertook to find sufficient employment for the Autariates, who were accounted by their neighbours an unwarlike tribe, in their own country. He fulfilled this promise by an invasion which effectually diverted them from their meditated attack on the Macedonian army. Alexander would have rewarded his zeal with the hand of his sister Cynane, the widow of Amyntas: but before the time came, Langarus was cut off by sickness. The king

<sup>1</sup> Niebuhr, u. s.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Williams (p. 37.) thinks that the real meaning was: *We fear no enemies but the Gods*. We may compare the language of the Germans in Cæsar, *De B. G.* iv. 7. *Sese unis Suevis concedere, quibus ne dii quidem immortales pares esse possint*: and the inscription on the bronze statue of Alexander by Lysippus (Tzetx. Chil. xi. Hist. 368.): *Αἰδῶσονται δ' ὅτι οἶκεν ὁ χάλκεος, ὡς Δία λεύσσω, Γᾶν δ' ἔμ' ἐμὲ τίθεμαι, Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὀλυμπον ἔχει.*

however was thus enabled to pursue his march without obstruction up the valley of the Erigon, toward the fortress of Pellion, which, as the strongest position in the country, had been occupied by Cleitus. It stood on high ground in the midst of lofty wooded hills, which were also guarded by Illyrian troops, so as to command all the approaches of the place: and the barbarians had sought an additional safeguard against the assaults of the Macedonians, in a sacrifice which they celebrated on the hill-tops, of three boys, three girls, and as many black rams. Yet all these precautions proved fruitless, and Alexander, after he made himself master of the adjacent hills—where he found the victims of those horrid rites—was proceeding to invest Pellion itself, when the arrival of Glaucias with a numerous army compelled him to retire, that he might provide for his own safety. We shall not dwell on the evolutions by which he extricated himself from a most perilous position. It is sufficient to mention that he first penetrated through a difficult defile, and crossed a river in the presence of an enemy greatly superior in numbers, and three days afterwards, having suddenly returned, fell upon the allies, whose camp was carelessly guarded, in the night, and broke up their host. Glaucias fled toward his own home, and was pursued by Alexander with great slaughter as far as the mountains which protected his territories. Cleitus at first took shelter in Pellion; but soon despairing of his own resources, set fire to the fortress, and retreated into the dominions of Glaucias.

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Pellion.

The accounts which reached Greece of Alexander's operations in these wild and distant regions were, it may be supposed, very imperfect and confused; and at length, during an interval in which no news was heard of him, a report of his death sprang up, or was studiously set afloat. It was at least either belief of

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the report, or confidence in the effect which it was likely to produce in others, that seems to have encouraged a party of Theban exiles, in concert with some of their friends at home who were no less impatient of the Macedonian yoke, to enter the city by night, and attempt a revolution. They began in an unhappy spirit, with the massacre of two officers of the Macedonian garrison, whom they found in the streets unaware of the danger. They then summoned an assembly, and prevailed on the people, chiefly by the strong assurances which they gave of Alexander's death, to rise in open insurrection, and lay siege to the Cadmea. The citizens who were still in exile were recalled: the slaves enfranchised, the aliens won by new privileges. Whether Demosthenes had been previously apprised of their design, is doubtful; but when they had taken the decisive step, he certainly aided them to the utmost of his power. He was enabled by the Persian subsidy to furnish them with a supply of arms for as many as needed it<sup>1</sup>, many of whom perhaps had been deprived of their own by the oligarchical government, and he induced the Athenians to enter into an alliance with them, and to promise them support. He himself probably believed the rumour which he must so earnestly have wished to be true; and it was no doubt this that emboldened the people on his motion to decree an expedition in aid of the Thebans. This decree however was not carried into effect: before the people could be brought actually to take the field, news arrived which put a stop to their preparations. Elis too, which seems to have fallen again into the hands of the anti-Macedonian party, openly espoused the cause of the Thebans

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 8. The account of Diodorus is incomparably more trustworthy and probable than the accusations of Dinarchus (c. Dem. p. 92.), who represents Demosthenes as withholding the money required to induce the Arcadian general to march to the aid of the Thebans.

so far as even to send their forces as far as the Isthmus, where they were joined by those of some Arcadian states. But here their generals were induced to halt, by the tidings which reached them of Alexander's return.<sup>1</sup>

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He was still at Pellion when he heard of the revolt of Thebes. He knew that unless it was crushed in time it would probably spread, and he was anxious about the garrison of the Cadmea. He therefore set out immediately for Bœotia. In seven days, having traversed the upper provinces of Macedonia and crossed the Cambunian range toward its junction with Pindus, he reached Pelinna in Thessaly. Six days more brought him into Bœotia. So rapid were his movements, that before the Thebans had heard that he had passed Thermopylæ, he had arrived at Onchestus. The authors of the insurrection would not at first listen to the news of his approach; they gave out that it was Antipater who commanded the Macedonian army: and then that Alexander, the son of Aeropus, had been taken for his royal namesake. But when the truth was ascertained, they found the people still willing to persevere in the struggle which had now become so hopeless. Alexander on the other hand, wishing to give them time for better counsels, now moved slowly against the city, and even when he had encamped near the foot of the Cadmea, which they had encompassed with a double line of circumvallation, waited some time for proposals of peace, which he was ready to grant on very lenient terms. There was a strong party within which was willing to submit to his pleasure, and urged the people to cast themselves on his mercy: but the leaders of the revolt, who could expect none for themselves, resisted every such motion: and as beside their personal in-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 8. διατρίβοντες ἐκαρᾶδόκουν, προσδοκίμου τοῦ βασιλέως ὄντος.

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fluence they filled most places in the government, they unhappily prevailed. It was their object to drive matters to extremities. When Alexander sent to demand Phœnix and Prothytes, two of their chiefs, they demanded Philotas and Antipater in return; and when he proclaimed an offer of pardon to all who should surrender themselves to him and share the common peace, they made a counter-proclamation from the top of a tower<sup>1</sup>, inviting all who desired the independence of Greece to take part with them against the tyrant. These insults, and especially the animosity and distrust which they implied, put an end to all thoughts of peace, and Alexander reluctantly prepared for an assault.

Capture of  
Thebes.

The fate of Thebes seems after all to have been decided more by accident than by design. Perdiccas, who was stationed with his division in front of the camp, not far from the Theban intrenchments, without waiting for the signal, began the attack, and forced his way into the space between the enemy's lines, and was followed by Amyntas son of Andromenes, who commanded the next division. Alexander was thus induced to bring up the rest of his forces. Yet at first he only sent in some light troops to the support of the two divisions which were engaged with the enemy. When however Perdiccas had fallen, severely wounded, as he led his men within the second line of intrenchments, and the Thebans, who at first had given way, rallied, and in their turn put the Macedonians to flight, he himself advanced to the scene of combat with the phalanx, and fell upon them in the midst of the disorder caused by the pursuit. They were instantly routed, and made for the nearest gates of the city, in such confusion, that the enemy entered with them, and being soon joined by the

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 9

garrison of the Cadmea, made themselves masters of the adjacent part of the city. The besieged made a short stand in the market-place; but, when they saw themselves threatened on all sides, the cavalry took to flight through the opposite gates, and the rest as they could find a passage. But few of the foot combatants effected their escape; and the conquerors glutted their rage with unresisted slaughter. It was not however so much from the Macedonians, as from some of their auxiliaries, that the Thebans suffered the utmost excesses of hostile cruelty. Alexander had brought with him a body of Thracians among his light troops, and he had been reinforced by the Phocians and by all the Bœotian towns hostile to Thebes, more especially by Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Plataea. The Thracians, impelled by their habitual ferocity, of which they had shown so fearful a specimen many years before at the capture of Mycalessus, the Bœotians, eager to revenge the wrongs they had endured from Thebes in the day of her prosperity, revelled in the usual licence of carnage, plunder, and wanton outrages on those whose age and sex left them most defenceless. The bloodshed however was restrained by cupidity, that the most valuable part of the spoil might not be lost. The number of the slain was estimated at 6000: that of the prisoners at 30,000. The Macedonians lost about 500 men.

It only remained to fix the final doom of the conquered city. Alexander, who had probably made up his mind on it, referred it to a council of his allies, in which the representatives of the Bœotian towns took a leading part. The issue of their deliberation might be easily foreseen, and did not want plausible reasons to justify it. There was a sentence which had been hanging over Thebes ever since the Persian war in which she had so recklessly betrayed the cause of

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of Thebes.

Grecian liberty.<sup>1</sup> It had never been forgotten, and calls had been heard from time to time for its execution.<sup>2</sup> And the city which had so long been permitted by the indulgence of the Greeks to retain a forfeited existence, had nevertheless been distinguished by her merciless treatment of her conquered enemies. In the case of Plataea she had not only instigated the Spartans to a cold-blooded slaughter, forbidden by the usages of Greek warfare, but she had destroyed a city which by its heroic patriotism had earned the gratitude of the whole nation, and was itself a monument of the national triumph. Nor was it forgotten that when Athens was at the mercy of its enemies she alone had proposed to sweep it from the face of Greece. It seems that these old offences were placed in the foreground, while little notice was taken of the later acts of violence and oppression toward the Bæotian towns, which were the real motive of their implacable resentment. The decree of the council was, that the Cadmea should be left standing, to be occupied by a Macedonian garrison; that the lower city should be levelled with the ground, and the territory, except the part which belonged to the temples, divided among the allies: the men, women, and children, sold as slaves, all but the priests and priestesses, and some citizens who stood in a relation of hospitality to Philip or Alexander, or held the office of Proxenus to the state of Macedonia. Under this head were probably included most of the conqueror's political adherents. He made one other exception, which was honourable rather to his taste than his humanity. He *bade spare the house of Pindarus*<sup>3</sup>, and as many as were to be found of his de-

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. II. pp. 305. 393.<sup>2</sup> See Vol. V. p. 88.<sup>3</sup> According to Dio Chrysost. i. p. 83. *κελεύσας ἐπιγράψαι Πινδαρου τοῦ μουσσοποιοῦ τὴν στέγην μὴ κατερε.*

scendants.<sup>1</sup> The rest of the city was razed to the sound of the flute, on which Ismenias, a highly celebrated artist, played an appropriate accompaniment.<sup>2</sup> The council likewise decreed that Orchomenus and Plataea should be rebuilt. The demolished buildings of Thebes may have furnished materials for the restoration of Plataea.

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It can hardly be doubted that policy had a large share in this rigorous measure, and that Thebes was destroyed chiefly because it would not have been safe to leave it standing, and that the example of its fate might strike the rest of Greece with a wholesome awe. Alexander himself, in his subsequent treatment of individual Thebans, tacitly acknowledged that his severity had been carried to an extreme which bordered upon cruelty. But the harshness which he displayed in this case enabled him to assume the appearance of magnanimity and gentleness in others. All the Greek states which had betrayed their hostility toward him, now vied with one another in apologies, recantations, and offers of submission. A reaction immediately took place at Elis in favour of the Macedonian party: and in the Arcadian towns which had sent succours for the Thebans, the authors of this imprudent step were condemned to death. The Ætolians too, who had shown some symptoms of disaffection, sent an embassy to deprecate the king's displeasure. Athens however had most reason to dread his anger, and strove to avert it by a servile homage, which at once marks the character of the man who proposed it, and the depth to which the people had fallen since the battle of Chæronea. When the first fugitives arrived from Thebes, the Athenians were

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, I. 9. Ælian, V. H. xiii. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Tzetzes, Chil. I. 328. and vii. Hist. 139. *Θρηνώδεσιν ἀλλήμασιν αὐλοῦντος Ἰσμηνίου — ὡς Καλλισθένης γράφει.*

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Alexander  
demands  
the Athe-  
nian  
orators.

celebrating their great Eleusinian mysteries. All fled in consternation to the city, and removed their property out of the country within the walls. An assembly was immediately called, in which, on the motion of Demades, it was decreed that ten envoys, the most acceptable that could be found, should be sent to congratulate Alexander on his safe return from his northern expedition, and on the chastisement which he had inflicted on Thebes. The king discovered no displeasure at this piece of impudent obsequiousness, but in reply sent a letter to the people demanding nine of the leading anti-Macedonian orators and generals: Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Polyeuctus, Chares, Charidemus, Ephialtes, Diotimus, and Mærocles, whom he charged both with the transactions which had led to the battle of Chæroneia, and with all the hostile measures that had since been adopted at Athens toward his father and himself, particularly with the principal share in the revolt of Thebes.<sup>1</sup> In the assembly which was held to consider this requisition, Phocion, it is said, both counselled the people to surrender the objects of the conqueror's resentment or apprehensions, and exhorted the elected victims to devote themselves spontaneously for the public weal.<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes is reported to have quoted the fable of the wolf who called on the sheep to give up their dogs. The people wavered between fear and reluctance, till Demades stepped in to remove the difficulty. He undertook—it was commonly believed for a fee of five talents—to appease Alexander, and save the threatened lives. But the success of the final embassy seems to have been mainly owing to Phocion's influence with the conqueror, who continued long to honour him with

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 10. Suidas (*Ἀντίπατρος*) gives eleven names, adding to Arrian's list those of Thrasybulus and Cassander. Plutarch (*Dem.* 23.) omits Hyperides, Chares, and Diotimus, and substitutes Damon and Callisthenes.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 15.

marks of his especial esteem.' He found the king satiated with the punishment of the Thebans, and disposed for an exercise of mercy which might soften the impression it had produced on the minds of the Greeks. He remitted his demand with respect to all except Charidemus, who perhaps had incurred his peculiar displeasure by his conduct at Ægæ after Philip's death, and who now embarked for Asia, and proceeded to the Persian court.

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The conqueror celebrated his return to Macedonia with an Olympic festival at Ægæ, and with games in honour of the Muses at Diium in Pieria. The inhabitants of Diium held the memory of Orpheus in great reverence, and boasted of the possession of his bones. At the time of the games it was reported that a statue of the ancient bard, which perhaps adorned his monument near the town, had been seen bathed in sweat. Alexander's Lycian soothsayer, Aristander of Telmessus, bade him hail the omen: it signified that the masters of epic and lyric poetry should be wearied by the tale of his achievements<sup>2</sup> These achievements will now for some time claim our undivided attention.

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Phoc. 17. ÆL V. II. 1. 25. There is a little obscurity about these embassies. Arrian seems to know only of two: one before and one after the demand made by Alexander. But Plutarch (Phoc. 17.) supposes two subsequent to that demand, the first having been contemptuously dismissed — τὸ πρῶτον ψήφισμα λέγεται 'Αλέξανδρον, ὡς ἔλαβε, ρίψαι, καὶ φυγεῖν ἀποστραφέντα τοὺς πρέσβεις. In the second, Alexander yielded to the persuasions of Phocion. In Dem. 23. he describes only two embassies, one before and one after the demand, and ascribes the success of the second entirely to Demades. Justin (xi. 4.) supposes two embassies previous to Alexander's demand. He was so much offended with the Athenians for receiving the Theban fugitives against his injunction, *ut secunda legatione denuo bellum deprecantibus ita demum remiserit, ut oratores et duces quorum fiducia toties rebellent, sibi dedantur*, but at last consented (it must be supposed after a third embassy), *ut retentis oratoribus duces in exilium agerentur, qui ex continenti ad Darium profecti non mediocriter momentum Persarum viribus accessere*. It is probable enough that several beside Charidemus went over to Asia, and that some were engaged in the battle of the Granicus.

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias, ix. 30. 7. Plut. Alex. 14.



## CHAPTER XLVIII.

RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF PERSIA,  
FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS TO ALEXANDER'S  
ACCESSION.

*History of Evagoras. — The Cyprian War ended. — Egyptian War. — Iphicrates and Pharnabazus. — Revolt of the Western Satraps. — Datames. — Agesilaus in Egypt. — Death of Agesilaus. — Revolt of Sidon. — Siege of Sidon. — Ochus invades Egypt. — Causes of his Success. — Mentor. — Hermias. — Accession of Darius Codomannus. — Reflections. — The Macedonian Army. — Alexander's Preparations.*

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ALEXANDER's invasion of Asia might well form the subject of a separate work<sup>1</sup>: and it belongs rather to universal history than to the history of Greece. The Greeks indeed were deeply interested in the event; but the effect it produced on their condition might be sufficiently understood from a very summary account of the transactions by means of which it was brought about. Still it was not without reason that writers of Grecian history thought themselves called upon to relate this great triumph of Grecian arts and arms—for such it was, though they were employed by a people whom the Greeks themselves did not account worthy of their name—which spread a Greek population over the fairest provinces of Asia, and carried the Greek language, manners, and modes of thinking, from the shores of the Mediterranean to the banks of the Indus. It is now scarcely permitted to one who

<sup>1</sup> It has been handled admirably on the whole by Droysen: though he sometimes shows himself as much prejudiced on the side of Alexander as Sainte Croix against him.

is traversing the same field to depart from their example. The reader however will not expect to see this subject treated here even with all the fulness of details into which we have entered in other portions of our narrative, which were more essential parts of a history of Greece. Our aim must be confined to a survey of the leading features of this ever memorable conquest, which may enable us to understand the spirit in which it was accomplished, and perhaps to judge of the designs as well as the achievements of the conqueror.

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But before we proceed it will be necessary, both for the sake of connection, and to illustrate the state of the Persian empire at the period when it was attacked by Alexander, to take a review of the principal events which befel it during about half a century before, or from the time of the peace of Antalcidas.

We have had occasion, in a former volume<sup>1</sup>, to mention hostilities in which Evagoras of Salamis was engaged with Persia in the reign of that Artaxerxes whom Cyrus attempted to dethrone. It may now be proper to say something more about the circumstances under which Evagoras rose to power at Salamis. The Greek princes who traced their origin to Teucer, had been expelled by a Phœnician chief, who, to secure his own authority, acknowledged himself the vassal of the Persian king. Evagoras, when he had made himself master of Salamis, both restored the ancient power and splendour of the city, which under its Phœnician rulers had lost its Greek manners and its maritime occupations<sup>2</sup>, and endeavoured to extend his dominion over the rest of the island. He succeeded so far, that only Amathus, Soli, and Citium held out against him, and they found themselves compelled to seek protection from Artaxerxes. He willingly pro-

History of  
Evagoras.

<sup>1</sup> Vol. V. p. 436.

<sup>2</sup> Isocrates, *Evag.* § 23. 55.

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mised them succours: for not only had the revolution by which his Cyprian vassal had been dethroned deprived him of an important island, but Evagoras had formed connections with the king of Egypt, and it seems had engaged in enterprises which threatened Phœnicia and Cilicia. Artaxerxes therefore made the cause of the Cyprian cities opposed to Evagoras his own, and ordered the satraps of the nearest maritime provinces, and Hecatomnus, the prince of Caria, to prepare an expedition for the invasion of Cyprus. But these preparations appear to have been delayed by his war with Sparta: and one of the reasons which made the peace of Antalcidas welcome to him was, that it left him at liberty to prosecute this undertaking, and, as his title to Cyprus was expressly acknowledged in the treaty, debarred Evagoras from all further succours which he might have obtained from his Greek allies. After the peace, the preparations were carried on with increased vigour, and at length a great armament was brought together; it is said upwards of 300,000 men and 300 galleys, to which the Ionian cities contributed most largely.<sup>1</sup> The army was placed under the command of Orontes: the sea-force was committed to Teribazus, under whom Gaos his son-in-law, though with inferior rank, seems to have had the chief direction of the naval operations. Evagoras on the other hand had obtained considerable succours from the Egyptian king, Acoris; and even Hecatomnus had privately furnished him with a subsidy which enabled him to take a large body of mercenaries into his pay. If we may believe Isocrates<sup>2</sup>, he had invaded Phœnicia, and made himself master of Tyre by force of arms. His

<sup>1</sup> Isocrates, Paneg. § 154. τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀπ' Ἰωνίας συμπέλευκεν. The armament was assembled on the western coast (ἐν Φωκαίᾳ καὶ Κύμῳ. Diodor. xv. 2.), and thence proceeded to Cilicia.

<sup>2</sup> Evag. § 75.

authority was certainly acknowledged there, and in some other Phœnician cities, and a Tyrian squadron of twenty galleys came to his aid against the Persians.<sup>1</sup> His fleet however with this addition amounted only to ninety sail. His native troops were about 6000 men; but beside the mercenaries he received reinforcements from many quarters—for all who were disaffected to the Persian government were his natural allies—among the rest from a chief who is called king of the Arabians.

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Still when the Persian armament had crossed over to Cyprus, Evagoras was not in condition to cope with it openly either by sea or land, and for a time confined himself to the object of intercepting the enemy's supplies with his cruisers. In this he was so successful that he reduced them to great distress, which caused a mutiny in their camp, and compelled them to return with their whole fleet to Cilicia for a fresh stock of provisions. Meanwhile he received a reinforcement of fifty galleys from Acoris, and having fitted out sixty more himself, thought himself strong enough to risk a battle. He chose his own time, and took the Persians by surprise; but the inequality of numbers was perhaps still too great. He was defeated, and besieged in Salamis by sea and land; but he made his escape by night with ten galleys, leaving his son Pnytagoras to govern in his absence, and proceeded to Egypt, to press Acoris for fresh succours. The Egyptian however seems no longer to have trusted in his fortune, and only furnished him with a scanty supply of money, with which he returned to Salamis. His affairs might now have seemed hopeless, and there can hardly be a doubt that if the siege had been prosecuted with due vigour, the city must have surrendered at discretion. But, hap-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, u. s.

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pily for Evagoras, the two satraps who commanded the Persian forces were jealous of each other, and each anxious for the credit of putting an end to a long and expensive war: so that when he made overtures of peace to Teribazus, they were more favourably received than the state of his affairs would have entitled him to expect. Teribazus would have permitted him to retain Salamis, on condition that he should pay a yearly tribute, and acknowledge himself the subject of the Persian king. Evagoras was willing to accept all the other conditions, but would not submit to this last clause, and claimed to be treated as a sovereign prince, the Great King's equal in rank and title. This was a concession which Teribazus did not venture to make. In the meanwhile however Orontes sent secret dispatches to the court, in which he charged Teribazus with wilful remissness in the management of the war, and with treasonable designs. Artaxerxes, who was himself about to undertake an expedition in person against the Cadusians, was alarmed by these insinuations, and ordered Orontes to arrest Teribazus, and send him a prisoner to court. This order Orontes immediately executed, and his rival was detained in custody until the King's return from his campaign. He himself succeeded to the sole command of the armament. But Teribazus had made himself popular among the troops — as indeed one of the charges laid against him was, that he had endeavoured to corrupt their loyalty — and they showed so much dissatisfaction at his disgrace, that Orontes feared he should be compelled to abandon the siege. He therefore made advances to Evagoras, and offered him the possession of Salamis on the terms which he himself had accepted from Teribazus. Evagoras, if he had known the state of things in the enemy's camp, might perhaps have risen in his demands: but he acquiesced in these proposals, which

seemed no less advantageous and honourable to him, than they were degrading to the majesty of the Persian crown, which had never before been known to treat on such terms with a rebel, as Evagoras was styled. Thus ended the Cyprian war, which lasted ten years, and during a part of this time employed a large share of the forces of the Persian empire against a single town<sup>1</sup>, and is said by a contemporary to have cost 15,000 talents.<sup>2</sup> This sum indeed was not much more than the value of the ornaments which the Great King constantly wore about his person<sup>3</sup>: it would hardly have been missed from his treasury. But it proved the incapacity of the government to wield the resources of the state.

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B. C. 376.  
The Cyprian war ended.

The danger which hung over Teribazus alarmed his son-in-law Gaos, and drove him into treason through fear lest he should himself be charged with it. He won over several of his captains, and entered into correspondence with the king of Egypt, and with Sparta, for aid against his master. This rebellion however was not long after stifled by his death — the work probably of assassins hired by the court — though Tachos, one of his officers who succeeded to his command, still maintained an independent footing for a short time in a fortress which he built on the coast of Ionia. In the meanwhile Artaxerxes, having returned from his expedition, ordered Teribazus to be brought to trial, and appointed three Persians of the highest reputation for probity as his judges. It was

<sup>1</sup> But I do not think it can safely be inferred from the language of Isocrates (Paneg. § 163.); as Mr. Clinton supposes (F. H. ii. p. 280. Append. c. 12.; *On the Cyprian War*), that the sea-fight had taken place six years before the time when that passage of the Panegyric was written. At all events it is very doubtful whether the siege of Salamis lasted so long. That Artaxerxes ever landed in Cyprus, I utterly disbelieve. The testimony of Diodorus (xiv. 98.) so oddly worded (αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς ἐν ταῖς ἑνὶ σατραπείᾳ πόλεις ἐπιπορευόμενος μεγάλας δυνάμεις διαβαίνει εἰς τὴν Κύπρον), is not sufficient to prove so strange a fact, of which he takes no further notice, and which is not mentioned either by Plutarch or Isocrates; for the expression στρατεύσας (u. s.) no more proves this, than it proves that Artaxerxes was present in person during the whole of the siege.

<sup>2</sup> Isocr. Evag. § 73.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. Artax. 24.

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not long before that one of those horrible punishments which were equally to be dreaded from the justice and from the caprice of this barbarous government, had been inflicted on some of their predecessors in office, who had been flayed alive, that their skins might cover the seat of justice. Teribazus obtained an impartial hearing, and completely refuted the calumnies of his accuser. He was received again into the royal favour, and Orontes was banished from the court in disgrace.

Egyptian  
war.

The recovery of Egypt was an object which had never ceased to occupy the attention of the Persian government since its revolt in the reign of Darius, the father of Artaxerxes. Before the Cyprian war an expedition had been sent against it under three generals, accounted the ablest in the King's service, Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazus: but with such ill success, that the Egyptian prince was encouraged to act on the offensive, and to aim at extending his dominion over other provinces of the empire. Acoris, as we have seen, was ready to furnish powerful aid to the enemies of Artaxerxes in every quarter, and he even entered into alliance with the Pisidian mountaineers, who paid not even nominal obedience to the Great King, and were at all times easily induced to attack his more peaceful subjects. About the year 377, when it appears that Artaxerxes was meditating a fresh attempt upon Egypt, Acoris collected a large body of Greek mercenaries, whom he tempted by uncommonly liberal pay; and by the like attraction he induced Chabrias to take the command of them. Athens however was at this time desirous of keeping on good terms with Persia, and, on the complaint of Pharnabazus, not only ordered Chabrias to quit the service of Acoris, but promised to send Iphicrates to act with the King's generals in the reduction of Egypt. An army of 200,000 men was raised for the next in-

Iphicrates  
and Pharnabazus.

vasion, which was to be conducted by Pharnabazus, but was so long delayed, that Iphicrates, who was to support him, at the head of 20,000 Greek mercenaries, could not help remarking in conversation with him on the difference between his words and his deeds. *The reason, answered the satrap, is that I am master of my words: my deeds depend upon the king.*<sup>1</sup> The best plans, it seems, were always liable to be suspended and defeated by the interference of the court, which, as in the case of Teribazus, was always open to insidious suggestions against its most active and faithful servants.

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The army at length began its march from Acè in Syria (Acre) the place of rendezvous, toward Egypt, accompanied by a fleet of 300 galleys of war, 200 smaller vessels, and innumerable transports. Acoris was no longer on the throne of Egypt: but his successor, Nectanabis, had had ample time for preparation, and had taken every precaution to secure himself against the threatened invasion. He had intersected the approaches to his kingdom on the side of Pelusium with deep ditches, had laid the adjacent country under water, and barred the passage of the canals. The invaders found the Pelusiac mouth of the river so strongly fortified, that they did not venture to make an attempt here. But Pharnabazus and Iphicrates embarked with a body of troops, and, landing at the entrance of the Mendesian arm with 3000 men, immediately proceeded to attack the fortress which guarded it. Nectanabis sent a small detachment of his army to its relief, and an engagement took place, in which the Egyptians, overpowered by the superior numbers of the enemy, who were reinforced from their vessels, were routed and fled toward the fortress: so hotly pursued that the conquerors entered

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xv. 41.



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along with them, made themselves masters of it, and razed it to the ground.

But now a difference arose between the Persian general and his Athenian colleague. Iphicrates, having heard from one of the prisoners that Memphis had been left unguarded, proposed immediately to sail up to it, and surprise it. Pharnabazus did not think it safe to undertake such an expedition until they were joined by the remainder of their forces: nor would he consent to let Iphicrates make the attempt, though he engaged to take the city with his mercenaries alone. His zeal even exposed him to suspicions of sinister aims; and the sharpness of his remonstrances offended Pharnabazus, who had indeed reasons for caution, as the servant of a jealous and ill-informed despot, which did not affect the Athenian. During this dispute the Egyptians had time to send a garrison to Memphis, and then advanced with all their forces to the scene of their late defeat, where, though no general battle was fought, the nature of the ground gave them a great advantage over the enemy in a number of petty encounters.<sup>1</sup> At length, when the season of the inundation arrived, Pharnabazus, finding the country inaccessible, determined to abandon the enterprise, and led the armament back to Syria. Iphicrates, fearing Conon's fate, took the first opportunity of escaping from the Persian camp, and, embarking by night, sailed away to Athens. Pharnabazus indeed laid the blame of the failure entirely upon him—not perhaps either maliciously or ignorantly, but to screen himself—and sent ministers to Athens to complain of him. The people promised to punish him as he should appear to deserve; but shortly after appointed him to the command of their own fleet.

<sup>1</sup> The reading, διὰ τὴν τῶν δαλων ὑχυρότητα, in Diodorus, xv. 43., though Wesseling passes it over in silence, seems clearly to require correction. It should be τόπων.

Toward the end of his long reign Artaxerxes saw his throne beset with greater dangers than had ever yet threatened the Persian monarchy. About the year 362 the satraps of Asia Minor conspired together in a general insurrection, and entered into alliance on the one hand with Sparta, on the other with Tachos, who had now succeeded Nectanabis in Egypt. Ariobarzanes satrap of Phrygia, Orontes of Mysia, Autophradates of Lydia, Datames of Cappadocia, and Mausolus prince of Caria, are mentioned as the leading members of this coalition. No other motive need be sought for this conspiracy than the natural desire of these powerful chiefs to take advantage of the weakness of the government, and of the king's advanced age and domestic troubles, in order to erect their provinces into independent kingdoms. In the case of Datames however we find another example of the common effects of a wretched system. He was a man of extraordinary abilities, had served the King with the utmost loyalty, and might have been the firmest bulwark of his throne. But the calumnies of some envious courtiers had excited the suspicions of Artaxerxes against him, and Datames saw himself obliged to revolt, to escape disgrace and ruin. The insurrection spread along the whole Asiatic coast of the Mediterranean, from Ionia to Egypt. It seems indeed that the court hardly retained its authority in any of the provinces west of the Euphrates. Half the revenues of the empire ceased to flow into the royal treasury. Its remaining forces were not sufficient to suppress the rebellion.

But even in this emergency, there remained one hope for the government, and, happily for it, one which it required no exertion of prudence or energy to realise. Though it did not know how to preserve the fidelity of its honest servants, it was able to reward the services of traitors. Such were found

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Revolt of  
the western  
Satraps.

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Datames.

among the confederate satraps. Orontes, who had been invested with the supreme command, and entrusted with the treasure collected for the pay of the mercenaries on whom they chiefly relied, tempted by the prospect of promotion, betrayed his friends, their towns and troops, into the King's hands. His example was followed by Rheomithres, who had been sent by the confederates to Egypt, and returned with a subsidy of 500 talents, and fifty galleys, which he received from Tachos. But immediately afterwards he found means to decoy several of the insurgent chiefs into his power, and sent them in chains to Artaxerxes. These instances of treachery seem either by fear or contagion to have dissolved the league. The rebels, one by one, hastened to make their peace with the King, that they might not be deserted or betrayed by their associates. Datames however would never again trust himself into the power of the prince who had so ill requited his faithful services: and Artabazus, who commanded the royal forces, was ordered to invade Cappadocia.<sup>1</sup> But here too more dependence was placed on treachery than on arms. Mithrobarzanes, a kinsman of Datames, whom he had entrusted with the command of his cavalry, was induced to go over to the enemy. Datames however contrived, by a stratagem which showed extraordinary presence of mind, to defeat and punish his perfidy. He advanced to attack the enemy, just at the moment that Mithrobarzanes was joining them, and persuaded his troops that the movements of the cavalry had been preconcerted with himself. On the other hand their simultaneous approach led Artabazus to suspect a double treachery; and Mithrobarzanes found himself repelled by the Persians. In his per-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xv. 91. Nepos (Datames, 6.) mentions Pisidia as the scene of this occurrence, and says nothing about Artabazus. Polyænus (vii. 21. 7.) assigns no place to it.

plexity, he turned his arms against both sides, and fell with a great part of his troops. The remaining adventures of Datames<sup>1</sup>, so far as they have been preserved, deserve to be mentioned here, because they illustrate the character of the Persian government. After he had been deserted by his eldest son, and it appears by most of his forces, he still guarded the approaches of his province against the royal army, and so harassed and reduced it by a series of actions, in which the nature of the ground always gave a decided advantage to his little band, that Autophradates, his former associate, who now commanded against him, was obliged to invite him to make his peace with the King: of course on his own terms, which left him really independent. The court was just so far sensible of its humiliation, as to be still bent on the only kind of revenge which it was able to take on the rebellious subject whom it had reluctantly pardoned. It laid continual snares for his life, which however he eluded with his wonted forethought and address. At length another traitor of high rank, Mithridates, a son of his old ally Ariobarzanes, was found willing to undertake the office of assassin. But it was not by any ordinary means that he could obtain access to Datames, who was constantly on his guard. It was not enough that he pretended to have revolted from the King, and to seek an alliance with Datames for his protection. He could only win his confidence by a series of hostile inroads, which, with the secret sanction of the court, he made into the neighbouring provinces. When he had infested and plundered them for a long time, and had given a share of the spoil and several captured fortresses to Datames, Datames began to believe that he was sincere in his professions of enmity to the

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<sup>1</sup> Related by Nepos, and Polyænus, vii. 29.

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King, and acceded to his proposal of a private conference to which they were to come unarmed. The place was fixed by Datames himself; but Mithridates caused some weapons to be hidden there beforehand, and when their interview was over, pretending that he had still something to say, slew him with a sword which he had drawn out while his back was turned.

This event took place perhaps under Ochus, the son of Artaxerxes, to whose character this crooked policy was peculiarly congenial. Artaxerxes died in 358, at the age of ninety-four, yet, it is said, of a broken heart, the father of 118 children, three of whom were accounted legitimate, and capable of succeeding to the throne. To prevent a civil war, such as had disturbed the beginning of his own reign, he adopted the extraordinary resolution of proclaiming Darius the eldest, king in his own lifetime; permitting him to wear the tiara upright, hitherto an exclusive privilege of the reigning prince. It was customary for the successor, when appointed in the reign of his predecessor, to name a present which he desired from the sovereign. Darius on this occasion made a request which deeply offended his father: he asked for Aspasia, a beautiful Ionian, who after the death of Cyrus had been transferred from his harem to his brother's. The King indeed did not express his displeasure by words; but he first bade Aspasia make her choice of a master, and when she decided in favour of his son, did not suffer him to possess her long. He appointed her priestess of Anaitis, the goddess worshipped at Ecbatana, whom the Greeks compared to their Artemis, and whose ministers were devoted to perpetual celibacy. Darius, irritated by his disappointment, lent a credulous ear to the suggestions of Teribazus, whom Artaxerxes had provoked by a similar breach of promise, and who now persuaded the prince that he was in danger of being

supplanted by his youngest brother Ochus. Thus he was instigated to conspire against his father's life: but was betrayed by one of his servants, and put to death, it was said, by the King's hand.

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There now remained but two barriers between Ochus and the succession. Ariaspes, the second legitimate prince, was generally beloved on account of the mildness of his character, and desired by the people as their future king. The favourite of Artaxerxes himself was another son named Arsames, whose abilities made him doubly formidable. Ochus indeed had a friend in the palace, who supported his interest, the princess Atossa, whom her father, either licensed by the Magian doctrine, or careless of all restraints, had added to the number of his wives. But he did not rely upon her influence: he determined to rid himself of his two rivals. Ariaspes he alarmed by false reports of the King's displeasure, and threats against his life, until he drove him to suicide. Artaxerxes could only bewail his loss, and suspect the cause: but he clung the more fondly to his favourite son. Ochus now grew more reckless, and employed a son of Teribazus to despatch Arsames. The old king saw himself bereft of his last hope, and surrounded by assassins: he sank under the shock; and Ochus, who also assumed the title of Artaxerxes, mounted the blood-stained throne. A general massacre of his father's surviving children, and of all who were connected with them, or had in any way incurred his suspicions, was the first act of his reign.

Such a character would not have been ill suited to a station which above all things required energy and decision, if he had not provoked enmity by his wanton cruelty. But Artabazus, who had defended his father's throne against the rebellious satraps, himself raised the standard of revolt against him. Two or three years before the death of Artaxerxes, Tachos

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Agésilas  
in Egypt.

had fitted out a fleet of 200 galleys, had raised an army of 80,000 Egyptians, and had sent to Sparta for aid, with pay for 10,000 mercenaries. After the general peace which followed the battle of Mantinea, from which Sparta was excluded because she would not acknowledge the independence of Messene, she was reduced to a state of discontented feebleness, unable either to give up her projects of ambition and revenge, or to move a step toward the execution of them. Only one prospect seemed open for her: the hope of relieving her poverty by the subsidies of her Asiatic allies. With this view the overtures of the revolted satraps had been favourably received, and the request of Tachos was readily granted. Agésilas himself, notwithstanding his advanced age, superintended the levies, and took the command of the troops, which included a thousand men furnished by Sparta, destined to serve in Egypt<sup>1</sup>, where he expected that the conduct of the war would be entirely committed to him. Tachos however had engaged Chabrias—who was always ready to accept a foreign commission—to command his fleet: Agésilas was keenly mortified by this disappointment; and, it is said, was also wounded on his arrival in Egypt, by an indiscreet jest, with which Tachos expressed his surprise at the diminutive and deformed person of so renowned a general.<sup>2</sup> As on many former occasions, he allowed his personal feelings to affect his political measures. Tachos, against his advice, made an expedition into Phœnicia, leaving his brother to govern in his absence. This man seized the opportunity to transfer the crown to his own son Nectanabis, who had accompanied the king his uncle into Phœnicia,

<sup>1</sup> I have combined the accounts of Diodorus, xv. 92., and Plutarch, Ages. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Theopompus (and an Egyptian historian, Lyceas of Naucratis) in Athenæus, xiv. 6. One might infer from the story, that Tachos spoke Greek, and even read Greek authors, for he is said to have quoted the line, Ὀδῶνεν ὄρος, Ζεὺς δ' ἐφοθεῖτο, τὸ δ' ἔρεκεν μῦν.

and had been sent by him at the head of the Egyptian troops to reduce some cities of Syria. With such advantages Nectanabis soon won over the army, and was acknowledged as king by the people: his next object was to gain the Greek mercenaries, and their leaders: and he sent his emissaries to sound Chabrias and Agesilaus. Chabrias would not desert his employer: but Agesilaus, cloaking his prejudices under a show of patriotism, declared that he, being not a private adventurer, but sent out on a public mission, could only consult the interests of Sparta, and would not decide between the rivals, until he had received instructions from home. The answer which the government made to his inquiry left him at full liberty to use his own discretion: and he then openly joined Nectanabis with all his mercenaries. Thus abandoned, Tachos fled to Artaxerxes, who, hoping to make good use of him for the recovery of Egypt, gave him a gracious reception.

In the meanwhile however a new pretender arose in Egypt to dispute the crown with Nectanabis. He appears to have been the more popular candidate: for his forces far outnumbered those of his rival; and he was not without hopes of gaining Agesilaus over to his side. Nectanabis himself entertained suspicions of his ally, which indeed his late conduct too well justified, and Plutarch intimates that it was chiefly dread of the shame which would have attended a second desertion, that prevented him from going over to the side which fortune now seemed to favour. He had not been able at first to prevail on Nectanabis to attack the enemy's undisciplined troops: he was dismayed by their superiority in numbers, and suffered himself to be shut up and besieged in his capital. A trench was begun round it, which, when completed, would have cut off all hope of relief. Nectanabis was now eager for a battle, as his last chance of stopping



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B. C. 360.  
Death of  
Agesilaus.

the circumvallation, which would soon have forced him to surrender, as the place was not stocked with provisions for a siege. But Agesilaus, notwithstanding the expostulations and reproaches of the Egyptians and the impatience of his Greek troops, refused to lead them out, until the two ends of the trench were only separated from each other by an interval just sufficient to allow room to form them in battle array. He then, by skilful manœuvres, drew the enemy into an engagement on this ground, where the greatest part of their forces were useless, while the rest, crowded together, were exposed to the attack of his little army, which was covered on either flank by the trench. The result was a complete victory, which secured the throne to Nectanabis. Agesilaus then set out homeward with 230 talents, which he received as the reward of his services. But he was taken ill in his passage, and died at a desert place on the coast of Africa, called the Harbour of Menelaus. His body—preserved in wax, as honey was not to be procured,—was carried to Sparta to receive its royal obsequies. We have already had occasion to notice, that Artabazus maintained himself for a considerable time, though with various success, against the court, chiefly by the help of Greek soldiers and generals, as Chares and Pammenes, and that Ochus was obliged to threaten Athens, and to conciliate Thebes by a subsidy, to deprive the rebel of these resources.<sup>1</sup> With a view no doubt to strengthen his interest among the Greeks, Artabazus had married a Rhodian lady, whose brothers, Mentor and Memnon, for a time aided him actively in his enterprises. At length, however, his fortune deserted him, and he found himself obliged to fly from Asia, and took refuge with Memnon at Philip's court. Mentor entered into the

<sup>1</sup> Vol. V. p. 311. 430.

service of Nectanabis as the commander of his Greek troops, and soon found an opportunity of benefiting his kinsman in a way that he could least have expected. Ochus in the beginning of his reign renewed the attempts which had been so often made for the recovery of Egypt, but with even worse success: the generals he employed were so signally defeated, that he himself incurred the ridicule of the Egyptians, and other provinces were encouraged to follow their example. The insolence and exactions of the Persian satraps and generals, who had their head-quarters at Sidon during the preparations for the war with Egypt, roused the city to an insurrection which soon spread throughout Phœnicia. The Sidonians not only seized and put to death many of the Persians who had provoked their resentment, and burnt a magazine of fodder which had been collected for the next campaign in Egypt; but, personally to insult the King, cut down the trees of a park in the outskirts where his predecessors had sometimes lodged. They entered into alliance with Nectanabis, and began to build galleys and to lay in ammunition and provisions, and to assemble mercenary troops. Ochus was so much incensed at their conduct, that he resolved to undertake an expedition against them in person, and at the same time to revenge the affronts he had suffered from the Egyptians.

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Revolt of  
Sidon.

In the meanwhile the example of Phœnicia animated Cyprus to revolt. The island was at this time divided among nine petty princes, who had all acknowledged the sovereignty of the Persian king, and now leagued themselves together to assert their independence. Ochus sent orders to Idrieus, prince of Caria, to collect an armament, and suppress the Cyprian insurrection; and Idrieus, having assembled forty galleys and 8000 mercenaries, placed them under the command of Evagoras, a son, it appears, of

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the prince whose actions we have already related, and of Phocion, who may perhaps have been induced by friendship for Evagoras to engage in this expedition, which otherwise must, we should suppose, have been somewhat repugnant to his feelings and principles. They landed in Cyprus, and found so rich a booty, that adventurers from various quarters, desirous of a share, flocked to their camp, and soon doubled the force of their army. The Cyprian princes were unable to make head against them; and after having reduced the rest of the island to submission, they sat down before Salamis, which—we know not through what vicissitudes—had now passed into the hands of Pnytagoras, a relative, it seems, of the royal house.<sup>1</sup> Yet Evagoras was not destined to recover his patrimony. He himself fell under the suspicions of Ochus, was first obliged to accept a government in Asia, by way of compensation, and being charged with some misconduct in it, fled to Cyprus, where he was arrested and put to death. Pnytagoras was pardoned, and allowed to retain Salamis.

While Ochus was assembling his forces in Babylon, the insurgents in Phœnicia carried on a successful warfare with the satraps of the neighbouring provinces, Belesys of Syria, and Mazæus of Cilicia. Sidon, like the other Phœnician cities, was governed by a magistrate, who—probably with very limited authority—bore the title of king. Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus, formed a league, which seems to have ruled the rest of Phœnicia; and their princes held regular meetings in Tripolis, a joint colony, as the name (Triburg) imports, of the three leading cities.<sup>2</sup> Tennes, who was now king of Sidon, had received succours from Egypt, consisting of 4000 Greek soldiers, under the

<sup>1</sup> Perizonius ad *Ællan.* V. H. vii. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 45. Strabo, xvi. p. 363. Tauchn.

command of Mentor the Rhodian. But though, with the aid of these auxiliaries, his affairs went on prosperously, and the enemy was not able to gain a footing in Phœnicia, Tennes, alarmed at the approach of a great army led by the king himself, and perhaps distrusting his confederates, determined to secure for himself the advantages of the first act of treachery. He dispatched a trusty messenger named Thessalio, to Ochus, with the offer of surrendering Sidon, and aiding him in the recovery of Egypt, where, from his knowledge of the country, his services would be peculiarly valuable. Ochus joyfully accepted these proposals, which promised the fullest gratification of his revenge against Sidon: though he was at first so indignant at the demand of the solemn pledge—the king's right hand—which Thessalio was instructed to ask for, that he was on the point of putting him to death. Prudence however got the better of his pride, and he gave the royal surety, which had always been held inviolably sacred: as the engagement of a king whose people deemed truth the first of virtues. Tennes, before he took this step, had made himself sure of Mentor's concurrence, on which he reckoned for the execution of his design. When Ochus appeared before Sidon, which in the meanwhile had been fortified with a triple trench, and with higher and stronger walls, and abundantly provided with all necessities for sustaining a long siege, Tennes went out on pretence of attending the congress at Tripolis, with an escort of 500 men, probably mercenaries devoted to his interest, and accompanied by 100 of the principal citizens as his counsellors, leaving Mentor to guard the city.<sup>1</sup> But when he approached the Persian camp, he caused his counsellors to be arrested,

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Siege of  
Sidon.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 45.) says μέρος τῆς πόλεως. This may have been either some quarter, or the citadel.

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and delivered them up to Ochus, who immediately ordered them to be put to death.

Tidings of this event were it seems soon carried to the city; and though the Sidonians had been so resolutely bent on resistance, as to burn their ships to prevent any citizen from seeking safety in flight, they were so dismayed by the treachery of Tennes, that they descended to implore the enemy's mercy, and sent out 500 of their remaining chief men, with the ensigns of suppliants, to the Persian camp. When they drew near, Ochus asked Tennes whether he engaged to put him in possession of the city; and having received that assurance commanded the ambassadors to be cut in pieces. He then marched up to the quarter where the Greeks were on guard, and Tennes required them to open the gates. The citizens could not prevent them from obeying this order, which was enforced by their own chief: they could only disappoint the tyrant's revenge by a voluntary death. By an unanimous resolution they set fire to their houses, and perished with their wives and children in the flames. Instead of a wealthy and populous city, Ochus found little more than the ashes of a vast funeral pyre, containing the remains of more than 40,000 dead. The treasure consumed in the conflagration was so great, that he sold the ruins for a large sum. It is some satisfaction to know that, notwithstanding the *royal hand*, probably in the first transports of his baffled rage, he put Tennes to death. Mentor was too important an auxiliary to be so treated: his troops were incorporated among the other mercenaries of the Persian army.

For Ochus had sent envoys to all the principal Greek cities, to levy soldiers for the expedition to Egypt. Athens and Sparta had declined to spend the blood of their citizens in such a cause. But Thebes had sent 1000 heavy-armed under Lacrates,

and Argos furnished 3000 under a leader named Nicostratus, of extraordinary bodily strength and prowess, which however, if he indeed wore a lion's skin, and armed himself with a club, in mimicry of Hercules, must have been far greater than his discretion. 6000 more were contributed by the Greek cities on the coast of Asia: and all joined the Persian army soon after the capture of Sidon. Ochus then began his march toward Egypt. In the approach to Pelusium he lost a great number of men in the marshes formed by the overflowing of the Nile<sup>1</sup>, according to Diodorus through ignorance of the country; though it seems difficult to conceive how in a road which the Persian armies had so often traversed of late he can have been in want of guides: perhaps the difficulties and dangers of the ground itself were subject to variation. On his arrival, he divided his Greek forces into three columns, each placed under the command of two generals, a Greek and a Persian. The first of these divisions which was destined to act against Pelusium, consisted of the Bœotians under Lacrates, and a great body of barbarian infantry and cavalry, under Rhosaces, a Persian of the highest rank, a descendant of one of the Seven who conspired against the Magians. We are not distinctly informed as to the relation in which these two officers stood to each other: but the expressions used by Diodorus<sup>2</sup> seem to imply that the military operations were to be conducted by Lacrates, subject to the control of his colleague. The second division contained the Argives, and was commanded by Nicostratus, and a Persian named Aristazanes, who held the office of Eisangeus,

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B. C. 346.  
Ochus in-  
vades  
Egypt.

<sup>1</sup> The βάραθρα. Diodorus, xvi. 46. καταπτήσας ἐπὶ τὴν μεγάλην λίμνην, καθ' ἣν ἐστὶ τὰ καλούμενα βάραθρα. But Strabo (xvi. p. 371. Tauchn.) places them nearer to Pelusium. After the Serbonic lake and Mount Casius comes ἡ ἐπὶ Πηλοῦσιον ὁδὸς, where are τὰ πρὸς Πηλουσίῳ βάραθρα, ἃ ποιεῖ ὁ παρεκχέμενος Νεῖλος, φύσει κοιλῶν καὶ ἐλαδῶν ὄντων τῶν τόπων.

<sup>2</sup> xvi. 47. στρατηγὸν μὲν ἔχοντες Λακράτην, ἡγεμόνα δὲ Ῥωσάκην.

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one of the highest dignities of the court. The third was committed to Mentor and the King's chief favourite, the eunuch Bagoas, under whom were placed the Asiatic Greeks. The King himself, with the remainder of his forces, stayed behind to await the issue of their operations, and to watch the turn of affairs. On the other hand Nectanabis had made active, and it seems judicious, preparations for the defence of his kingdom. He had taken 20,000 Greeks and as many Libyans into his pay, and had 60,000 Egyptian troops. The whole eastern side of the Delta was protected by a chain of fortresses, as well as by new canals, and a great number of boats had been collected to guard the passages of the river.

The invaders made their attack in three directions. While the first division remained before Pelusium, Mentor and Bagoas marched southward, along the eastern side of the Delta toward Bubastus; Nicostratus and Aristazanes, taking Egyptian guides whose families were left behind as hostages, embarked their troops and endeavoured to find an entrance through one of the more western branches of the river. The success of this last expedition decided the event of the war. They landed their forces unperceived, and encamped within the Delta; were attacked by a body of Greek mercenaries under Clinius a Coan, but defeated them with great slaughter, and killed their general. This disaster dismayed Nectanabis, who imagined that there was no longer any obstacle to prevent the whole Persian army from penetrating into the heart of his kingdom, and instead of advancing with the main body of his army to repel Nicostratus, fell back upon Memphis. Diodorus thinks that he would not have committed this error, if he had taken some Greek general for his counsellor, but that the success with which he had resisted the preceding invasion, when he was aided by

two experienced Greek officers, Diophantus the Athenian, and Lamius the Spartan—names else unknown—had elated him with a false confidence in his own abilities. The effect of this step was to dishearten his best troops. Hitherto Pelusium had been vigorously defended. The Bæotians, who had thought to take it by assault on their first arrival, found themselves repulsed by a sally of the garrison, and obliged to resort to a surer but tardier mode of proceeding. Lacrates diverted the stream which protected it into another channel, raised a mound across its bed, and then battered the walls with his engines. But the Greeks to whom the defence of the place was entrusted, raised new walls and wooden towers behind the breaches, and continued to fight manfully, until they heard of the retreat of Nectanabis. They then thought themselves abandoned, and made overtures to Lacrates, who engaged that they should be allowed to return to Greece with all their property. But Bagoas, whom the king sent to take possession of the place, allowed his barbarian troops to plunder them as they marched out; and Lacrates was so indignant at this breach of the capitulation, that he ordered his troops to fall upon their allies, and protect their countrymen. Bagoas himself was obliged to fly, and complained of the conduct of Lacrates to the King; but even the influence of the favourite could not lead Ochus to overlook the necessity of keeping on good terms with his Greek generals: he reproved Bagoas, and punished the other offenders with death.

Bubastus, on its huge brick terraces<sup>1</sup>, might likewise have sustained a long siege, if its gates had not been opened by fear and treachery. Mentor spread a report through his camp, that it was the King's purpose to pardon all who should surrender their

Causes of  
his success.

<sup>1</sup> Ritter, *Afrika*, p. 825.



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towns to him, but that those who held out should suffer the fate of Sidon; and he connived at the escape of his Egyptian prisoners, that they might carry this intelligence to their homes. The consequence was, that, as in all the towns the garrisons were part natives part Greeks, each race became eager to get the start of the other, and secure the royal favour for itself. Hence at Bubastus the Egyptians clandestinely sent an envoy with an offer of surrender to Bagoas: but the Greeks having seized him, and detected his commission, fell upon the Egyptian garrison, and forced it, after some loss of killed and wounded, to take refuge in one quarter of the town. Each party then hastened to surrender. The Egyptians called in Bagoas, the Greeks treated with Mentor. There was however a similar rivalry between the two generals on the Persian side: each desired the honour of the conquest for himself. Mentor secretly encouraged the Greeks to attack Bagoas as soon as he should have entered the city. Accordingly, when he had marched in with a part of his troops, expecting no resistance, the Greeks suddenly shut the gates, cut his men to pieces, and took him prisoner. Mentor had the merit of procuring his release, and the glory of receiving the surrender of the city; and by this device won the friendship of Bagoas, and the favour of Ochus, and thus rose to posts which had never before been conferred on a Greek. The other fortified towns followed the example of Bubastus; and Nectanabis, despairing of Memphis in the midst of so general an abandonment of his cause, gave it up himself, and fled into Ethiopia, or — according to an eastern legend which would have made Alexander an Egyptian — to the court of Philip.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Syncellus, p. 487. ed. Bonn., he adds: *ἦν ἡ καὶ 'Ολυμπιάδι μυχθὲς διὰ γονεῖας υἱὸν ἔσχεν Ἀλέξανδρον*. The well known story in Herbelot (*Bibliothèque Orientale*, DARAB) was invented by Persian vanity in the same spirit. Darab

Ochus, having thus become master of Egypt almost without a blow, indulged his revenge in the wildest excesses of tyrannical cruelty and insolence. He delighted especially in wounding the religious feelings of the conquered people, while he gratified his rapacity by the plunder and profanation of their sepulchres and temples. Even the archives of the temples became a treasure to Bagoas, to whom the Egyptian priests afterwards paid large sums for the sacred records which had been carried away into Persia.<sup>1</sup>

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(Darius) has conquered Filikous (Philip) and demands his daughter in marriage. Darab ayant reçu la fille de Philippe pour sa femme, et s'apercevant dès la première nuit de ses noces que cette Princesse avoit l'haleine mauvaise, résolut de la renvoyer à son père, quoiqu'elle fût déjà enceinte. Philippe la fit soigneusement garder jusqu'à ce qu'elle se fût délivrée de son fruit. Elle accoucha d'un fils, qui fut nommé Alexandre, lequel Philippe déclara lui appartenir. So an old Saxon legend traced the Conqueror's origin to Alfred (Thierry, *Hist. de la Conquête*, l. viii. t. 3. p. 77. Br.). The anecdote preserved by Athenæus (iv. c. 33.) from the *Ægyptiaca* of Lynceus, that Ochus took the Egyptian king prisoner, only proves that this is a writer of little authority.

<sup>1</sup> The recovery of Egypt is assigned by Diodorus to the year Ol. cvii. 3. (a. c. 350.) Mr. Clinton (F. H. ii. Appendix, c. 18. *Kings of Persia*, p. 316.) mentions this date without any objection, and apparently only to confirm its accuracy. I do not know whether it has been observed that it is utterly irreconcilable with the received date of the *Φίλιππος* of Isocrates (a. c. 346.) which I have adopted with Mr. Clinton on the ground of internal evidence which he states in his Tables under that year. But in this work, which on these suppositions was written four years after the recovery of Egypt, Isocrates speaks of it as still independent, and as having defeated the last armament with which it had been attacked by the king of Persia, so as to be more than ever inclined to despise him (§ 117, 118.). Wesseling, in his note on Diodorus (xvi. 48.), thinks that this was the expedition there mentioned by his author, in which Nectanabis was aided by Diophantus and Lamius. If so, either Diodorus was mistaken in his statement, that the first occasion on which Ochus invaded Egypt in person, was that of the conquest: or else Isocrates has, with more than usual neglect of historical accuracy, misrepresented the fact which he mentions: since he most plainly expresses that the King commanded in person, and had been most disgracefully repulsed. Egypt, he says, had been in a state of revolt, *κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον*—that is of the peace of Antalcidas. *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐφοβοῦντο μή ποτε βασιλεὺς αὐτὸς ποιησάμενος στρατείας κρατήσῃ*. . . . *νῦν δ' οὗτος ἀπῆλλαξεν αὐτοὺς τοῦ δέους τούτου. συμπαρασκευασάμενος γὰρ δύναμιν ὅσῃν οἷός τ' ἦν πλείστην, καὶ στρατεύσας ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν οὐ μόνον ἡττηθεὶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγελασθεὶς καὶ δόξας οὕτε βασιλεύειν οὕτε στρατηγεῖν ἄξιον εἶναι*. But whatever liberties Isocrates might take with history as to circumstances, it is impossible he could have written these words, if four years before Egypt had been conquered by Ochus, and was then groaning under a most oppressive yoke. It would seem therefore that the recovery of Egypt must have taken place later than 346, though, as Mr. Clinton observes from the passage he quotes in Philip's letter, before 340 a. c. But if we may depend on the dates given by Apollodorus (in Diog. Laert. Aristot.) for the Life of Aristotle, according to which the philosopher was driven from Atarneus through the fall of Hermias (Ol. cviii. 4. a. c. 345) Egypt must have been then conquered. So that we might suppose Isocrates

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Mentor.

Hermias.

Mentor was rewarded with a satrapy which included all the western coast of Asia Minor. He also obtained the pardon of his brother, and of Artabazus, whose eleven sons he advanced to high military rank. This promotion however was no doubt owing to the fear rather than to the gratitude of Ochus, who had now begun to entertain serious apprehensions of Philip's designs, and felt the need of an able officer in this station, the rather as there were still some insurgents remaining, who did not acknowledge his authority. Mentor was the better qualified for such a post, as he was not restrained by any scruples from promoting his master's interests. One example of his mode of proceeding deserves notice from its connection with the fortunes of Aristotle. A Bithynian adventurer, named Eubulus, had founded a little principality on the coast of Mysia, including the strong towns of Atarneus and Assus, and at his death transmitted it to his favourite servant Hermias. Hermias had received a liberal education at Athens, and as a disciple of Plato had become acquainted with Aristotle. When he had succeeded to the government of his little state, he invited both Aristotle and Xenocrates to his court, where they staid until his misfortunes compelled them to make a precipitate flight. The independence of Hermias appeared to insult the majesty of the empire, and Mentor determined to put an end to it. But he did not think himself strong enough to effect his purpose with the forces he had at his disposal, or preferred artifice as the easier course. He affected to seek the friendship of Hermias, who was generous and guileless, and probably placed more confidence in the Greek, than he would have done in a Persian satrap. He suffered

to have written just before the expedition of Ochus. In Vol. V. p. 396. I followed the common chronology. If the argument stated in this note is valid, the words, *which he conducted in person*, should be omitted in that passage.

himself to be drawn into an interview with Mentor, and was immediately arrested. Mentor used his ring to accredit letters forged in his name, which induced the garrisons of his fortresses to open their gates to the Persian troops, and then sent him in chains to Ochus, who put him to a cruel death.<sup>1</sup> The two philosophers had just time to make their escape with Pythias, the sister of Hermias, whom Aristotle generously married in her poverty and exile; and he celebrated the virtue of his deceased friend in an ode which is still extant.

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Bagoas ruled in the upper provinces with a still more extensive authority than Mentor in the west, with whom he preserved a close alliance which contributed to the power of each. Between them it seems that Ochus retained little more than the name of king, though with ample means of indulging his ferocious temper. He became so odious that Bagoas thought it expedient to remove him, apparently not from any personal offence, but that he might not be anticipated by other hands. He took him off by poison, and raised his youngest son Arses to the throne, but put to death all his brothers, that the new king might be the more dependent on himself. Arses however showed signs of uneasiness under this patronage, which alarmed Bagoas, who caused him to be murdered with all his children in the third year of his reign. The person whom he next chose to fill the vacant throne was a member of the royal family, named Codomannus, a grandson of Ostanes, the brother of Artaxerxes II., and had acquired some reputation for personal courage, chiefly through an exploit which he had performed in one of the expeditions against the Cadusians, when he accepted a

B. C. 336.

Accession  
of Darius  
Codo-  
mannus.

<sup>1</sup> κρεμασθεις ἀπώλετο. Strabo, XIII. p. 610. The expression denotes crucifixion, not strangling, as Stahr (*Aristotelia*, p. 76.) renders it. Strabo mentions Memnon as the author of the stratagem. Diodorus (xvi. 52.) Mentor. The difference is of no moment, as the two brothers were now reunited.

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challenge from one of their stoutest warriors, and slew him in single combat. This however can scarcely have been the quality which recommended him to Bagoas: but it is said that they had previously been friends, and perhaps there was no other prince of the blood on whose gratitude he could so safely rely. Codomannus, on his accession, which took place about the time of Philip's death, assumed the name of Darius. He soon discovered that Bagoas, who may have intended at length to mount the throne himself, designed that he should share the fate of his last two predecessors. A cup of poison had been prepared for him. But having detected the plot, he called Bagoas into his presence, and compelled him to drink the deadly draught. This was the king — a popular and honoured prince, who had freed the throne from a degrading subjection, and was thought well qualified to defend it, — who governed the Persian empire, when Alexander was on the point of invading it.

**Reflections.**

There are two reflections which are naturally suggested by this sketch of Persian history. One is that there was no longer any internal principle of unity in the monarchy sufficient to keep it together. For many years it had been saved from the dissolution with which it had been constantly threatened, not by the strength of the government, but by the want of good faith and mutual confidence among its most powerful subjects: and the single advantage it possessed, in its power of rewarding those who came over to its side, might easily be turned against itself, whenever it should be attacked by an enemy who offered a rallying point for all malcontents, was strong enough to protect those who joined him, and had means of requiting their services. The empire comprehended a number of provinces which, though it claimed dominion over them, were inhabited by perfectly independent tribes, which disdained even

the show of submission: and others governed by satraps, who transmitted their authority by hereditary succession, and held themselves as well entitled to it as the Great King to his throne. Those who received their governments from the court were always ambitious to convert them into similar sovereignties, and were encouraged by the example of numberless successful insurrections: while obedience and loyalty were never secure from the fate of rebels and traitors.

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Another observation which is not less forcibly impressed on us by this retrospect is, that in all his military enterprises the Persian king depended much more on his Greek mercenaries and their leaders than on his native troops and generals. Still as Greece abounded in adventurers who were always ready to enter into his pay, it might have been supposed that the military force of the empire would have been at least equal to any that could have been opposed to it. But we have also seen that none of the Persian kings had yet conceived the thought of maintaining a standing army of Greeks. They contented themselves with occasional levies, drawn from many quarters, and varying in numbers according to the temporary exigency. It was owing to a like cause that in Greece itself no attempt had hitherto been made to adopt the arms and tactics which constituted the strength of the Macedonian army. It is true that even a Greek force similarly organised, in Persian pay, would have been much less serviceable, as well as trustworthy, from the utter want of national spirit, and the unavoidable tendency of such a soldiery to consult their own safety in preference to their employer's interests. But hence resulted a twofold advantage to the king of Macedonia. He commanded an army, the main body of which was drawn from his own people—a hardy and warlike race: and one which had been

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The Ma-  
cedonian  
army.

receiving continual improvement in its structure and mode of armour, was in a state of the highest discipline, and physically superior to every Greek army of equal numbers that could have been brought against it. It will be convenient here to notice the leading features in the composition of the Macedonian army, such as it was when Alexander set out on his expedition to Asia.

The main body, the phalanx—or quadruple phalanx<sup>1</sup>, as it was sometimes called, to mark that it was formed of four divisions, each bearing the same name—presented a mass of 18,000 men, which was distributed at least by Alexander into six brigades of 3000 each, formidable in its aspect, and on ground suited to its operations, irresistible in its attacks. The phalangite soldier wore the usual defensive armour of the Greek heavy infantry, helmet, breast-plate, and greaves: and almost the whole front of his person was covered with the long shield called the *aspis*. His weapons were a sword, long enough to enable a man in the second rank to reach an enemy who had come to close quarters with the comrade who stood before him<sup>2</sup>, and the celebrated spear, known by the Macedonian name *sarissa*, four and twenty feet long. The *sarissa*, when couched, projected eighteen feet in front of the soldier: and the space between the ranks was such that those of the second rank were fifteen, those of the third twelve, those of the fourth nine, those of the fifth six, and those of the sixth three feet in advance of the first line. So that the man at the head of the file was guarded on each side by the points of six spears.<sup>3</sup> The ordinary depth of the phalanx was of sixteen ranks. The men who stood too far behind to use their *sarissas*, and who therefore kept them raised until they ad-

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, *Tactica*, 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 19.

vanced to fill a vacant place, still added to the pressure of the mass. As the efficacy of the phalanx depended on its compactness, and this again on the uniformity of its movements, the greatest care was taken to select the best soldiers for the foremost and hindmost ranks<sup>1</sup> —the frames, as it were, of the engine. The bulk and core of the phalanx consisted of Macedonians; but it was composed in part of foreign troops. These were no doubt Greeks. But the northern barbarians, Illyrians, Pæonians, Agriarians, and Thracians, who were skilled in the use of missiles, furnished bowmen, dartsmen, and slingers: probably, according to the proportion which the masters of tactics deemed the most eligible, about half the number of the phalanx. To these was added another class of infantry, peculiar in some respects to the Macedonian army, though the invention belonged to Iphicrates. They were called *HYPASPISTS*, because, like the phalangites, they carried the long shield: but their spears were shorter, their swords longer, their armour lighter. They were thus prepared for more rapid movements, and did not so much depend on the nature of the ground. They formed a corps of about 6000 men. The cavalry was similarly distinguished into three classes by its arms, accoutrements, and mode of warfare. Its main strength consisted in 1500 Macedonian and as many Thessalian heavy horse. Both the rider and his horse were cased in armour, and his weapons seem to have corresponded to those of the heavy infantry. The light cavalry, chiefly used for skirmishing and pursuit, and in part armed with the sarissa, was drawn from the Thracians and Pæonians, and was about a third of the number of the heavy horse. A smaller body of Greek cavalry probably stood in

<sup>1</sup> *Λοχαγοί and οὐραγοί.* Arrian, Tact. 18. 20.



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nearly the same relation to the other two divisions, as the Hypaspists to the heavy and light infantry.<sup>1</sup>

To the Hypaspists belonged the royal foot body-guard, the Agema, or royal escort, and the Argyraspides, so called from the silver ornaments with which their long shields were enriched. But the precise relation in which these bodies stood to each other, does not appear very distinctly from the descriptions of the ancients. The royal horse-guard was composed of eight Macedonian squadrons<sup>2</sup>, filled with the sons of the best families. The numbers of each are not ascertained, but they seem in all not much to have exceeded or fallen short of a thousand.<sup>3</sup>

Alexander's  
prepar-  
ations.

The whole force with which Alexander crossed over into Asia amounted to little more than 30,000 foot and 5000 horse. Of the infantry only 12,000 were Macedonians: 7000 are described as allied troops, 5000 as mercenaries, collected perhaps by the subsidies of those states which did not furnish contingents of men. Experience however had proved that such an army might safely defy any force which a king of Persia had ever yet brought into the field: and in this respect Alexander might feel a reasonable confidence of success. Nor did the low state of his treasury at all affect his prospects: it was a deficiency which might be abundantly supplied by the first fortunate campaign. There were however some grounds for apprehension, which might have induced a more cautious prince to hesitate. His marine was so inferior to that of Persia, that he had cause to fear lest his communication with his own kingdom might be

<sup>1</sup> Here we should have mentioned the *διδάχαι*, who according to Pollux, x. 5. § 132., and Curtius, v. 13. 8. (where see Schmieder's note), were a species of dragoons; a permanent body invented by Alexander, who fought either on foot or on horseback, as occasion required; if Arrian's silence on occasions where the name must have occurred if the thing had existed (i. 6. 8, 9. iii. 21. 12.), did not render it almost certain, as Droysen observes (p. 100.) that this was no more than a temporary expedient.

<sup>2</sup> *ἱλαί*.

<sup>3</sup> Saint Croix, *Eramen*, p. 433. foll.

cut off, and lest his hostile neighbours might be excited and enabled by Persian succours to invade it in his absence. But he justly thought, that if such dangers were allowed to suspend the execution of his plans, they would never be realised: and he wisely determined to commit himself at once to the resources of his own genius and energy. He would not listen to the advice of his elder counsellors, who wished him, before he quitted his dominions, to marry, and leave an heir to his throne. He felt no misgivings to prompt him to such a delay. As the time of his departure drew near, the great objects of his ambition engrossed his mind, as with a real presence. Though he had only seventy talents left in his coffers, he distributed almost all the remaining property of his crown — lands, houses, and customs — among his friends: and when he was asked by Perdicas, what he reserved for himself, answered, MY HOPES.

## CHAPTER XLIX.

## ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION IN ASIA, TO THE BATTLE OF ISSUS.

*Alexander crosses the Hellespont. — Ilium. — Ptolemy and Aristobulus. — The Granicus. — Battle of the Granicus. — Ephesus. — Miletus. — Halicarnassus. — Siege of Halicarnassus. — March through Caria. — Lycia. — Mount Climax. — Pamphylia. — Pisidia. — Phrygia. — Gordium. — Cappadocia. — Tarsus. — Alexander and his Physician. — Approach of Darius. — March to Issus. — Movements of Darius. — Field of Battle. — Battle of Issus. — Capture of Damascus.*

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B. C. 334.  
Alexander  
crosses the  
Hellespont.

EARLY in the spring of 334, Alexander set out on his march to the Hellespont, leaving Antipater, with an army of 12,000 infantry and 1,500 horse, regent in Macedonia, and to keep a watchful eye on the affairs of Greece. Parmenio, who after Philip's death had returned from Asia, commanded the phalanx under the king: his son, Philotas, the Macedonian cavalry, and another son, Nicanor, the hypaspists. The Thesalian horse were placed under the command of Calas, son of Harpalus; the Greek under Erigyius; the Thracian and Pæonian light cavalry under Cassander, son of Antipater. In twenty days the army reached Sestus, where a fleet of 160 sail, including twenty Athenian galleys, and a great number of transports, had been provided for its embarkation. Parmenio was ordered to superintend the passage of the main body of the infantry and of the cavalry, to Abydos, while Alexander himself proceeded to Elæus, to sacrifice in the sanctuary of Protesilaus, and to pray for a happier landing than had been vouchsafed to that hero on the shore of Asia. Here he also erected

an altar to commemorate his departure from Europe, and then embarking, and steering his own galley, made for the harbour on the opposite coast, which tradition had fixed upon as the landing-place of the Achæans in the Trojan war. In the middle of the Hellespont he sacrificed a bull, and made libations from a golden goblet to Poseidon and the Nereids. As his galley approached the land, he hurled his spear into the ground, and leapt ashore the foremost in his armour, as if to take solemn possession of Asia. Another altar, dedicated to the propitious gods, marked the place of his landing.

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He then proceeded a few miles toward the south-Ilium. east to visit the village, which its inhabitants, perhaps with real, but certainly interested credulity, gave out to be the site of the ancient city of Priam, where there was a temple of Athene, and where the altar was shown at which Priam was said to have been slain by Neoptolemus. Alexander would probably have been little inclined for antiquarian researches, if any doubt had been suggested to him about the locality which has been the subject of so much controversy. But he felt an interest in the scene, such as no one who ever visited it before or after him, could have experienced. To suppose that the marks of enthusiasm which he displayed were merely, or chiefly, the results of a politic calculation, designed to rouse the spirit of his followers, and to win the favour of the Greeks, by connecting his expedition with that which was celebrated in their earliest heroic song<sup>1</sup>, seems an opinion which places his character in

<sup>1</sup> As Schlosser intimates (l. iii. p. 99.), though somewhat ambiguously, recognising indeed Alexander's *poetical nature*, but saying, that he made a brilliant use of it. One objection to this view is, that he was not accompanied by his army; its enthusiasm therefore could not be roused by the spectacle. Still less can I adopt Flathe's supposition (l. p. 283.), that his main object was to obtain an announcement of victory from the gods, and that the priests of the temple at Ilium *macedonised*. This is really not only laying undue weight on the story in Diodorus (xvii. 17.) about the fallen statue of Ariobarzanes, but misinterpreting it. For it was not the

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a false light, and brings him down too near to the level of an age, in which poetry is entirely excluded from the sphere of war and politics. He undoubtedly trod the plain of Troy with the feeling that it had been the scene of the exploits of his ancestors, which he was about to emulate. He sacrificed to Athene, dedicated his own panoply in her temple, and in its place took down some of the arms which hung there, as the Ilians pretended, from the time of the heroes, and ever afterwards had them borne before him by some of his guard into his battle-fields. He also endeavoured by propitiatory rites to avert the wrath which, as a descendant of Neoptolemus, he might dread from the shade of Priam. But he had not gone to indulge a frivolous curiosity: and when one of the villagers offered to show him the lyre of Paris, he refused to look at it. *He would gladly have gazed on the relic, if it had been that to which Achilles sang the deeds of the brave.* To this his great progenitor, he paid the most affectionate honours. Descending to Sigeum, he anointed and crowned the column which marked the barrow supposed to contain the remains of Achilles. His most intimate friend and inseparable companion, Hephæstion, adorned the monument of Patroclus in like manner. On one account only, he was heard to say, he envied Achilles, that his achievements had been celebrated by Homer.

The historian to whom we are indebted for the most ample and authentic information we possess concerning Alexander, Arrian of Nicomedia, takes this occasion to remark, that in this respect the Macedonian hero had indeed been singularly unfortunate; since even the Expedition of the younger Cyrus, and the Return of the Ten Thousand, had been rendered by Xenophon's pen more renowned than the incom-

priests, but Alexander's own soothsayer, Aristander (see Wesseling's note), who made the prediction.

parably greater actions which he himself was about to record. The remark itself strikes us as somewhat strange, when we reflect on the immense mass of historical writings, which in Arrian's time were still extant, relating to Alexander's reign, and that among the contemporary authors who treated this subject, two were eminently qualified, by their station and opportunities, to do it justice. Two of his generals, Aristobulus and Ptolemy, who held one of the highest posts in the army, and afterwards became king of Egypt, undertook the office of relating his conquests; and they both wrote after his death, when they were no longer subject to the strongest of the motives that might before have induced them to swerve from the truth. Nor was it without reason that Arrian himself observed, that Ptolemy's royal dignity was an additional guarantee of his veracity: not indeed perhaps because of the keener sense of honour which it inspired, but as more completely establishing his independence, and raising him above petty temptations to falsehood. It is possible that the literary attainments of these writers were very inferior to their means of knowledge: but if Alexander's achievements are now less known than they deserve, it is not certainly because he wanted a bard like Homer, but because they were related by many of his historians in a strain of rhetorical exaggeration. Hence, according to Arrian, no story had been oftener told, or with more contradictory statements. Even Aristobulus and Ptolemy frequently differed from each other. We however must account it a misfortune that their works have not come down to us; though the loss may have been owing to the superior merit of Arrian's narrative, which was probably found a more pleasing composition<sup>1</sup>, and is possibly more valuable

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Ptolemy  
and Aris-  
tobulus.

<sup>1</sup> Yet it must be owned that his simplicity is sometimes rather too meagre, and that, without the details which Curtius, through his superior liveliness of imagination

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than either of them would have been by itself. For Arrian, a soldier, statesman, and philosopher, who governed the province of Cappadocia in the reign of Hadrian, while he emulated Xenophon's style, also exercised a critical judgment on the discrepancies of his predecessors. Still a modern reader may be excused for regretting that he has not the means of deciding for himself.

From the plain of Troy Alexander turned northward to rejoin the main body of his army, which he found at Arisbe, not far from Abydos. He then bent his march along the coast of the Propontis, receiving in his way the submission of Priapus<sup>1</sup>, which opened its gates to a detachment of his forces. Amyntas, son of Arrabæus, was sent forward with some squadrons of light horse to scour the country, and collect intelligence of the enemy's movements. The two satraps whose provinces lay on the western coast, Spithridates of Lydia and Ionia, and Arsites of Phrygia on the Hellespont, with several other Persian generals, and Memnon the Rhodian, who had succeeded to Mentor's authority after his death, which happened about the time of Alexander's accession, had assembled 20,000 Greek mercenaries, and about an equal number of native cavalry, and were encamped near the town of Zelea on the right bank of the Granicus, a small stream which flows from mount Ida into the Propontis to the west of Cyzicus. Here, when the news arrived that Alexander had crossed the Hellespont, they held a council of war. Memnon advised that they should avoid a battle: for which, with such inferiority in the numbers of their infantry, they were not prepared: and retreating should lay waste the country, and even destroy the towns in their line of march. The want

The Granicus.

tion, was happily led to preserve, Arrian's narrative would often afford but a faint and colourless outline.

<sup>1</sup> There can be no doubt that Πρίαπον — not Πρίδρον — should be substituted for Πρίαπον in Arrian's text.

of provisions would prevent Alexander from pursuing them, and from remaining where he was. It seems doubtful whether this plan, if it had been adopted, would have had any effect beyond that of delaying an engagement. It could scarcely have been executed on such a scale as to hinder Alexander from penetrating by another route into the interior. But the Persians, who were jealous of Memnon's influence, and suspected that he wished to protract the war on which it so much depended, treated his proposal as degrading to their master's dignity. Arsites declared that he would not allow a single house in his province to be burnt: and his sentiments were unanimously applauded by his countrymen. It was determined therefore to await the enemy's approach on the Granicus, where, with a greatly superior cavalry, they would have the advantage of a strong position.

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Alexander had advanced near to the river, when his scouts brought word that the Persian army was drawn up on the other side; and he immediately began to form his own in order of battle. Parmenio advised him to encamp on the left bank. The enemy would not venture to remain where they were, from fear of surprise in the night; and thus he would be able to effect his passage, without danger or molestation, the next morning. If he should attempt it then, a repulse might ensue from the difficulties of the ground, ominous for his enterprise and disheartening to his troops. Alexander admitted the force of these arguments, considered from Parmenio's point of view. But for him what seemed to the old general an objection, was the strongest motive for an immediate attack. To be stopped by an appearance of difficulty and danger at the outset of his enterprise was the worst of all omens: and it was to no purpose that he had crossed the mighty Hellespont, if he was now to be detained by a paltry brook.

Battle of  
the Gra-  
nicus.



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Yet the obstacles were not trifling. The stream was in many places evidently too deep to be forded; and the opposite bank was high and steep. The Persians had posted their cavalry—the arm on which they chiefly relied—on its edge, the Greek mercenaries at some distance in the rear. Alexander had drawn up his phalanx in six divisions in the centre<sup>1</sup>, flanked on the right by the Macedonian and Pæonian cavalry, and by the greater part of the light infantry, on the left by the Thessalian, Greek, and Thracian horse. He committed the command of the left wing to Parmenio, and put himself at the head of the right. He was soon recognised by the enemy from the brilliance of his armour, and the respectful attention of the officers who surrounded him; and as they concluded that the brunt of the attack would be on the side where he stood, they strengthened their left wing with some additional squadrons of their best troops. There was a short pause of silent expectation while the two armies, which were to begin the conflict for the dominion of Asia, stood face to face, separated by a narrow stream. It was broken by Alexander, who, having mounted his horse, and addressed a few words of exhortation to his nearest followers, ordered Amyntas, son of Arrabæus, with his light cavalry, and Socrates, with a squadron of the horseguards, supported by a division of the hypaspists under Ptolemy, son of Philip<sup>2</sup>, to advance into the water: he himself followed at the head of the phalanx, to the sound of the trumpets and amidst the war cries

<sup>1</sup> It seems clear that the names of Craterus and Philippus have been repeated, through some mistake, in Arrian's enumeration of the *φάλαγγες* (i. 14), and that the *τάξεις*, brigades of the phalanx, were here, as at Issus and Arbela, six in number, and each of 3000 men. Mr. Williams has been led by this accidental error to describe the Macedonian phalanx generally as *composed of eight brigades, containing 2000 men each*. Yet at Issus, he can find only five brigades, though there six are distinctly enumerated.

<sup>2</sup> This appears to have been the state of the case, though there is an obscurity in Arrian's expression (i. 14.) *τὴν Σωκράτους ἔλην Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Φιλίππου ἄγοντα*, which might lead one to suspect that some words had dropt out of the text.

of his men, moving in a slanting direction up the bed of the river<sup>1</sup>, to prevent the Persians from taking him in flank on his landing.<sup>2</sup>

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Amyntas and Socrates, when they reached the opposite bank, were received with a galling shower of darts and a vigorous charge, against which they had to contend with very inferior numbers, and under the disadvantage of ground which was at once lower and less firm. They were, it seems, barely able to maintain their footing, until Alexander came up to their relief. He immediately charged into the thickest of the fray, where the principal Persian leaders were engaged. His life was at one moment in imminent danger. He had advanced to meet Mithridates, a nobleman allied to Darius, who was coming up in front of his squadron, and had brought him to the ground with the shock of his spear. At this instant he received a blow from Rhœsaces on his helmet, which broke off a part of the crest and nearly pierced it. Him too Alexander unhorsed with a javelin wound in his breast. But while he was busied with this enemy, Spithridates coming behind had raised his scymitar over his head, for a stroke which would probably have descended with deadly effect on his shattered helmet, had not Cleitus, the brother of Alexander's nurse Lanicè, intercepted it by a cut of his sabre, which severed the Persian's right arm from his body.<sup>2</sup> While the cavalry was thus engaged, one

<sup>1</sup> Arrian adds, ἡ παρείλκε τὸ βεῦμα. I do not understand in what sense the stream could be said *παρείλκειν*; and rather wonder that no critic has suggested the obvious correction *παρεῖχε*, or *παρεῖκε*, as the stream (which had πολλὰ βάθια, i. 13.), *permitted*. So (i. 21.) it is said of the towers, *παρεῖχον ἀκροβολίζεσθαι*. Neophytus Ducas, who published an edition of Arrian's works, with a translation of the Anabasis, and notes, and some tactical illustrations in modern Greek (*Ἐν Βιέννῃ τῆς Ἀουστρίας*, 1809), translates *πρὸς τὴν θέσιν τοῦ βεύματος*; and, in the note, he seems to wish to express the same meaning by *ὡς αὐτῷ προχωροῖν*, which would indeed be a correct paraphrase of *ἡ παρεῖχε τὸ βεῦμα*. — *Παρεῖκε*, as coming still nearer to the present reading, would perhaps be preferable, if τὸ βεῦμα were away, as (ii. 23.) *ἔποι παρελκοί*.

<sup>2</sup> Flathe's scepticism about this incident seems a little strained. He cites Diodorus, Plutarch, and Justin, as if it was not mentioned by Arrian.

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division after another of the phalanx effected a landing: the light troops with which the Macedonian horse was interspersed, annoyed the enemy greatly with their missiles: and it was found that the strong javelin<sup>1</sup>, with which the Macedonian troopers could thrust at the faces of their antagonists, was a much more efficacious weapon than the slight dart with which the Persians were armed. Their centre gave way to Alexander's impetuous attack, which was sustained by still increasing numbers; and the disorder soon spread to the extremities of the line, till all were put to flight. Alexander however did not suffer his troops to pursue the Persian cavalry to a great distance, but returned to attack the mercenaries, who had kept their ground rather through amazement at the sudden issue of the first combat, than with any deliberate purpose. While he moved against them with the phalanx, he ordered the cavalry to attack their flanks and rear. Thus surrounded, they were almost all cut to pieces: very few escaped among the wounded, and only 2000 were taken prisoners. The loss of the Persians amounted only to about a thousand: but it included a great number of their chief officers. Alexander lost only some five and twenty of his horseguards—who fell at the first landing, and whom he honoured with brazen statues, which were still standing in Arrian's time at Dium, the workmanship of the king's favourite sculptor Lysippus—sixty of his other cavalry, and thirty of the foot. All these he interred the next day with martial pomp, and granted an exemption from every kind of tax and charge to their parents and children. He visited the wounded in person, and while he inspected their wounds, made inquiries which gave them a welcome

<sup>1</sup> *Ξυστὰ κρᾶνεία*. Gronovius observes, that their strength consisted, not in the material, but the form. Yet the cornel has been always noted as a very hard wood; and otherwise, Arrian would not have mentioned it.

opportunity of relating their exploits. Nor did he withhold the rites of burial from the enemy's dead. But he sent the Greek prisoners in chains to Macedonia, to be kept to forced labour, as guilty of bearing arms against their country, in contempt of the decree of the national congress. To identify his cause in another manner with that of Greece, he sent 300 suits of Persian armour to Athens, to be dedicated to the tutelary goddess in the Acropolis, with an inscription expressing that they had been taken from the barbarians of Asia by Alexander the son of Philip, and the Greeks, *all but the Lacedæmonians*; a stigma, as he could not but account it: which however Sparta might as justly reckon among her titles of honour. In the joy of his first victory, he likewise remembered Ilium: enriched its little temple with offerings, and ordered the village to be transformed into a city, which he honoured with extraordinary privileges and immunities.

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Arsites had fled after the battle into Phrygia; but there, it was said, overpowered by grief and shame by the disaster, which he attributed to his own counsels, laid violent hands on himself. Alexander bestowed his satrapy on Calas; encouraged the barbarians, who had fled to the mountains, to return to their homes; and ordered the tribute to remain on its ancient footing. Parmenio was detached to take possession of the satrap's residence, Dascylium. The king himself, bending his march southward, advanced toward Sardis. The news of his victory produced such an effect in the capital of Lydia, that when he had come within eight or nine miles of it, Mithrines, the commander of the garrison, accompanied by the principal inhabitants, met him, with a peaceable surrender of the city, the citadel, and the treasure. He retained Mithrines on an honourable footing near his person, and committed the command of the citadel to

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Ephesus.

Pausanias, an officer of his guard. He appointed Nicias to superintend the collection of the revenue, and Asander, son of Philotas, to the satrapy of Spithridates. To conciliate the Lydians, he restored their ancient laws; that is, most probably, abolished all the restraints which the policy of the Persian government had imposed on them, when it crushed their rebellion after the first conquest<sup>1</sup>: while, perhaps to make them more familiar with Greek usages, he ordered a temple to be built on the citadel to Olympian Zeus. A body of cavalry and light troops were placed at the disposal of Asander, and the Argive contingent was left as a garrison in the citadel. Four days after, Alexander arrived at Ephesus. There too, as soon as the tidings of the battle arrived, a body of mercenaries who had been stationed there by Memnon, took ship with Amyntas, son of Antiochus, a Macedonian emigrant, who had fled his country to avoid the effects of the king's displeasure, or because he was conscious of a share in some of the plots formed against him. Ephesus was divided between an oligarchical and a democratical faction, which seem nearly to have balanced each other. The oligarchy had been sustained by the power of Persia: their adversaries therefore looked forward with hope to the impending invasion, and had probably received promises of support from Philip. Violent tumults had taken place, in which the oligarchs, aided by Memnon's troops, had prevailed, forced many of their opponents to leave the city, threw down a statue of Philip which stood in the temple, committed other acts of sacrilege there, and broke open the tomb of Heropythes, a great popular leader, who had been buried in the market-place. A complete reaction ensued on Alexander's arrival: democracy was formally restored, the exiles returned

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. II. p. 187.

to their homes, and the triumphant party became eager for revenge on their vanquished oppressors. One of the oligarchical leaders, with his son and nephews, was dragged out of the sanctuary, and stoned to death. Alexander then interfered to prevent further bloodshed, and forbade any proceedings to be instituted for the punishment of political offences. The city was permitted to expend the tribute which it had before paid to the Persian government on its new temple, which was not yet finished. At a later period he offered to defray the whole expense of the building, on condition that his own name should be inscribed on it as its founder: an offer which the Ephesians were too proud of this great ornament of their city to accept, and declined with ingenious flattery.<sup>1</sup> Before his departure, he celebrated a great sacrifice to the goddess, with a solemn procession of his whole army in battle array. By like measures, especially by the establishment of democracy and remission of tribute, he endeavoured to gain the goodwill of all the other Greek cities on the coast, which was of great importance to him at this juncture, while the naval power of Persia was still formidable.

In the mean while he had received offers of submission from Magnesia and Tralles, in the vale of the Mæander, and had sent Parmenio forward to take possession of them. He had also at first reason to hope that Miletus would be as quietly surrendered to him; for Hegesistratus, who commanded the garrison, had made him like offers by letter. But the approach of a Persian armament, which was on its way from Phœnicia, encouraged Hegesistratus to change his intention, and defend his post. Nicanor however, Alexander's admiral, got the start of the barbarians, and arrived with his fleet of 160 galleys at Ladè,

<sup>1</sup> *It did not become one god to dedicate offerings to others.* Strabo, xiv. p. 641.

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before they appeared: and Alexander forthwith secured the island, which commanded the entrance of the port of Miletus, with a detachment of 4000 men. The Persians, finding themselves shut out, came to anchor at Mycalè. Their fleet amounted to 400 sail. Yet, notwithstanding this great inequality, Parmenio advised the king to hazard a sea-fight. A victory, he thought, would be attended with the greatest advantages, while defeat would not make the state of his naval affairs much worse: since, as it was, the enemy were masters of the sea. An omen too, which he had observed, confirmed him in his opinion. Alexander pointed out to him, that it might be otherwise interpreted, and that his arguments were not sounder than his rules of divination. The Macedonian fleet was inferior, not only in number, but in nautical skill and training to the Phœnician and Cyprian galleys. It would be mere foolhardiness to seek a battle under such disadvantages; and a defeat, far from leaving him in nearly the same condition as he now stood in, might involve consequences no less important and disastrous than a general insurrection in Greece. The eagle which had been seen to perch on the beach behind the royal galley, signified that he was destined to overcome the Persian navy by his operations on land.

Miletus.

Miletus was divided into two distinct cities by an inner wall, which appears to have been much stronger than the outer one: if indeed what was called the outer city was not a mere open suburb. Alexander had taken it by assault on his first arrival, and then prepared to besiege the other. The townsmen came to a compromise with the garrison, and by mutual consent they deputed one of the most eminent citizens to the king, with an offer of neutrality, which he rejected, bidding them prepare to sustain an immediate attack. His enginery soon made a breach in the

wall, which his troops mounted before the eyes of the Persians, who were unable to relieve their friends: for, to cut off all chance of succour, Nicanor had moved up to the mouth of the inner harbour, and laid some galleys across it side by side, so as effectually to bar entrance or escape. The citizens and the garrison, when the besiegers began to pour in through the breach, fled toward the sea; some put off in boats, but found the harbour's mouth closed before they reached it: about 300 of the mercenaries swam to a rocky islet within the harbour, and prepared to defend themselves there, until Alexander, admiring their courage, permitted them to purchase their lives by entering into his service. The Persian fleet continued for some time moored at Mycalè, in the hope of drawing the enemy into an action: but as it was forced to fetch its water from the mouth of the Mæander, Alexander ordered Philotas to proceed to the place, with a body of infantry and cavalry, and to hinder the crews from landing. The fleet was consequently obliged to go over to Samos for provisions. It returned indeed shortly after, and attempted to surprise the Macedonians in the harbour; but having been foiled in this attempt, withdrew from the coast of Miletus.

Alexander now perceived that his fleet would be of little service to him, while the state of his finances was such, that he could ill bear the cost of it. On the other hand, he hoped to shut out the Persians from all the ports of Asia, and thus to disable them from continuing their naval operations. He therefore resolved to dismiss his fleet, retaining only a small squadron, which included the Athenian galleys, for the transport of his besieging machines, and to confine his attention to the prosecution of the war on the southern coast. His first object was the reduction of Halicarnassus, where the enemy had now collected



almost all the strength which he had remaining in this quarter. Memnon, who after the battle of the Granicus sent his wife and children as pledges of his fidelity to Darius, and had been invested by him with supreme authority in the west of Asia, and with the command of all his naval forces, had been long making preparations for the defence of the place, where he himself, with the Persian Orontobates, who had married the daughter of Pixodarus, and had succeeded him as satrap of Caria, and a numerous garrison of Greeks and barbarians, awaited the invader's approach. They were animated by the presence of two Athenians, Ephialtes and Thrasybulus, who had come to offer their services against the common enemy. The fleet too, lying at the mouth of the harbour, was capable of rendering good service during a siege. The city, built on heights which rise abruptly in the form of a theatre from the sea, was naturally strong, and had been elaborately fortified, both with walls and a ditch forty-five feet in width, and about half as many in depth, and contained two citadels, one on the heights at its back, the other, celebrated for the enervating spring of Salmacis, which rose there, at the northern extremity of the great harbour<sup>1</sup>: a smaller harbour was sheltered by an island called Arconnesus<sup>2</sup>, which was also a place of great strength. Alexander, on his march from Miletus, made himself master of all the towns that lay between that city and Halicarnassus; and on his entrance into Caria, he was met by Ada, the widow of Idrieus, who surrendered her fortress of Alinda to him, begged leave to adopt him as her son, and placed

<sup>1</sup> Vitruvius, ii. 8. Strabo, xiv. p. 656, 657.

<sup>2</sup> Which, according to Pliny (N. H. v. 31.), contained a town called Ceramus; but as there was certainly another town of that name on the adjacent coast of Caria, this is probably a mistake. It does not appear that Strabo speaks of this island as a fort (as Mr. Williams supposes, p. 80.). His two citadels are no doubt those described by Vitruvius, both on the main land.

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herself under his protection. He then advanced toward Halicarnassus, and encamped at about half a mile from the walls. On the day of his arrival, he encountered a brisk sally from the garrison, which however was easily repulsed. But before he commenced his operations here, having received some offers which led him to expect that he should gain admittance at Myndus, a town which lay a few miles westward on the coast, he made an attempt on it in the night, but, not meeting with the promised support from within, while succours were introduced by sea from Halicarnassus, he withdrew, and applied himself wholly to the siege of the capital.

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Halicarnassus.

He began by filling up the ditch, so as to enable his engines and wooden towers to approach the walls. The besieged made many vigorous sallies for the purpose of setting fire to the machines, but were always repulsed, and sometimes with great loss. Once a mad attempt of two Macedonian soldiers<sup>1</sup>, who, having challenged one another over their cups to a trial of valour, undertook to storm the citadel on the land side alone, brought on an engagement, which was near becoming general, and might have ended in the capture of the city. For two towers and the intervening wall had been battered down by the engines: but before advantage was taken of the breach, the besieged built another brick wall in the form of a crescent behind it. Twice they made a desperate attempt to destroy the engines which Alexander brought to play on this new wall: the second time, at the instigation of Ephialtes, with their whole force; but they were defeated with great slaughter, in which Ephialtes himself fell, and it was believed that

Siege of  
Halicarnassus.

<sup>1</sup> So Arrian. But by Diodorus (xvii. 25.) they are described as τῶς and soon after as πολλοί. They also make their attempt by night. This is the action after which, according to him, Alexander applied for leave to bury some of his dead, who had fallen close to the walls, but was refused through the influence of the two Athenians. I will not undertake to decide on the probability of Mr. Williams's conjecture, p. 81. But the story is hardly reconcilable with Arrian's narrative.

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Alexander might then have stormed the place, but was induced to spare it by the hope that it would soon surrender. In fact, Memnon and Orontobates now despaired of defending it much longer, and resolved to abandon it. In the dead of the night, they set fire to a wooden tower, and to some of the houses and magazines near the wall, and while the conflagration spread, made their escape, and crossed over to Cos, where it seems they had previously deposited their treasures.<sup>1</sup> The garrison took refuge, some in the citadels, some in Arconnesus. Alexander immediately entered the city, and checked the progress of the flames. But as soon as he had become master of it, he razed it to the ground. He did not however think it worth while to stay, until he had dislodged the enemy from their remaining strongholds: but having committed the province to Ada, he left her, with about 3000 foot and 200 horse, under a Macedonian officer, to reduce them.<sup>2</sup> He himself pursued his march along the south coast of Asia Minor, to make himself master of the ports which might harbour the Persian fleet.

But as winter was now approaching, he determined, before he left Caria, to send a part of his troops, who had lately married when he set out on his expedition, back to Macedonia, to pass the winter at home. He gave the command of them to three of his generals, who were themselves in the same case; directing them on their return to bring with them as many fresh troops as they could raise. The measure was politic, as well as gracious; for his army had been much weakened to supply so many garrisons as were required for the conquered cities; and nothing was

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 27. His account however differs materially from Arrian's; for he omits the fire.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, xiv. p. 657. ἀλούσης τῆς πόλεως, πλὴν τῆς ἑκρας (διττὴ δ' ἦν ἐκείνη) πολιορκεῖν ἔδοκεν· ἐόλω δὲ ὀλίγω βσπερον καὶ ἡ ἑκρα, πρὸς ὀργὴν ἤδη καὶ ἀπέχθειαν τῆς πολιορκίας γενομένης.

more likely to promote the levies in Macedonia, than the presence of the victorious warriors, whose return attested at once his success and his liberality. Another officer was sent to collect all the troops he could in Peloponnesus. Parmenio was ordered to proceed with the greater part of the cavalry and the baggage to Sardis, and thence into Phrygia, where he himself, after he should have traversed the coast of Lycia and Pamphylia, designed to meet him in the spring.

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In his march through Caria he met with a short resistance from the garrison of the strong fortress Hyparna; and, according to Diodorus, turned aside to punish the insolence of the inhabitants of Marmora in Peræa, who, relying perhaps on the strength of their town, which stood on a high rock by the sea-side, had ventured to annoy the rear of his army, and had not only plundered some of the baggage, but killed several men. When besieged they defended themselves with great obstinacy; and at length the young men set fire to the town, and forcing their way through the enemy's lines, took refuge in the neighbouring mountains. On his entrance into Lycia, Telmessus capitulated, and after he had crossed the Xanthus, he received the submission of most of the Lycian towns. Phaselis even presented him with a golden crown; and the motive which led it to pay him this honour may help to account for the ready submission of the other Lycians. The people of Phaselis had suffered much from the incursions of their neighbours, the Pisidian mountaineers, who had even taken up a fortified position in their territory, for the purpose of continual molestation. They hoped that Alexander would deliver them from this annoyance, and they were not disappointed. For, on his return from an expedition, which, notwithstanding the lateness of the season,—it was now about mid-winter—

March  
through  
Caria.

Lycia.

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he had undertaken into the interior, to reduce the Milyans, who inhabited a tract of Phrygia on the confines of Phrygia and Pisidia<sup>1</sup>, he took the fort.

He was still in the neighbourhood of Phaselis, when he was apprised of a plot, which had been formed against his life, by his namesake, the son of Aeropus, whom he had appointed to command the Thessalian cavalry in the room of Calas, the new satrap of the Hellespontine Phrygia. It appears that, notwithstanding this favour, the Lyncestian either could not forgive the king for the execution of his two brothers, or could not forget the ancient pretensions of his family to royal dignity. He had entered into a negotiation with the Persian court through the fugitive Amyntas, and Darius had sent down an agent named Asisines, to obtain a secret interview with him, and to offer, if he killed his sovereign, to raise him to the throne of Macedonia, or at least to aid him in the attempt to secure it, with a thousand talents. The Persian emissary had fallen into the hands of Parmenio, and revealed his business; and Parmenio had sent him to the king. Alexander held a council on the subject, and by its advice despatched orders to Parmenio to arrest the Lyncestian and keep him in custody.

Mount  
Climax.

Between Phaselis and the maritime plains of Pamphylia, the mountains which form the southern branch of Taurus descend abruptly on the coast, leaving only a narrow passage along the beach, and this never open but in calm weather, or during the prevalence of a northerly wind. The promontory was called Mount Climax. At the time when Alexander was about to resume his march eastward, the wind

<sup>1</sup> It is not easy precisely to trace the boundaries of the Milyas; but Droysen (p. 136.) apparently confounds Termessus with Telmessus, mistranslates the last sentence of Strabo's thirteenth book, and then finds fault with Col. Leake's Map.

was blowing from the south, and the waves washed the foot of the cliffs. He therefore sent the main body of his army over the mountains to Pergè, by a circuitous and difficult road<sup>1</sup>, which however he had ordered to be previously cleared by his Thracian pioneers. But for himself he determined with a few followers to try the passage along the shore; danger and difficulty had a charm for him which he could scarcely resist. Perhaps the wind had already subsided: soon after it shifted to the north; a change in which he recognised a special interposition of the gods. Yet, according to Strabo's authors, he found the water still nearly breast high, and had to wade through it for a whole day. As he advanced from Pergè, he was met by an embassy from the neighbouring town of Aspendus, which lay a little further eastward near the mouth of the Eurymedon, offering to acknowledge his authority, but praying that they might not be compelled to receive a Macedonian garrison. This request he granted, but in return demanded a contribution of fifty talents, and the tribute of horses which they had been used to pay to the Persian king. These terms were accepted, and Alexander, passing Aspendus, proceeded along the coast to Sidè, a barbarised colony of Cuma, which he took and garrisoned. The neighbouring fortress of Syllium he found prepared to repel his first attack; and he soon after received intelligence that the Aspendians refused to execute their engagements, and were making preparations to sustain a siege. He therefore retraced his steps, and to their surprise

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Pamphylia.

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Leake (Asia Minor, p. 190.) has been misled by a false reading in Arrian, i. 26., *χαλεπήν άλλως καὶ οὐ μακράν*. This would contradict Strabo, xiv. p. 666., *περίοδον ἔχει* (which Col. Leake renders correctly, p. 175.), as well as his own map. But the negative is not found in the best manuscript of Arrian, and unless it is omitted, *άλλως* has no meaning, though Ducas, having translated, *ἦτις ἦττον μὲν σύντομος, ἀδιάδατος ὅμως άλλως*, in his note gives the explanation, *χαλεπήν άλλως (μὴ ὥδοπεποιημένην θηλονότι) μήτε μακράν ἢ οὕτω χαλεπήν μὲν, οὐ μακράν δέ*. He adds, *ἀλλ' ἐν άλλοις εὐρήται τὸ μακράν καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ οὐ*.

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suddenly appeared before their walls. They hastily abandoned the lower town, and retired into the citadel, which stood on a steep rock overhanging the river. Alexander with his army took up his quarters in the houses below, and the Aspendians, now repenting of their levity, sent another embassy to sue for peace. He granted it, but on harder terms, requiring 100 talents and yearly tribute, and exacting hostages for their performance. Then, having returned to Pergè, he began his march toward Phrygia.

Pisidia.

His road led through the heart of Pisidia, where he was the more desirous of striking terror, as its fierce and lawless inhabitants, secure in their mountain barriers, and almost impregnable fortresses, had constantly defied the power of the Persian government. Yet he could not spare the time which would have been necessary to reduce all its strongholds. Termessus, situate on a steep rock, commanding a narrow pass which led from Pisidia into Phrygia, appeared to him too strong to be attempted, though he had dislodged the barbarians from the position which they had taken up without the walls, and made himself master of the pass. But the resistance of Termessus procured for him offers of alliance from its enemy Selgè, another of the principal cities, which proved very useful to him. He stormed Sagalassus, though beside its natural strength its inhabitants were accounted the most warlike of the Pisidians; and this success was followed by the submission of most of the smaller towns. He then advanced by the lake Ascania<sup>1</sup> to Celænæ, where the citadel, on an almost inaccessible rock, was guarded by a garrison of 1000 Carians, and 100 Greeks, placed there by the satrap of Phrygia. It offered however to surrender unless

Phrygia.

<sup>1</sup> Which the reader will not confound with the northern lake of the same name.

it should be relieved within sixty days; and Alexander thought it best to accept these conditions; and having left a body of 1500 men to observe it, and appointed Antigonos, son of Philip, to the important satrapy of central Phrygia, he prosecuted his march to Gordium, where he had ordered Parmenio to meet him.

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Arrian does not expressly state the object of this movement, which, as Alexander designed next to make for the coast of Syria, involved an enormous circuit. It is hardly credible that he was deterred from advancing directly into Cilicia by the difficulty of passing through the mountain region (the Rugged Cilicia), which immediately follows Pamphylia; or that he marched so far north merely for the sake of better quarters to refresh his troops in during the remainder of the winter.<sup>1</sup> There were other motives which might lead him to penetrate so far into the interior of Asia Minor, and to traverse it in two directions so distant from the line of march, that would have led to the point which he had mainly in view. He probably thought it necessary to establish his authority in the central provinces, so far at least as to break off their relations with the Persian government, and thus to secure the Greek cities on the western coast from the attacks which might have been made on them from this quarter, if the peninsula, east of Lydia, had remained subject to Darius. The central situation of Gordium<sup>2</sup> also afforded means of easier communication with Macedonia, which the movements of the Persian fleet in the Ægean rendered very desirable, while it enabled him to negotiate on a more advantageous footing with the satraps of the provinces on the Euxine, who, when they saw him so near, might appre-

Gordium.

<sup>1</sup> These are Flathe's suppositions, i. p. 292.

<sup>2</sup> See Col. Leake's observations on the position of Juliopolis, which, in the time of the Roman empire, occupied the site of Gordium. *Asia Minor*, p. 81.



hend an immediate invasion. Accordingly, it seems to have been from Gordium that he sent Hegelochus to the coast, with orders to equip another fleet for the protection of the islands which were threatened by the Persians. Here he was rejoined by the troops whom he had sent to winter by their own hearths, accompanied by the new levies, 3000 Macedonian infantry and 650 horse, 300 from Macedonia, 200 from Thessaly, the rest from Elis. Here also he received an embassy from Athens, which came to request that he would release the Athenian prisoners who had been taken among the mercenaries in the battle of the Granicus, and had been sent to Macedonia. Alexander did not think it prudent, while he was on the eve of a decisive contest with Darius, to relax his severity toward the Greeks who took part with the barbarians, but he gave the Athenians leave to renew their application at a more seasonable juncture.

Gordium had been in very early times the seat of the Phrygian kings, and was supposed to have derived its name from Gordius, the father of the more celebrated Midas. In the citadel was preserved with religious veneration a waggon, in which, according to the tradition of the country, Midas with his father and mother entered the town, at a time when the people, who were distracted by civil discord, were holding an assembly. They had been informed by an oracle that a waggon should bring them a king who should compose their strife. The sudden appearance of Midas convinced them that he was the king destined for them; and when he had mounted the throne, he dedicated the waggon in the citadel, as a thank-offering to the king of the gods, who, before his birth, had sent an eagle to alight upon its yoke, while Gordius was ploughing, as a sign of the honour reserved for his race. This legend had given rise to a prophecy that whoever should untie the knot of bark by which the

yoke was fastened to the pole, must become lord of Asia. Alexander did not leave Gordium before he had proved that this prophecy related to himself. He went up to the citadel, and separated the yoke from the pole. Whether he loosened the knot by drawing out a peg<sup>1</sup>, or cut it with his sword, his own followers were not agreed. But all the spectators were convinced that he had legitimately fulfilled the prophecy, and a storm of thunder and lightning, which took place the same night, removed every shadow of doubt on the subject (333).

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He now resumed his march eastward, and at Ancyra received an embassy from Paphlagonia, promising obedience on the somewhat ambiguous condition, that he should abstain from entering their country. The subjugation of this extensive and very mountainous region would have detained him much too long from the more important objects which he had in view, and he therefore contented himself with this show of submission, which at least heightened, while it proved, the terror inspired by his name, and annexed Paphlagonia to the satrapy of Calas. As he advanced through Cappadocia towards the passes of Taurus, he met with no resistance; and his authority was at least nominally acknowledged to a great distance beyond the Halys, so that he could appoint a satrap of Cappadocia, whose name, Sebictas, indicates that he was an Asiatic, and who perhaps possessed influence enough to render him a useful ally in a country so imperfectly conquered. Near the entrance of one of the defiles or gates which lead into the plains of Cilicia, he encamped on the same site where Cyrus had halted<sup>2</sup>, and here he found

B. C. 333.  
Cappadocia.

<sup>1</sup> As Aristobulus related. Arrian, II. 3. Droysen (p. 152.) justly observes that the other version is much more appropriate to the character and destiny of the conqueror, and would have been more readily believed by the army. But, critically considered, this is a reason for preferring the account of Aristobulus, whom Droysen elsewhere, as if in dispraise, styles the *sober*.

<sup>2</sup> The younger, according to Arrian; but the elder, according to Curtius (III. 4.), who is supported by Mr. Williams in his learned Essay on the Geography of the

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Tarsus.

Alexander  
and his  
physician.

that the pass was strongly guarded. He therefore left Parmenio behind with the phalanx, and taking only a part of the light troops, set out at nightfall to surprise the enemy at the Gates. His approach however was not unperceived; but it inspired so much alarm that the guards abandoned their post; and at daybreak, having been overtaken by the rest of his army, he began to descend into the plain. On his way he received tidings from Tarsus, that the satrap Arsames, having heard that he had passed the Gates, was about to quit the city, which at first he meant to defend, and, it was feared, would plunder it before his departure. Hereupon Alexander pushed forward with his cavalry and the lightest part of the infantry at full speed for Tarsus, and Arsames, whatever his intention may have been, fled, leaving the city unhurt, to join the army of Darius.

Alexander, on his arrival at Tarsus, while his blood was still violently heated by these extraordinary exertions, had been tempted to plunge into the clear and limpid waters of the Cydnus, which flowed through the city. This imprudence was generally supposed to have been the cause of a fever which seized him immediately after<sup>1</sup>, and which soon became so threatening in its symptoms that most of his physicians despaired of his life. One however, an Acarnanian named Philippus, who stood high in his confidence, undertook to prepare a medicine which would relieve him. In the meanwhile, a letter was brought to the king from Parmenio, informing him of a report that Philippus had been bribed by Darius

Anabasis, p. 101., where he contends that Alexander could not have entered Cilicia by the pass described by Xenophon, and that Xenophon's Dana is not Tyana, but must be sought near the modern Eragli.

<sup>1</sup> Aristobulus however attributed it solely to fatigue; and Captain Kinneir, who bathed in the Cydnus close by Tarsus, on the 3d of November, declares that its waters did not seem colder than those of any other stream in the country. *Journey*, p. 121.

to poison him. Alexander, it is said, had the letter in his hand, when the physician came in with the draught, and, giving it to him, drank while he read,—a theatrical scene, as Plutarch unsuspectingly observes, but one which would not have been invented but for such a character, and which Arrian was therefore induced, though doubtingly, to record.<sup>1</sup> The remedy, or Alexander's excellent constitution, prevailed over the disease; but it was long before he had regained sufficient strength to resume his march. In the meanwhile, he sent Parmenio forward with about a third of the army, to occupy the nearest of the maritime passes leading out of Cilicia into Syria. He himself, when sufficiently recovered, proceeded westward with the rest of his forces to Anchialus, where he beheld the statue of its reputed founder Sardanapalus, the voluptuous king, who judged so differently from himself—as the Assyrian inscription on his monument and the figure itself attested—of the value and use of life. At Soli, where he arrived next, he found a strong leaning to the Persian interest, which induced him to place a garrison there, and afforded him a fair ground for demanding a contribution of 200 talents. Yet it seems to have been only an oligarchical party that had favoured the Persians; and perhaps the penalty was levied on them alone; for he established a democratical

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<sup>1</sup> Flathe (i. p. 298.) questions the fact, for a singular reason; because Alexander affected to consider his life as threatened by the secret machinations of Darius, and therefore would not have given such a proof of confidence in any of his servants—the very thing which the story, if true, disproves. This is a historical *petitio principii*. I do not quite understand what Parmenio was doing, that he should not have come himself, instead of writing. One sees from Curtius (iii. 6.) how the story was embellished. In Arrian (ii. 4.) Parmenio's letter only mentions a report which he had heard, that Philippos had been bribed. In Curtius, it asserts that he had been promised a thousand talents, and the hand of the sister of Darius. There was certainly some confusion between this story and that of Alexander, the Lyncestian. Seneca (*De Ira*, ii. 23.) says that it was Olympas who sent the warning letter about Philippos; Diodorus (xvii. 32.), that it was she from whom (immediately after his recovery) her son received notice of the Lyncestian's treasonable designs.

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government, and the garrison may have been needed for its security. Before he returned to Tarsus, he made an inroad with a division of his forces into the mountains of the Rugged Cilicia, and in the course of seven days reduced their wild inhabitants by force or terror to submission. On his return to Soli, he received the agreeable intelligence that Orontobates had been defeated in a hard-fought battle by Ptolemy and Asander, and that the citadel of Halicarnassus, and the other places which he had retained on the coast of Caria, had fallen.<sup>1</sup> Darius had previously suffered a much greater loss in the death of Memnon, who was carried off by a sudden illness while engaged in the siege of Mitylenè, which, after having made himself master of Chios through treachery, and of the rest of Lesbos, he had invested closely by sea and land. Alexander, before he left Soli, celebrated the victory of his generals, and at the same time testified his gratitude for his own convalescence by a solemn sacrifice to Esculapius, with a military procession, a torch-race, and musical and gymnastic contests. He then marched back to Tarsus, and, sending Philotas forward with the bulk of the cavalry across the Aleian plain, himself took a more circuitous route along the coast through Magarsus to Mallus, a town which claimed the Argive hero Amphilochus as its founder. On this ground, as himself descended from the Heracleids of Argos, he both healed its intestine disorders, and exempted it from the tribute which it had paid to the Persian government.

Approach  
of Darius.

At Mallus for the first time he received certain intelligence of the approach of the great Persian army

<sup>1</sup> Such undoubtedly is the impression conveyed by the language of Arrian, ii. 5.; and one does not understand why the places held by Orontobates should be mentioned, if they were not taken after his defeat. Yet it is perplexing to find Cos and Halicarnassus spoken of soon after (ii. 13.) as if they were still in the hands of the Persians. Droysen passes over this difficulty in silence. Flathe (i. p. 306.) supposes that they had recovered Halicarnassus.

commanded by Darius in person. It can however hardly be doubted that he had long before been apprised of its movements, and had been expecting to fall in with it. Whether he delayed his departure from Cilicia, in the hope that the Persian king might be induced to advance until he was drawn into a disadvantageous position within the mountains, as was at last the case, is a question which cannot be decided with certainty, but his operations in Cilicia undoubtedly show that, if he did not calculate on this result, he was willing to take the chance of it. Darius had advanced from Babylon, according to Arrian, at the head of 600,000 fighting men, with the usual train and equipage which had ever been deemed necessary to the state of the Great King in all his expeditions. Indeed, when we compare the description which Curtius gives of the retinue of Darius with that which we read in Herodotus of the procession with which Xerxes moved from Sardis, we find reason to think that the pomp and luxury of the Persian court had been continually increasing. The symbols of the Magian religion also seem to have been exhibited more conspicuously and with greater magnificence. An image of the sun, we are informed, glittered on the top of the royal pavilion. The sacred fire was borne on silver altars at the head of the column, followed by Magians chanting their hymns; and 365 youths of the same caste, in scarlet robes, representing the days of the year, marched before the sacred chariot. The bands of horse and foot which escorted the King's, were dazzling as heretofore in their clothing and arms. They were followed by 400 of the royal horses. Then came the carriages which contained the mother, consort, and children of Darius, with their attendants, and after these the royal harem, almost in equal number with the priests. 600 mules and 300 camels bore the treasure. The

Persian grandees likewise brought each his household along with him. Darius had probably expected to meet Alexander on his road toward the Euphrates, in some of the plains eastward of Cilicia. He came with full confidence of victory, notwithstanding the experience of former ages, for princes do not always gain wisdom from the lessons of history, and it is even possible that the chronicles of Persia had failed to inform him how often such mighty hosts had been vanquished by a handful of men. When the Athenian Charidemus, who had taken refuge at his court, ventured to suggest to him that his glittering array would not strike terror into the Macedonian phalanx, he was so incensed that, in the first transports of his indignation, he ordered him to be put to death. Nevertheless, he at first listened to the counsel of the Macedonian fugitive Amyntas, who advised him to await Alexander's approach in a great plain, two days' march from the pass of Amanus, which Arrian, who describes the place of his encampment only by this distance, and by the obscure name of Sochi, calls the Assyrian Gates.

He was still at Sochi when Alexander reached Malus; but he had then been for some time in that position, and had grown impatient of further delay. He had begun to attribute the tardiness of his enemy's advance to fear; and when he heard of Alexander's illness at Tarsus, of his expedition against the western mountains of Cilicia, and of the festivities at Soli, he suspected that these were but so many pretexts used to cover his real motive. It was in vain that Amyntas assured him that Alexander would not shrink from giving him battle on any field. His courtiers now easily persuaded him, that he had only to appear and trample down the Macedonians with his cavalry. He resolved to wait no longer inactive, but to cross the mountains in quest of his hesitating foe. On the

other hand, Alexander seems to have been convinced that Darius had adopted what was evidently the wisest plan, and was determined not to advance any farther westward, but to preserve the advantage of a position which enabled him to make the best use of his vast superiority in numbers. He held a council of war at Mallus, and, having announced the intelligence which he had received, consulted it on the course which he should take. There was but one voice among all present, that he should lead them immediately to seek the enemy. At Castabalus, where he encamped on the second day after his departure from Mallus, he was joined by Parmenio, who, after having occupied the nearest maritime pass, had taken possession of Issus, and then advancing along the coast, dislodged the barbarians—probably part of the troops of Arsamenes—who still remained posted on the hills near the coast, and cleared and secured the whole road as far as the second maritime pass, the Gates of Syria and Cilicia. At Issus, Alexander left the sick and wounded, and two days after passed the Gates, and encamped not far from Myriandrus. A violent storm of wind and rain, which occurred in the course of the next night, delayed his march, and seems to have prevented him from beginning the ascent of the mountains, which he would otherwise have crossed into the vale of the Orontes.

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March to  
Issus.

In the mean time, Darius had been making a nearly parallel movement in the opposite direction, on the eastern side of Amanus. He did not attempt to pass the mountains by the southern defile, which would have brought him down to Myriandrus, either because he knew that the maritime Gates had been occupied by the enemy, or because the road which he took led more directly into the plains of Cilicia, where he expected to find Alexander still lingering; for farther to the north is another pass, the Amanic Gates, which

Movements  
of Darius.



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crosses Amanus a little above Issus. Why Alexander neglected to secure it, or did not take this road to Sochi, if it was that which Darius preferred as the shortest, does not distinctly appear; and if it were not for the invalids whom he left at Issus, his movement along the coast would give some colour to the suspicion, that he had received information which led him to hope that Darius was about to quit his position at Sochi. Even if it were so, we might still understand the mixture of surprise and joy with which, while detained near Myriandrus by the weather, he received the tidings that the Persian army had passed through the Amanic Gates, and was on its march along the coast to overtake him. He immediately ordered some of his officers to embark in a small vessel<sup>1</sup>, and proceed toward Issus to reconnoitre, and not until they returned and reported that they had seen the enemy, that Darius was at hand, would he believe what he so eagerly desired. Darius, before he moved from Sochi, had sent his treasure, and a part of his baggage, with the superfluous followers of his camp, and the wives and children of his principal officers, to Damascus: yet he was still accompanied by his mother Sisygambis, his consort Statira, and his children, two princesses, and a son six years old. When he had crossed the mountains, and learnt that Alexander had passed before him on the road to Syria, he immediately advanced in the same direction. At Issus he found the defenceless Macedonian invalids, and was persuaded by his courtiers to order them to be put to death with cruel tortures.<sup>2</sup> The next day he moved forward until he reached the Pinarus, a small stream

<sup>1</sup> He did not embark himself, as Flathe represents (i. p. 299.) in his eagerness to prove a stratagem.

<sup>2</sup> So Arrian. Curtius says that, after they had been mutilated (*instinctu purpuratorum*), he ordered them to be led through the camp, and when they had thoroughly surveyed it, to be sent on to relate what they had seen to Alexander.

descending between steep and high banks from the side of Amanus to the sea, which is here parted from the foot of the mountains by a narrow plain.<sup>1</sup> Here he encamped on the right bank of the river, and soon discovered that the enemy whom he had supposed to be flying before him, was on the way to meet him.

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Alexander, as soon as he had ascertained the fact, assembled his principal officers, to prepare them for the approaching battle, or rather perhaps to suggest to them the topics by which they might animate their men. He reminded them of the many reasons they had to be confident of victory<sup>2</sup>: of the victories which they had already gained over the same enemy: of the infatuation by which Darius had been led to pen up his army in a narrow space, where, though it was large enough for the evolutions of the phalanx, the greater part of his host would be utterly useless: of the difference between the Medes and Persians, who were enervated by inveterate habits of luxury, and the hardy Macedonians, who had been so long inured to martial toils: between slaves and freemen: between the Greeks, who fought for a wretched hire on the side of the barbarians, and those who had willingly lent their aid to the national cause; between the warlike races on the northern frontier of Macedonia, and the herds of feeble and timid barbarians, whom the Persian king collected from the provinces which acknowledged his authority: in fine, between Alexander himself and Darius. He also pointed out

Field of  
battle.

<sup>1</sup> That in which Kinnelr (Travels, p. 138.) recognised the field of battle, is described by him as varying in breadth from one and a half to three miles. But the identity is very doubtful.

<sup>2</sup> Droysen (p. 161.) finds, in the beginning of the speech which Arrian records—I suppose in the words *παρεκάλει δαρδαιῶν*—a confirmation of the hint which Curtius gives, that the unexpected appearance of the Persian army produced a temporary uneasiness in the Macedonian camp. But Curtius speaks not of the soldiery, as Droysen describes, but of Alexander himself—evidently for the sake of rhetorical effect. Arrian's expression (ii. 7.), *ἀπαγγέλλουσιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐν χειρὶν εἶναι Δαρειῶν*, shows what was the feeling of the army: he had Darius within arm's length.

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the greatness of the prize which was now at stake; that they were not now to encounter the satraps of Darius with a small body of cavalry and mercenaries, but Darius himself, with an army composed of his choicest troops; so that nothing less than the dominion of Asia depended on the issue of the conflict. He added grateful recollections of their past exploits, with modest allusions to the share he himself had taken in all their dangers; and he appealed to the example of the Ten Thousand, who had trodden the ground where they were then standing, and under circumstances so much less favourable had successfully defied the whole power of Persia.

Battle of  
Issus.

His address was received with ardent congratulations and assurances, and with an unanimous request that he would lead them against the enemy without delay. He first sent forward a small body of cavalry and bowmen to ascertain that the road was clear, and then, having sacrificed by torch-light on a neighbouring hill to the gods of the country<sup>1</sup>, set out, after the evening meal, toward the Gates, which he reached about midnight; and, the pass being secured, allowed his troops to repose there till morning. At daybreak he resumed his march, at first in column, the cavalry in the rear; but as the ground opened between the mountains and the sea, gradually extended his front, until he had drawn up his whole army in battle array in the plain of the Pinarus, where Darius was making his dispositions to receive him. To gain time and detain the advancing enemy, he had sent a body of 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry across the river, ordering the infantry to be posted at the foot of the hills which bound the plain on the south

<sup>1</sup> Curtius (iii. 8. 22.), who adds — with reference probably to the place of the sacrifice — *patrio more*. I do not know whether Droysen intentionally varies in his statement of this circumstance from Curtius, the only author, I believe, who mentions it. Mr. Williams also (p. 105.) describes the sacrifice as performed at the defile.

side, and form a bay as they verge toward the sea: so that when the Macedonian army had entered the plain, they were in the rear of its right wing. On the right bank he found room for 60,000 of his best Persian troops, who were distinguished by the title which the Greeks write Cardaces<sup>1</sup>, and for 30,000 Greek mercenaries, commanded by Thymondas a son of Mentor, who had formed part of Memnon's forces in the Ægean, but after his death and the reduction of Mitylenè, had been ordered to join the royal army. These, as the chief strength of his line, he posted in the centre, where they would be opposed to the Macedonian phalanx. Behind, the length of the plain was filled with the remainder of the host, distributed in masses according to their nations, but without any means of taking a part in the fight. He himself, in his state chariot, according to invariable Persian usage, took his place in the centre of the whole line. But he had prepared not for attack but for defence: he had thrown up some entrèchments where the bank was least difficult of ascent: a symptom of misgiving which greatly encouraged the Macedonians. When his dispositions were completed, he recalled his cavalry from the other side of the river, and stationed the main body in front of his right wing near the sea, the rest on his left at the foot of the mountains.

Alexander had drawn up the phalanx, as usual, in six divisions in the centre, taking the command of the right wing himself, which was flanked by the

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, xv. c. 3. p. 327. Tauch. describes the *Kάρδακες* as the Persian militia, which received an education exactly similar to that of the Spartan youth. The description, ἀπὸ κλοπείας τρεφόμενοι, may refer to a part of their early training, which coincided with the famous institution of Lycurgus; but, according to Ælius Dionysius (in Eustath. p. 368.) *κάρδαξ* was the name by which the Persians called πάντα τὸν ἀνδρείον καὶ κλῶπα. Theopompus (quoted in the same passage) seems to have described them as barbarian mercenaries. A thousand *Kάρδακες* composed part of the army of Antiochus in Polyh. (v. 79.), who seem not to have been Persians, since the Persians are mentioned in another place.

hypaspists, and by the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. He had given the command of the infantry on the left to Craterus, under Parmenio, who commanded the whole of the left wing, and whom he charged to keep close to the shore, that the enemy might not take him in flank. The cavalry of the Peloponnesians and of the other allies were stationed at this end of the line. A small body of cavalry and light troops were posted in front of the Persian division which occupied the recess at the foot of the hills. But when Darius, finding that the ground did not afford sufficient room for the evolutions of his cavalry on his left wing, sent it to join the main body by the sea-side, Alexander also ordered the Thessalian cavalry to move round by the back of the line to support Parmenio. And as his right wing appeared to him still in danger of being outflanked, he strengthened it with two squadrons of his horse-guard, and with some of the light troops and Greek mercenaries, which he withdrew from other parts of his line. The division which he had opposed to the Persians in his rear, had made a charge which forced the enemy to retreat to the higher ground, where 300 horse were sufficient to watch them, and he was thus enabled to employ the light troops at the extremity of his right wing.

His plan was first to attack the enemy's left, which was the weakest part of the Persian line, and, when it was routed, to turn upon the right, which would then be exposed on two sides. He advanced at first slowly, to preserve the order of the phalanx, to within a short distance of the river-side, and rode up and down, scattering words of exhortation, which were answered by a shout that expressed the universal eagerness for the battle: but as soon as they had come within reach of the Persian arrows, which instantly began to shower upon them, he led the way

at full speed into the water, and in a few minutes was in close combat with the enemy. Their left wing was almost immediately broken by the impetuosity of his charge; but his own was exposed to great danger by the rapidity of this movement, which in the passage of the river disordered the phalanx and left a gap in its centre. Thymondas and his Greeks took advantage of this opportunity to make a vigorous attack on the divisions to the left, which had been detained by greater difficulties in the crossing, and had not been able to keep up with those on the right. National emulation and animosity exasperated the conflict. The Greeks were eager for a trophy over the hitherto invincible phalanx: the Macedonians resolute to maintain their own honour, and not to fail their king and comrades in the moment of victory. The issue might have been doubtful had not Alexander, after the enemy's left was put to flight, wheeled round and fallen upon the rest of his line, taking the mercenaries in flank. But the fortune of the day was decided sooner than it would have been by the mere efforts of the combatants, through the timidity of Darius, who no sooner perceived the rout of his right wing, than he ordered his charioteer to turn the heads of his horses for flight. His cavalry had crossed the river to charge Parmenio's divisions, and was engaged in an obstinate combat: but when it was seen that the Great King was quitting the field, and that the mercenaries were overpowered by Alexander, it also gave way and joined the crowd of fugitives, through which it vainly endeavoured to find a passage.

The aspect of the plain over which this vast multitude was flying in all directions, but chiefly toward the northern outlet, may be imagined, but cannot be adequately described in words. The carnage among

the cavalry, which was encumbered with heavy armour, seems to have been greater in proportion than that of the infantry. It was estimated at more than 10,000 men: 100,000 are said to have fallen in the whole: and we need not suspect much exaggeration in Ptolemy's assertion, that in the pursuit he crossed a gully which was filled up with heaps of slain. Darius pushed across the plain in his chariot, until he reached the foot of the northern hills: he then laid aside his bow, his shield, and his royal robe, and mounted a horse, which soon carried him out of the reach of his pursuers. His pusillanimity on this occasion seems to belie the reputation which he had gained for personal valour. Yet it is not difficult to conceive, that the courage with which in his private station he met a single enemy in equal combat, might fail him when he was set up in his chariot of state and his royal robes as part of a military pageant.

Alexander, though he had received a slight wound in his thigh, joined in the pursuit till it was too dark to distinguish the objects before him. He could not come up with Darius himself, who had taken flight too early in the battle, but he lighted on the chariot which contained his arms and his robe, and sent them back to the camp. On his return, he found that the Persian camp had been plundered by his soldiers,—and to the Macedonians, though the most valuable part of the baggage had been sent to Damascus, it must have seemed to contain inestimable treasures—but the royal tent with all its furniture was reserved for himself. From a bath prepared with all the appliances of Eastern luxury, and steaming with the richest perfumes, he passed into the gorgeous pavilion, where a table had been spread as for the supper of Darius. And now, for the first time, he learnt what, in the eyes of his new subjects, belonged to the dignity of the Great King in his hours of recreation and

privacy.<sup>1</sup> But before he began to refresh himself after the fatigues of the day, his ears were struck by the wailings of women in an adjoining tent; and on inquiry, he learnt that the mother and wife of Darius, having been informed that his chariot and arms were in the possession of the conquerors, had concluded that he had been slain, and were mourning over their supposed loss. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus, one of the great officers who bore the title of *somatophylax* (bodyguard), to undeceive them, and to assure them that he did not mean to deprive them of any part of their ornaments or of the honours of royalty. It was no personal enmity, but an honourable ambition, that had moved him to make war on Darius. The Greeks added a pleasing story, which to many readers has conveyed one of their earliest and not least correct impressions of Alexander's character: that the next morning he himself visited the captive princesses, attended by Hephæstion, whom, as there was no difference in their dress, they at first mistook for him: that he saluted Sisygambis with the title of mother, caressed the young prince, who, ne observed to his followers, showed a manlier spirit than his father, and assured all of his protection and favour. Yet this anecdote, if true, would scarcely have been omitted both by Ptolemy and Aristobulus: and perhaps Alexander showed a more delicate generosity if he abstained from a visit, which, however kind and condescending his language and behaviour, could not but carry with it something like the air of a triumph.

It is better attested that his chief attention was devoted on the day after the battle to the care of the wounded, and the burial of the dead, which was

<sup>1</sup> This perhaps is the meaning of the exclamation attributed to him by Plutarch (Al. 20.). τοῦτ' ἦν, ὥς εἰκε, τὸ βασιλεύειν, which otherwise would sound like either childish wonder, or philosophical irony.



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splendidly solemnised with the attendance of the whole army drawn up in battle array: that he publicly praised and rewarded those who had distinguished themselves, and made several promotions among his officers. Balacrus, son of Nicanor, was appointed satrap of Cilicia, and Menes somatophylax in his room. He also celebrated his victory by an act of grace. He remitted fifty talents which were still in arrear, of the penalty which he had laid on Soli, and restored its hostages. Before he withdrew from the field of battle, he erected three altars on the banks of the Pinarus to the same deities—Zeus, Hercules, and Athene,—to whom he had dedicated those which marked the places of his embarkation and his landing on the Hellespont. A new city called Nicopolis was afterwards founded as a more durable monument of the victory: but its site is no longer known. That which still preserves the conqueror's name (Scanderoon: the Issic Alexandria), was perhaps built on a different occasion.

Capture of  
Damascus.

He then took the road to Phœnicia; but sent Parmenio forward, with a small detachment including the Thessalian cavalry, whom he selected for this service as a reward for their good conduct<sup>1</sup>, to seize the first fruits of his victory, the treasure deposited at Damascus. It included, beside the military chest, the most costly part of the wardrobe and furniture, both of Darius and his chief nobles. With it were a number of Persian ladies of the highest rank, with their children and retinues: several Persians of the first quality, who had probably taken refuge there after the battle: and envoys of Sparta and Athens, with two Thebans, who had accompanied Darius from Babylon. The number of persons of a lower class, including several hundred ministers of royal luxury—music girls,

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Alex. 24.

cooks, confectioners, chaplet-weavers, perfumers, and the like<sup>1</sup>—amounted to 30,000.<sup>2</sup> On his road Parmenio fell in with a courier, who was bearing a letter to Alexander from the governor of Damascus, containing an offer to betray the treasure into his hands, and desiring him to send one of his generals with a small body of troops. Parmenio having read the letter, sent the courier back to Damascus. The treacherous governor, under pretence of flight, brought out the treasure—a load for 7000 beasts of burden,—beside the Gangabæ (packmen), and the whole train of persons of all ranks who had accompanied it. Parmenio, as if believing that they had come out with hostile intentions, ordered his cavalry to charge the defenceless multitude. This was a signal for indiscriminate plunder, in which a great part of the precious spoil was wasted. But upwards of 3000 talents, together with the principal captives, among whom were three daughters of Ochus, three of Mentor's, Memnon's widow and infant son, a niece of Darius, and the Greek ambassadors, were preserved for the king. Darius had one consolation under this misfortune: the traitor was killed by a loyal subject, who abhorred his perfidy, and laid his head at the feet of his injured master.

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<sup>1</sup> Parmenio's letter (in Athenæus, xiii. 87.) gives the precise numbers: 329 music girls (παλλακίδας μουσουργούς), 46 chaplet-weavers, 40 unguent-makers, and 406 persons, who, under various denominations, for which we have hardly corresponding terms, belonged to the Great King's *maison de bouche*.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iii. 13.

## CHAPTER L.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ISSUS TO THE TAKING OF  
PERSEPOLIS.

*Movements in the Ægean. — Letter of Darius. — Alexander's Reply. — March through Phœnicia. — Siege of Tyre. — Proposals of Darius. — Siege of Gaza. — Jerusalem. — March to Egypt. — Foundation of Alexandria. — Oasis of Ammon. — Oracle of Ammon. — Government of Egypt. — Return to Phœnicia. — March through Mesopotamia. — Gaugamela. — Battle of Gaugamela. — The Pursuit. — Entry into Babylon. — Babylon. — Susa. — The Uxians. — The Persian Gates. — Persepolis. — Burning of the Palace. — Tomb of Cyrus.*

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THE spoil of Damascus was not the most important advantage which Alexander reaped from the battle of Issus. It averted a danger, which, notwithstanding Memnon's death, had continued to give him occasion for much uneasiness; for he was still threatened with a diversion in his rear—a general rising of the Greeks and an invasion of Macedonia—which might have interrupted, even if it did not finally defeat his enterprise.

Movements  
in the  
Ægean.

Memnon, on his death-bed, had appointed his nephew Pharnabazus, the son of Artabazus, to succeed him in his government until the King's pleasure should be known. Pharnabazus and Autophradates prosecuted the siege of Mitylenè with such vigour, that the inhabitants were reduced to capitulate, on the conditions that the mercenaries in their pay should be allowed to depart: that they should take down the columns which contained their treaty with Alexander, and should enter into alliance with Darius on the terms

of the peace of Antalcidas, and should recal their exiled citizens—the anti-Macedonian party—and restore one half of their confiscated property. But the Persian generals were no sooner masters of the town, than they introduced a garrison commanded by an officer of their own; created Diogenes, one of the exiles, tyrant; and levied arbitrary contributions, both on the city and on opulent individuals. Pharnabazus was soon after confirmed by Darius in the authority which he had received from his uncle, and, having sent Datames, a Persian officer, with ten galleys to the Cyclades, sailed at the head of one hundred, with Autophradates, against Tenedos, which was forced to submit on terms similar to those which had been accepted by Mitylenè. Datames however was surprised near Siphnus by Proteas, a Macedonian officer, who had been sent by Antipater to collect ships from Eubœa and Peloponnesus, and was returning with fifteen galleys, with which he took eight out of the Persian squadron, with all their crews. Datames himself escaped with two to the main fleet. Pharnabazus and Autophradates then bent their course southward, and having in their passage left a garrison in Chios, where a part of their navy was stationed, they despatched a squadron to Cos and Halicarnassus; and themselves, with one hundred of their fastest sailors, made for Siphnus. Here they received a visit from Agis, king of Sparta, who came in a single galley to request a subsidy, and as large an armament as they could spare, for the purpose of withdrawing Peloponnesus from the Macedonian alliance. It was at this juncture that the news of the battle of Issus was brought to the fleet. It immediately put an end to whatever plans had been concerted for hostile operations in Greece. Pharnabazus sailed back with twelve galleys to Chios, where he feared that the intelligence might produce a reaction in favour of Alex-

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ander. Agis received thirty talents and ten galleys from Autophradates, but did not himself return with them: he sent them to his brother Agesilaus, who was at Tænarus—a great place of rendezvous for mercenary troops—and directed him to sail with them to Crete, and secure it for the Spartan or anti-Macedonian interest. He himself, after some stay in the islands, followed Autophradates to Halicarnassus.

Thus then Alexander had nothing more to fear on this side for the present. But it was not the less his foremost object to guard against the recurrence of this danger, and to deprive the Persian government of all means of aiding the Greeks in their attempts for the recovery of their independence. He saw that if he once made himself master of Phœnicia and Egypt, the Persians would be deserted by the best part of their galleys, which were furnished by the Phœnician cities, and would be unable to repair the loss. His authority would then be undisputed in all the provinces of the empire west of the Euphrates.

Darius had continued his flight without intermission until he had crossed the river at Thapsacus, where he arrived with about 4000 fugitives, who had successively joined his train; and then first felt himself out of immediate peril. The rest of the barbarian host was probably for the most part irretrievably dispersed: though Curtius speaks of a body which was again collected by some of the surviving generals in Cappadocia, and which they found means of recruiting by fresh levies in that and the adjacent provinces. Four of the Greek officers, Amyntas, Thymondas, Aristomedes a Thessalian of Pheræ, and Bianor an Acarnanian, with about 8000 mercenaries, taking a circuitous route over the mountains, came down to Tripolis, on the coast of Phœnicia, before Alexander had quitted the field of battle. Here they found the ships which had brought their men from Lesbos, and

having seized as many as they required to embark in, burnt the rest, and crossed over to Cyprus. Amyntas, it seems, conceived the bold project of making himself master of Egypt. Whether he obtained the concurrence of his colleagues, does not appear; but he certainly took the lead in the enterprise. Sabaces, the satrap of Egypt, had fallen in the battle; and Amyntas, pretending that he had a commission from Darius, gained admittance at Pelusium. He then dropped the mask, and calling on the Egyptians to shake off the hated yoke of Persia, marched against Memphis. He was joined by a great number of the natives, and Mazaces, the Persian commander of Memphis, having marched out to give him battle, was defeated, and forced to take shelter behind the walls. But the victors were elated with this success, and thrown off their guard. They suffered themselves to be surprised by Mazaces, while dispersed in quest of booty in the neighbourhood of the city, and Amyntas was slain, with almost all his men.

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Darius indeed had the force of the greater part of his empire still entire, and at his command. The troops of the eastern satrapies, including some of the most warlike in his dominions, had already been summoned to the royal standard; and it was only the length of time necessary for bringing them together that seems to have prevented him from marching into Cilicia with this additional incumbrance. They were now on their way toward Babylon; and he might expect, in the course of a few months, to see himself at the head of a still more numerous host than he had commanded at Issus. He appears to have believed at first that Alexander would follow up his victory, without delay, by an active pursuit; and it was perhaps partly with the view of gaining time, that he no sooner reached a place of safety, than he began to sound Alexander's

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Letter of  
Darius.

temper by overtures of negotiation. Even however if his army had been already assembled, he would certainly not have been eager to renew the contest. He had probably not made up his mind as to the full extent of the sacrifices which he would submit to for the sake of peace: and he therefore sent two envoys to Alexander — who had now reached Marathus, a Phœnician city on the coast, over against the isle of Aradus — with a letter, couched in terms which pledged him to nothing, but opened the way for a pacific discussion. He assumed the tone of remonstrance, as one who had suffered an unprovoked aggression. He reminded Alexander that his father had been on terms of peace and alliance with Ochus, but on the accession of Arses had commenced hostilities, without any just cause, against Persia: and that since he himself had mounted the throne, Alexander, instead of sending an embassy to renew the ancient amicable relations between the two kingdoms, had invaded his territories, and forced him to wage war in self-defence. He was now reduced, by the chance of war, to make a request: such however as one king might becomingly address to another; that Alexander would restore his mother, wife, and children. He himself was willing to become Alexander's friend and ally, and desired that he would send ministers with the two Persian envoys, to treat with him.

Alexander's  
reply.

The Persian envoys had been instructed to urge the request contained in their master's letter by word of mouth. Alexander sent Thersippus along with them, charged with a letter to Darius, but with orders to abstain from oral communications on the subject. The letter was a kind of manifesto, in which he vindicated the justice of his proceedings by various reasons, as good, at least, as the strong are usually able to find for attacking the weak. He began like the wolf in the fable. The ancestors of Darius had

invaded Macedonia and Greece, and he had been appointed by the Greeks their general, and had come over to Asia, to avenge their wrongs and his own. Ochus had furnished succours to Perinthus and the Thracians against Philip. It was through the machinations of the Persian court that Philip had been murdered; and his death had been made a subject of boastful exultation in its public letters. Darius himself had been the accomplice of Bagoas in the murder of Arses, and had usurped the throne of Persia: he had endeavoured to excite the Greeks to war against Macedonia, and had offered subsidies to Sparta, and to other states, which indeed had been accepted only by Sparta; but his agents had succeeded in corrupting many private persons, and had been incessantly labouring to disturb the tranquillity of Greece. His invasion therefore had been undertaken on just grounds. But since the gods had crowned his arms with victory, none of those who had trusted themselves to his clemency had found reason to regret their choice. He therefore invited Darius himself to come to him, as to the lord of Asia. He might beforehand receive pledges of his personal safety, and might then ask with confidence for his mother, wife, and children, and for whatever else he could desire. In future, he must address Alexander as the king of Asia, in the style not of an equal, but of a subject, or must expect to be treated as an enemy. If however he disputed his claim to sovereignty, let him wait for his coming, and try the event of another contest. He might rest assured, that Alexander would seek him wherever he might be found.

At Marathus, Alexander likewise received the Greek envoys to the Persian court, who had been taken at Damascus: Euthycles, the Spartan; the Thebans, Thessaliscus, son of Ismenias, and Dionysodorus, who had gained an Olympic prize; and Iphicrates, a son of

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the famous general of the same name. The Thebans he immediately released, both in pity to Thebes, and because it seemed excusable that men whom he had deprived of their country should seek what aid they could obtain for themselves and for it from his enemies. The high birth of Thessaliscus, and the Olympic victory of Dionysodorus, also, it is said, weighed with him in their favour, though he did not share the admiration with which gymnastic feats were commonly regarded. Iphicrates he retained at his court; but, both for his country's sake, and his father's, always treated him in the most honourable manner, and after his death sent his bones to his family at Athens. Euthycles, as a citizen of an avowedly hostile state, who had no personal claims on his indulgence, he for a while kept in confinement, though not, it is added, in chains: and even him he released, when his fortune had reached a height from which he might safely despise such enemies.

On his road to Phœnicia, Alexander had been met by Straton, son of the king of Aradus, Gerostratus, whose territory included Marathus and several other towns on the main. Gerostratus himself, with all the other Phœnician and Cyprian princes, was serving in the Persian fleet, under Autophradates. Yet Straton brought a golden crown to the conqueror, and surrendered all the cities in his father's dominions into his hands. As he advanced from Marathus, Byblus capitulated to him; and Sidon, where every heart burnt with hatred of Persia, hailed him as her deliverer. Thus he proceeded without resistance toward Tyre. And even from this great city he received a deputation on his way, composed of the most illustrious citizens, among whom was the king's son, bringing a golden crown, and a present of provisions for the army, and announcing that the Tyrians had resolved to obey all his commands.

It seems that the language in which this message was conveyed intimated something as to the limits of that obedience which the Tyrians were willing to pay. It was not meant that it should extend so far as totally to resign their independence. This Alexander probably understood, and nothing could satisfy him short of absolute submission, and full possession of so important a place. But he met the offers of the Tyrians, as if they had been made in the sense which he required: and bade the envoys apprise their fellow-citizens, that it was his intention to cross over to their island, and offer a sacrifice to Melkart, the Phœnician Hercules, whom he chose to consider as one with the hero of Argos and Thebes. This was perhaps the least offensive way of bringing the matter to an issue; and it obliged the Tyrians to speak their mind more plainly. They now informed him that in all other points he should find them ready to submit to his pleasure, but that they would not admit either a Persian or a Macedonian within their walls; and they begged that he would celebrate the sacrifice which he wished to offer in Old Tyre, which lay on the coast opposite to their island city, where their god had another, and probably a much more ancient sanctuary. Alexander indignantly dismissed their ambassadors, and called a council of his principal officers, in which he declared his intention of besieging Tyre, and thought fit to explain the reasons which rendered this undertaking necessary, arduous as it was. He observed that it would be unsafe to invade Egypt, so long as the Persians commanded the sea, and that to advance into the interior against Darius, while Tyre remained neutral or vacillating, and while Cyprus and Egypt were in the enemy's hands, would be to let the war be transferred to Greece, where Sparta was openly hostile, and Athens only withheld from the avowal of her enmity by fear.

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On the other hand the reduction of Tyre would be attended with the submission of all Phœnicia, and the Phœnician fleet, the strength of the Persian navy, would soon pass over to the power which possessed the cities by which it had been equipped, and to which the crews belonged. Cyprus would then speedily fall, and there would be no further obstacle to the conquest of Egypt. They might then set out for Babylon, leaving all secure on the side of Greece, and with the proud consciousness that they had already severed all the provinces west of the Euphrates from the Persian empire.

B. C. 332.  
Siege of  
Tyre.

The motives which induced Alexander to undertake the siege of Tyre are more evident than those which led the Tyrians to defy his power, after so many of the other Phœnician cities had submitted to him. We cannot indeed be surprised that they should not have been more willing than the people of Aspendus to admit the Macedonians within their walls: but still it was probably something very different from an instinctive love of independence that animated them to resistance. The main ground of their conduct seems to have been more in the nature of a commercial calculation of expediency. The issue of the contest between Alexander and Darius was still doubtful: notwithstanding his past success the Macedonian conqueror might meet the fate of the younger Cyrus in some future field of battle. If the Persians should ever recover their lost provinces, Tyre might look forward to the remission of her tribute, the extension of her territory, and other rewards of her fidelity, shown as it would have been at so perilous a juncture. Perhaps she even indulged a hope that she might have the glory of arresting the invader's progress, and of giving a decisive turn to the war in favour of Darius. In any case the Tyrians believed their city to be impregnable so long as they were superior at sea,

and they did not anticipate the manner in which the state of affairs in this respect was soon to be changed. It is highly probable—though the fact is not mentioned by Arrian who touches very slightly on their motives—that they were encouraged by promises of succour from their powerful colony Carthage<sup>1</sup>, which assiduously kept up her connection with her parent city by periodical embassies and pious offerings. Still it seems that there was a numerous party within which disapproved of this policy. For we are informed that many of the citizens<sup>2</sup> dreamt that Apollo—whose statue, part of the spoils of Gela<sup>3</sup>, they had received from the Carthaginians—had declared to them that he was about to leave the city. And it was thought necessary, either for the purpose of detaining the god, or of quieting the popular uneasiness, to adopt an expedient similar to that which many years before had been employed by the Ephesians in a like emergency<sup>4</sup>; to fasten the statue of Apollo, who was denounced as a friend of Alexander<sup>5</sup>, by a golden chain to the altar of Melkart. On the other hand Alexander seems to have thought it prudent to raise the spirits of his troops by assurances of divine assistance, in an enterprise which appeared to surpass human ability. He too related that he had seen Hercules in a dream taking him by the hand, and leading him within the walls of his city: a sign, as Aristander interpreted it, of success, though in a Herculean labour.

An ordinary conqueror might indeed himself have needed such assurances to encourage him, when he was about to attack a place so prepared for defence as Tyre at this time was both by nature and art. The

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iv. 2. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. Alex. 24. Curtius has only one dreamer.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, xiiii. 108.

<sup>4</sup> See Vol. II. p. 181.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. u. s. Ἀλεξανδριστὴν καλοῦντες.

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island on which the city stood was separated from the main by a channel half a mile broad, through which, in rough weather, the sea rushed with great violence. This strait was indeed shallow on the side of the Phœnician coast, but near the island became three fathoms deep. The walls, which rose from the edge of the cliffs, were 150 feet high on the land side, and composed of huge blocks of stone, cemented with mortar. The city was abundantly stocked with provisions and military stores, contained a number of copious springs, was filled with an industrious and intelligent population, expert in all the arts of naval warfare, and possessed mechanists and engineers not inferior it seems to any that were to be found in the Macedonian camp. Though the greater part of the Tyrian fleet was absent in the Persian service, there still remained a sufficient number of galleys of war, and of smaller craft, both for the defence of the harbours—for there were two, one on the north, the other on the south side of the island—and for the annoyance of the enemy.

Alexander had no naval force which he could immediately oppose to this. His plan was soon formed: he resolved to carry a causeway through the channel, and when it had reached the foot of the walls, to batter them from it with his engines. To provide materials for the work, he demolished the remaining buildings of Old Tyre. The forests of Libanus furnished an ample supply of timber. The real difficulty of the undertaking was not perceived until the dam had been carried half way across the water. For so long the depth was trifling, the piles and stones were easily sunk and firmly fixed in the muddy bottom, and the work was carried on without hinderance. But as the depth increased, while the work itself became more and more laborious and difficult, it was at the same time exposed to all the interruptions which the besieged could devise to retard its progress. It now

came within reach of the missiles which they discharged from the top of the walls; and the Tyrian galleys taking their station at a short distance, incessantly annoyed the workmen, who were not armed to sustain these attacks. Alexander however ordered two wooden towers to be erected near the extremity of the mole, covered with hides, and surmounted with engines, so as both to shelter the workmen and repel the assailants. The Tyrians now prepared a more formidable mode of attack. A horse transport was filled with dry twigs and other combustibles, over which they poured pitch and brimstone. In the forepart an additional space was inclosed, so as to form a huge basket for the reception of these materials, in the midst of which were fixed two masts, which at the ends of their yard-arms supported two cauldrons filled with an inflammable liquid. The stem was raised high above the water by means of ballast heaped near the stern. The besieged, having waited for a favourable breeze, towed the ship behind two galleys toward the mole, and when it came near set it on fire, and, seconded by the wind, ran it on the end of the mole between the towers. The flames soon caught them: but the conflagration did not reach its full height, until the masts gave way, and discharged the contents of the cauldrons on the blazing pile. To render it the more effectual, the men on board the galleys from a convenient distance plied the towers with their arrows, so as to defeat every attempt that was made to extinguish the fire. A shoal of boats now came off from the harbours filled with people, who soon tore up the piles, and set fire to all the machines which had not been overtaken by the flames of the burning ship. The ruin of the work which had cost so much time and labour was completed in a few hours. Alexander however was not disheartened: he gave orders that a new mole

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should be begun, of greater breadth, so as to be capable of receiving more towers, and that new engines should be constructed. But as he now became aware that, without some naval force to oppose to the Tyrians, he should find the difficulties of the siege insurmountable, he repaired in person to Sidon, with a detachment of light troops, to collect as many galleys as he could. Here he found himself already in possession of one of the advantages which he had expected from the reduction of Tyre, which, accruing earlier than he had hoped, proved the main instrument of his success.

Gerostratus, king of Aradus, and Enylus of Byblus, as soon as they heard that he had become master of their cities, quitted the Persian fleet, with their squadrons, and with a part of the Sidonian galleys; so that Alexander was joined at Sidon by eighty sail of Phœnician ships. About the same time came in ten from Rhodes, as many from Lycia, three from Soli and Mallus, and his own victorious captain, Proteas, from Macedonia. And these were followed not long after by the Cypriot princes with 120 galleys. He had now an armament of nearly 250 sail at his orders. While it went through a course of training for a sea-fight, and while the machines were in preparation, he made an excursion, with some squadrons of horse and a body of light troops, into the range of Anti-Libanus, and having reduced the mountaineers to submission, within eleven days returned to Sidon, where he found a reinforcement of 4000 Greek soldiers, who had been brought by Cleander from Peloponnesus. He then set sail for Tyre in line of battle, himself, as on shore, commanding the right wing, and Craterus the left. The Tyrians it seems expected his approach and were prepared to meet him; but they had not heard of the arrival of the Phœnician and Cyprian galleys, which perhaps they rather hoped to have seen on their own

side : and when they saw the numbers which he brought with him, they gave up all thoughts of resistance, and only used their galleys to block up the mouths of their harbours. Alexander, when he came up, found the northern harbour too well secured to be attacked, though he sunk three of the enemy's galleys which were moored on the outside, and captured one which was consecrated to the tutelary god. The next day he stationed the Cypriots under the command of Andromachus near the entrance of this harbour, and the Phœnicians near the other, in the same quarter where his own tent was pitched.

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In the mean while the mole had been restored, and was actively carried forward : engineers had been collected in great numbers from Phœnicia and Cyprus, and had constructed abundance of engines, which were planted, some on the mole, others on transports and on the heavier galleys. These vessels at first found the approach very much impeded by a bed of stones which the besieged had carried out into the sea from the foot of the cliffs ; and the attempts which the Macedonians made to remove this obstacle were for some time thwarted by the dexterity and boldness of the Tyrian divers, who cut the cables of the ships which were anchored for the purpose of drawing up the stones. Chain cables were at length substituted, and the passage was then rapidly cleared by machines, which raised the stones out of their bed, and hurled them into the deep water. The walls were now assailed by the engines on every side : and the contest grew closer and hotter than it had ever been. Every contrivance that ingenuity quickened by fear could suggest was tried by the besieged to ward off these attacks. Very famous in particular was one, which is not the less credible because Arrian's authors seemed to have passed it over in silence : the invention of shields filled with heated sand, which they were made to discharge on the



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assailants, and which penetrating between their armour and their skin, inflicted indescribable tortures. Still the means of attack kept growing on the resources of defence. Dejection began to spread within the walls; and there were some who proposed to renew a horrid rite, which had long fallen into disuse: the sacrifice of a boy of good family to Moloch. It does honour to the Tyrian government, that it did not either humour this bloody superstition, or give way to despair; it was policy perhaps—to check all thoughts of capitulation—rather than ferocity that induced it to execute its Macedonian prisoners on the top of the walls, and to cast their bodies, in the sight of the besiegers, into the sea<sup>1</sup>; but it directed the energy of the people to better expedients. It made a vigorous attempt to surprise the Cyprian squadron stationed near the northern harbour, and would have gained a complete victory over it; but Alexander, having received timely notice of the sally, sailed round unobserved, turned the fortune of the day, and sunk or took most of the enemy's ships. All hopes from offensive measures were crushed by this blow; the safety of the city now rested chiefly in the strength of its walls.

Even these, after several fruitless attempts had been made in other quarters, began to give way on the south side; and a breach was opened, which Alexander tried, but did not find immediately practicable. Three days after however, when a calm favoured the approach of the vessels, he gave orders for a general attack. It was to be made on all sides at once, to distract the attention of the besieged; and the fleet was at the same time to sail up to both the harbours, in the hope that in the midst of the tumult it might force an entrance into one of them. But the main assault was to be directed against the breach that had been already

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, II. 24. Curtius (IV. 2. 15.) makes them to be heralds.

formed. The vessels which bore the engines were first brought up to play upon it; and when it had been sufficiently widened, were followed by two galleys, with landing boards and the men who were to mount it. One was commanded by Admetus, and was filled with troops of the guard, and in this Alexander himself embarked. The other bore a detachment of the phalanx belonging to the division commanded by Cœnus. Admetus and his men were the first to effect a landing, animated by the immediate presence of their king, who, after he had paused awhile to observe and animate the exertions of his warriors, himself mounted the breach. When the Macedonians had once gained a firm footing, the issue of the conflict, notwithstanding the desperate resistance of the besieged, did not long remain doubtful. Admetus indeed, who led the way, was slain: but Alexander soon made himself master of two towers and the intervening curtain, through which the troops from the other vessel poured in after him, and he then advanced along the walls to the royal palace, which stood on the highest ground, that he might descend from it with the greater ease into the heart of the city. The Tyrians, seeing the wall taken, abandoned their fortifications, and collected their forces in one of the public places, where they gallantly made head against their assailants. But in the mean while both the harbours had been forced, their ships sunk or driven ashore, and the besiegers landed to join their comrades in the city. It soon became a scene of unresisted carnage and plunder. The Macedonians, exasperated by the length and labours of the siege, which had lasted seven months, and by the execution of their comrades, spared none that fell into their hands. The king—whom the Greeks call Azelmicus—with the principal inhabitants, and some Carthaginian envoys who had been sent with the usual offer-

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ings to Melkart, took refuge in his sanctuary: and these alone, according to Arrian, were exempted from the common lot of death or slavery. It was an act of clemency, by which the conqueror at the same time displayed his piety to the god. Of the rest 8000 perished in the first slaughter, and 30,000, including a number of foreign residents, were sold as slaves. But if we may believe Curtius, 15,000 were rescued by the Sidonians, who first hid them in their galleys, and afterwards transported them to Sidon—not, it must be presumed, without Alexander's connivance or consent.

It sounds incredible, that he should have ordered 2000 of the prisoners to be crucified; though he might have inflicted such a punishment on those who had taken the leading part in the butchery of the Macedonians. But, after the king and the principal citizens had been spared, it is not easy to understand why any others should have suffered on this account.

So fell Tyre, the rich, and beautiful<sup>1</sup>, and proud, in arts and arms the queen of merchant cities. The conqueror celebrated his victory with a solemn military and naval procession, sacrifice, and games, in honour of the tutelary god who had thus fulfilled his promise, and, though after the labour of so many months, had at length brought him into his city. He dedicated the engine which had first shattered the wall, and the sacred galley, in the sanctuary of Melkart. Tyre was still occupied as a fortress, and soon recovered some measure of her ancient prosperity, which it preserved for some centuries under the shade of the Roman empire: and, after a long period of almost utter desolation, seems again to be lifting up her head, though in a very humble condition, in our days. But Alexander's work, which changed her

<sup>1</sup> Ezekiel, xxvii.

island into a peninsula, put an end for ever to her power and independence, and is now almost the only monument remaining of her ancient greatness.<sup>1</sup>

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We do not know how far the delay which she opposed to the progress of the Macedonian arms, engaged the attention of the Persian court. But if Darius ever conceived any hopes from it, or ever thought of taking advantage of it, this can only have been so long as his fleet continued to command the sea. When it was deserted by the Phœnician and Cyprian galleys, he had no longer any means of relieving Tyre, unless by an expedition over land, which certainly never entered his thoughts. On the contrary, before the siege was ended, though probably after Alexander had been joined by the squadrons of Cyprus and Phœnicia, he sent another embassy to him with more definite overtures. His ambassadors now offered 10,000 talents as the ransom of his family, the cession of all the provinces west of the Euphrates, and the hand of his daughter Barsine<sup>2</sup>, as conditions of peace and alliance. Alexander laid these proposals before his council: and Parmenio declared, that if he were Alexander, he should accept them. *So should I*, the king is reported to have answered, *were I Parmenio*. His own prospects stretched far beyond the old man's desires: and the acquisition did not tempt him the more because it might be made without farther toil or danger. He replied in the same strain as before. The gold and the land which Darius offered were already his own;

Proposals  
of Darius.

<sup>1</sup> There seems to be little doubt that Sour occupies the place of Tyre: though Niebuhr, who visited it in 1766, and found there a spring (which has been described by other travellers) rising out of a basin of large hewn stones, observes (vol. III. p. 78.) that the isthmus seemed to him a natural one, which had been once intersected by an artificial channel that had afterwards been choked up with sand, and he therefore questions the site. Sour was then a rising village: in 1816, Mr. Buckingham found it a well-built thriving town, of about 800 houses. Niebuhr's stay seems to have been too short for accurate observations.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iv. 5. 1.; and Plutarch (De Alex. Fort. 11. 6.) calls her Statira.

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nor would he accept a part of his treasures or his empire instead of the whole. If he chose to marry the princess, he did not need her father's consent. If Darius desired to receive his favours, he must come in person as a suppliant. Darius was now convinced that he had no alternative beside submission or another trial of strength, and he applied his whole attention to his military preparations.

Siege of  
Gaza.

In the summer of 332 Alexander set forward on his march toward Egypt, accompanied by the fleet, which he had placed under the orders of Hephæstion. But he was still to be detained by another obstacle in Syria: for Darius had subjects who were more faithful to him than he was to himself. An eunuch named Batis<sup>1</sup>, who had the command of Gaza near the southern frontier of Palestine, trusting to the strength of the place, which was built on an artificial mound rising out of a sandy level partly covered by the inundations of the sea, and fortified with a very high wall, having taken a body of Arabians into his pay, and laid in a stock of provisions sufficient for a long siege, resolved to defend it. Alexander immediately ordered engines to be constructed for an assault: but his engineers declared that they were unable to invent any of such power as to make an impression on walls of such height. He then ordered a mound to be raised to the foot of the walls on the south side, where they were most accessible, to afford a basis for his machines; and when it had reached a sufficient height, the engines were brought up to batter them. Alexander had been induced to keep for a time out of the reach of the enemy's missiles by his soothsayer Aristander, who discovered from the fall of a stone which a bird dropt on him while he was sacrificing, that he should take the place, but that his own person

<sup>1</sup> According to Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* xi. 8. 3.), Babemeses.

was in danger. The assault however had not long begun, before the besieged made a sally with lighted torches, and set fire to the machines, while, having the advantage of the higher ground, they drove the Macedonians toward the edge of the terrace. Alexander no longer heeded the soothsayer's warning, but hastened up with his guard to support them; and, though he could not save the engines, forced the enemy back within their walls. But during the combat he was wounded by a dart from a machine, which penetrated both through shield and corslet into his shoulder. The wound however, though severe, animated him with a joyful hope that the rest of the prediction would be fulfilled: and while he himself remained under the hands of his surgeons, who found the cure slow and difficult, he ordered the engines which he had used at the siege of Tyre, and which he had left there, to be fetched, and the mound to be carried on, until it had reached the height of 250 feet, and the breadth of a quarter of a mile.<sup>1</sup> When his preparations were completed, and he himself was again able to take the field, he renewed his attack both by battering and undermining the walls. Thrice nevertheless the assailants were repulsed: but in the fourth attempt a great breach was opened, which enabled them to fix their scaling-ladders. Neoptolemus, a relative of the king's by the mother's side, was the first who reached the top: he was followed by many, who soon opened the gates from within to their comrades. Yet the besieged still fought, until every man was put to the sword: the women and children were sold. Alexander introduced a new population into

<sup>1</sup> Arrian (ii. 27.) seems to say that it was carried all round the city (*ἐν κύκλῳ πάντοθεν τῆς πόλεως*). Droysen objects that such a work was unnecessary, and would have demanded a much longer time than was occupied by the siege. In this he is probably right: but it is another question whether Arrian's words will admit the sense which he assigns to them: that the mound was *concentric with the city wall*.

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L.  
Jerusalem.

the place from the neighbouring towns, and used it as a fortress.

A Jewish tradition preserved by Josephus<sup>1</sup>, related that, after the reduction of Gaza, Alexander again turned northward, and marched to Jerusalem, where the high priest Jaddus, from whom he had demanded troops and a supply of provisions during the siege of Tyre, had ventured to resist his will, pleading the loyalty which he owed to his lawful sovereign, the Persian king. As he approached the Holy City, he was met by the greater part of the inhabitants in their white feast-day robes, and by the priests and Levites, with the high-priest at their head, in their sacerdotal vestments. The Chaldeans and Phœnicians—ancient enemies of the Jewish name—who accompanied Alexander, hoped for leave to plunder the city, and to execute his vengeance on the refractory high-priest. But the conqueror—like Attila at the sight of Leo and his clergy—was struck with pious awe by the spectacle, and to the surprise of his attendants, was seen to advance alone toward the high-priest, and to bow as in adoration before him. He afterwards declared that such was the figure which he had seen in a dream at Dium, when it had cheered him with a promise of success in the enterprise which he was then meditating. Having been thus convinced of the power of the Deity whom Jaddus served, he went up to the temple and sacrificed according to the Jewish ritual: honoured the priests with munificent gifts, and the nation with extraordinary privileges, which he denied to the envious and malignant Samaritans, though they pretended affinity with the Jews.

We cannot be surprised that a story, so exactly fitted to please Jewish ears, that the Samaritans, only changing the scene and persons, applied it to them-

<sup>1</sup> Antiq. xi. 8. 5.

selves, should not be found either in Arrian or Curtius. On the other hand it certainly is strange, if there was any foundation for the story, that no mention should have been made by our best authors of any visit of Alexander to Jerusalem. Arrian indeed seems to contradict the main fact related by Josephus: for he says that, after the fall of Tyre, all the cities of Palestine, except Gaza, submitted to the conqueror. If so, Alexander's appearance before Jerusalem cannot have been a threatening one: and the motive of his visit would seem to have been only the satisfaction of a natural curiosity. But then Josephus must have been mistaken as to the time of the occurrence, which must have happened either before the siege of Gaza — as Arrian may be supposed to intimate—or some months later, in the army's second passage through Palestine. It is difficult to decide between these two conjectures: but in other respects the story, notwithstanding the silence of the Greeks, is probably well founded. The respect paid by Alexander to the Jewish religion, and even the fiction of the dream, are perfectly consistent with his character and policy, if they do not stamp the substance of the narrative with an unquestionable mark of truth. It is certain however that Syria was left subject to Andromachus, who succeeded Parmenio in the government of Damascus.

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The siege of Gaza had occupied, it seems, three or four months; and it was perhaps not before December 332, that Alexander began his expedition to Egypt. Here he might safely reckon not merely on an easy conquest, but on an ardent reception, from a people who burnt to shake off the Persian tyranny, and had even welcomed and supported the adventurer Amyntas. Mazaces himself, as soon as he heard of the battle of Issus, became aware that all resistance to Alexander would be useless, and met him with a

March to  
Egypt.



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L.

B. C. 331.  
Foundation  
of Alex-  
andria.

voluntary submission. At Pelusium he found the fleet, and having left a garrison in the fortress, ordered it to proceed up the Nile as far as Memphis, while he marched across the desert. Near Heliopolis he crossed the river, and joined the fleet at Memphis. Here he conciliated the Egyptians by the honours which he paid to all their gods, especially to Apis, who had been so cruelly insulted by the Persian invaders; but at the same time he exhibited a new spectacle to the natives, a musical and gymnastic contest, for which he had collected the most celebrated artists from all parts of Greece. He then embarked, and dropped down the western or Canobic arm of the river to Canobus, to survey the extremity of the Delta on that side, and having sailed round the lake Marcotis, landed on the narrow belt of low ground which parts it from the sea, and is sheltered from the violence of the northern gales, which would otherwise desolate and overwhelm it, by a long ridge of rock, then separated from the main land by a channel, nearly a mile (seven stades) broad, and forming the isle of Pharos. On this site stood the village of Racotis, where the ancient kings of Egypt had stationed a permanent guard to protect this entrance of their dominions from adventurers, especially Greeks, who might visit it for the sake either of plunder or commerce; while for greater security they granted the adjacent district to a pastoral tribe, which regarded all strangers as enemies. Alexander's keen eye was immediately struck by the advantages of this position for a city, which should become a great emporium of commerce, and a link between the East and the West—one of the great objects which already occupied his mind — while it secured the possession of Egypt to his empire, and transmitted the name of its founder to distant ages. He immediately gave orders for the beginning of the work, himself traced

the outline, which was suggested by the natural features of the ground itself, and marked the sites of some of the principal buildings, squares, palaces, and temples. The two main streets, which intersected each other at right angles in a great public place, one traversing the whole length of the city, and forming a series of magnificent edifices, provided for health and enjoyment by a free current of air, and the inundations of the Nile secured it from the pernicious effects which would otherwise have arisen from the vicinity of the lake. A causeway connected the island — on which it is said Alexander at first thought of building the city — with the main, and divided the intervening basin into two harbours, which were only joined together by a canal near either end. By the continual accumulation of sand, this isthmus has been so enlarged, that it now forms the site of the modern Alexandria. Still there were two defects to counter-balance so many advantages of situation. The harbour was on both sides difficult of entrance, and there was no other within a great distance either on the east or the west. This inconvenience could never be wholly remedied, though the danger of the approach from the sea was afterwards much lessened by the erection of a magnificent beacon-tower, on a rock, near the eastern point of Pharos, which threw out its light to the distance it is said of nearly forty miles. The other defect was the want of water: and for this ample provision was made by a new canal, branching from the Nile, which brought a constant supply into the cisterns over which the houses were built. Yet Alexandria was thus placed at the mercy of every enemy who could make himself master of the canal and deprive it of a main necessary of life. It was a part of Alexander's plan to people the city with a mixed colony of Greeks and Egyptians, in which the prejudices of the two races might be effaced by

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habitual intercourse, though Grecian arts and manners were to give their character to the whole: and therefore, among the temples of the Grecian gods, he ordered one to be founded for the worship of Isis.

A favourable omen is said to have afforded a presage of the prosperity which awaited the new city. When he was about to trace the course of the walls, no chalk was at hand for the purpose, and it was found necessary instead to make use of flour, which soon attracted a large flock of birds from all sides to devour it. Aristander—who was never at a loss—construed this incident as a sign of the abundance which the city should enjoy and diffuse. That indeed probably far exceeded its founder's most sanguine hopes: but still less could he have foreseen or calculated all the elements of a new intellectual life, which were to be there combined, and the influence which it was to exert over the opinions and condition of a great part of the world.

He was still thus engaged when Hegelochus arrived with the news that the Persians had been dislodged from the last holds of their power in the Ægean. Tenedos had revolted from them, as soon as it became sure of Macedonian protection. At Chios the democratical party had risen against the government established by the Persian satraps, and had taken Pharnabazus himself prisoner: and soon after Aristonicus, the tyrant of Methymna, having sailed into the harbour, before he had heard of the recent revolution, with some pirate-ships, fell into their hands. The crews were all put to death; he himself, together with the oligarchical leaders, who had betrayed the city to the Persians, were sent to Alexander to receive his sentence. Mitylene, too, where Chares, the Athenian general, commanded the garrison, had been forced to capitulate, and the whole of Lesbos had been recovered. Hegelochus had likewise left his colleague Amphoterus

in possession of Cos, which the islanders had freely surrendered. There Pharnabazus had made his escape: but he had brought the other prisoners with him, among whom, beside Aristonicus, were several tyrants who had ruled under Persian patronage. These Alexander abandoned to the mercy of the cities which they had governed, and they all suffered a cruel death; the Chians, as both enemies and traitors, he sent under a strong guard to a wretched exile in the stifling island prison of Elephantinè.

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He was now on the confines of Egypt and Libya. In the region which lay not many days' march to the west, as some Greek legends told, Hercules and Perseus had pursued their marvellous adventures: both, it was believed, had consulted the oracle of Ammon in the heart of the Libyan wilderness. Alexander may have been desirous of emulating the achievements of his two heroic ancestors: or, if he had not heard of them, might still have been attracted by the celebrity of the oracle and by the difficulty of reaching it. That he was impelled by curiosity about its answers, is very doubtful; but it is highly probable that he did not overlook the advantage which he might derive from them, however they might run, and the mysterious dignity with which the expedition itself might invest him in the eyes of his subjects. If however to these motives for the enterprise it should be thought necessary to add any others of a more intelligible policy, it might be conjectured that he also wished to impress Cyrene with respect for his power, and to show that even her secluded situation did not place her beyond the reach of his arms. It may at least be presumed that this was one of the grounds which induced him to take the road along the coast, to the Oasis of the temple of Ammon. Accordingly on his march to Parætonium he was met at about midway by envoys from Cyrene, who brought a crown and other magni-

Oasis of  
Ammon.

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ficent presents: among the rest, some of the productions for which their country was most famed—300 war-horses and five chariots. They are said to have requested him to honour them with his presence: and, if they wished to escape a visit, it was certainly safer, as the examples of Tyre and Aspendus had shown, to invite than to deprecate it. After a march of about 200 miles along the coast—perhaps nearly as far as the eastern frontier of the territory of Tripoli—he appears to have taken the direction towards the south-east, which leads, in five or six days for a private caravan, to the Oasis. It was now for the first time that the Macedonians became acquainted with the face of the Libyan desert, its pathless sands, naked rocks, burning sky, and delusive images. That the journey should have furnished numberless stories for the entertainment of the camp, may easily be supposed. It is more difficult to understand how Alexander could have been at a loss for guides well acquainted with the way, as both Ptolemy and Aristobulus represented: though the one related that the perplexity of the wanderers was relieved by two great serpents, which pointed out the track, and were heard even when they could not be seen: the other described two ravens as performing the same office. Whether these are mere fictions of an idle fancy, or cover some fact which we are not able to ascertain, it is hardly worth while to inquire.<sup>1</sup> That the army was refreshed with the extraordinary occurrence of a shower of rain, in which it saw a manifest interposition of the gods, cannot reasonably be doubted. At length it descended safely into the green, well watered, and richly cultivated valley, where, embosomed in thick woods, stood within the

<sup>1</sup> As to the ravens, there is no reason to doubt the literal fact. It appears that these birds are looked upon as indicating the vicinity of a well in the African desert. Two ravens met Belsoni, as he was approaching the Oasis El Wak. Ritter, *Afrika*, p. 969.

same inclosure, the palace of the ancient priestly kings, and, close by, the temple of Ammon.

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L.

Oracle of  
Ammon.

It was a visit such as Ammon had probably never before received, and the priests no doubt did their utmost, both to welcome the royal pilgrim with due honours, and to impress him with the highest veneration for their oracle. It was not, it seems, always in the temple itself that answers were given. The god chose the place of his revelations for himself. His visible symbol, a round disk formed of precious stones<sup>1</sup>, was placed in a golden ship, from which, on each side, hung sacred vessels of silver; and borne on the shoulders of eighty priests, attended by a train of virgins and matrons, who accompanied the procession with sacred chaunts, in which they implored a propitious and certain answer, according to the secret impulse of the deity which directed their steps. By such a procession Alexander seems to have been met, as he approached at the head of his army, and to have been conducted into the temple, where his questions were answered by the chief-priest. What these questions and answers were, was perhaps never known to any but the interlocutors. It is indeed in itself by no means improbable that the priest saluted him as a hero of divine origin, and promised him the empire of the world: the address would not have been more flattering, nor the prophecy bolder, than the Greek oracles, which were less safe from exposure, had sometimes ventured on. But it is well-attested that Alexander did not, at least at the time, disclose what he had heard; but merely declared to his followers that he had received such answers as he had desired, and showed his satisfaction by his offerings and donations.

<sup>1</sup> *Umbilicus* (Curtius, iv. 7. 23.), which the commentators think may be illustrated by the rude stones worshipped at Emesa and Paphos. But the description, *smaragdo et gemmis coagmentatus*, does not seem to favour this conjecture. I suspect that this *umbilicus* was a scarabæus.

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L.

Govern-  
ment of  
Egypt.

Aristobulus perhaps only expressed himself carelessly when he said that the army returned by the same route: we cannot hesitate to prefer Ptolemy's statement, that it took the direct road to Memphis; unless indeed we should adopt a supposition, which might render the two accounts more consistent: that Alexander struck across the desert in a third direction, which leads directly to the lake Mareotis.<sup>1</sup> At Memphis he received reinforcements which had been sent to him by Antipater, and embassies to present congratulations or petitions from several states of Greece: among them, it seems, one which brought a golden crown, that had been decreed by a congress assembled at the Isthmus on the occasion of the Isthmian games. It now only remained for him to settle the mode of administration by which Egypt was to be governed in his absence. It was his object at once to gain the good-will of the Egyptians, and to secure a province so important, and so easily defended, from the ambition of his own officers. The system which he established served in some points as a model for the policy of Rome under the emperors. He retained the ancient distribution of the country into the districts called *nomes*, and not only permitted them to be still governed by the native magistrates, the *nomarchs*, but placed them all under the authority of two Egyptians; one of them afterwards resigned his office, and the whole devolved on his colleague. But garrisons were stationed at Memphis and Pelusium, commanded by two Macedonians; and a body of mercenaries was placed under the orders of an Ætolian named Lycidas, who was himself controlled by a Macedonian commissary and two inspectors. The country on the western side of the Delta was committed to the care of Apollonius; that on the

<sup>1</sup> The same by which General Minutoli returned from Siwah: though Ritter (*Afrika*, p. 978.) is inclined to think that this was the very road by which Alexander reached the Oasis.

east, toward Arabia, to Cleomenes, an Egyptian Greek of Naucratis, who afterwards became unhappily celebrated for his rapacity and financial stratagems: and he was appointed to receive the tribute collected by the nomarchs, but with orders not to alter that arrangement. Still an army was left under the command of Peucestes and Balacrus, and a fleet under that of Polemo. The mutual jealousy of these officers was a sufficient pledge for their loyalty.

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In the spring of 331 he set out from Memphis on his return to Phœnicia. At Tyre he found his fleet arrived, and celebrated another sacrifice to Melkart, and received an embassy which had been brought over from Athens in the Paralus. Its chief object was to obtain the release of the Athenian prisoners taken at the battle of the Granicus; and this Alexander now granted, with several other requests which were urged by the crew of the Paralus, who accompanied the envoys in a body. The accounts which came from Peloponnesus indicated that it was threatened with a commotion through the restlessness of Sparta: and Amphoterus was ordered to lead a squadron to the aid of the Peloponnesians who were well affected toward the Macedonian interest, and the war with Persia, and to recover Crete from the Spartans. A new fleet of 100 sail was ordered to be fitted out in the ports of Phœnicia and Cyprus to follow and reinforce Amphoterus. Whether on this occasion Alexander visited Jerusalem is doubtful; but it seems that he made an expedition into Samaria to punish the Samaritans, who, goaded perhaps by ill treatment, had revolted against Andromachus, had taken him prisoner, and burnt him alive. On Alexander's approach, the authors of this atrocity were delivered up to him, and tranquillity was restored. He then began his march toward the Euphrates, and before the end of August arrived at Thapsacus.

Return to  
Phœnicia.



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L.

March  
through  
Mesopo-  
tania.

A body of troops had been sent forward to throw a bridge across the river. Two had been begun, but not carried quite over, because Mazæus, a Persian officer, who had been entrusted by Darius with the defence of the passage, was posted with about 3000 cavalry, two thirds Greeks<sup>1</sup>, on the other side. As soon however as he heard that Alexander was approaching, Mazæus, whose force seems indeed so small that it could hardly have been meant to dispute the passage, but rather to observe the enemy's movements, retired, and the bridges were finished without interruption. When he had crossed the river, Alexander did not follow the route which Cyrus had taken through the Mesopotamian desert, but directed his march toward the northeast, through a country which afforded a more abundant supply of food for man and beast, and where the army had less to suffer from the heat of the summer. On the road some Persian scouts fell into his hands, from whom he learnt that Darius, with an army far greater than he had before brought into the field, lay on the left bank of the Tigris, prepared to guard the passage against him. He now advanced at full speed toward the Tigris: but when he reached it found neither Darius himself nor any hostile force, and met with no other obstacle in the crossing than the rapidity of the stream. On the left bank he gave his troops a few days' rest after their forced march, during which there occurred an eclipse of the moon. Aristander expounded it as a sign that, during that month, the Persian monarchy was destined to lose its power and glory: and when Alexander sacrificed to the moon, the sun, and the earth, as the powers which

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, III. 7. Gronovius, to bring these numbers nearer to those of Curtius, who (IV. 9. 7.) has 6000, would insert *ὅτι* or *ἐπὶ* before *τούτων*, and this last conjecture, Droysen (p. 218.) thinks evidently right, because the Greek mercenaries did not serve as cavalry. Yet soon after, in the description of the battle, we have *οἱ μισθοφόροι ἱππεῖς* commanded by Menidas, and *ἡ ξενική ἵππος ἢ τῶν μισθοφόρων* commanded by Andromachus. It is moreover extremely doubtful that Arrian would have used either *ὅτι* or *ἐπὶ* in such a sense.

concurred to produce the portent, the victims were found to announce a victory. He then marched southward along the river, and four days after his reconnoitring parties brought word that a body of cavalry was in sight. He immediately drew up his army in order of battle: but being presently informed that the enemy's cavalry then in sight did not appear to exceed 1000 men, he pushed forward with a few squadrons of his own to meet them. They fled at his approach, but some were overtaken, and slain or made prisoners. From these he learnt that Darius with his whole army was encamped at no great distance.

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The Persian king had employed the long interval allowed him by Alexander's operations after the battle of Issus, to collect the remaining strength of his empire, and he had assembled a host with which, if superiority of numbers could have ensured success, he might reasonably have hoped to crush his adversary. It was also composed for the most part of more warlike troops. The division which was most formidable, both for numbers and martial qualities, consisted of the hardy tribes which inhabited the plains on the eastern side of the Caspian, and the valleys above Caubul on the borders of India. They were led by Bessus, the powerful satrap of Bactria; and he was also followed by a body of horse-bowmen, furnished by the Sacæ, who wandered in the valleys east of Transoxiana, and though they did not acknowledge his authority, willingly joined him as allies for the sake of pay and plunder. All the provinces between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and from Syria and Cappadocia to the mountains west of the Indus, had poured forth their choicest warriors. The whole amount was stated by some authors at a million of foot and 40,000 horse: this may be a great exaggeration, but it was probably reduced as much too low by those who reckoned no more than 200,000 in-

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I.

Gaugamela.

fantry. There were beside 200 scythed chariots, and 15 elephants brought from the west of India. With this host Darius had encamped in one of the wide plains between the Tigris and the mountains of Kurdistan, near the Bumodus, a tributary of the Lycus, and a village named Gaugamela (the camel's house<sup>1</sup>), which should have given its name to the battle fought near it, but was forced, through a caprice of which we have many examples, to surrender this distinction to the town of Arbela, which lay more than twenty miles off, where Darius had left his baggage and his treasure. He had been persuaded by his courtiers that his defeat at Issus was entirely owing to the disadvantage of the ground, and he had therefore chosen a field on which he might fully display his forces, and where the enemy would have neither sea nor mountains to cover his flanks, and he had ordered a large tract of the plain to be cleared and levelled for the evolutions of his cavalry and chariots.

Alexander, having ascertained the enemy's posture, gave his army four days' repose before he advanced, and fortified his camp: intending to leave the invalids, the prisoners, and the greater part of the baggage, behind him there, that his troops might march to battle without any unnecessary incumbrance. He then set out soon after midnight that he might come up with the enemy by day-break. Some hillocks intercepted the view of the Persian camp, until he had approached within three or four miles of it. He then looked down upon the plain in which the mighty host was drawn up in battle array. The centre was occupied as usual by Darius himself, surrounded by

<sup>1</sup> Or rather, according to Plutarch (Al. 31.), the dromedary's. There was a legend, that a dromedary, which had preserved the life of some Persian king by its speed, had this village assigned for its abode, and the revenues of an adjacent district for its maintenance. Strabo (xvi. p. 334. Tauch.) refers it to Darius Hystaspis, whom the camel had accompanied on his expedition to Scythia, bearing the provision for the royal table.

his horse-guard of a thousand noble Persians, who were honoured with the title of the royal kinsmen, by the foot-guard, which was distinguished by the golden knobs of its lances, and by some other picked troops. Behind it was posted a deep mass composed of Uxians, Babylonians, and some adjacent tribes. In front of the royal station were ranged the elephants, and fifty of the war chariots; but on either side was a body of Greek mercenaries, according to Curtius, 50,000<sup>1</sup>, who were esteemed the only troops capable of withstanding the Macedonian phalanx. At the extremity of the left wing, which it was known would be opposed to Alexander himself, who always took his station in the right, were placed the Bactrian and Scythian cavalry, with a hundred chariots: on the right that of Armenia and Cappadocia, which seems to have stood next to them in reputation, with fifty of the chariots. The forces of the other nations were drawn up successively, horse and foot together.

As soon as he came within sight of the enemy, Alexander halted and called a council of war, to propose the question whether he should immediately offer battle. Most of his officers wished him to engage without delay: but Parmenio advised him to encamp on the spot, and, before he advanced, to explore the ground on all sides, to ascertain that no snares had been laid for the cavalry, and to obtain a more distinct view of the enemy's preparations. Alexander adopted this advice, and spent the rest of the day in riding over the field with his cavalry guard and a part of the light infantry. On his return he again assembled his officers, and addressed them with a few words of exhortation: not, he said, so much because he deemed it necessary for their own

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encouragement — they had already given sufficient proofs of valour, and needed no incitement — but that they might convey his words to the divisions under their command. It was to be remembered that they were now about to fight, not for the possession of Syria, or Phœnicia, or Egypt, but for the entire dominion of Asia. With such a prize before them, they had chiefly to urge the necessity of the strictest order, and the utmost harmony in every movement: that the silence of the march must be deep, the shout<sup>1</sup> and the war-song at the onset loud and fearful. The officers themselves must be alert both to receive and communicate their orders. The universal feeling should be, that the issue depended on the manner in which each man did his duty.

When the king had retired to his tent, Parmenio came to him, it is said, with another proposal: to attack the Persian army in the night. Alexander declared that he would not steal a victory: he must conquer openly, and by a fair trial of strength. He could not have been satisfied, nor could any victory have been deemed decisive until he had extorted from the vanquished a confession of their inferiority. A nocturnal attack would, as Arrian observes, have exposed him to the risk of an ignoble disaster, and its success, however complete, would have afforded but an imperfect triumph. There was more of cunning than of wisdom in Parmenio's project; and Alexander's reply showed no less prudence than magnanimity. He probably felt as secure of victory as before the battle of Issus. When his generals came to his tent the next morning at day-break to receive his orders, they found him still in a profound sleep. Parmenio, it is said, was at length obliged to rouse

<sup>1</sup> The *γῆρυς*, which his soldiers assured him the enemy would not be able to stand. Plut. R. et I. Ap. Alex. 12. It seems to have been a Macedonian word, though Sturz has not inserted it in his list. Schneider too omits it in his lexicon.

him, and expressed his surprise that the king should have slept as well, at so critical a juncture, as if he had just gained the victory. *Is it not as good as a victory*, was the answer, *to have overtaken the enemy?*

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His order of battle was in general similar to that which he had adopted on former occasions, from which he never deviated without some peculiar grounds. The phalanx occupied the centre in six divisions with the hypaspists, and the Macedonian cavalry under Philotas in the right, where Alexander commanded in person: on the left were the Thessalian cavalry and that of the other allies: on this side Craterus commanded the foot under Parmenio. Some light troops, archers, and dartmen were posted in front of the Macedonian cavalry, with a view more particularly to ward off the attack of the chariots. But on this occasion Alexander thought it necessary to guard by a new precaution against the imminent danger with which he was threatened of being taken in the rear. For this purpose he formed a second line, composed of some brigades of the phalanx in the centre<sup>1</sup>, with a part of the light troops, the Pæonian cavalry under Aretas and Aristo, and the mercenaries, horse and foot, under Menidas and Cleander, on the right, and on the left the Thracian infantry under Sitalcas — another division had been left to guard the camp and the prisoners — supported by three bodies of cavalry, Odrysians, mercenaries, and allies. The object of this arrangement was to counteract the preponderance of the enemy's masses, by the rapid movements of these light troops in any direction in

Battle of  
Gaugamela.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian's description (iii. 12.) clearly implies that the *δευτέρα τάξις*, by which the phalanx was rendered *ἀμφίστομος*, was distinct from the light cavalry and infantry, which were stationed on either flank *ἐς ἐπικαμπήν*; as indeed its destination was manifestly quite different: but he does not mention how it was composed. Hence Droysen has been led to confound it with the troops which were placed *ἐς ἐπικαμπήν*.

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which an attempt might be made to attack the flanks or the rear of the main body of the Macedonian army. His whole force, according to Arrian, amounted to no more than 40,000 foot and 7000 horse.<sup>1</sup>

It was a maxim of Persian warfare never to encamp within such a distance of an enemy as to be exposed to the danger of surprise in the night: and Darius, apprehensive of such an attack as Parmenio was said to have suggested, had ordered his whole army to remain all night under arms in order of battle. A bad preparation both of body and mind for the approaching combat. The King indeed is said to have passed along the line during the night by torch light, cheering his troops by his presence and his words. Yet the morning found them not only wearied by want of sleep, but dispirited by the long anticipation of the deadly struggle.

As the two armies drew near to each other, Alexander saw himself with the extreme squadrons of his right wing, in front of the Persian centre, out-flanked by the whole length of the enemy's left wing. He advanced therefore by an oblique movement toward the right, and continued still to move forward in the same direction, after the Scythian cavalry had begun to charge those which were posted in

<sup>1</sup> Flathe (i. p. 324.) endeavours to bring the numbers of the two armies as near as possible to one another: but by means of assumptions for which he does not show sufficient grounds. He thinks it probable that the Persian army was not so numerous as at Issus, because there had not been so long a time for assembling it. But the levies in the eastern satrapies had probably been begun long before the first battle. He also conceives that Alexander had already a strong body of barbarian auxiliaries in his army, and that the second line was chiefly composed of them. But the only evidence he can produce for this assumption is, that Alexander demanded a supply of troops from the Jewish high priest for the siege of Tyre, that Jews actually served in his army in Palestine (Joseph. c. Ap. I. 22.), and that a Phœnician fleet was sent against Peloponnesus. Arguments apparently too slight to be opposed to the silence of all the historians. Arrian's description does not suggest any such idea as that of which Flathe exposes the absurdity: that the Persian line was no longer than that of the Macedonians: he expressly asserts the contrary, and shows that it was only by extraordinary efforts, as well as through the superior ability of their commander, that the Macedonians were able to avoid being surrounded.

front of his line. The tract which had been cleared and levelled for the operations of the chariots did not extend much farther on this side: he had nearly reached its limits, when Darius fearing that this arm, on which he placed great reliance, would become useless, ordered the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry, which were stationed in advance of the rest, to wheel round and take the enemy in flank. Alexander first sent Menidas with the mercenary squadrons to meet this attack, and then seeing him nearly overpowered by superior numbers, ordered Ariston and his Pæonians, with Cleander's infantry, to support him. On the other hand, the rest of the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry advanced to the aid of their comrades, when they began to give way, and a warm engagement ensued, in which the Macedonians with great difficulty maintained their ground: for their antagonists were not inferior in courage, and both men and horses were clad in armour. It seems to have been by the skill and precision of their movements that the Greeks were enabled first to sustain their charge, and then to rout them. At the same time the chariots were set in motion against the phalanx. Darius had hoped that they would throw it into confusion, and thus break the firmest part of the enemy's line. But they were met midway by the light troops which had been directed to watch them. Most of them were stopt or turned back by the loss of their drivers, and those which reached the phalanx, passed harmlessly through the avenues which it opened for them, and then were easily secured.

In the mean while the main body of the Persian army was advancing, and was near coming into action: its left wing still stretched far beyond the head of Alexander's column, and another body of cavalry made a movement as with the design of taking him in the rear. Aretas was still in reserve



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with his light horse in the second line, and Alexander now ordered him to charge these assailants. Another division of the Persian cavalry which was posted nearer to the centre now quitted the ranks to join in the combat with Aretas. Their movement left an opening in the Persian line, which, as Alexander instantly perceived, afforded an opportunity for a decisive attack. He immediately formed his Macedonian cavalry into a pointed column, and charging into the vacant space soon began to make havoc among the ranks on his left, which stood between him and Darius. Shortly after, the phalanx came up, and began to press the enemy in front with the irresistible weight of their bristling sarissas. The Persians, and even their Greek mercenaries, were unable to withstand the double shock. Disorder and consternation soon spread through their left wing, and Darius saw the danger approaching his own person. It no doubt realised his secret forebodings, and it appears that he had made careful preparations for flight. He alighted from his chariot, mounted a fleet and eager courser<sup>1</sup>, made his way through the column in the rear, and was some miles on the road to Arbela, while a part of his troops were still engaged, and not without a prospect of victory.

For, though the left wing was soon utterly broken, especially after Aretas had put the enemy's cavalry to flight, the battle seemed for a while to be taking a different turn in other parts of the field. The Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry, on the extremity of the Persian right, had turned the left wing of the Macedonians, and began greatly to distress Parmenio. The first consequence of their partial success was, that two divisions on the left of the phalanx, those of Simmias and Craterus, were restrained from advancing

<sup>1</sup> A mare which had been taken from her foal according to Plutarch, Al. 33.

with the rest to support Alexander's charge, and a wide breach was thus opened in the Macedonian line. This was observed by the commanders of the Indian and Persian cavalry, which occupied the centre immediately in front of Darius, and they directed a furious charge through the midst of the phalanx. But instead of joining in the attack on the Macedonian left, which, had it been thus supported, would perhaps have put it completely to the rout, they did not stop until they had reached the camp on the neighbouring heights, where the Thracians were keeping very negligent guard, and, in imagined security, were mostly unarmed. They would have been the less able to defend it, as the prisoners, who were numerous, took part to the utmost of their power with the assailants, if the two divisions of heavy infantry in the second line, changing their front, had not come up to their relief, and falling on the Persians, as they were busied with plunder, killed many, and put the rest to flight. It might have seemed natural that an attempt should have been made to rescue the royal captives. But Arrian's silence leaves us in some doubt whether they had not been left behind at the fortified camp. Yet some authors related that Sisygambis refused to fly. The queen—the most beautiful woman in Asia—had died not long after the battle of Issus in childbed. Darius, it is said, heard at the same time of his loss, and of the noble treatment and the magnificent burial which she had received from the conqueror: and, though at first incredulous and suspicious, when he was at length satisfied by the report of a faithful slave, lifted up his hands to heaven, and prayed to Oromasdes, that if his kingdom was to pass from himself, it might be transferred to Alexander.

Alexander was recalled from the pursuit of the routed Persians and of Darius by a message from Parmenio, requesting succour, and immediately hastened,

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The pur-  
suit.

though, as may easily be supposed, very reluctantly, with the cavalry of his guard, toward that part of the field.<sup>1</sup> But in his way he encountered the fugitives who had been dislodged from the camp, and who, finding themselves intercepted, made a furious effort to break through. The combat was close and hot. Sixty of the Macedonians fell, and Hephæstion, and two other generals, were wounded. The loss on the other side was no doubt much greater: but a part of the Persians forced their passage through, and escaped. Alexander, as he was coming up to his left wing, learnt that the gallant exertions of the Thessalian cavalry had already delivered Parmenio from his danger: though their victory was probably owing in a great measure to the dismay which seized the Persians, when they heard of their king's flight, especially as a report seems to have prevailed of his death. The rout was now complete in every part of the field; and Alexander again set out in pursuit of Darius. He continued it as long as the light lasted, and then halted to rest the men and horses till midnight on the left banks of the Lycus (the Greater Zab), while Parmenio took possession of the Persian camp. The passage of the Lycus had been more destructive to the fugitives than the swords of their pursuers. The bridge was soon blocked up by the numbers who made for it as their only refuge, and the rest, in blind terror, cast themselves into the rapid stream, and, encumbered with their armour, strove in vain to reach the opposite bank. At midnight Alexander resumed his pursuit of Darius, whom he hoped to overtake at Arbela. There indeed he found the whole of the

<sup>1</sup> So Arrian (iii. 15.), with whom Curtius (iv. 16. 3.) and Plutarch (Al. 33.) agree, though they mention Alexander's reluctance, which Arrian omits. Diodorus (xvii. 60.) says that Alexander never received the message. It seems strange therefore that Droysen, who professes to follow Arrian's account of the battle, should relate (p. 228.) that Alexander received it just as he was about to charge, but dismissed the bearer with the remark that Parmenio must have lost his senses.

royal treasure and baggage: but Darius himself had continued his flight without intermission, accompanied by the Bactrian cavalry and a part of his guards, and by about 2000 Greek soldiers, who had joined him on the road. He had bent his course over the mountains toward the capital of Media: a route by which it was scarcely practicable to follow him with an army.

Knowing so little as we do of the numbers which Darius brought into the field on this eventful day, we can as little rely on any of the statements which we find as to the amount of his loss. But it is somewhat suprising that Arrian, whose judgment in other points is usually so clear, should have related, in a manner which betrays no doubt, that the Persians slain amounted to 300,000, and the prisoners to a still greater number, while the Macedonians lost only about 100 men.<sup>1</sup>

This day however decided the contest, though the escape of Darius disappointed one of the conqueror's most cherished hopes. Alexander was not so eager to secure the person of Darius, as to neglect the more important fruits of his victory which lay before him in the southern provinces of the empire: the possession of the capitals which contained the immense treasures that had been piled up by the Persian kings for many generations. These might have been exposed to danger, if the news of his own approach had not quickly followed that of the battle which put an end to the authority of the ancient government. He therefore postponed the pursuit of Darius, and continued his march toward Babylon. He had been prepared to expect resistance, since Mazæus had taken refuge there after the battle. But at no great distance from the city he was met by the whole

<sup>1</sup> Droysen however takes no offence at these numbers.

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I.Entry into  
Babylon.

population, with the priests and magistrates, and Mazæus himself, and Bagophanes, the commander of the citadel, at their head, bringing rich presents, and surrendering the city, the citadel, and all the treasures it contained. Thus attended, the conqueror made his triumphal entry, the army following his chariot, through streets strewn with flowers, and lined with silver altars, smoking with incense, amidst the songs of the priests. Babylon had never been well affected to the dynasty of the Achæmenids, and had suffered much from their resentment. Xerxes, in a fit of despotic caprice, or instigated by his Magians, had persecuted the religion of the Chaldæans, and had pulled down the temple of Belus, and others, which had never afterwards been restored, but remained, in their ruins, monuments of the tyranny of the government, and motives of animosity to the people. Alexander here found himself in a position very like that which had been so advantageous to him in Egypt, and he made an equally judicious use of it. One of his first measures after he entered the city was to give orders for the rebuilding of the demolished temples: and to place himself under the direction of the Chaldæans for the purpose of sacrificing in the most acceptable manner to Belus. At the same time he provided for the security of the capital by a distribution of powers according to the maxim which the Persian kings had once adopted, but too often neglected. He appointed Mazæus satrap of Babylon, and Apollodorus of Amphipolis to command the forces which he left with him, but committed the citadel and the garrison — 700 Macedonians and 300 Greeks — to Agathon, and charged Asclepiodorus with the collection of the tribute.

Babylon. The army was permitted to revel for some time<sup>1</sup> in

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xvii. 63.) says, more than thirty days. It is however a little

the enjoyments which the most splendid and voluptuous of Eastern cities offered in profusion to the bewildered senses of the rough soldiers of the North, who, inured from their childhood to poverty and hardship, found themselves suddenly transported into the lap of ease and luxury. Alexander probably considered this as a reward due to the fatigues which they had lately undergone to place him on the throne of the East; and he added a donative from the treasures of Babylon which must have amounted to several thousand talents. Perhaps he believed that this short taste of pleasure would serve to animate them under the toils and dangers which they had still to encounter in the remoter and wilder regions of Asia, by the remembrance of the delights which awaited them on their return. Nor in fact, under such a leader, was much danger to be apprehended from the effect of this sojourn on the habits of the common soldier; more might be feared from the change it was likely to make in the views and characters of their chiefs, who now saw themselves raised to almost princely rank, in the possession of boundless wealth, and surrounded with all the instruments of sensual gratification the most refined and intoxicating. To Alexander himself however this interval was not one of indolent repose: perhaps not much longer than was necessary for transacting the various affairs which had been accumulating during his march from the coast of Syria. Babylon itself was chiefly interesting to him, as he probably at the first sight of it conceived the design of making it the capital of his empire: a purpose for which it was manifestly adapted beyond any of the other great cities of the East, not so much by the inexhaustible fertility of its territory, or by the strength of its walls, and the magnificence of its

suspicious, that the news of the surrender of Susa had not arrived before Alexander left Babylon.

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buildings<sup>1</sup>, as by the advantages of its position, its comparative vicinity to Europe, and its more immediate connection with the sea, which — as he may already have divined — opened a passage to India, the remote goal of his ambition.

Susa.

It was about the middle of November when he set out for Susa. Rich as Babylon was, its treasures were small in comparison with those which were known to have been amassed in the palace at Susa: and it had therefore been his first care, as soon as he gave up the pursuit of Darius, to despatch one of his officers named Philoxenus, to make himself master of them. On his road he met a courier whom Philoxenus had sent with the agreeable tidings, that the satrap Abulites had surrendered Susa without resistance, and that the whole of the treasure was in safe custody. In twenty days after his departure from Babylon, he arrived at Susa. The sum which he found here amounted to 40,000 talents of uncoined gold and silver, and 9000 in the gold pieces called Darics. The value of the other parts of the royal hoard may be in some degree estimated from the fact, that among the property of Bagoas, which he bestowed on Parmenio, was a wardrobe worth 1000 talents. At Susa had been preserved the spoils which Xerxes had carried off from Greece: among them the brazen statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton: Alexander now sent them back to Athens, where Arrian saw them in the Ceramicus.

Soon after his arrival he received the reinforcements which he had been expecting from Europe. They were conducted by Amyntas, son of Andromenes, and consisted of 6000 foot and 500 horse from Macedonia, 3500 Thracian foot and 600 horse, and 4000 foot with 380 horse from Peloponnesus. The general was ac-

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, xv. p. 323. Tauch.

accompanied by fifty noble Macedonian youths, to serve as the king's pages. He also brought a present to the king from his sisters; some articles of dress, the work of their own hands: employment which, Alexander now learnt, was deemed degrading by the Persian ladies.<sup>1</sup> But Amyntas was, it seems, also the bearer of important news from Greece. Threatening movements had taken place in Peloponnesus under the influence of Sparta; and Antipater, though he was obliged to send his levies to the army, was preparing for a war at home. Alexander now sent Menes down to the coast of the Mediterranean, to take the government of Syria, Phœnicia, and Cilicia, with 3000 talents, part of which was to be transmitted to Antipater, and the rest to be employed in the collecting of fresh troops, which were continually required to fill the place of those which were left as garrisons, or in occupation of the newly conquered countries. The arrival of the reinforcements under Amyntas enabled him to reward the most deserving of his old soldiers with military commands; he seems to have instituted a new subdivision of the cavalry in order to multiply the number of the officers; and to have departed from the ancient usage according to which they were always taken from the district which furnished the troops, and to have thrown all places open to merit.<sup>2</sup> He rewarded Abulites with the satrapy of Susiana, but appointed Archelaus general of its forces, and Mazarus, another Macedonian, commander of the citadel. Then, having celebrated the acquisition of Susa with sacrifices and games, leaving Sisygambis and her grandchildren in the palace of

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 L.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, v. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 16. Whatever may have been the nature of these regulations, they seem to have been the same as those which are mentioned by Diodorus (xvii. 64.) and Curtius (v. 2.), though, according to these writers, they were made during a halt in Sitacene (Satrapene of Curtius), Amyntas having rejoined the army at Babylon.



CHAP.  
L.  
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The  
Uxians.

their ancestors, he took the road to Persepolis, the still more ancient seat of the Achæmenids, where they ruled, not as conquerors, but as heads of their own nation. Between the plains of Susiana, and those of the proper Persis, lies a mountainous region then inhabited by the Uxians, who were in possession of a defile through which the high road passed. The Uxian mountaineers — for a part cultivated the plain — were a poor but hardy race, which had never been subdued: and the Great King, when he travelled from his Persian to his Susian capital, had always been obliged to pay the tribute which they demanded. When Alexander entered their country, they sent to inform him that he would not be permitted to pass the defile without the usual acknowledgment. The Persian kings had probably disguised the weakness betrayed by their compliance with the name of munificence: but Alexander saw it in its true light, and he had never yet won a passage by any instrument but the sword. Suppressing his indignation, he bade the Uxians meet him at the pass, and receive their dues. But in the mean while, setting out by night with his guard and other picked troops, in all about 8000, he struck into a rugged track which led into the heart of the mountains, and the next morning fell suddenly on the Uxian villages, which he laid waste, driving off the flocks and herds which formed the chief wealth of the natives, and putting all who fell into his hands to the sword. He then left Craterus to take possession of the heights to which he expected the enemy would retreat, and himself hastened forward to seize the pass. The Uxians, who had levied all their forces to receive the tribute, when they came up, found the Macedonian army posted on the strong ground in which they had placed their whole confidence. Though they were probably far superior in numbers, they did not venture to try their strength,

but immediately took to flight. Many were overtaken by their pursuers, others perished among the precipices; but a still greater number flying to the mountains fell into the hands of Craterus. The rest sent a suppliant embassy to Alexander; their leader Madates had married a niece of Sisygambis, and the queen-mother was induced, it is said, to intercede for them. They were permitted to retain their land, subject to a yearly tribute of horses, sheep, and cattle.

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L.

Between the Uxian defile, or as it was called the Gates of Susis, and Persepolis, there were two routes, a shorter one over a succession of lofty, thickly-wooded mountains, and an easier one over the lower ground. This last was the royal road: the other, at all times difficult, and in winter hardly passable. Both were terminated by the Persian Gates, a pass still more arduous than the last, and occupied by a much more formidable enemy. For here Ariobarzanes the satrap of Persis—faithful to his master, or ambitious of independence—had intrenched himself with an army of 40,000 foot and 700 horse, on the heights which inclose the defile, and behind a wall which he had built across it. Alexander sent Parmenio with the baggage, the Thessalian cavalry, the mercenaries, and allied troops<sup>1</sup>, by the lower road; while he himself, with the Macedonian infantry, the cavalry of the guard, and a part of the light troops, crossed the mountains, and encamped near the foot of the pass. The next day he made an attempt to penetrate it, but found the enemy's position too strong to be forced,

The Persian Gates.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian here (III. 18.) expresses himself with unusual indistinctness. He says that Parmenio was sent with the troops mentioned in the text, and with all the other heavy-armed (*δοσι ἄλλοι τοῦ στρατεύματος βαρύτερον ὅπλισμένοι ἦσαν*), and yet adds, that Alexander took with him all the Macedonian infantry—that is, the phalanx, the part of the army which was more heavily-armed than any other. So Droysen makes Parmenio set out with the heavy-armed and the baggage train, and neither explains nor notices the seeming inconsistency.

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and was obliged to retire to his camp, not without loss from their missiles, and from the stones which were rolled down on the heads of the assailants. His perplexity was relieved by some of his prisoners, or, according to another account, by a shepherd, a Lycian by birth, who offered to point out a way over the mountains, by which he might descend on the enemy's rear. He now left Craterus, with two brigades of the infantry, and a small body of cavalry and bowmen, in the camp, ordering him to keep up a great number of fires to deceive the Persians, and as soon as he should hear the signal of the trumpets which were to announce the king's arrival at the opposite end of the pass, to make an attempt to storm the wall. He himself, with four brigades of the infantry and the remainder of the cavalry and light troops, followed his guides over the mountains, where in many places the snow had been drifted to a great depth. At the end of about eight miles he divided his forces, and sent three brigades under Amyntas, Philotas, and Cœnus, into the plain, to throw a bridge over a river which crossed the road to Persepolis.<sup>1</sup> He himself, with the brigade of Perdiccas, the hypaspists, some squadrons of horse, and the lightest of the bowmen, turned to the right along a still more rugged path, which led to the defile. Before day-break he had reached the Persian outposts. At the first he put all the men to the sword. From the second a few escaped; and still more from the third; but all were so panic-struck, that they fled into the mountains, and none apprised Ariobarzanes of the enemy's approach. With the first dawn of day, having left Ptolemy with 3000 men on one of the heights above the Persian camp, he ap-

<sup>1</sup> Not of course the Araxes (Bendemir), which flows close by Persepolis. It may have been—as Droysen thinks—the Aroëis, but perhaps more probably is a stream which appears to flow from the same mountains farther eastward in a direction nearly parallel to the Araxes, and to lose itself in the plain.

peared before it below. The blast of the trumpets first gave notice of his presence both to the astonished enemy and to Craterus, who, when he heard the expected signal, immediately led his men to attack the wall. The Persians, thus threatened on three sides, lost all self-possession; abandoned their fortifications to Craterus and Ptolemy, and thought only of flight. The greater part were cut to pieces, or perished among the precipices. Ariobarzanes, with a few horsemen, made his escape into the mountains.

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After a short rest, Alexander advanced into the plain to rejoin his generals, who had by this time completed the bridge, and, having crossed the river, proceeded by forced marches toward Persepolis. His speed was quickened by a letter which he received on the road from Tiridates, the governor of the city, offering to surrender the treasures, but expressing his fears that he should not be able long to preserve it from plunder. As he approached the capital, he is said to have been met by a multitude of Greeks, who had been transported, it seems, from Asia Minor<sup>1</sup> — for what offence is not recorded — and had been barbarously mutilated. The fact itself, though omitted by Arrian, and used by other writers as a topic for a rhetorical exercise, is consistent enough with Persian usages to be perfectly credible, and perhaps had some connection with the events that followed: for Alexander, though he met with no resistance, and found the treasure untouched, permitted his soldiers to plunder the city<sup>2</sup>, which seems to have surpassed


Persepolis.

<sup>1</sup> One of them, according to Curtius, was a native of Cuma: another indeed was an Athenian. Flathe (i. p. 287.) thinks that they were partizans of democracy in the cities on the western coast.

<sup>2</sup> This fact, however it may be explained, seems sufficiently attested by Diodorus and Curtius, notwithstanding Arrian's silence. Flathe (i. p. 334.) supposes that Alexander and his troops were exasperated by the resistance of the inhabitants. But this would hardly have been passed over in silence by our authors. Diodorus does not say, as Flathe represents, that the city was burnt down as well as the palace.

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I.



both Babylon and Susa, as well in the opulence of its inhabitants, as in the hoards of the crown. This had been the principal reservoir—perhaps because the province was deemed the most secure from invasion—into which the tribute of the East had flowed from the beginning of the monarchy. The amount of the royal treasure is estimated at 120,000 talents: a sum which the authors who felt themselves constrained to report it, could not help acknowledging to be almost incredible: and yet we have no reason to suspect that it has been very much exaggerated. It seems to have been one of the state maxims of the Persian kings to draw as little as possible from this pile of wealth; and it was probably their pride to be continually augmenting it. The expenses of the court and army, as they were chiefly defrayed by a system of purveyance, did not require any great outlay of money<sup>1</sup>: and we have seen that on some occasions the most important preparations were allowed to remain long suspended, because the means of prosecuting them could not be obtained from the court<sup>2</sup>: while tribute was rigidly exacted from the satraps, even for parts of their provinces which were but nominally subject to them, and which yielded no revenue.<sup>3</sup>

Burning of  
the palace.

The sight of the mutilated Greeks, which must have excited feelings of vehement resentment in the army, may have contributed to inspire Alexander with the thought, that it became him to appear in this ancient seat of the Achæmenids as the avenger of the injuries which in the days of their prosperity they had inflicted on Greece, and more especially on Athens, and thus to discharge the commission which he had received from the congress at Corinth. Yet there may have been some ground for the story, which appears to have been more commonly received, that he was not in full pos-

<sup>1</sup> See Heeren, *Ideen*, i. l. p. 484. foll.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. IV. p. 442. n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. III. p. 467.

session of his judgment, when, in spite of Parmenio's remonstrances—who begged him to consider that he was about to spoil his own property, and that it would seem as if he did not mean to retain his conquests, and had only come to rifle and ravage the lands through which he passed,—he set fire with his own hands to the royal palace. Many of his admirers no doubt thought his memory dishonoured by the tale that, at a banquet given by one of his generals, when the guests were heated with wine, an Athenian courtesan suggested the thought of this—as she might naturally deem it—glorious revenge, and that the king, starting up in a half sportive, half passionate mood, led the way and hurled the first torch into that magnificent and venerable pile. But Arrian seems to have perceived that such a sally, in a convivial moment, would have betrayed less weakness than the deliberate purpose of an act so barbarous and useless. And if, as Plutarch asserts, it was admitted on all hands that he soon repented of the deed, and ordered the conflagration to be stopped—that he afterwards regretted it Arrian himself observes<sup>1</sup>—we should be at a loss to reconcile such levity with the character which he displayed whenever it was not disguised by intemperance.

This violence, if it was the result of sober reflection, would also have been somewhat strangely contrasted with the reverence which he showed for the tomb of Cyrus, which he visited at Pasargadæ: a city not far to the south-east of Persepolis, built, it is said, by the founder of the monarchy as a monument of his victory over Astyages.<sup>2</sup> There, in the midst of the park, was

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Tomb of  
Cyrus.

<sup>1</sup> VI. 30.

<sup>2</sup> Heeren supposes Pasargadæ (or according to Tychoen Parsagada—abode of Persians) to have been the name of the district which included both cities. Zoega believed Pasargadæ to have been the more ancient: Persepolis to have been founded by Darius.

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## L.

a small tower, containing his golden coffin resting on a bier, a table covered with drinking vessels, tapestry, and carpets, and dresses of Babylonian workmanship, and jewelled ornaments, and arms. On the outside was an inscription in Persian characters which declared to whom the sepulchre belonged, and claimed respect for the remains of the king of Asia. Within the same inclosure was the dwelling of a Magian family, which ever since the reign of Cambyses had been charged with the care of the tomb. Alexander, when he came to Pasargadæ, ordered Aristobulus to enter the sepulchral chamber, to inspect its condition, and repair any injury which its ornaments might have suffered in the course of time. The palace of Pasargadæ also contained a treasure of 6000 talents, which he carried away.

Arrian gives no hint that Alexander designed to punish the people of Persis for the acts of its ancient kings otherwise than by the conflagration of the palace: and it is very doubtful that the plundering of the capital was premeditated: the disposition which had been shown to seize the treasure might sufficiently account for it. He seems to have respected national feelings when he appointed Phrasaortes, son of Rheomithres, satrap of the province, though he left Tiridates in the office which he had before held<sup>1</sup>, and entrusted the citadel of Persepolis to a Greek.

Thus, in about three years and a half after he had crossed the Hellespont, Alexander had broken the military force of the Persian empire, had made himself master of its richest provinces, had seated himself on the throne of Darius. His conquest indeed was not

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, v. 6. 11. As the treasure was to be removed, it would seem that Tiridates must have been appointed to receive the tribute of Persis: though Flathé infers from Arrian's silence on this point, that the province continued to enjoy its ancient immunity.

yet complete: his rival not yet in his power. But he might fairly assume the title of king of Asia, as it had been borne by Cyrus and his successors. What remained to be done was not so much to assert his claim to it with the sword, as to take possession of the rest of his dominions.

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L.



## CHAPTER LI.

FROM THE TAKING OF PERSEPOLIS TO THE DEATH  
OF DARIUS.

*Hopes and Plans of Darius. — Alexander sets out for Ecbatana. — Enters Ecbatana. — Forced March to Rhagæ. — Plot against Darius. — Murder of Darius. — Alexander enters Hyrcania. — Submission of Artabazus. — The Mardians. — Arrival at Zadracarta. — Alexander's Policy. — Movements in Greece. — Defeat and Death of Agis.*

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LI.  
Hopes and  
plans of  
Darius.

AFTER the battle of Gaugamela, Darius had taken the road to Ecbatana. This ancient capital of Media contained a considerable treasure, and here he thought he might wait in safety for the turn of events: not without a hope that some accident might happen to arrest Alexander's progress. He calculated perhaps on the resistance which might be made by the satrap of Persis, or by the wild tribes on its north-west border; partly too, it may be, on the movements which were beginning to threaten Macedonia in Greece. For even after his last defeat he had received an embassy from Sparta, which was accompanied by an Athenian named Dropidas; and he had learnt that the nation at large was not so blinded by names as to share the sentiment of the Corinthian Demaratus, who, when he saw Alexander seated on the throne of the Great King, is said to have shed tears of joy, and to have observed that the Greeks who had died before they witnessed that sight, had lost a great pleasure<sup>1</sup>: as if it was a happiness for Greece

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Al. 37. 56. Elsewhere (Ages. 15.) he himself expresses a different feeling.

to have the Great King reigning at Pella, as well as at Susa. But it seems that he trusted entirely to fortune, or to the exertions of others. It is very doubtful whether he ever entertained the design of collecting a fresh army, and meeting Alexander again in the field: though Arrian's silence may not prove anything against the assertions of the other historians on this point, which are in some degree confirmed by the rumour which he himself mentions about the preparations of Darius. But his final resolution was to retreat before Alexander, if he should advance into Media, toward the north-east, laying waste the country through which he passed, and to seek refuge on the other side of the Oxus, where he might hope that the conqueror would be content to leave him unmolested. He sent his baggage and his harem to the Caspian Gates, one of the passes of mount Elburz. The force which he had gathered at Ecbatana is said by Diodorus and Curtius to have amounted to more than 30,000 infantry, including 4000 Greeks and 3000 cavalry. Arrian mentions only 6000 foot and 3000 horse as accompanying his march. It is possible that a part was sent forward with the baggage, and that when he began to retreat, numbers left his standard. Bessus however, in whose satrapy he meant to seek shelter, Barsaentes, the satrap of Arachosia and Drangiana, Nabarzanes, who had commanded the cavalry in the right wing at the battle of Issus, and the aged Artabazus, loyal as ever to the royal house, still adhered to him.

Alexander suffered four months to elapse before he again set out in pursuit of Darius. Plutarch says that he wished to rest his army. Yet in the course of this time, with a body of cavalry and light troops, he made an expedition which lasted thirty days against the fierce tribes in the highlands of Persis, and, notwithstanding the obstacles opposed by the rigour of

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LI.

B. C. 330.  
Alexander  
sets out for  
Ecbatana.

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LI.

the season, penetrated into their secluded valleys, and reduced them to submission. If the site of Ecbatana is occupied by Ispahan<sup>1</sup>, it seems a little surprising that he should have remained so long within a distance which he could have traversed perhaps in about twelve days, without any of the difficulties which he encountered in his expedition against the Persian mountaineers. On the other hand, if Darius was as far off as Hamadan, it is very easy to understand why Alexander should have let the winter pass before he resumed his march with his whole army toward the northern mountains of Irak. On his road to Ecbatana he turned aside to subdue the Parætace-nians<sup>2</sup>—one of the tribes to the north of Persis, who, relying on their highland strongholds, subsisted chiefly on plunder—and committed the government of the province to Oxathres, son of Abulites, late satrap of Susa. When he resumed his march, he received information that Darius, having been reinforced by auxiliaries from Scythia, and from the independent Cadusians, was about to meet him and to offer battle. There seems to be reason to suspect that this report may have been a stratagem by which Darius intended to gain time. Alexander was induced by it to leave his baggage behind, and to advance with his army prepared for action. But when he had reached the borders of Media, he discovered that the report he had heard was unfounded, and that Darius was bent on flight. This intelligence quickened his movements, and, within three days' march of Ecbatana, he was met by Bisthanes, a son of Ochus, who informed him that Darius had set out five days before from the

<sup>1</sup> This question will be considered in the Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Williams, for the interest of his theory about the site of Ecbatana, takes it for granted (*Life of Alex.* p. 177., and *Geogr. Memoir of Ecbatana*, p. 25.) that the expedition against the Parætacæ mentioned by Arrian (iii. 19.) is the same with that described by Curtius, v. 6. 12. But this assumption is utterly groundless, and inconsistent with Arrian's language.

Median capital with his little army, carrying off the treasure, which amounted to about 7000 talents.

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LI.

Enters  
Ecbatana.

During his stay in Persis, Alexander had collected a vast number of mules and camels to transport the treasures of Persepolis, where, after the disposition that had been manifested by the inhabitants, he did not think they could be left in safety, to Ecbatana. Even if it was in his power to have reached the Caspian Gates by a shorter road, it would not be surprising that he should have given up the chance of overtaking the fugitive on that side of the pass, that he might first enter Ecbatana, and make arrangements for the reception of so important a deposit. At Ecbatana he permitted the Thessalian cavalry and as many of the other allied troops as desired it, to return to their homes. The object of his expedition had been so far attained, that he had no longer any colour for detaining them without their consent. But he invited those who were willing to continue in his service to enter their names in a roll, and many preferred to remain with him. The rest received 2000 talents in addition to the pay which was due to them. Epocillus was appointed to escort them with a body of cavalry—for the Thessalians sold their horses—as far as the coast, where Menes was directed to provide for their passage to Eubœa. Parmenio, who had been left with the baggage, was ordered to lodge the treasure in the citadel of Ecbatana, and to commit it to the care of Harpalus, under the guard of 6000 Macedonians, some cavalry and light troops. The Macedonians were afterwards to be brought up to rejoin the army by Cleitus, the commander of the royal squadron of the guard, who had been detained by illness at Susa. Parmenio, with a division composed of the Greek mercenaries, Thracians, and a part of the cavalry, was afterwards to make a circuit through the territory of the Cadusians, who inhabited

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LI.Forced  
march to  
Rhagæ.

the mountainous region now called Dilem, and then to proceed along the shores of the Caspian into Hyrcania.

He himself, with the main body of the army, advanced by forced marches in pursuit of Darius. Many of the men and horses sank under the fatigue: but he abated nothing of his speed, until, having traversed a space of about 300 miles in eleven days, he reached Rhagæ, at the distance of fifty miles from the gates. There, having ascertained that Darius had passed through, he gave up immediate pursuit as hopeless, and allowed five days' rest to his troops. Rapid as had been his progress through Media, he considered it as conquered, and committed the satrapy to a Persian named Oxodates, whom he had found imprisoned in the citadel of Susa by order of Darius. This appeared a sufficient guarantee of his fidelity to his new master. He then advanced in the track of the fugitives. After he had passed the Gates, he laid in a stock of provisions, which he learnt it would be difficult to procure in the desert country that lay before him, and had sent out Cœnus with a foraging party, when two of the followers of Darius, a Babylonian named Bagistanes, and Antibelus, the son of Mazæus, arrived at the camp, with tidings that Darius had been thrown into chains by Bessus, Barsaentes, and Nabarzanes.

Plot against  
Darius.

Bessus and his accomplices had, it seems, soon after their master's fortunes became desperate, formed the plan of seizing his person, with the intention either to deliver him up to Alexander or to despatch him, as might best serve their interest. Their object was to secure themselves in the independent possession of their satrapies; and they hoped either to receive them as the reward of their treachery from Alexander, or to be able after the death of Darius to retain them by force. Bessus was in some way connected with

the royal family, and thus saw a prospect of mounting the vacant throne with the appearance of a legitimate title. The Bactrian troops, which formed the strength of his little army, were devoted to him; but Patron, the commander of the Greek mercenaries, was the more steadfast in his fidelity to Darius, as he feared above all things to fall into Alexander's hands; and the loyalty of Artabazus was known to be incorruptible. The traitors therefore thought it necessary to proceed with caution. In a council which was held after their departure from Ecbatana<sup>1</sup>, Nabarzanes ventured to propose that the king should for the time resign his authority to Bessus, whose birth, rank, and influence in the provinces where they might expect to rally their forces, pointed him out as the man best qualified to restore the falling empire. Darius was so indignant at this suggestion, that he drew his scymitar, and was with difficulty restrained from rushing upon the speaker. But after Bessus and Nabarzanes had withdrawn, he was induced to stifle his resentment by the counsels of Artabazus, who represented the danger of discord in the camp, at a juncture when Alexander was so close behind: and the conspirators, when they next appeared in the royal presence, feigned repentance and submission, and were again seemingly received into favour. But in the meanwhile they endeavoured to gain over the rest of the troops, and their designs became known to Patron and Artabazus. The Greek obtained an audience of Darius, disclosed his suspicions, and pressed the king to take refuge in the Greek camp. Darius, it is said, declared that he would rather die among his own people than owe his safety to the

<sup>1</sup> According to Curtius (v. 8.) Darius in this council proposed to wait for Alexander, and give battle: a design so inconsistent with his character—especially if he had but 9000 men with him—that I am surprised Droysen should think the rhetoric of Curtius sufficient to prove it.

CHAP.  
LL

protection of foreigners; nor could the persuasions of Artabazus induce him to change his resolution. He was soon after deserted by his attendants: his tent was surrounded by the Bactrians, and no resistance was offered by the other troops, when by the command of Bessus he was chained and placed in a covered chariot. All submitted to the rebel's authority, except the Greeks, and Artabazus and his sons, who withdrew from the camp, and turned aside out of the high road into the mountains of the Tapurians (Taberistan).

Alexander, when he heard these tidings, immediately prepared for still more active pursuit. He did not even wait for the return of Cœnus, but leaving Craterus to follow with the army by gentle marches, set forward the same evening with a part of the cavalry, including the guard, and a select body of foot, whom he ordered to take nothing with them but two days' provisions. They marched the whole night, and did not halt until the next day at noon: and after a short repose again set out, continued their march through the night, and arrived at daybreak at the place where the fugitives had encamped, when they were deserted by Bagistanes. Here he was informed of the course that had been taken by the Greeks and Artabazus. His men and horses were now nearly spent with toil: yet he pressed forward without intermission for another night, and on the following noon reached a village where the barbarians had encamped the day before. Here he learned that they had determined to pursue their march during the night; and it seemed hopeless with troops so fatigued to overtake them on the same road. By inquiry however among the country people, he discovered that there was a cross-road leading over a desert arid tract, by which he might gain upon them. But his infantry were unable to follow him with the speed

required for this last effort: he therefore mounted 500 of the officers and best soldiers of the infantry, in their ordinary armour, and ordering Nicanor and Attalus to proceed along the high road with the hypaspists and Agrianians lightly equipped, himself with his little band took the shorter route. After another laborious night, he came up by daybreak with the enemy, whom he found in all the disorder of a hasty retreat. The numbers which he had brought with him were not known, and his unexpected presence spread general consternation. Scarcely any attempt was made at resistance: the conspirators, when they found that he was approaching, pressed Darius to mount a horse, and fly with them. The unhappy king now preferred falling into the hands of a generous enemy. On his refusal, they left him mortally wounded in the chariot, and took to flight accompanied by 600 horse. He expired before Alexander saw him. The conqueror threw his own cloak over the corpse.

CHAP.  
LI.

Murder of  
Darius.

One of the many kings who would have been happier and more honoured if they had never mounted the throne. Yet if he had reigned in peaceful times he would probably have been esteemed at least as well able to fill it as most of his predecessors: and it is very doubtful whether any of them, had they been in his case, would have defended it more successfully. None however could have lost it more ingloriously; and perhaps he has only gained the credit of mildness and moderation, because, as Arrian observes, he had no opportunity of showing his real character in this respect, in a reign which was one series of troubles and disasters. As, after his accession to the throne, he lost the reputation for personal courage which he had previously earned, so it was his fate after death to recover the honours of which he had been stript



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LJ.

during his life.<sup>1</sup> Alexander ordered his body to be buried in the sepulchre of his ancestors with royal magnificence, took charge of the education of his children, and married his daughter.

Alexander had encamped near the Parthian city, which, being a point where many roads met, bore the sounding Greek name of Hecatompylus (the hundred-gated), probably not far from Damaghan; and here he suffered his troops to rest until they were rejoined by the main body, which he had left under the command of Craterus. If we might believe Curtius and Diodorus, a very general wish now manifested itself in the army to be released from further service, and it was only by an eloquent appeal to their sense of honour that Alexander induced his Macedonian troops to remain with him. It is certain that he now dismissed the greater part of his Greek auxiliaries, but with praise and munificent rewards. Beside their pay, reckoned to the time of their arrival in Greece, the horsemen received each a talent, and each foot soldier a tenth part of that sum. But those who were willing to stay were rewarded with a donative of three talents a man—that is, probably for the cavalry, and for the infantry in proportion. A letter from Alexander to Parmenio, quoted by Plutarch, proves that he thought it expedient to proclaim that the Macedonians also were at liberty to depart—if there were any who chose to abandon their king in the midst of his victorious career. His offer was received with general acclamations: they would follow him into whatever part of the world he might lead them. Their zeal was recompensed with the treasure found among the baggage of Darius. Yet, when the auxiliaries had left him, he found his army reduced to 20,000 foot, and 3000 horse: to be reinforced indeed

<sup>1</sup> The remark may appear sentimental; but it is Arrian's.

within no long time by the two brigades of the phalanx, which were waiting for the arrival of Cleitus at Ecbatana. The satrapy of Parthia and—though he had not yet entered it—of Hyrcania, was bestowed on a Parthian, Amminapes, who had contributed with Mazaces to open Egypt to the Macedonians: but with him as usual was associated a Macedonian named Tlepolemus, as inspector, or military governor of the province.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
LL.

He then divided his forces into three columns, for the invasion of Hyrcania. With the lightest he himself took the shortest, but most difficult road over the mountains on his left. The second division he gave to Craterus, with orders to march westward into the territory of the Tapurians, and both to reduce the barbarians to submission, and if possible to make himself master of Artabazus and the Greeks. Erigyius, with the third division and the baggage, was to follow the easier and more circuitous road which led northward to Zadracarta—probably the site of Sari, the modern capital of Mazanderan. This mountainous region, which separates the great plains of Khorasan from the fertile valleys which open on the south coast of the Caspian sea, was inhabited by a fierce race of independent barbarians. Alexander by the rapidity of his movements—advancing with a few light troops before the main body of his division—secured the passes, yet the troops which followed him did not effect their passage without some difficulty and loss. In his camp on the river which Curtius calls the Zio-baris, Diodorus the Stibœtes, where he rested four days, he received a letter from Nabarzanes, who had already abandoned Bessus, and now offered to surrender himself, if he might be assured of his personal safety. Alexander gave the royal pledge which he

Alexander  
enters  
Hyrcania.

<sup>1</sup> ATT. III. 22. σκοπεῖν τὰ ἐν Παρθυαίῳ τε καὶ Ὑρκανίῳ.

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LI.

Submission  
of Artabazus.

required; considering him perhaps as the tool of Bessus, and therefore as beneath his vengeance. As he pursued his march, he was met by Phrataphernes, the satrap of Hyrcania, and by several of the principal Persians who had followed Darius, and had made their escape after his death. They had been faithful to their prince, and found a gracious reception from the conqueror. He then proceeded toward Zadracarta; but it seems before he reached it he was rejoined by Craterus and Erigyius.<sup>1</sup> Craterus had overpowered all resistance wherever he passed through the land of the Tapurians, but he had not fallen in with Artabazus or the Greeks. Soon after however Artabazus himself came to the camp with three of his sons, accompanied by Autophradates, the satrap of the Tapurians, and by deputies from the Greek soldiers. To reward the submission of Autophradates, Alexander permitted him to retain his satrapy; and he honoured the loyalty of the venerable Artabazus, whom he kept near his own person, with the most delicate marks of attention. He himself usually accompanied the march of the army on foot: but, when attended by Artabazus, he mounted on horseback, that the old man, who was now in his ninety-fifth year, might not be ashamed to ride by his side. To the Greek deputies, who wished to capitulate with him, he gave a stern answer: he would make no stipulation with men who had so violated the duty which they owed to their country, and had disobeyed the decrees of the national congress. They must throw themselves unconditionally on his mercy, or must provide for their safety as they could. They then consented to surrender at discretion, and at their request Alexander sent Andronicus and Artabazus to conduct the troops to his camp.

<sup>1</sup> This depends on the question whether the Zadracarta mentioned by Arrian (iii. 23.) is the same place with the Zadracarta which he mentions (iii. 25.), or, as Droysen thinks, a different one.

Another fierce tribe remained to be subdued on the western side of Hyrcania, the Mardians, whose seats appear to have occupied the confines of Ghilan and Mazanderan; a race of robbers who thought themselves secure in the midst of the thick forests which clothed the sides of their mountains, and had therefore neglected to propitiate the conqueror. He had indeed advanced so far eastward, as to lead them to suppose that he did not intend to attack their territory, which had not for a long time been violated by the foot of an invader. His sudden appearance therefore struck them with the greater terror, and when his perseverance had surmounted the natural obstacles of the land, he had but little resistance to encounter from its inhabitants. In the course of this expedition Bucephalus fell into the enemy's hands. Alexander made it known that unless his horse was restored to him, he would not leave the country until he had exterminated the whole population. The threat answered its purpose: the noble animal was brought back to its master; and soon after an embassy came to announce the entire submission of the tribe. Alexander committed the government of it to Autophradates, whom he had already entrusted with the adjacent satrapy of Tapuria. He then returned to his encampment on the road to Zadracarta, where he found the Greek soldiers who had come to await his pleasure, with the envoys who had accompanied Darius in his flight, and had afterwards followed their countrymen into the Tapurian mountains. Beside those of Sparta and Athens there were some from Sinope and Chalcedon. They met with various treatment according to the difference of their cases. The Spartans and the Athenians were placed in confinement: the envoys of Sinope, which lay within the territories of the Great King, and had no share in the national deliberations of the Greeks, were allowed to

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depart; and the same indulgence was extended to Heracleides, the envoy of Chalcedon, though not entitled to the same plea. The soldiers too who had been in the service of Persia before the states to which they belonged had entered into alliance with Macedonia, were set at liberty. The rest were incorporated with the army on the same terms on which they had served Darius, and were placed under the command of Andronicus, who had interceded in their behalf. Alexander then made his entry into Zadracarta, where he remained fifteen days, and solemnised his triumph with sacrifices and games. It was an interval of repose needed to refresh his troops after the fatigues which they had lately undergone, and to prepare them for the toils and hardships of the expedition on which he was now about to lead them into the eastern provinces of the empire.

The further Alexander advanced into the heart of Asia, the more clearly must he have perceived the disproportion between the forces with which he had achieved his conquests, and the extent of the territory which he had subjected to his sway. For the purpose indeed of victory, his army seemed sufficiently strong: and he had reason to believe that into whatever new regions he might penetrate, he should meet with no obstacles in nature which he could not surmount, and no enemy that he could not overpower. But his object was not merely to gain battles, and to traverse vast countries, but to found a durable empire in the East: and for this end it was necessary that his authority should be cheerfully acknowledged by the inhabitants of his new dominions: that they should be led as soon as possible to forget that they had been reduced under the yoke of a foreigner: that his government should appear to them a continuation of that to which they had been accustomed under their native princes. It was henceforth not as the conqueror, but

as the successor, of the Great King, that he wished to be regarded by his Eastern subjects. The death of Darius — brought about as it had been so as to leave him without reproach — was an event of inestimable importance in this point of view. The vacancy of the throne did not indeed establish his title to the succession: but too many revolutions had happened in Persia, especially of late years, for much offence to be taken at a change of dynasty, if in other respects national prejudices were spared. The voluntary submission of Artabazus, while it might have great weight as an example, showed that Persians the most devoted to the royal house might now acknowledge Alexander as their legitimate sovereign. The Persian kings themselves, though in the course of two centuries their authority had spread its roots far and wide in the habits and feelings of the people, derived their power — except in the small province which was the cradle of their dynasty — from conquest, and in many parts of their dominions had been always looked upon as foreign masters. Alexander therefore might well step into the place of Darius.

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The title under which he ascended the throne, was of much less importance than the manner in which he filled it. The policy dictated by his situation required that he should keep two objects constantly in view: the one to conciliate his subjects, the other to impress them with reverence for their new ruler. The first end was attained with little difficulty, and without any extraordinary sacrifices. It was only necessary, that all who submitted to him should find as much security for their persons and property as had been afforded by the preceding government: and with a little vigilance and activity it was easy to give more. The tribute was left on its ancient footing: all branches of the administration were conducted in the same manner as before: but tyranny and arbitrary

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policy.

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exactions were likely to be repressed in a greater degree both by the character of the sovereign, and by the system of mutual control which he established for his own security. The provinces which bordered on the predatory tribes, which had so long been permitted to retain their independence in the heart of the empire, must have had reason to rejoice in the revolution which had transferred the sceptre to a hand that could wield the sword. It was probably at least as much with a view to conciliate the people, as to gain the support of the great families—though it would be difficult nicely to distinguish between the two ends—that, as he left Greece at a greater distance behind him, he more and more frequently filled the vacant governments with Persians, or allowed those who submitted to retain their satrapies: so that this became at last a rule from which he seldom deviated. It operated certainly as a strong lure to incline those who were still wavering to his side. But this can scarcely have been his principal motive: for after the death of Darius he had less and less reason to apprehend resistance to his arms, but might well grow more and more anxious about the means of securing his conquests: and he might think with good ground that the sight of Macedonians filling the highest stations, even if they did not abuse their power, was likely to excite general discontent.

It was however still more necessary for an Asiatic ruler that he should be feared and revered than that he should be loved. It may be thought that Alexander's wonderful fortune, and extraordinary endowments of body and mind, could not fail to strike the conquered nations with admiration, and that no artifices could be necessary to exalt him in their eyes. But Alexander must soon have discovered, that it was not by such means Eastern royalty ever attracted the veneration of its subjects.

No intrinsic merit could in their estimation supply the place of the pomp and splendour which they always associated with the idea of greatness. The Great King, though the feeblest and worst of men, was viewed as a superior being, so long as the luxuries and ceremonies of a court were interposed between him and the rest of mankind: but no measure of wisdom and virtue could have obtained the same reverence for him, if in his dress and manner of living he had descended to a level with other men. It was therefore absolutely necessary for the security of Alexander's throne that he should adopt the principal at least of the outward distinctions, which had been always deemed essential to the majesty of his Persian predecessors: that he should assume the Eastern garb in which alone some of these distinctions could appear: that he should be surrounded by a numerous train of state attendants, and that the simple forms of the Macedonian court should be exchanged for the strict rules of Persian etiquette. The Great King wore his tiara erect; he sat on a raised seat, on which it was a capital crime in a subject to place himself; he was to be served with certain ceremonies; and he was to be approached only with peculiar observances, which resembled a religious adoration, and were perhaps derived from a persuasion which they strongly tended to confirm, of a kind of divinity that resided in the royal person.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Yet it would not be safe to attribute to the Persians any very distinct conceptions on this point. Flathe observes, that the modern Persians revere their kings as divinities: which, whatever travellers may say, it is clear no Mahometans can do. He adds, that Chardin relates, that the modern Persians ascribe powers of healing to their kings. Kings of England too, who were not looked upon either as gods or heroes, touched for the evil. The state of the case may be illustrated by a passage in the life of Timur. After having mentioned some instances of the veneration with which the Tartar conqueror was regarded by his emirs, Chereffeddin proceeds to observe (tom. II p. 273.), "*Toutes ces démonstrations de respect et d'amour des officiers de Timur, sont non seulement des preuves de son grand mérite; mais elles marquent outre cela quelque chose de divin, qui lui avoit été accordé d'en haut par dessus les autres hommes.*" We see that the propensity



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Alexander was not of a character that would have permitted him to become the slave of such forms: but he was too prudent to discard them, even if they had been, as perhaps they were at first, repugnant to his feelings. It was his object, as far as possible, to relieve and temper them with Grecian taste and freedom. In the camp he never allowed them to fetter his movements; but on state occasions it was his wish to observe all the leading points of the Persian ceremonial. But there was a great difficulty in the way. Was it to be expected that his Macedonian nobles, the partners of his toils, who had been used to terms of familiar intercourse with their princes, should submit to a foreign custom, which placed so wide a distance between him and them? Or, on the other hand, was it consistent with his dignity to dispense in their case with the marks of respect which he exacted from his Persian subjects?

It was a question turning indeed upon a mere form, but involving the most important consequences. The compliance of the Macedonians would reduce them, outwardly at least, to a level with the conquered people, from whom it was no doubt their wish to be distinguished as a superior race. It is probable that they viewed all the favours conferred on the Persians with jealousy, as rights withheld from themselves, and at the utmost reluctantly admitted the expediency of such concessions. Still the honours bestowed on others could not lower them. But if they submitted to the ceremony now required from them, the distinction on which they prided themselves was effaced: nor would they be able to retain any of their national privileges but at the king's pleasure: every trace of freedom might soon be lost.

of mankind to idolise power and greatness, is common to all ages and countries, and may be indulged even where it is utterly inconsistent with the letter of a received creed.

There can be little doubt that it was the very same reason which led Alexander to attach so much value to the ceremony. It was his intention to reduce all his subjects to the same level beneath himself: to recognise no distinction between Europeans and Asiatics, Greeks and barbarians: to admit no claims founded on any other title than personal merit, and this to be measured by the zeal shown in his service, and subject to his own judgment. In him this was perhaps not the simple effect of ordinary ambition: it was a natural result of the view which he took of the relation in which he stood to his own people. The distance which might seem to separate him from them was so great, that any advantage they might possess over the conquered nations, was in comparison too trifling to be regarded. The Macedonians were a semi-barbarian race, which had only been raised to the station it now occupied among nations by the efforts of its kings. He, according to the traditions of his family, which he firmly believed, was not only sprung from the purest Hellenic blood, but from a heroic lineage, and on both sides traced his origin to the father of the gods. And he felt himself to be worthy of this illustrious descent. The victories, which enabled the Macedonians to look down upon other nations as their inferiors, had been his triumphs. It was he who still sustained the monarchy he had founded. The Macedonians had as much reason as the Persians to regard him as a being of a higher order.

Still, as these thoughts had been nourished and unfolded in himself by the recent change in his fortunes, it was not to be expected that the Macedonians could be easily brought to adopt these views. Yet it was only so far as they were impressed with them, that they could willingly submit to a ceremony, which was both degrading in itself, and mortifying to their national self-complacency. It seems to have been for

the purpose of overcoming their aversion, that Alexander, about the same time that he assumed the tiara, and some other distinguishing ornaments of the royal attire<sup>1</sup>, and ordered his court after the Persian model, encouraged the diffusion of a report, which in fact only expressed his own consciousness of his extraordinary genius in a mythical form: that his birth, as well as his origin, was divine like that of Hercules and Æacus<sup>2</sup>: the secret, which had been long kept to protect Olympias from dishonour, had been revealed to the king himself by the oracle of Ammon.<sup>3</sup> It was

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch indeed (Al. 45.) asserts that Alexander did not adopt the tiara, or the vest called the *κάνδους*, or the loose trowsers (*ἀναξυρίδες*) which belonged to the Median garb. But it seems hardly credible that he should have assumed the Eastern dress, and yet have forborne to use those parts of it which in the eyes of the people were inseparably associated with the royal majesty. We may therefore confidently prefer the positive testimony of Diodorus (xvii. 77.) τὸ Περσικὸν διάδημα περιέθετο (or, as Curtius more distinctly describes it (vi. 6.), *purpureum diadema distinctum albo, quale Darius habuerat*) καὶ τὸν διὰλευκὸν ἐνεδύσατο χιτῶνα, καὶ τὴν Περσικὴν ζώνην, καὶ τὰλλα πλὴν τῶν ἀναξυρίδων καὶ τοῦ κἀνδους. The royal dress seems to have been distinguished not so much by its fashion, except in the tiara, as by its colours, which Alexander adopted. Wesseling (on Diodorus, u. s.) suggests what is not improbable, that he by degrees assumed other parts of the Medo-Persian attire.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch (Al. 27.) reports a remarkable conversation which Alexander had in Egypt with a philosopher called Psammon (Pe-Amoun?) who taught that all men are governed by God: for the ruling principle in each is divine: but Alexander was of opinion that the deity (τὸν θεόν) is indeed the common father of all men, but adopts the best as peculiarly his own, ἰδίους ποιοῦμενον ἑαυτοῦ τοὺς ἀρίστους.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Williams (Alex. p. 217.) has a singular remark on this subject, which deserves notice, as many readers may have been misled by it. He says: — *When it was proposed to pay the same outward respect to Alexander (as to the Persian king), it could only be done by asserting, that he was as much entitled to divine honour as Dionysius, Hercules, and the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux. As far as I can trace, Alexander never attempted to claim any other homage as a divinity; nor do I find, from any respectable authority, that he ever asserted himself to be the son of Ammon.* But if it is admitted that Alexander claimed homage as a divinity, it seems to be moving a superfluous question of pagan theology, to inquire what kind of divinity he claimed. Mr. Williams's remark would lead the uninformed reader to suppose, that Dionysius, Hercules, and the Dioscuri, were not worshipped as gods. And again, if it was necessary to assert, that Alexander was as much entitled to divine honour as these personages, it would seem to have been necessary, for the proof of this assertion, to show that he, like them, was the son of a god: though still it did not follow that he should receive divine honours in his lifetime. Mr. Williams, while he rejects the story, unconsciously produces the strongest arguments in its favour. Arrian's language (iv. 9.), προσκυνεῖσθαι ἐθέλειν Ἀλέξανδρον λόγος κατέχει, ἐκούσης μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ τῆς ἀμφὶ τοῦ Ἀμμωνος πατρὸς μᾶλλον τι ἢ Φιλίππου δόξης, seems to imply that he had found, from authority which seemed to him respectable, that Alexander not only asserted, but fancied himself to be a son of Ammon. Flathé (i. 347.) conceives that the relation to Ammon was claimed to impose upon the Asiatics. But it is not at all clear that

indeed not likely that such a story should be believed, except perhaps in the ardour of military enthusiasm by the most ignorant of the private soldiers. But still it might serve as a colour for his claims, which might render them less revolting to the feelings of Macedonians and Greeks, than if they had rested merely on his power of enforcing them. The bitter consequences which flowed from this unhappy state of things will appear in the sequel.

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Nearly about the same time that Alexander was engaged in the pursuit of Darius, the affairs of Greece took a turn which relieved him from all anxiety about the safety of Macedonia. His progress had been anxiously watched by the Greeks, who regarded it not merely as a succession of dazzling achievements, but as it affected the interests of their own country; and they had never ceased to hope that it might be arrested by some disaster, which would be the signal for a general insurrection against Macedonian ascendancy. Before the battle of Issus the language of the Persian courtiers was re-echoed by the orators in the Greek assemblies: and Demosthenes, mistaking his wishes for grounds of belief, assured the Athenians that they would soon hear that the Macedonian army had been trampled down by the Persian cavalry. Even after the second defeat of Darius, his cause did not appear desperate in Greece, and an embassy had been sent, as we have seen, by Sparta, to solicit his aid for the preparations she was then making against Antipater. It was of course subsidies only that they expected from him: but these, in a contest which was to be decided chiefly by mercenary troops, were of great importance. In the meanwhile she had formed a confederacy which embraced the greater part of the Peloponnesian states: Elis and Achaia, except Pellene,

Movements  
in Greece.

any thing more than the title and ensigns of royalty were needed to obtain their profoundest homage.

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LL

and the whole of Arcadia, except Megalopolis, entered into this league; Argos seems to have kept aloof, and Messenè was undoubtedly hostile. Even beyond the Isthmus some states promised assistance: probably those of the west, as the Ætolians had either already incurred Alexander's vehement displeasure by the reduction of Æniadæ, or were meditating the blow which they afterwards struck.<sup>1</sup> Athens however did not venture to stir, though Demosthenes, according to his rival, claimed the merit of having been the principal author of the movements in Peloponnesus<sup>2</sup>; Alexander's flattering presents may have concurred with the garrison of the Cadmea, to restrain her from a step which would have exposed her to the fate of Thebes.

The news of Alexander's progress in the East rather encouraged than disheartened the Peloponnesians. The further he advanced, the less probable it became that he would ever return to Greece: the longer was the interval allowed for some decisive stroke, while Macedonia was abandoned to its own resources, which were almost exhausted by the incessant demand of levies for the army in the East. They waited only for a favourable opportunity: and this was at length afforded by events which took place in the countries north of Macedonia, which were subject to Alexander. Zopyrion, who had been appointed governor of the maritime region between the Balkan and the Danube, had engaged in a rash expedition against the Scythians, had been defeated and slain; and the greater part of his army, 30,000 men, had shared his fate.<sup>3</sup> It was perhaps this disaster that encouraged Memnon, the governor of Thrace, to throw off his allegiance to Alexander, and to excite the Thracians, who were themselves sufficiently impatient of the yoke, to sup-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Al. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Ctes. § 167

<sup>3</sup> Justin, xii. 1.

port him in his revolt.<sup>1</sup> While Antipater marched to suppress this rebellion, the Peloponnesian confederates, thinking that they now saw a juncture highly propitious to their designs, assembled their forces, and declared open war against Macedonia. The Spartans first took the field under their king Agis, with the entire levies of Laconia, and a body of mercenaries, and gained a decisive victory over an army which was brought against them by Corragus, of whom we do not know whether he was a Macedonian or an Arcadian leader.<sup>2</sup> But he probably commanded the troops of Megalopolis. After his defeat, Agis was joined by the other forces of the league, which, including 10,000 mercenaries, amounted to 20,000 foot and 2000 horse, and laid siege to Megalopolis. He pressed it so closely, that its fall was daily expected, when the news came that Antipater was advancing to its relief. When he heard of the movements in Peloponnesus, he brought the war in Thrace, where he had probably already gained some decisive advantage over the enemy, to a speedy termination: and then hastened southward, on his march collecting the forces of all the states which still adhered to Macedonia, so that when he arrived in Peloponnesus he was at the head of 40,000 men. Agis, though so much inferior in numbers, did not decline a battle, and it seems that he skilfully endeavoured to compensate for the difference by the strength of his position, and that it was not until he was drawn from it in pursuit of the enemy, that the fortune of the day turned in favour of the Macedonians.<sup>3</sup> Early in the action he himself was severely wounded, and carried

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 62.

<sup>2</sup> Freinsheim (Supplement. ad Curt. vi.) has, *juxta Corrhagum Macedonia castellum*: apparently neither understanding the words of Æschines (Ctes. § 165.) nor perceiving the moral impossibility that the battle should have been fought in Macedonia. Corragus however does not sound like a Greek name. We find a Macedonian so called in Diodorus, xvii. 100.

<sup>3</sup> Curtius, vi. 1, 2.

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LLDefeat and  
death of  
Agis.

out of the field ; but finding that his pursuers were on the point of overtaking him, ordered himself to be set down, and, resting on one knee, defended himself to the last with a spirit worthy of Sparta. The allies lost between 5000 and 6000 men ; Antipater, according to the more credible account, more than 3000.

After this defeat nothing remained for the vanquished but to throw themselves on the conqueror's mercy. Antipater however would not undertake to decide on the conditions of peace. To relieve himself from responsibility, or rather perhaps in imitation of the policy which Philip and Alexander had adopted on similar occasions, he assembled a congress at Corinth, and referred the case of the rebellious states to its judgment. The Achæans and Ætolians were condemned to pay a fine of 120 talents to Megalopolis. But the congress itself did not venture to pass sentence on Sparta. She was ordered to place fifty of her principal citizens as hostages in the hands of Antipater, and to send an embassy to Alexander, to learn his pleasure.<sup>1</sup>

This blow riveted the chains forged at Chæronea, which however were still destined to be burst by more than one gallant struggle, though never to be finally shaken off. Alexander, when he heard of Antipater's success, is said to have spoken contemptuously of *the battle of mice*<sup>2</sup>, which his lieutenant had been fighting, while he had been slaughtering myriads,

<sup>1</sup> Droysen's admiration is entirely reserved for his hero, whose conquests he chooses to consider as the cause of Greece : the Greeks who take up arms against Macedonia are a discontented, faithless, mercenary faction : he even goes the length of charging the Spartans (who at least were not a faction) with treason to the cause of Greece, because they refused to take part in the congress of Corinth, and afterwards made war with Alexander. It has been the fate of every struggle for freedom, and one of the hardest trials of those who engage in one, that, if it proves unsuccessful, it is condemned as an enterprise of madmen and traitors. Yet such language ill becomes a historian, whose country so lately shook off a foreign yoke, by an effort which has been applauded more than that of Agis, only because it was more successful.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Ages. c. 15. *μυσμαχία τις*.

and overrunning kingdoms ; and while the event continued unknown, it did not in the slightest degree interfere with his operations. Yet Antipater's victory was perhaps not much less hardly won than either of his own over Darius. But from the distance at which he now stood, Greece and Macedonia began to appear very diminutive objects. His little kingdom was now chiefly valuable to him as a nursery of soldiers ; and the most important advantage which he reaped from the establishment of his power in Greece, was that it ensured a constant succession of recruits for his army. But he had resolved not to be much longer dependent on his European dominions for such supplies. The barbarians, he believed, only wanted training to become as good troops as the Macedonians : and he gave orders that boys should be selected from the hardiest races to be instructed in the Greek language and in the use of Macedonian arms. This was the first step toward an interfusion of European and Asiatic blood, manners, and feelings, which he appears to have contemplated as the firmest support of his throne.



## CHAPTER LII.

## ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS IN BACTRIA AND SOGDIANA.

*Alexander marches toward Bactria. — Treachery of Satibarzanes. — Artacoana. — Philotas. — Loses Alexander's Favour. — Plot of Dimnus. — Trial of Philotas. — Alexander's Accusation. — Unpopularity of Philotas. — His Defence. — He is put to the Torture. — Death of Philotas and Parmenio. — Other Trials for Treason. — Encroaching Spirit of Olympias. — The Ariaspicians. — March across the Paropamisus. — Passage of the Oxus. — Bessus is betrayed and taken. — Alexander reaches the Jaxartes. — Foundation of Alexandria Eschate. — Revolt in Sogdiana. — The Seven Fortresses. — The Asiatic Scythians. — Passage of the Jaxartes. — Defeat of the Scythians. — Enterprise of Spitamenes. — Defeat of the Macedonians. — Alexander's Revenge. — Doom of Bessus. — Scythian Embassy. — Pharasmanes. — Fresh Revolt in Sogdiana. — Alexander lays Siege to the Sogdian Rock. — Roxana. — Success of Spitamenes. — Chase at Bazaria. — Alexander's Court. — Death of Cleitus. — Invasion of Xenippa. — Sysimithres. — Defeat and Death of Spitamenes. — Winter Quarters at Nautaca. — Parætacene. — Fortress of Choriene. — Hermolaus. — Plot of the Pages. — Punishment of the Conspirators. — Callisthenes. — Offends Alexander. — Is accused of Treason. — Put to Death.*

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Alexander  
marches  
toward  
Bactria.

ALEXANDER'S next object, after the subjection of Hyrcania had secured a communication between the shores of the Caspian and the interior provinces on the south side of the chain of Elburz, was to crush the resistance which he had to expect from Bessus and his remaining confederates, and to take possession of the eastern satrapies as far as the borders of India, where a boundless field lay open to his ambition. The power of Bessus was the most formidable, as well on account of the extent and resources of the fertile and populous countries which he governed, as

because the adjacent steppes of Tartary, and the high table-land to the east of his province, both afforded a ready refuge from pursuit, and might again supply him with numerous auxiliaries. It was therefore to this quarter that Alexander's attention was mainly directed. From the Hyrcanian capital he marched into the territory of the Parthyæans, or Parthians—the people who were destined to wrest so large a portion of his empire from his successors—which lay at the southern foot of the Elburz.<sup>1</sup> It must not however be supposed that he retraced his steps. He no doubt advanced along the south-east corner of the Caspian, through Korkan, and then crossed the lower ridges which connect the Elburz with the Indian Caucasus. He thus came within the borders of Aria to a city called Susia, most probably Tous, ruins of which are still found near Meshed, the modern capital of Persian Khorasan.<sup>2</sup> Here he was met by Satibarzanes, the satrap of the province, to whom he restored his satrapy as the reward of his submission. An important ally was thus detached from Bessus: and Aria, acknowledging Alexander's authority, parted Bactria from the southern provinces, two of which, Drangiana and Arachosia, were governed by Barsaentes, one of the murderers of Darius. As Alexander expected reinforcements from Media, he ordered Anaxippus to accompany Satibarzanes with forty horse-dartmen, to prevent any hostilities which might arise through mistake between the natives and the troops which were on their march from the west.

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, xi. 9. V. Hammer (Wiener Jahrbuecher, vii. p. 253.) observes that Parthyæa—which he considers as equivalent to Faraschwad, or the land of the plain and of the mountains—originally comprehended Ghilan, Dilem, Mazanderan, Dabistan, Taberistan, and Kumis. He refers to a dissertation in his *Fundgruben des Orients*, iii. p. 319. Strabo (u. s.) distinguishes only two provinces, Comisene and Chorene, in Parthyæa, or Parthyene, which he makes to extend westward as far as Rhagæ. He does not mark its eastern limits.

<sup>2</sup> “About seventeen miles N. N. W. of Meshed, upon the eastern bank of a small stream that forms a principal branch of the Meshed river.” Fraser, Khorasan, p. 517.

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Treachery  
of Sati-  
barzanes.

Artacoana.

At Susia he received intelligence that Bessus had assumed the tiara, the name of Artaxerxes, and the title of king of Asia; that he had been joined by a great number of Persians, had collected a powerful Bactrian army, and expected to be reinforced by some of the Scythian tribes. Bessus was evidently aware of the advantage which he might derive from the ensigns of royalty; and this was a hint which must have confirmed Alexander in his resolution not to neglect them. He was here joined by a part of the troops from Ecbatana, including the Thessalian volunteers, and other mercenaries, horse and foot, under Philippos and Andromachus, and was rapidly advancing toward the Oxus—in the direction, it seems, of Meru-Shah Jehan,—when tidings reached him that Satibarzanes had put Anaxippus and his party to death, and was collecting all the forces of Aria in the city of Artacoana, with the intention of joining Bessus. He had not supposed that Alexander would have turned aside from his route to disturb his preparations. But Alexander instantly halted, and, having ordered Craterus to follow with the main body of the phalanx, pushed forward with two brigades, the light troops, and the cavalry of the guard, by forced marches toward Artacoana. At the unexpected news of his approach, Satibarzanes took to flight, and was deserted by most of his troops. Artacoana, which stood on a high rock, precipitous on one side, and well supplied with water, did not immediately open its gates; and Craterus was ordered to besiege it, while the king himself pursued the fugitives into the heart of their mountains. Those who remained in the villages were spared: of the rest few escaped death or slavery. On his return to the camp, Artacoana surrendered, and Arsames, a Persian, was appointed satrap of Aria. Not very far from Artacoana, yet probably not so nearly on the same site as has been commonly

supposed, Alexander's eye was struck by the central position and extraordinary fertility of a plain on the banks of the Arius (the Heri-rood), which induced him to found a city there for a Macedonian colony, to be called by his name (Alexandria Ariorum): under that of Herat, it still preserves his memory, and continues to be the great inland *port* of the East<sup>1</sup>, an emporium of commerce between India, Persia, and Tartary. The army then continued its march southward to Prophthasia (probably Furrah in Seistan) the capital of Drangiana. Barsaentes was still less prepared for resistance than Satibarzanes, and he fled across the mountains into the territory of one of the Indian tribes, on the borders of his eastern satrapy Arachosia. But it seems that the fame and the terror of Alexander's arms had gone before him; for he was seized by the Indians, and sent to Alexander, who put him to death.

The army's stay at Prophthasia was rendered unhappily memorable by one of the dark passages in Alexander's history: the first cloud that casts a shadow over his heroic character: the first calamity that embittered his hitherto uninterrupted prosperity. He discovered grounds for suspecting that a conspiracy had been formed against his life, with the privity at least of several of his principal nobles, of some who held the highest offices near his person, and had been distinguished by the most signal marks of his favour and confidence: among the rest by Parmenio's son Philotas. Philotas was at this time the only survivor of three brothers who had accompanied the expedition. Hector, the youngest, had been drowned in the Nile, as Alexander was descending the river on his return to Syria. He had been always much beloved by the king, who was nearly of the same age, and was in-

Christie in Pottinger's Travels, p. 415.

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Loses  
Alexander's  
favour.

terred by his orders with great magnificence. Nicanor, the commander of the hypaspists, died of a sudden illness, while the army was in full march against Bessus: at this loss also Alexander expressed much grief; but as his own movements admitted of no delay, he left Philotas with a body of the cavalry which he commanded, to pay the last rites to his brother's remains. Philotas himself, as the commander of the horse-guard, stood nearer to the king's person than any man in the army, except perhaps Craterus and Hephæstion. None had enjoyed a larger share of the royal bounty; nor indeed would his temper, which was inclined to boundless profusion and to ostentatious magnificence, have been satisfied with any ordinary supplies. Nevertheless it was long since he had really possessed Alexander's confidence. During his stay in Egypt, Alexander had received secret information of language used by Philotas in private conversation with a person to whom he thought he might safely unbosom himself, highly offensive to his sovereign. It was a Greek girl, one of the captives taken at Damascus<sup>1</sup>, in whose company, while he boasted of his own exploits, he affected to speak slightly of Alexander, as a stripling who owed all that he had acquired to himself and his father.<sup>2</sup> Some of these expressions had reached the ears of Craterus, who, if not an enemy, was a rival both of the father's and the son's for Alexander's good graces, and he brought the girl secretly to the palace, to tell her story to the king. It is painful to believe that Alexander could have listened to such contemptible information: but Ptolemy and Aristobulus agreed as to the fact, that it was in Egypt he conceived the first suspicions of Philotas<sup>3</sup>, which appear

<sup>1</sup> She was a native of Pella or Pydna, and had been taken by Autophradates on her passage to Samothrace. Plutarch, de Alex. Fort. II. 7. Al. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, u. s., and Al. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, III. 26.

to have had no other ground. Yet he continued, as we have seen, to employ his services in the same high station, and outwardly to honour him as much as ever with his favour and confidence, while from time to time he received fresh motives for suspicion and resentment through the same impure channel. Still it is scarcely credible that he had hitherto entertained any serious doubts about his loyalty. He could not in that case have allowed him to retain a post which gave constant access to his person: nor would he have chosen Parmenio to superintend the transport of the treasures which were accumulated at Ecbatana, and to command the forces by which they were guarded. But even his respect for Parmenio appears to have been much abated, especially since the battle of Gaugamela, where the old general, whose cautious counsels had never suited his temper or plans, was thought to have betrayed some want of energy and firmness. From Philotas he had been long at heart completely estranged, and was open to still more unfavourable impressions concerning him. The offence which Philotas had given by the indiscretion of his language, had been much aggravated since Alexander had begun to assume the Persian state, and since a question had arisen as to the honours which he was to receive from the Macedonians. Philotas, as was to be expected from his character, which was frank and generous, but arrogant and harsh, appears to have declared himself strongly both against the compliance required from them, and the reasons alleged for it. Both in public and in private he ridiculed the story which was becoming current, of the oracle which had revealed Alexander's supernatural birth. If we may believe Curtius, he had even ventured to write in a letter to the king, that he congratulated him on his admission into the number of the gods, but that he pitied those who were doomed to live under one who

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Plot of  
Dimnus.

was not content with the limits of human nature. It was therefore clear that he might be expected vehemently to oppose the changes which Alexander wished to introduce.

Such was the state of Alexander's feelings toward Philotas, when Dimnus, a Macedonian officer, was charged by a youth named Nicomachus, with whom he was on terms of the closest intimacy, with a plot against the king's life. Nicomachus had informed his brother Cebalinus, that Dimnus had pressed him to take part in the conspiracy, and as an inducement had named several officers of high rank as his accomplices. Cebalinus, who feared to excite suspicion if he applied for an audience of the king, happened to meet with Philotas at the palace gate, and disclosed the danger to him. Philotas entered the palace, and had a long interview with Alexander, but did not mention the information he had received, and in answer to the inquiries of Cebalinus alleged that the king had not been at leisure to attend to him. Another day passed: the same opportunity offered itself; and again no use was made of it. The third day was that on which the attempt was to be made against the king's life. Cebalinus, finding that Philotas had not spoken to the king on the subject, addressed himself to Metron, one of the royal household, who immediately carried the message to Alexander, though he happened to be then in the bath. Cebalinus was brought into his presence, and while he was examined, orders were given to arrest Dimnus. Dimnus however either killed himself, or struggled so violently against the officers, that he received a mortal wound from them.

Thus while his guilt seemed to be proved, no evidence remained as to the particulars of the conspiracy, but such as might be given by Nicomachus, a person

whose character did not entitle him to full credit.<sup>1</sup> But Alexander now discovered that the information had been received two days before by Philotas, and called upon him to account for his silence. Philotas pleaded in excuse, that the author of the story appeared to him so contemptible, that he did not think it fit to be mentioned to the king: he appealed to the whole tenor of his past life in proof of his innocence, and begged the king, however reprehensible his silence might have been, not to interpret it as treason. Alexander appeared to be satisfied with his apology, and offered his hand in token of forgiveness. But he forthwith held a council, at which Nicomachus was introduced, and repeated his story. Philotas was absent; and Craterus seized the occasion to revive the king's suspicions against him. He was supported by Hephæstion, Cœnus, Erigyus, Perdicas, and Leonnatus; and Alexander was persuaded that it was necessary to arrest Philotas, and to wring the truth from him. That evening Philotas supped at the royal table: but in the night his house was surrounded by armed men, who led him a prisoner to the palace. Guards were stationed at the city gates, to prevent the news from being carried to Parmenio. The next day the Macedonian troops were assembled, according to the forms used when they were to constitute a tribunal for the trial of a capital cause, as the representative of the Macedonian people. The corpse of Dimnus was exhibited: the witnesses, Nicomachus, Cebalinus, and Metron, were produced; and, when they had given their evidence, Alexander himself came forward as the accuser of Philotas. The speech which Curtius puts into his mouth, though perhaps

Trial of  
Philotas.

Alexander's  
accusation.

<sup>1</sup> Droysen (p. 292.) describes him as one of the royal pages (*einem Jüngling aus der Edelschuur des Königs*), and does not give the slightest hint of the character implied in the expressions of Curtius, *scortum*, *exoletus*, which are important for a just estimate of the transaction.



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the rhetorical ornaments belong to the Roman writer, may be considered as faithfully representing the substance of that which he delivered. We know from the concurring testimony of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, that the strongest argument on which the charge of treason was grounded, was drawn from the prisoner's silence as to the information he had received from Cebalinus: we may therefore easily believe that Alexander endeavoured to supply the deficiency of this evidence by all the other indications he could collect of treasonable designs. When Philotas was arrested, it seems that his papers were seized, and that among them was found a letter from his father, written before Nicanor's death, in which he gave some advice to both his sons, which, if it had been ascertained that they were engaged in a conspiracy, might have been interpreted as a cautious allusion to it. He bade them take care first of themselves, then of their friends; so, he added, we shall accomplish our purposes. As to the nature of these purposes, it contained no further hint. Yet it seems that Alexander produced this letter as a proof by which he himself was convinced, that both Nicanor and Parmenio shared the treasonable designs of Philotas. As to Philotas himself, the assembly was reminded that he had been the intimate friend of the pretender Amyntas, and had been strongly suspected of having abetted his attempt to ascend the throne after Philip's death: and that Attalus, the implacable enemy of all the children of Olympias, had married his sister. The insolent, if not treasonable language in which he had been long used to speak of his sovereign and benefactor, the audacious letter in which he had sneered at the oracle, were now for the first time made public. Alexander himself could no longer doubt that his life was in danger: it only remained to be seen whether his faithful soldiers, on

whose loyalty he cast himself, would shield their king from the daggers of traitors.

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Against such an accuser, a hero who was the idol of his army, a sovereign on whose favour every man present depended for wealth and promotion, whose life was so precious that it could not be too dearly secured by any sacrifice, and that his simple affirmation of his own apprehensions might seem sufficient proof of his danger, it must have gone hard with any defendant. But Philotas was not even popular with the army: his character was not amiable: he had made himself generally obnoxious by his overbearing manners, by his invidious display of his enormous wealth, by the luxury in which he indulged at the expense of the soldier's comfort: often, when the men were seeking their quarters, had they found the way blocked up by a train of carriages laden with the general's treasures: often had they been turned out of their lodgings to make room for his attendants: and even forced to take a circuitous path, that their noise might not disturb his slumbers. But it seems that he had still more deeply wounded the feelings of the Macedonians by another kind of indiscretion. He did not disguise his contempt for the national dialect and manners: he professed to know no language but Greek, and to need an interpreter to converse with the soldiers, who only spoke their mother tongue: he affected to treat the Macedonians as no better than barbarians: perhaps claiming a pure Hellenic origin, like Alexander's, for his own family: and, as if borrowing the tone of Demosthenes, insulted them with the names of Phrygians and Paphlagonians.<sup>1</sup> Such a person, charged with an atrocious crime by one who was as much admired and beloved as he was hated and envied, could not be viewed with impartial eyes:

Unpopu-  
larity of  
Philotas.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, vi. 11.

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though many may have been moved with a feeling of pity at the reverse of fortune by which the man, whose pride scarcely acknowledged his king as his superior, was brought before them as a criminal to await his doom from them. If there were any who hesitated, and who watched the effect which the accusation produced on others, their doubts must have been removed, when Cœnus, the prisoner's brother-in-law, calling him parricide and traitor, was seen to take up a stone, to set the example of the punishment which, according to ancient usage, a Macedonian assembly, combining the functions of judge and executioner, inflicted in such cases with its own hands.

But this summary proceeding would not have satisfied either Alexander, or the private enemies of Philotas: and it was suspected that this burst of loyal indignation was only a feint by which Cœnus endeavoured to save his kinsman from the further ignominy and torture which awaited him. The king interposed, and declared that the culprit should be heard in his own defence<sup>1</sup>: and, that he might have the full benefit of it, himself in the meanwhile withdrew from the assembly.

His defence.

It would be of little importance, if we were able to ascertain how far the speech of Philotas has been faithfully reported by Curtius: the arguments attributed to him are equally strong, whether he used them or not.<sup>2</sup> It was not pretended that Dimnus, though he was said to have enumerated his principal accomplices for the very purpose of attracting Nico-

<sup>1</sup> Curtius adds that he bade Philotas address the Macedonians in their own language: but this, if he himself had spoken in Greek, is hardly credible: it would indeed have been but a slight aggravation of the injustice of the whole proceeding: but would perhaps have betrayed Alexander's passion too glaringly.

<sup>2</sup> The manner in which Droysen has slurred them over, omitting the greater part and the strongest, and putting the weakest forward, as if there were no others, is perhaps as gross a breach of good faith as a historian ever committed: and yet he ventures to speak (p. 296.) of the uncandid use which Ste. Croix has made of his authorities in his account of this transaction.

machus into the plot, had ever mentioned his name, which would have had more weight than any of the others. He admitted the fact of his silence, which alone gave a colour of probability to the charge: but the king himself had at first professed to be satisfied with the explanation he had given of it: and the utmost it could prove was some degree of imprudence and remissness. He owned that he had not thought a story which came to him through such a channel as the worthless stripling Nicomachus fit for the king's ears: it seemed likely to agitate him with causeless apprehensions, and to lead to the sacrifice of many innocent lives. Alexander himself had taught his friends to be cautious in such matters, when he neglected Parmenio's information about the physician Philippus. But if he had been an accomplice of Dimnus, was it credible that he should have waited passively until the plot was revealed to others? that he should not have stopt the mouth of Cebalinus, or have taken advantage of the free access which he had to the king's person, to forestall the disclosure by the execution of his design? Could he have foreseen the death of Dimnus, or have believed himself safe while he lived? Had he much to gain, or rather not every thing to lose, by the crime which he was said to have meditated? He possessed indeed considerable power and influence through the station which he occupied near the king. But was his popularity with the army such that he could have expected to rise higher when Alexander should be removed?

From an impartial tribunal, which adopted the principle, that a defendant is to be accounted innocent until he has been proved to be guilty, there is little doubt that such arguments would have obtained an acquittal, though they might not dispel all the suspicions raised by the conduct of Philotas. But before he had concluded his defence he was inter-

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He is put  
to the tor-  
ture.

rupted by clamours which too clearly showed the disposition of his judges; and at the end they were ready to have torn him to pieces. But Alexander returned, and adjourned the assembly to the next day, and the prisoner was led back to the palace. It seems to have been felt that such proofs, though sufficient—as they would have been had they been still lighter—to procure the condemnation of Philotas, scarcely afforded a decent ground for a charge against the venerable Parmenio: nor, we may hope, would Alexander himself have consented, without some better evidence, to sacrifice his father's old friend, the general to whose assistance Philip accounted himself most indebted for his conquests<sup>1</sup>, who had been the guide of his own youth, the companion of his victories, who, though he seldom saw his advice followed, was never weary of suggesting what appeared to him the best. It is reasonable to suppose that he at least desired to ascertain the truth on this point, even though he might not have had fortitude enough to act upon it according to the dictates of justice. According to the prejudices of that age, those which then prevailed in the most civilised nation of the earth, and which have been but slowly and partially dissipated by the light which we enjoy, no evidence was so trustworthy as that which was extracted by torture. Philotas was reserved for this trial. He-phæstion, Cræterus, and Cœnus were appointed to preside at the question, while Alexander waited for the result in another apartment, not too distant, it is said, to hear the prisoner's shrieks. Philotas appears to have given way to the force of pain and terror sooner than had been expected, and he at last made a confession as ample and minute as his tormentors

<sup>1</sup> Philip once said, the Athenians were lucky to be able to find ten generals every year: he, in the course of many years, had only found one, Parmenio. Plutarch, R. et L. Ap. Philipp. 2.

desired: yet it was a story so improbable that, even without any knowledge of the previous facts, we should be led to conclude that, since his enemies refused to dictate it, he framed it to suit their wishes. The main thing required was that it should involve his father, as well as admit his own guilt. He confessed that Parmenio had been induced to form a design against the king's life before the death of Darius, by the instigation of his friend Hegelochus, who had since fallen in battle, whose indignation had been excited by Alexander's claim to divine honours. While Darius lived, Parmenio had not thought it prudent to remove the king: he himself—for the admission of the general purpose was not deemed sufficient, unless he also acknowledged his participation in the plot of Dimnus—had hastened his measures through fear lest his father, who was now seventy years old, might be snatched away by death from the command which placed the royal treasure at his disposal.

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The next day this confession was read before the military assembly, in the presence of Philotas, and of the persons named by Nicomachus, who were all despatched on the spot. The next most pressing care was to get rid of Parmenio, before he heard of his son's death. He was at the distance of between thirty and forty days' march: as soon as the news reached him, he might be expected to revolt, and with such a treasure in his hands, had means of doing much harm, if not of endangering Alexander's throne. Polydamas, one of Parmenio's intimate friends, was chosen to carry an order to Cleander, who was next in command at Ecbatana, to put him to death. He went, leaving his brothers as hostages, accompanied by two guides. Mounted on dromedaries, they crossed the desert, and arrived at Ecbatana in eleven days. Polydamas, entering the city by night, delivered the

Death of  
Philotas  
and Parmenio.

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King's letters to Cleander, and the next morning repaired, with him and his principal officers, to Parmenio's residence, where, while the old man was reading a letter which had been forged for the purpose in his son's name, they fell upon him, and slew him. His head was carried to Alexander.

Such is the account given by Curtius of this transaction: in its leading outlines it bears the stamp of truth, and is perfectly consistent with the little that Arrian has reported from Ptolemy and Aristobulus: though the Greek writer passes over it so hastily, that we do not even know whether his authors mentioned the torture. They too probably related the affair as briefly as possible. But their narrative cannot have been more favourable to Alexander's character. For Arrian—so low at the bottom was his estimation of his hero's virtue—declares himself in doubt, whether he believed in Parmenio's guilt, or only felt that his own safety required his death. And in spite of the confession wrung from Philotas, both he and his father appear to have been the victims, much more of resentment and of policy than of suspicion.<sup>1</sup> Yet, barbarous as is the iniquity of the whole transaction, which hideously combines some of the worst features of Greek democracy and of Eastern despotism, we have seen enough of the unhappy position in which

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Williams, apprehending it seems that his readers might feel some misgivings as to his hero's treatment of Parmenio, has been at the pains to find out another charge which might justify the execution, if that of treason should seem to fail. He observes (p. 192.), *One fact is certain — Parmenio had refused to obey orders. Alexander had commanded him to advance from Media through Cadusia, into Hyrcania; and the king's western march into the territories of the Mardi was apparently undertaken for the sake of meeting him. But neither Parmenio nor his troops seem to have quitted the walls of Ecbatana.* (Just before the author had said: *It is not unlikely that Parmenio also paid the last honours to his gallant son — Nicanor, who died in Parthia.*) What Mr. W. asserts to be a certain fact, is nothing more than an utterly groundless and most improbable guess. We might more fairly assume it to be certain, that if Parmenio had committed such an act of disobedience, Mr. W. would not have been the first person to make it known. The time when Parmenio was to begin his march to rejoin the army, is nowhere mentioned: perhaps was never fixed, but was to depend on circumstances, as the arrival of Cleitus. Droysen (p. 268.) assumes — also without authority, but with much more probability — that Parmenio was ordered to set out in the following spring.

Alexander was placed, to render him an object of pity, rather than of blame; and we need not suppose that his generous nature had already been corrupted by power and prosperity. The persons whose conduct throughout the affair strikes us as most revolting, are the Macedonian nobles: especially Craterus. Certainly it was not pure zeal of loyalty that led him to open Alexander's ears to the wretched information which first kindled his resentment against Philotas, and afterwards to direct the tortures by which the suspicions he had instilled into his master's mind were to be confirmed: any more than this was the cause of his frequent quarrels with Hephæstion. Of Hephæstion, as Alexander's personal and dearest friend, we might think more favourably. But it is a suspicious circumstance, that he was rewarded with a share of the high command which had become vacant by the death of Philotas. Alexander did not now deem it safe to commit the whole to one person; not even to his beloved Hephæstion. He divided the horse-guards into two regiments, one of which he gave to Hephæstion, the other to a person little less dear to him, Cleitus son of Dropidas.

This division strongly indicates how deeply distrust, even of the followers whom he admitted to his closest intimacy, had taken possession of his mind. It was the heavy price which he had to pay for his conquests: the penalty, perhaps we may add, of suspicions too lightly indulged: which again were but the natural result of the artificial and uneasy position in which he had placed himself between his old and his new subjects: the necessity of alienating some to gain others, or of attempting to reconcile all at the expense of truth. It would have been wiser, as well as more magnanimous, if he had refused to listen to the officious information of Craterus, or, with the same generous confidence which he had shown to his physician, had communicated it to Philotas.



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Other trials  
for treason.

But the blood which had been shed called for more. After one traitor had been punished, it was not fit that others equally criminal should be spared. And now Alexander the Lyncestian, whose trial had been hitherto deferred through regard for Antipater, whose daughter he had married, was brought out of his prison, after three years' confinement, to answer the charge on which he had been arrested. The hesitation which he betrayed, when thus suddenly called upon for his defence, was interpreted by the soldiers as a proof of conscious guilt, and he fell beneath their spears. But Philotas had many friends of high rank in the army, who, it was natural to suppose, must have been acquainted with his designs, which could scarcely have been accomplished without their concurrence. Among these were the sons of Andromenes, Amyntas, Polemo, Attalus, and Simmias, who all filled important commands. And the suspicion suggested by their intimacy with Philotas, was confirmed by the behaviour of Polemo, the youngest, who left the camp as soon as he heard of his friend's arrest, or torture. His brothers therefore were brought to trial, in the same assembly, according to Curtius, which had just before executed its judgment on Alexander the Lyncestian. The king himself appeared in person as their prosecutor; but as in this case his feelings had not been strongly excited, the tone of his accusation was probably much milder than in that of Philotas. The grounds of the charge, if calmly considered, were manifestly frivolous, unless it was necessary to put every friend of Philotas to death: and Amyntas, who was first called upon for his defence, pleaded their cause so ably, that they were acquitted. He immediately requested that he might be allowed to go in search of Polemo, and undertook to bring him back to the camp. His request was granted, and he returned the same day with his brother, who it seems had been unable

to support the thought of tortures, from which innocence afforded no security. Alexander himself was now satisfied as to Amyntas, who soon after died in his service.

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Alexander's conduct in this last prosecution might seem worthier of a Tiberius, if a better light had not been thrown on it by some facts, for the knowledge of which we are indebted to Curtius, and which are interesting in other points of view. Amyntas, when he was sent to bring new levies from Macedonia, had been ordered by the king to execute his commission without any regard to the protection which might be given by Olympias to those who were unwilling to serve. It seems that Alexander had been informed by Antipater, that his mother had abused her authority in this manner; it was probably one of the many complaints which the regent was obliged to make against her interference in affairs of state, from which her son's directions expressly excluded her. Much as he loved her, he knew enough of her temper to be sure that she would not rest satisfied with a share of power, and therefore thought it best to withhold it from her altogether. Still her restless and haughty spirit gave rise to frequent collision between her and Antipater, whose complaints once drew a remark from Alexander: that Antipater did not know how soon ten thousand letters were blotted out by a single tear of a mother. Among the conscripts brought by Amyntas were some who had taken shelter in the palace, and whom, in obedience to the king's orders, he had compelled Olympias to give up. Hence he became an object of her resentment, and she endeavoured to prejudice her son against him and his brothers. It was not the only case in which she strove to instil suspicion and jealousy—perhaps equally groundless—into Alexander's mind. Her advice indeed, not to be so lavish of his favours as to

Encroaching spirit of  
Olympias.

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raise his friends to a level with princes<sup>1</sup>, may seem to have been dictated by pure maternal affection: yet it admitted of an application to Antipater, which renders the motive questionable.

It does not seem inconsistent with what has been related, that Alexander's distrust should have been extended to his soldiers, or at least that he should have wished to discover whether any of them had been tampered with by their officers. Arrian's silence is no reason for rejecting the statement of other writers, that he adopted the expedient, so familiar to the police of modern governments, of opening their letters. Nor perhaps ought we to reject the farther account, that he collected the men whose correspondence gave proofs of discontent in a separate corps, as a groundless fiction. This may have been the notorious fact; the opening of the letters a conjecture to explain it. The story at least deserves notice, as indicating a report which seems to have been current in the army.

The Ariaspans.

It was probably late in the autumn of 330, when Alexander resumed his march. His object was now, instead of returning into the road to Meru, to make himself master of the passes of Paropamisus, the high chain of mountains which separates Bactria from the valleys that open to the south-east on the basin of the Indus. First however he advanced southward into the fertile plains on the banks of the Etymander (the Helmund), which were then inhabited by a peaceful and industrious tribe, the Ariaspans, who, for the services they had rendered to Cyrus, when on his expedition to Scythia they supplied his famishing army with provisions, had been honoured by the Great King with the title of his benefactors.<sup>2</sup> Such beneficence

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Al. 39. ἰσοβασιλείας.

<sup>2</sup> The whole of this transaction is remarkably illustrated by one which is mentioned by Pottinger, *Travels*, p. 106. The Belooches said *that though they*

might some day prove equally serviceable to a Macedonian army: and it was therefore politic to encourage it. Alexander rewarded the hospitable race with a grant of additional territory, and with some political privileges, which are described under the vague name of freedom: but he did not fail to place them under the government of a satrap. Here it is said he made a sojourn of sixty days, which however he can hardly have devoted to the regulation of this little province. But if, as Curtius relates, he was joined shortly after by the brigades of the phalanx from Ecbatana, it may be supposed that he waited for their arrival. During this interval we find that he was still haunted by the fear of treason. Demetrius, a somatophylax, was arrested as an accomplice of Philotas, and his dignity was bestowed on Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, for whom it laid the foundation of his after greatness.

It must have been near midwinter when he again set out on his expedition against Bessus. He seems to have ascended the valley of the Etymander, and so to have penetrated into Arachosia, the eastern satrapy of Barsaentes, where he marked the site of another Alexandria, which still flourishes under the modern name of Kandahar. The snow lay deep on the mountains, and as he advanced northward the soldiers suffered extreme hardship from the severity of the cold, and the scarcity of provisions. On his road he heard that the Arians had been again roused to insurrection by Satibarzanes, who had entered the province with 2000 horse which he had received from Bessus. He immediately sent Erigyius, Calanus, and Artabazus—who was perhaps supposed to possess some influence

*lived in a desert and were a poor set, they had once entertained Nusseer Khan—who had been to Mushed in Khorassan to assist the king of Kubool against the Persians, and came home through Seistan and the desert—and his army for five days so profusely that he ever afterwards called them the Dil Kooshas, or open-hearted, that is, generous. This was at Nooshky, not 200 miles from the country of the Ariaspiana.*

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March  
across the  
Paropa-  
misus.

over the insurgents—to quell the revolt; and the Parthian satrap Phrataphernes was ordered to co-operate with them. In the meanwhile he arrived at the foot of the highest pass by which he was to cross the Paropamisus, called Caucasus by the Greeks (the Hindoo Kuh), into the basin of the Oxus. And here, perhaps about fifty miles north-west of Cabul, he founded another Alexandria (ad Caucasum), where he planted a colony of Macedonian veterans. The province of the Paropamisus was committed to Proexes, a Persian; the garrison of the city to Niloxenus, one of the officers of his guard.

The time which he spent in these quarters is not distinctly marked by the historians. Strabo says that he wintered there, but Arrian's language would lead us to suppose that he staid there no longer than was necessary for the foundation of the new city: and, as prudence forbade him to wait for the season when new dangers and difficulties would have arisen from the melting of the snows, it may be presumed that he did not let himself be deterred by the severity of the winter. It appears to have been by the pass which leads through the ancient city of Bamian that he crossed the Hindoo Kuh, though our authors do not mention any city which he found in the heart of the mountains. During the first part of its march the army suffered only from cold and fatigue. But as the highlands began to sink toward the vale of the Oxus, and its progress was less impeded by the depth of the snow, it began to experience scarcity of food. Bessus had not yet assembled forces sufficient to withstand the expected invasion, and he placed his whole confidence on the natural obstacles which might retard it. He did not however trust entirely even to the mountain barrier which separated him from his restless enemy, but still further to check his progress, had ordered the whole country which the Macedo-

nians were to traverse, between the lower valleys of the northern side and the left bank of the Oxus, to be laid completely waste: so that Alexander, as he descended, found himself in an artificial wilderness, where he had expected an abundant supply. The provisions of the camp were at length entirely spent, and it was found necessary to sacrifice a part of the beasts of burden to preserve the lives of the men. Even this coarse fare they found no wood to dress, and it was only rendered tolerable by the silphium, which grows in great abundance in these valleys, and is still a favourite article of food among the natives. Yet it seems that Alexander founded another Alexandria at the northern foot of the mountains, to secure both extremities of the pass. The hardships of the march were a little relieved at the Bactrian town of Drapsaca or Adrapsa, where he allowed his troops some days of repose.

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Drapsaca itself seems to have been situate among the highlands: for he is said to have advanced after his halt there to Aornus, which was not only a large town, but, as its name imports, a fortress built on a commanding height: so strong, that Alexander thought fit to leave a garrison in it, though he had taken it, as well as Drapsaca, at the first assault. He then proceeded to Bactra, probably the modern Balk, which we might conclude to have been then as now the chief city of Bactria, if we were certain that Bactra was, as Strabo supposed, the same place as Zariaspa, which Arrian seems to distinguish from it. In the meanwhile Bessus had crossed the Oxus, had burnt the boats which carried his troops over, and then, bending his course toward the north-west, had halted at Nautaca, probably near the modern Karshi, or Nackshab. His Bactrian horse had quitted his standard when they found that he did not mean to await the enemy's approach, but he was still accom-

panied by some powerful chiefs, who were followed by a body of Sogdian cavalry, and by the Dahæ, one of the Scythian tribes. Intelligence of his movements had been brought to Alexander by one of his courtiers, a Magian named Cobares, who thus at the same time showed how little reliance could be placed on the loyalty of the rest. At Bactra he was rejoined by Erigyius, who had quelled the revolt of the Arians, and had slain Satibarzanes himself with his own hands. But it seems that the report which he brought of the conduct of Arsames raised Alexander's suspicions of his fidelity; and he sent Stasanor to arrest him, and to succeed him in his satrapy. That of Bactria he committed to Artabazus, but summoned the Bactrian chiefs to a general assembly, or review of their forces, to be held at Zariaspa on his return. As he was now about to cross the Oxus, he dismissed some of his Macedonian troops, whom their age and infirmities rendered unfit for the laborious service which awaited the army in the Scythian deserts, and the Thessalian volunteers, whose spirit had sunk under the hardships of the march across the mountains, in which many of their horses had perished.

Bessus had probably passed the Oxus at Kilif, where caravans proceeding from Balk to Karshi are still commonly ferried over.<sup>1</sup> The road along which Alexander followed his traces crossed a strip of the great desert which stretches from the Caspian toward the skirts of the high table-land which contains the sources of the Oxus and the Jaxartes. That in this march his army was much distressed by want of water, may be easily believed; though Arrian's silence might lead us to suspect that Curtius has exaggerated its sufferings. It was however one of the many oc-

<sup>1</sup> Burnes, II. p. 212.

casions in which Alexander displayed that passive fortitude, which endeared him to his soldiers no less than his contempt of danger. On the last day's march, as they approached the river, he would not quench his own thirst until their wants had been supplied. The Oxus was here not much less than 800 yards wide<sup>1</sup>: and there were neither boats to be procured, nor materials for building any. There was however no enemy at hand to offer interruption: and Alexander transported his troops safely over on the skins of the tents stuffed with straw. The passage occupied six days. He then pushed across the desert north of the river, toward Nautaca: but on his way was met by envoys from two of the chief followers of Bessus, named Spitamenes and Dataphernes. From them he learnt that the usurper had already experienced treachery like that which he had practised toward Darius. He had been seized by Spitamenes and Dataphernes, who now expressed their readiness to deliver him up to Alexander, if he would send one of his officers to them with a detachment of his army. He appointed Ptolemy to this service with a select body of cavalry and light troops, and ordered him to set forward with the utmost speed in pursuit of the fugitives. Ptolemy executed his orders so zealously, that he performed a march of ten ordinary stages in four days: and on the fourth reached the place where Spitamenes had encamped the day before. Here, it is said, he discovered that the two chiefs were wavering in their purpose as to the surrender of Bessus. This was perhaps a conclusion which he drew from their proceedings: for he may have expected that, as he was coming at their request, they would have waited for him. But it seems that though Bessus was so little esteemed that no hand was raised

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Passage of  
the Oxus.

Bessus is  
betrayed.

<sup>1</sup> Burnes (ii. p. 214.) estimated its breadth at upwards of 800 yards a little lower down, at Khoju Salu.



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in his behalf, they could not depend on the willingness of their troops to submit to the Macedonians. Ptolemy therefore left his infantry behind, and hastened forward with his cavalry to overtake them. In the course of the day he came to a village, or small town, surrounded by a slight fortification, where he found that Bessus had been left in the custody of a few soldiers. Yet it is not quite clear whether they considered themselves as his jailors or his guards; for Ptolemy thought it necessary to encircle the village with his cavalry and to negotiate with the inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> When they were assured that no harm should befall them if they gave up Bessus, they admitted him within their walls, and he took possession of the wretched man who had so dearly purchased the brief enjoyment of a shadow of royalty.

And taken.

Spitamenes and Dataphernes had withdrawn to a short distance; ashamed it is said to appear in person on such an occasion. That Aristobulus was misinformed when he reported that they themselves brought Bessus to Ptolemy, is unquestionable, since the authority of Ptolemy, here a part of the events which he related, is above all suspicion. But it seems probable that they wished it to be believed among their countrymen, that they had reluctantly submitted to the conqueror, when they found that resistance would be unavailing, while from Alexander they claimed the whole merit of the surrender. They appear however to have accompanied Ptolemy, when he returned with his captive to the army. He had sent despatches to announce his success, and at the same time to inquire in what manner Bessus should be brought into the king's presence. Alexander ordered him to be stript naked, and to be stationed

<sup>1</sup> Arrian's language (III. 30.) is ambiguous. It is not clear whether Ptolemy treated with the villagers or the soldiers. The condition, that they should be allowed to depart, seems more applicable to the soldiers.

with a clog round his neck on the right of the road by which the army was to pass. When he himself came up to the place in his chariot, he halted, and after having upbraided the prisoner with the treachery and ingratitude he had shown to his king and benefactor, ordered him to be scourged, while a herald proclaimed the crimes for which he suffered. He did not however immediately put him to death, but committed him to the custody of Oxathres, the brother of Darius, and sent him to Zariaspa, the capital where he had lately appeared in royal state, to be reserved for a still more painful and ignominious punishment.

Alexander had now reached the delightful country irrigated by the waters of the Kohik<sup>1</sup>—Zerafshan, the gold-showering,—which is extolled in the descriptions of Eastern writers, whose praises are confirmed by the testimony of European travellers, as one of the paradises of the world. Its exuberant fertility and beauty have no doubt always made the deeper impression from the contrast they present to the dreary sterility of the adjacent desert, in which the river, by the Greeks called Polytimetus—a term nearly equivalent to its modern epithet—is lost, before it reaches the Oxus, in the salt lake of Dengiz. With the horses which he found in its pastures he supplied the losses which his cavalry had sustained in its march across the mountains and through the desert on both sides of the Oxus: and then advanced to Maracanda, the capital of Sogdiana, which, through a singular coincidence, has retained the greater part of its ancient name in that of Samarcand, which it nevertheless derived from a totally distinct tradition.<sup>2</sup> He placed a Macedonian garrison in the citadel; but,

<sup>1</sup> So called from a Kohik, or hillock, which rises between the river and Samarcand (Baber, p. 49.). Its ancient name was Soghd (Introd. to Baber, p. xxxvii.).

<sup>2</sup> Samarcand means the city of Samar. Droysen however suspects that this etymology has been fabricated to account for the modern name.

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LII.

Alexander  
reaches the  
Jaxartes.

it seems, left Spitamenes—though not with the title of satrap—in possession of great authority, probably as governor of the district which he had held under Bessus. He then advanced toward the north-east, through the hill country of Uratippa, or Osrushnah, and having crossed the chain which branches westward from the Ak-Tagh, or in which the Asferah mountains sink into the desert, arrived at the left bank of the Jaxartes, probably not very far below Khojend; not however without molestation from the natives, who, suddenly descending from the mountains, fell upon the Macedonians, while dispersed in quest of forage, and carried off a number of prisoners. Alexander pursued them into their fastnesses, and did not leave their country until he had reduced them to submission, but himself received a wound from an arrow which for some time confined him to a litter.

It was, according to Curtius, in the course of his march through Maweralnahr, though whether north or south of Maracanda his description does not indicate, that he came to a small town where Xerxes, on his return from Europe, had planted the priests and people of Branchidæ, who had betrayed the treasures of their sanctuary into his hands. That the Milesian troops, who served in the Macedonian army, should have been eager to take vengeance for the sacrilege on the descendants of the criminals, may be easily conceived; but that Alexander should have allowed them not only to plunder and destroy the town, but to massacre the inhabitants, sounds hardly credible; though the story cannot be safely rejected as a groundless fiction.

North of Uratippa, on the skirts of the desert which intervenes between the hills and the Jaxartes, stood a chain of fortresses, seven in number, which had been built within a short distance of each other, apparently

for the purpose of protecting Sogdiana against the incursions of the Scythian tribes: the principal among them bore a name which the Greeks translated into Cyropolis, and which seems to indicate that they all owed their origin to the founder of the Persian monarchy. Alexander left a small garrison in each before he advanced to the left bank of the Jaxartes. He had now reached the borders of a vast region, the nature and extent of which were very imperfectly known to the best informed among the Greeks. The only facts which the Macedonians were able to ascertain as to their position were, that the country beyond the Jaxartes was inhabited by a race of barbarians who resembled the Scythians of Europe, and that the river discharged its waters into a great lake, or inland sea. Possibly they also heard the name of Tanais among those by which it was known to the tribes of various origin which were seated on its banks. But perhaps even without this suggestion they might easily entertain the fancy, that this was the stream which divided Europe from Asia, and, after a long course through the heart of the Scythian wilderness, entered the lake Mæotis. It was a persuasion which must have been very agreeable to their pride, to believe that they had traversed the whole of Asia in this direction, and it must have soothed their better feelings to think that they were again on the confines of Europe. Alexander could not have wished to dispel this allusion, even if he did not take pains to encourage it; but it is difficult to believe that he shared the ignorance out of which it arose, and that he had not a generally correct conception of the distinction between the Caspian and the Mæotis, which had been long understood in Greece. He did not intend, for the present at least, to push his conquests beyond the Jaxartes. There was nothing to attract him into the Scythian deserts while India lay

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Foundation  
of Alex-  
andria  
Eschate.

behind him unexplored: and even if he had not reached the northern limits of Asia, he might well be content that his empire should be bounded on this side as that of Cyrus had been. But he wished both to erect a durable monument of his expedition, and to provide for the security of this frontier more effectually than had been done by the seven fortresses. He therefore selected a site on the Jaxartes for a new Alexandria. No place seems to correspond to this object so well as the ancient city of Khojend, which lies on the left bank, at the point where the river issues from the highlands of Ferghana, and changes its course from south-west to north-west: though it does not appear to have been ever very flourishing — a consequence perhaps of its unwholesome air<sup>1</sup> — and the tradition of its Greek origin has been lost, transferred perhaps to Samarcand, which still boasts of Alexander as its founder.<sup>2</sup>

While he was thus employed, he received two embassies, one from the Scythians beyond the river — the Europeans as they were called by the Macedonians — and another from a race in which he recognised those Abians whom Homer had celebrated as the justest of mankind. It is not clear whether their name contributed to suggest the thought of this identity, or whether it was merely an inference from the contrast between their peaceful habits and those of the predatory hordes which belonged to the same family. Still less can we hope to ascertain their exact situation: though it is most probable that they were seated in the upper valleys of the Jaxartes, where, secured by their mountain barriers, they maintained a quiet independence. If their embassy struck Alexander's imagination, that of the northern Scythians excited a much deeper interest; for it was

<sup>1</sup> Baber, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Baber, p. 48.

from them that he had most to fear. He sent some of his officers back with their envoys, under the pretext of cultivating their friendship, but with the purpose of gaining information, as to their country and military strength, which might be useful to him in some future expedition.

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LIII.

In the meanwhile an insurrection broke out in his rear, which spread rapidly over the newly conquered provinces. It began among the mountaineers of Uratippa, who made a sudden attack on the seven fortresses, and, having killed the Macedonian garrisons, proceeded to strengthen their fortifications, and to prepare for a siege. But they obtained succours from the inhabitants of the Sogdian valleys, where Spitamenes and his associates possessed the chief influence: and though they had not yet declared themselves by any open act, Alexander had reason to believe that the revolt was caused by their instigation. Spitamenes was a bold, ambitious, restless man, and though he appears to have met with a gracious reception from Alexander, had perhaps expected a more liberal reward for his treachery to Bessus, and may have been disappointed because he had not been promoted to the vacant satrapy. He had not only excited the Sogdians to rebellion, but had drawn many of the Bactrian chiefs over to his side, by insinuations, that the assembly to which they had been summoned was meant as a snare for their lives or liberties.

Revolt in  
Sogdiana.

Alexander's first care was to reduce the seven fortresses. He immediately ordered a number of scaling ladders to be provided, and sent Craterus with a detachment to invest Cyropolis, while he himself marched against Gaza—a name which seems to survive in the desert of Ghaz, which stretches westward of Uratippa to the sea of Aral—the fortress which lay nearest to the camp. It was defended by a mud wall of no great height, which was soon cleared by the

The seven  
fortresses.

missiles of the besiegers and rapidly scaled. Alexander ordered all the men to be put to death: the women and children formed part of the plunder: the town was reduced to ashes. He then marched without delay against the next, which was stormed the same day, and underwent like treatment. The following morning he advanced upon a third, and while he assaulted it, sent the cavalry forward to prevent the inhabitants of the two next from making their escape. The unhappy barbarians, when they learnt the fate of the neighbouring town, first from the smoke of the conflagration, and then from the fugitives, quitted their own to seek refuge in the mountains, and falling into the hands of the Macedonian cavalry, were almost all cut to pieces. Thus in two days Alexander had made himself master of five out of the seven. Cyropolis, which was now the next in his line of march, was both the most strongly fortified, and held by the most numerous and warlike garrison; consisting of 15,000 men, who had thrown themselves into it as the place where they might hope to make the most persevering resistance. Alexander here brought up his engines to play upon the walls on one side, and led the enemy to believe that his sole object was to open a breach there. But he had observed that on another side, the bed of a torrent which passed through the town, and was now dried up<sup>1</sup>, left a large entrance that had neither been filled up nor guarded. While the attention of the besieged was engrossed by the attacks of the engines, he himself, with a small body of light troops, made a circuit, and, sheltered by the high banks of the empty channel, crept into the town unobserved. He immediately hastened to break open the nearest gates. The barbarians however were not dismayed by the sight of the enemy within

<sup>1</sup> This, as Droysen observes, proves that Cyropolis was not Khojend and did not lie on the Jaxartes.

their walls, but boldly advanced to repel him; and a warm engagement ensued, in which Alexander was stunned by a heavy stone which fell on the nape of his neck, and not only disabled him for the moment, but for some days almost deprived him of sight.<sup>1</sup> The barbarians were nevertheless forced to give way, and were soon completely overpowered by a multitude of fresh troops, who poured in through the gates and over the deserted wall. Eight thousand fell in the carnage which followed; the rest took shelter in the citadel; but, as it was not supplied with water, they too were fain to surrender the next day. Their lives it seems were spared; as, according to Ptolemy, were those of the seventh garrison, which threw itself on the conqueror's mercy; but all the prisoners were kept in close confinement, to be transported out of the country.

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LII.

Short as this contest had been, it showed a spirit in the barbarians which must have led Alexander to anticipate a still fiercer and more obstinate struggle with the other insurgents: and it was scarcely at an end, before he found himself threatened by a new enemy. For on his return to his camp on the Jaxartes, he saw its right bank lined by a host of Scythians, whom Arrian distinguishes from those to whom the embassy had been sent, as the Asiatic. They probably occupied the country to the north-east of the river, and differed in blood and language from those who ranged over the steppes westward, and to the north of the sea of Aral and the Caspian. They might think their independence endangered by the rising city: but it seems that they had also been urged by the agents of Spitamenes, to make their appearance while the invader was occupied with the

The Asiatic  
Scythians.

<sup>1</sup> So Plutarch (de Al. Fort. 11. 9.), though he makes Hyrcania the scene of the occurrence.



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insurrection in the south. At the same juncture news arrived that Spitamenes had taken up arms and was besieging the Macedonian garrison in the citadel of Maracanda. Alexander sent a detachment to its relief, consisting of 1500 foot and 800 horse, all mercenaries, with sixty of his cavalry guard under the command of Andromachus, Menedemus and Caranus. But he appointed his interpreter, Lycian, named Pharnuches, to the command of the whole division, deeming him qualified, by his knowledge of the language, and by the dexterity which he displayed in his intercourse with the barbarians, to conduct an expedition in which more, it seems, was to be accomplished by address than by force. The new city—though it was only twenty days since the foundations had been laid—was by this time surrounded with a wall high enough to sustain an attack and he now planted a colony in it, composed chiefly of Greek mercenaries, but with a mixture of natives and of Macedonian invalids. Having then consecrated it with sacrifices and games, he prepared to chastise the Scythians.

They were confident in their prowess, and at first attributed the inaction of the Macedonians to the fear which it inspired. As they shot their arrows across the river, which was here not very broad, they defied Alexander with barbarian insolence, and threatened that, if he attempted to attack them, he should learn the difference between the Scythians and the effeminate races which he had hitherto subdued. Alexander ordered pontons or rafts to be made, and the skins of the tents to be prepared like those with which he had transported his troops across the Oxus. In the meanwhile Aristander sacrificed, to consult the

<sup>1</sup> According to Arrian (iv. 3.), voluntary settlers from the neighbourhood. Curtius says (vii. 6. 27.) that they were prisoners whom Alexander ransomed but it seems not very likely that he would have entrusted them with such a post.

gods on the issue of the enterprise. The victims were found to forebode some disaster: and the king, it is said, notwithstanding his impatience, did not at first venture to neglect the omen. But when on a second trial they still presented a threatening aspect, he declared that he would brave any danger rather than bear the insults of the Scythians any longer. Aristander calmly replied, that he could not make a report contrary to the intimations given by the gods, to suit Alexander's pleasure. One might suspect some collusion between the king and his soothsayer, if we believed, what Curtius relates, that the sacrifices suddenly proved propitious. Arrian however seems to have read, that they continued unfavourable to the last, and that Alexander embarked in spite of them. It seems more probable therefore that Aristander, who no doubt understood the practical use of his science as well as Xenophon, wished to divert his master from an undertaking which, even without any adverse omens, he might have judged to be very dangerous: especially as Alexander had not yet quite recovered from the effects of the blow he had received at Cyropolis. And Curtius gives strong warrant for the conjecture, that he was acting in concert with Hephestion, Craterus, and Erigyius, who all endeavoured to dissuade the king from his purpose.

When the pontons were prepared, he ordered the engines to be planted by the water's edge, while the troops were drawn up along the bank ready to embark. The Scythians were riding up and down on the opposite side with their usual gestures of defiance. At an appointed signal, a discharge of missiles began, with an effect which seems to have amazed and terrified the barbarians nearly as much as the fire-arms of the Spaniards did the natives of the New World. Several of them were wounded, and one of their bravest warriors fell from his horse, pierced through

Passage of  
the Jax-  
artes.

CHAP.  
LII.

Defeat of  
the Scy-  
thians.

both buckler and corslet. At this sight the rest retreated out of the reach of the engines, and Alexander seized the opportunity to begin the passage. He himself led the way. The bowmen and slingers were landed first, and were ordered to ply the enemy with their missiles, that they might not be able to fall upon the infantry until the whole of the cavalry had crossed over. As soon as the whole army had come to land, he sent a small detachment of cavalry to charge the enemy. But the Scythians waited for their approach, and then suddenly wheeling round, assailed their flanks with a shower of arrows, while by the rapidity of their movements they eluded every attack. Alexander, seeing his troops engaged in an unequal contest, advanced with the main body of his horse, interspersed with the bowmen, and the rest of the light infantry; and when he came up to the scene of action, sent some squadrons forward to charge, while he followed at the head of a column flanked with the light troops.<sup>1</sup> The Scythians, threatened by this second division, did not venture to repeat the evolution on which they usually relied, but which would now have exposed their flank to the enemy. As little were they able to sustain the charge with which they were assailed in front. They did not long keep their ground, but sought safety in flight. Alexander however was not to be satisfied with a decided victory. He was bent on pursuing them until the last man was slain or taken. He pressed forward, in spite of the scorching heat, with unabated speed, and only paused for a few moments at a well to slake his burning thirst. But the water proved brackish, or otherwise noxious, and he soon began to experience the effects of the draught, which compelled him to relinquish

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Williams takes a different view of Alexander's tactics, which is no doubt equally consistent with Arrian's description. But Droysen also supposes the column to have attacked the flank of the Scythians.

the pursuit, and to permit himself to be carried back, in a state of extreme danger, to the camp. So, Arrian observes, Aristander's prediction was fulfilled: and he believed that it was only Alexander's illness that saved the Scythians from extermination. About 1000 of them were left on the field, and 150 taken. The defeat struck the rest of the people with awe, and Alexander soon after received an embassy from their king, or, as he was perhaps then called, the Khakhan, offering excuses for the hostile proceedings of his countrymen; which he represented as the acts of a single tribe, not authorised by the general consent of the nation: and professing himself willing to submit to Alexander's pleasure. Alexander graciously accepted the apology, which he could not becomingly have rejected, unless he had followed up the war in Scythia, for which he had now no inclination or leisure. He even restored the prisoners without a ransom. The fame of such clemency and liberality, coupled with that of his victory over a people which had hitherto been deemed by its neighbours invincible, attracted the homage of the Sacæ, who seem to have ranged over the highlands to the west of the chain of Belur Tâgh, and behind their mountain barriers might have thought themselves secure from his arms. He sent one of his officers with their envoys, when they returned, under the same pretext, and with the same view, as in the case of the Scythian embassy.

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But his attention was now drawn to another quarter by the tidings he received of the corps which he had sent under the orders of Pharnuches. Before it arrived at Maracanda, the garrison had successfully repelled the assaults of Spitamenes, and when he heard that another Macedonian force was approaching, he raised the siege, and retreated toward a city, which Arrian does not name, but which he describes as the

Enterprise  
of Spita-  
menes.

CHAP.  
LII.

Defeat of  
the Mace-  
donians.

capital of Sogdiana—a title which he had before given to Maracanda. This second capital, as it undoubtedly stood lower down in the vale of the Sogd, may be now represented by Bokhara. Pharnuches and his colleagues hastened to overtake him, and continued to pursue him even after he had taken refuge in the desert of Khiva. Here however he was joined by a body of 600 horse, which the Scythian tribes of this region sent to his aid, when they found that their country had been invaded: and thus reinforced he ventured to wait for his pursuers. They came up with him in a plain on the skirts of the desert, which afforded ample room for the evolutions in which the Scythian cavalry excelled, and which, as we have seen, had called for Alexander's military skill, as well as a superior force, to baffle them. Spitamenes now employed them with complete success. His Scythian allies, eluding the charge of the Macedonian cavalry, whose horses were enfeebled by a laborious march and the scarcity of food, and wheeling round the phalanx, galled its flanks with their arrows, and as often as they were put to flight returned after a short interval to the attack. It soon became evident that the only hope of safety for the Macedonians lay in a speedy retreat to some place of shelter, and the generals resolved to fall back upon the Polytimetus, which offered a refuge in the woods that lined its banks. They formed their division in a hollow square, and reached the river, though pursued by the barbarians, without much loss. But it seems that their movements were not well concerted, and that Pharnuches, whose talents were probably not equal to such an emergency, did not possess sufficient authority over his colleagues. Caranus, who commanded the cavalry, no sooner saw the river before him, than, without orders, and before the rest were aware of his intention, he pushed forward to gain the opposite

bank. When this movement was observed by the infantry, who were still more eager to escape from the continual molestation which they were utterly unable to repel, they did not wait for a command, but followed in disorderly haste, and plunged into the water. The Scythians perceived the advantage which was offered to them by the enemy's mistake, and instantly dashing into the river, attacked the fugitives on all sides. A few only had landed, and these were for the most part overtaken and cut down. The rest were repulsed from the bank, which was high and steep, and exposed without defence to the enemy's arrows. At length they all made for a small island, which indeed afforded them firm footing and the use of their shields, but seems to have been open on all sides to the missiles of their assailants. Here almost all perished: the few prisoners who fell into the hands of the barbarians were put to death in cold blood. According to Aristobulus, who however gave a different account of the operations which led to this result—not more than 40 horse, and about 300 foot, made their escape to bear the mournful tidings to Alexander.

It was the first disaster that had befallen his arms: and he hastened to wipe off the stain. Spitamenes had been encouraged by his success to advance again on Maracanda, and renew the siege of the citadel. Alexander, by one of his extraordinary marches, appeared there on the fourth day after he had moved from the bank of the Jaxartes. But, on the news of his approach, Spitamenes again took to flight, and retraced his steps toward the desert. Alexander pursued him with ardent speed, until he reached the scene of the recent carnage, where he halted to pay the last honours to the remains of the slain. But he still did not give up the hope of overtaking Spitamenes, before he came to the edge of the boundless

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desert, into which it would have been madness to follow him. He therefore returned into the vale of the Polytimetus, and ravaged it, as he marched up the river, in its whole length and breadth: reducing the fortresses into which the unfortunate inhabitants fled for shelter, and putting to death all whom he found there as accomplices in the revolt of Spitamenes. This is certainly one of the acts of Alexander's life for which it is most difficult to find an excuse. There seems to be no ground even for the wretched plea of necessity, or policy, which has been urged in his behalf. Both Curtius<sup>1</sup> and Arrian<sup>2</sup> afford reasons for believing that the mass of the Sogdian population was peaceably disposed, and had been urged into insurrection against its will by the influence and arts of Spitamenes. The real motive of the desolation with which the conqueror visited this lovely region, can hardly be mistaken. It was manifestly resentment for the dishonour of his arms, the loss of his troops, and the escape of Spitamenes. He wreaked his vengeance on the innocent, because he was not able to reach the guilty. But if anger is to be admitted as an extenuation of such cruelty, the most horrible atrocities of a Jenghiz, a Timur, or a Nadir, must be accounted venial offences. It ought rather to be acknowledged, that humanity was not one of the qualities that adorned Alexander's character, and that the clemency for which he has been often praised, did not rest on this foundation, but was the result of less amiable feelings, even where it was not the effect of a mere calculating policy. He could not perhaps have filled the part which he acted in the history of the world, if he had been capable of letting an

<sup>1</sup> VII. 6. 24., speaking indeed only of the population of Maracanda.

<sup>2</sup> IV. 3. and 6., in his statement of the purpose for which Pharnuches was appointed to conduct the expedition: ἐπὶ τῷ καθομιλῆσαι τοῖς βαρβάροις μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

emotion of pity restrain him in the career of his ambition. In the narrative of his conquests there is hardly room for a moral reflection on the misery they caused: because it would be equally appropriate every where. But he is answerable as a man, even to posterity, for all the evil he wrought, which did not essentially belong to his vocation as a conqueror.<sup>1</sup>

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The year 329 was now drawing to a close, and as tranquillity, or the solitude which conquerors call peace, had been established in Sogdiana, Alexander, leaving Peucolaus with 3000 men as satrap of the province, proceeded to take up his winter quarters in Zariaspa. Here he was joined by the satraps Phrathernes and Stasanor, who brought Arsames, the suspected satrap of Aria, and Barzanes, who had been appointed to the government of Parthyæa by Bessus, with them in chains. About the same time he received reinforcements, of Greek mercenaries brought by Asander and Nearchus, and of Asiatic troops which had been levied by Asclepiodorus, the satrap of Syria. The generals who had escorted Menes and the treasure to the coast, also met him at Zariaspa. And now he held a solemn council, which was probably attended not only by his own officers but by the Bactrian chiefs, to decide finally on the fate of the traitor Bessus. He was condemned to be

Doom of  
Bessus.

<sup>1</sup> Droysen's attempt to palliate the barbarity of Alexander's proceedings in this case is the more revolting, because he gives entire credit to the statement of Curtius, as to the reluctance with which the Sogdians engaged in the insurrection, and believes that the modern Tadzhiks of Bokhara represent the original peaceful and industrious race of subjects which inhabited the country at the time of the Macedonian invasion. Yet we are called upon, not merely to excuse the ruthless destroyer, but to admire *the clearness and rigour with which he adjusted his plans to his resources*. A merit which cannot be denied to Robespierre. It is much to be regretted that so excellent a work as this of Droysen's should be disfigured by an idolatry which sacrifices everything to its hero. The language of Anaxarchus is as unbecoming in the mouth of a historian as of a philosopher. Mr. Williams too, whose humanity bursts out in a blaze of indignation at the bare thought of Julian's devastations in Assyria (*Essay on the Geography of the Anabasis* p. 211.), is not at all moved by the *vengeance* which Alexander exercised in Sogdiana. (*Life of Al.* p. 216.) Indeed the expression that *he overran the whole country* hardly leads the reader to suspect anything more than the suppression of the rebellion.



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mutilated, according to Persian usage, in his nose and ears, and then to be conveyed to Ecbatana, to suffer death in the presence of an assembly of Medes and Persians, which was to be called together to witness his punishment. There can be little doubt that Alexander's motive for this rigorous treatment of Bessus, was not so much indignation at his crime, as a politic regard for the majesty of the throne, which had been outraged in the person of Darius. Arrian justly censures his compliance with the barbarous practice of superadding torture to death. It seems however to have been designed to gratify Oxathres, and the other kinsmen of Darius, to whom, according to Curtius and Diodorus, the execution was committed.<sup>1</sup> They are said to have put him to a cruel death<sup>2</sup>, and even extended their vengeance to his lifeless remains, which they carefully guarded, that they might not be torn by bird or beast, an essential condition, according to the Magian religion, of an honourable interment.<sup>3</sup>

Scythian  
embassy.

During his stay at Zariaspa, his ambassadors returned from the country of the European Scythians,

<sup>1</sup> Droysen (p. 327.) observes that Alexander's treatment of Bessus is a remarkable proof how much he respected Eastern prejudices. Mr. Williams on the contrary is of opinion that *Alexander deeply erred in ordering Bessus to be scourged publicly for his crimes*: and that *the feelings of the Persians were as much outraged by the degrading punishment of Bessus, as those of the English nobility would be, were they to see a duke of Norfolk or Northumberland flogged by the hands of the common hangman through the streets of London*. The propriety of this illustration may be partly estimated from the nature of the punishments which the Persian kings were used to inflict on any of their subjects who incurred their displeasure. As to the question itself, it may be sufficient to observe, that Arrian blames Alexander for adopting a barbarian usage in the punishment of Bessus; that according to Diodorus and Curtius, Bessus was tortured by the Persians themselves; that Alexander could not have intended to outrage the feelings of the Persians by the punishment he inflicted on the murderer of their king; and that his means of judging on this subject were at least as good as the best scholar enjoys at this day. He too had read his Xenophon.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xvii. 83., Plutarch, Al. 43.), who imputes the atrocity to Alexander himself. According to this account he was torn, limb from limb, between two trees, which were first bent, and then suddenly allowed to spring back. But Curtius only represents him as fastened to a cross, after having being mutilated, and there pierced with arrows.

<sup>3</sup> Curtius, vii. 5. 40. Compare Herodotus, i. 140.

accompanied by Scythian envoys, sent by a new king, the brother of the last, who had succeeded to the throne in the interval after the first embassy. They brought presents and a message from their prince of even more friendly import than that which Alexander had received from his predecessor. He professed the most unreserved submission to Alexander's pleasure, and offered his daughter's hand as a pledge of the close alliance which he wished to contract with his powerful neighbour. If Alexander should not think fit to accept this proposal, he suggested that the object might be accomplished by an union between the great men of the Macedonian court and the daughters of the principal Scythian chiefs. Alexander received the envoys most graciously, and assured them that there was no need of such a connection to cement the friendship that subsisted between him and their king.

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About the same time he received a still more gratifying proof of the impression made by the fame of his victories, and of his personal character, on the neighbouring barbarians, in the arrival of a powerful chief named Pharasmanes, who is described as king of the Chorasmanians, and whose territories, which long preserved the name of Khauresm, lay on the lower Oxus and the south coast of the sea of Aral, probably comprehending the whole of the modern khanate of Khiva, and extending perhaps farther northward, between the Aral and the Caspian. He came attended by a body of 1500 horse, not merely with general offers of submission and service, but it is said with a distinct tender of his aid for a particular object which he himself suggested. He described his own dominions, we are informed, as bordering on the land of the Colchians and the Amazons, and was ready, if Alexander was inclined to make an expedition against those celebrated races, both to accompany him as his guide, and to supply his army with

Pharas-  
manes.

provisions. It is difficult here to distinguish between truth and fiction. The mention of the Amazons seems clearly to prove that the proposals of Pharasmanes have not been correctly reported. This supposed nation of female warriors was an object of strong curiosity to Alexander's soldiers, who had been familiar with the story from their childhood, and as they advanced toward the north-east, appear to have been continually expecting to fall in with them. Hence a report became current, and found a place in the works of the greater part of Alexander's historians, that, on the banks of the Jaxartes, he had received a visit from a queen of the Amazons. But the Chorasmian king, if he was acquainted with the name, must have heard it first from the Greeks themselves. Nor is it easy to explain how he could have been led to describe himself as a neighbour of the Colchians, from whom he knew himself to be separated by a great distance, whether of land or sea. Alexander also must have been perfectly aware that, when he moved eastward from the shores of the Caspian, he was leaving the seats of the Colchians farther and farther behind him. Still it is credible enough that Pharasmanes may have proposed to conduct him round the northern shores of the Caspian, for the purpose of subduing the tribes which were seated between it and the Euxine. He himself perhaps had but a vague notion of the distance; and Alexander must have greatly underrated it, if he really made the answer which Arrian attributes to him: that he must first march into India, and so complete the conquest of Asia: he would then return to Greece, and make an expedition with his whole force, naval as well as military, into the countries on the Euxine: and he desired Pharasmanes to keep himself in readiness then to assist him: in the meanwhile to maintain a good understanding with Artabazus and the other satraps

of the provinces which lay nearest to his territories. The plan itself however which this answer indicates, is such as we may very well believe Alexander to have entertained.

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The accounts remaining of his next two campaigns are very confused. Neither Curtius nor Arrian enable us distinctly to follow his movements. Arrian gives but a brief outline, dwelling only on a few incidents, and evidently not strictly adhering to the order of time: and Curtius mentions some facts, which raise a suspicion that the Greek author has either omitted or totally misrepresented some very important operations. According to his account, when Alexander moved from Bactra or Zariaspa in the spring of 328, he crossed the river Ochus, and came to a city called Marginia, in the vicinity of which he founded six towns, at a short distance from one another, on lofty hills, that they might the more easily combine their forces for mutual aid to bridle the disaffected province. If the Ochus was, as is commonly believed, one of the streams which flow toward the Caspian from the mountains which form the barrier that separates the table-land of Khorasan from the low countries south of the Oxus, there could be little doubt that the name Marginia is connected with those of Margiana, and of the river Margus, or Murghab, from which the province was so called: and it might be supposed that Alexander, before he crossed the Oxus, had made an expedition southward to quell some disturbances which had taken place in Margiana, and to secure the communication between Bactria and Asia by the lower road, which he had himself designed to take before he was diverted from his purpose by the insurrection of Satibarzanes. But it is certainly easier to believe that Curtius was altogether mistaken in this statement, than that Arrian either wholly omitted to mention these transactions, or de-

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Fresh re-  
volt in Sog-  
diana.

scribed them in a manner which, but for this hint of the Roman writer, would have rendered it impossible to recognise their real nature. It is besides clear, that during the winter sojourn at Zariaspa Alexander's attention was fully engaged by the affairs of Bactria and Sogdiana.

Some of the Bactrian chiefs still held out against him, and though the greater part were kept quiet by his presence, he saw enough to convince him that he could not depend on their submission, any longer than they were overawed by a superior force, at least while Spitamenes was at hand to excite them to revolt: and he learnt that notwithstanding his desolating ravages, the Sogdians were not reconciled to his yoke, but intrenching themselves in their fastnesses among the hills, defied the authority of Peucolaus. He therefore left a strong corps in Bactria under four generals, Polysperchon, Attalus, Gorgias, and Meleager, who however were it seems all placed under the command of Craterus<sup>1</sup>, to reduce the remaining insurgents, and to restrain the rest of the population from new attempts, and himself proceeded to cross the Oxus. While he was encamped on its bank, its water being so loaded with clay as to be scarcely drinkable<sup>2</sup>, wells were dug for a better supply, and from one, which was opened close to Alexander's tent, there gushed up a spring of naphtha, or, as the Greeks called it, oil.<sup>3</sup> Aristander was consulted on the prodigy, and foretold a very laborious, but successful campaign.

Having passed the river he divided his forces into five columns, one of which he placed under the com-

<sup>1</sup> This may be safely inferred from iv. 17., though Arrian, through negligence which seems to show that he, like Alexander, was impatient to reach India, has omitted to mention the name of Craterus with those of the four generals.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, vii. 10. 13.; and so it is described by Burnes, vol. ii. p. 214., second ed.

<sup>3</sup> *Naphtha occurs in considerable springs on the shores of the Caspian Sea. — It is used instead of oil.* Ure's Dictionary of Chemistry, art. NAPHTHA.

mand of Hephæstion, another under Ptolemy, a third under Perdiccas, and the fourth under Cœnus and Artabazus. They were directed to traverse the country in various directions, and to meet him and the fifth division at Maracanda. The chief object was to reduce the strongholds in which the insurgents had taken refuge; and there can be little doubt that, as usual, he reserved the most arduous of these enterprises for himself. We may therefore here adopt the order of Curtius, who relates that he now marched against a fortress which was deemed the strongest in the country, so as to be distinguished from the rest by the simple appellation of the Rock.<sup>1</sup> It was held by a chief named Arimazes, who had collected a great number, according to Curtius 30,000, of his countrymen in it; and the general belief that it was impregnable, had induced the Bactrian Oxyartes, who had been a follower of Bessus, and had either never submitted to Alexander, — as he did not, it seems, concur in the treachery of Spitamenes against Bessus — or had again revolted, to send his wife and daughters to take shelter within its walls. This was an additional motive to quicken Alexander's eagerness for the possession of the place. It was, like the hill fortresses of India, an insulated rock, precipitous on all sides, and only accessible by a single narrow path. Provisions had been laid in sufficient, it was thought, even if the siege should last two years. Alexander himself, when he saw it, was almost inclined to despair. But he sent Cophas the son of Artabazus to summon Arimazes to surrender. The chief received the message with derision, and asked whether the

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Alexander  
lays siege to  
the Sogdian  
rock.

<sup>1</sup> Droysen supposes it to have been situate near the pass of Kolugha or Derbend so often mentioned in the history of Timur's early expeditions, and he would select the place called Kohiten, which is laid down in the map to Baber's Memoirs as an insulated hill, as the precise spot. It seems clear that, if it was in Sogdiana, it must be looked for in this quarter. Mr. Williams's hypothesis on the subject will be noticed in the Appendix.

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Macedonians had wings? In no other way did it seem possible for an enemy to reach the summit. The taunt roused Alexander to a resolution which he would allow no obstacle to foil. He proclaimed a reward of ten talents for the man who should first mount to the top, and a sum proportionately less for each of the nine who should follow. The lowest prize was to amount to 300 darics. The most agile and expert climbers in the army soon came forward as competitors for wealth and honour to be earned by a risk which they were used to despise. They provided themselves with cords, and with a number of the iron pegs with which the tents were secured, and set out in the middle of the night toward the most precipitous, and consequently the most neglected, side of the rock. The attempt would perhaps have been utterly desperate, if the ascent had not been rendered easier by the snow which lay on the ground, and which had become so solidly frozen, that the pegs when driven into it could support the weight of the body. Still more than thirty of the adventurers lost their footing, and were buried so deep in the snow at the foot of the hill that their bodies could not afterwards be found. Their more fortunate companions, who gained the summit in safety, announced their success to their friends below by the waving of flags, the signal which Alexander had appointed. As soon as he saw it, he again sent Cophas to summon Ari-mazes, and to point out to him that the Macedonians had found wings. The sight of the enemy above his head, whose strength he did not know, seems to have deprived him of his presence of mind, and he hastily surrendered the fortress.

Roxana.

Alexander thus became master of the daughters of Oxyartes. One of them named Roxana was surpassingly beautiful, and made such an impression on the conqueror, that he resolved to share his throne with

her. Arrian praises him for the generosity he showed to his fair captive, over whom he might have exercised the rights of a victorious enemy. But Plutarch seems to take a more probable view of the case, when he conjectures that his resolution was dictated not less by policy than by inclination. His marriage with Roxana was likely to conciliate her countrymen, whose resistance was the most obstinate he had yet encountered: and it accorded with the general system which he had adopted in his treatment of his new subjects. It was immediately attended with one important advantage. Oxyartes, as soon as he heard of the honour which the king was about to confer on his family, repaired to the Macedonian camp, and henceforth zealously exerted all his influence in Alexander's service.<sup>1</sup>

Curtius relates that Arimazes, his kinsman, and the principal refugees taken in the fortress, were put to death by the conqueror. But it is very improbable that he should have displayed such severity on an occasion which naturally suggested extraordinary clemency. Curtius indeed refers the capture of Roxana to a different place: and therefore his account of the treatment of the vanquished may belong to another occasion. Though the Rock was the strongest fortress in Sogdiana, there were others in the high valleys of the upper Oxus, which appear still to have afforded shelter to some of the Bactrian and Sogdian insurgents. But Alexander was not at leisure to advance farther in this direction. His presence was required at Maracanda for the settlement of the province, and to secure it against the

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Williams (p. 237.) seems to suppose, that what Plutarch says (AL. 47.) about the difference between Hephæstion and Craterus, relates to Alexander's marriage with Roxana. But it clearly applies only to the general subject which led Plutarch to mention the marriage: Alexander's adoption of Asiatic usages. The marriage however might be very *repugnant to the feelings of the Macedonians* — as an indication of the policy which they thought injurious to them — though they did not think a *Bactrian bride*, as such, at all *degrading*.



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Success of  
Spitamenes.

inroads of Spitamenes. This gallant chief, when forced to take refuge in the desert accompanied by a small body of Sogdian fugitives, had only waited for a fresh opportunity of renewing hostilities against the invaders. As soon as Alexander had crossed the Oxus into Sogdiana, having collected about 600 of the Massagetæ, one of the Scythian tribes who ranged over the Chorasmian desert, he made an irruption into Bactria, and surprised and cut to pieces a party of 300 Macedonian cavalry, who were stationed near the frontier, and took Attinas their commander prisoner. Flushed with this success, he ventured to advance into the neighbourhood of Zariaspa; and though he was not strong enough to attack the city, he collected a large booty from the surrounding district. Craterus was at this time engaged, we do not know how, elsewhere. Zariaspa had been considered so secure, that several invalids of the horse-guard were left there, with Peithon, the governor of the royal household, and a cithar-player named Aristonicus, protected only by a very small body of mercenary cavalry. They had however now recovered so as to be able to bear arms. Peithon collected all the forces he could muster, including some of the royal pages, and sallying out upon the enemy, surprised them as they were retreating with their spoil, wrested the whole from them, and slew a great number. But as he marched back in triumph to Zariaspa, he suffered himself to be surprised in his turn. Spitamenes made a circuit, and laid an ambush for him on his road, into which he fell. His little band made a brave resistance; but the greater part were killed: among them Aristonicus, fighting more manfully, says Arrian, than could have been expected from his profession: Peithon himself was wounded and taken prisoner.

Craterus, when he heard of these events, set out in

pursuit of the Scythians, and chased them back into the desert, where they were joined by a thousand more of their countrymen, and, as he still advanced, waited to give him battle. They were however routed, and left 150 of their number on the field ; but Craterus did not venture to pursue them any further : and this check scarcely counterbalanced the advantages they had gained. It was to be expected that Spitamenes would renew his attack in some other quarter : for among the tribes of the desert, more especially the Massagetæ, who were always ready to make war where they saw a prospect of plunder, he could never be in want of troops. To take precautions against this danger, was one of the main objects that called Alexander to Maracanda. Here, after he had been rejoined by his five generals, he proceeded to regulate the internal affairs of the country. To heal the wounds which his vengeance had inflicted the year before, and to provide for the permanent security of the province against hostile inroads and internal disaffection, he directed a number of new cities to be founded : according to one statement no fewer than twelve. They were planted with colonies in which Macedonians or Greeks were mixed with barbarians : but, it seems, in such proportion, and on such terms, as to give a decided predominance to the European population. Hephæstion was ordered to superintend the establishment of the new settlers : a business which required much judgment and caution. In the meanwhile the king made a progress through the country to reduce the places which still remained in the hands of the insurgents. In the course of this expedition he came to a royal park, in a district which Curtius calls Bazaria, where the game had remained untouched for more than a century. The army, according to the custom of an Eastern chase, formed a circle within the inclosure, and drove the

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Chase at  
Bazaria.

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wild beasts toward the centre, where the king and his nobles despatched them. Alexander himself was attacked by a lion of extraordinary size, and rejecting the aid of Lysimachus who would have interposed in his defence, killed it with his own hand. The incident, as Curtius suspects, through some strange perversion of the facts, gave rise to a story which became widely current, that Lysimachus by the king's orders had been exposed to a lion. Alexander's achievement earned the applause of a Spartan envoy, who was present, and exclaimed: *A brave struggle, Alexander, with the royal beast for the mastery.* But the Macedonian spectators, who had shuddered at the danger, deemed their king's life too precious to be risked in such a contest, and a military assembly was held on the subject, which, exercising a democratical privilege, that had probably been long dormant, decreed that the king should not in future hunt on foot, or without some of his chief officers by his side. Four thousand head of game were destroyed in this memorable chase; and Alexander's combat with the lion was afterwards commemorated by a group of figures in bronze which Craterus dedicated at Delphi.

On the return of the army to Maracanda, Artabazus begged leave to resign his satrapy of Bactria, a post too laborious for his advanced age. He was dismissed into an honourable retirement, and Cleitus was appointed to succeed him. The new satrap had been ordered to prepare for his departure, and Alexander himself was on the point of setting out on a fresh expedition toward the western frontier of Sogdiana, to reduce a mountainous district which was still occupied by a band of Bactrian exiles. The eve of their parting was a day which the Macedonians were used to solemnise as a festival of Dionysus. But on this occasion for some unknown reason Alexander substituted a sacrifice in honour of the Dioscuri.

Alexander's  
court.

The religious ceremony was closed as usual by a banquet, at which Cleitus was present, and which was immoderately prolonged, according to a custom which Alexander certainly found already prevailing in his father's court, and had no need to learn, as Arrian intimates, from the barbarians. Among the guests were some Greek literary parasites, poets, rhetoricians, and sophists, persons of little reputation at home, who made up for the slenderness of their abilities by the grossness of their flattery, with which unhappily Alexander was not disgusted, if he did not encourage it as subservient to his political ends. Three of these adventurers, Agis, an epic versifier of Argos, Cleon, a Siceliot, and Anaxarchus of Abdera, who professed the flexible philosophy of his countryman Democritus, have escaped oblivion through the pre-eminence of their baseness. The conversation, when it was growing late, fell on the Twin Heroes, whom, as Euripides expressed it, their father Zeus had made gods.<sup>1</sup> The courtly tongues readily seized this occasion to dwell on the praises of the more illustrious hero then present, who, but for the envy which always attends living worth, would have been universally acknowledged as far greater than the Dioscuri, greater than Hercules himself. Cleitus, whom wine had released from ordinary reserve, checked this profane flattery, perhaps the more sternly, because he perceived its practical tendency, to favour the establishment of the ceremonies which he had always strongly opposed. He observed too that it was at the expense of the Macedonians, who had contributed their share to all the great achievements which were ascribed solely to their king, that his merits were thus magnified. And he quoted some verses of Euripides which denounced the injustice of the custom by which the

<sup>1</sup> Helena, 1759. *ἡμᾶς Ζεὺς ἐποίησεν θεοὺς.*

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Death of  
Cleitus.

honour of every victory was commonly assigned to the general alone. The remark must have been offensive to the king, not merely from its personal application, but as inculcating a sentiment directly adverse to the admission of the practice which he wished to introduce. But when his own actions were made the subject of a more particular discussion in comparison with his father's, and, in reply to the flatterers who depreciated Philip's exploits, Cleitus extolled them far above his son's, and as he rudely reminded him of the battle of the Granicus, stretched out his right hand, exclaiming, *This hand, Alexander, then saved your life*, the king could no longer contain his passion. He sprang up to rush upon Cleitus, but was held back by some of his friends, while he called out for his guards to come and rescue him from the traitors who were confining him, as Bessus had Darius. In the meanwhile Cleitus, who did not still desist from his provoking language, was hurried out of the banquet chamber. Alexander was then released; but as his fury was only inflamed by the short restraint it had undergone, he immediately snatched a spear from the hands of a sentinel and hastened toward the door. Unhappily Cleitus had also recovered his liberty, and, no less frantic than the king, was returning to the palace, and met Alexander, who was calling out for the object of his vengeance, and, as soon as he perceived him, thrust the spear through his body.

When he saw the brother of his nurse Lanicè, the companion of his boyhood, the preserver of his life, stretched dead at his feet, the double intoxication of wine and rage was instantly overpowered by a thrill of remorse. He retired to his chamber in an agony of grief, and throwing himself on his bed, continued to repeat the names of Cleitus and Lanicè, whom, after her two sons had been slain in his service, he

had deprived of her only brother. The murderer of his friends, as he loudly called himself—perhaps the assassination of Parmenio had begun to appear to him in its true light—he was not fit to live. For three days he rejected food, and abandoned himself wholly to his anguish. Then, as its violence began to subside with the abatement of his bodily strength, his friends attempted with more success to soothe, console, and rouse him from his dejection. The soothsayers bad him submit to the just wrath of Dionysus, who had visited him with a temporary phrenzy, to manifest his displeasure at the neglect of his festival, which the king must celebrate in due form, if he wished to propitiate the god. The army adopted a less innocent artifice for the same purpose; they passed a resolution that Cleitus had been justly put to death: and forbad the interment of his remains, until the king interfered, and ordered him to be buried. The motive of this servility may be admitted as a palliation of its baseness. There is nothing else to distinguish it from the adulation of Anaxarchus, who expressed the same sentiment in a more philosophical form. The poets, he suggested to Alexander, had placed Dicè, the goddess of justice, at the right hand of Zeus, to signify that whatever he decreed was right: in like manner whatever was done by a great king ought to be deemed just, first by himself, and, when so approved, by all other men.<sup>1</sup> Alexander's understanding was too sound to be deceived by the obsequiousness of his soldiers, or by the sophist's theological and ethical fallacies: he more readily listened to the soothsayers, and found some comfort in the thought, that his fatal burst of passion was the working of the offended god: and before he left Ma-

<sup>1</sup> Anaxarchus had the merit at least of frankly professing the principle. How many adopt and act upon it, both in religion and politics, who have not the candour to avow it!

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Invasion of  
Xenippa.

racanda atoned for his past neglect by the celebration of the Dionysiac festival. But the most efficacious remedy for his grief was supplied by the cares of public business, and the toils of war. Hephæstion was sent with a detachment into Bactria, to provide for the subsistence of the army in its winter quarters. Amyntas was appointed to the vacant satrapy of Artabazus. Alexander himself set out on the expedition which he had before meditated toward the western frontier. The region which he was about to invade, which the Greeks, perhaps with a slight corruption of its proper name, called Xenippa<sup>1</sup>, lay, it seems, on the skirts of a range of hills, which rise about ten miles north of Bokhara, running from east to west, and still bear the name by which they were then known, of the Nura mountains. It was a district abounding in villages, as its soil was singularly fertile. The natives, fearing that it might become the theatre of war, and might suffer, as the vale of the Sogd the year before, from Alexander's resentment, when they heard of his approach, compelled the Bactrian exiles to withdraw. Amyntas was sent to intercept them. But as their numbers amounted to more than 2000, all mounted, they ventured to attack him, and, having taken him by surprise, long maintained a hard combat. They were at last put to flight, and left 400 on the field of battle, and 300 in the enemy's hands; but the Macedonians purchased their victory with the loss of eighty slain, and between three and four hundred were wounded. Curtius seems to say that the fugitives soon afterwards submitted, and obtained pardon from the conqueror: but perhaps this ought to be understood of the inhabitants of Xenippa, who had still reason to dread his

<sup>1</sup> The great number of names ending in *tippa* in the modern maps of Maweral-nahar seems to indicate, that it is only the first part of the name *Xenippa* that was formed by the Greeks according to the analogy of their own language.

displeasure on account of the shelter which they had afforded to the refugees. He then advanced toward the highlands of Nura, or, as Curtius writes it, Naura, where the principal defile was occupied by a chieftain named Sysimithres, who was in possession of a strong fortress at its entrance. According to Curtius, he surrendered at the first summons; but as Curtius has manifestly confounded the capture of this fortress with that of another to be mentioned hereafter, we cannot be sure that he has not wholly misrepresented the manner in which it fell into Alexander's hands. It is only certain that the reduction of this place was not attended with the immediate submission of the whole canton. Alexander afterwards, taking the cavalry only with him, made one of his extraordinary marches in pursuit of the remaining insurgents. Philip, a younger brother of Lysimachus, to show his devotion to the king, accompanied him the whole way on foot; and when they overtook the fugitives, fought gallantly by his side; but as soon as the enemy was routed, sank exhausted by the effort, and expired in his master's arms. On his return to the camp, after he had completely dispersed the barbarians, Alexander had to lament another loss, the death of his brave general Erigyus, which had just taken place: perhaps an effect of wounds received in the attack of the fortress. His obsequies, and those of the young soldier, were celebrated together.

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Sysimithres.

When this district had been pacified, there remained no enemy on foot in Sogdiana, though, as long as Spitamenes lived at large, it could never be secure from invasion. Alexander now proceeded with the main body of his army to Nautaca, where he meant to spend the winter, leaving Cœnus, with a division of horse and foot, in the vale of the Sogd, to preserve the tranquillity of the country, and, if possible, to draw Spitamenes by some stratagem into his power. Spi-

Defeat and death of Spitamenes.



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tamenes, as Alexander had expected, did not long remain quiet; but as the strongholds of Sogdiana were now all in the hands of the Macedonians, he saw no hope left but in an attack on Cœnus and his division. Having come to Bagæ, a strong place on the north-west frontier, he again collected a body of cavalry, about 3000, from the Massagetæ, and marched against Cœnus. A hard-fought battle ensued; but the Macedonian tactics and discipline gained a decided victory. The barbarians fled, leaving 800 slain: the victors, according to their own statement, lost less than forty. Spitamenes indeed escaped, but his Sogdian and Bactrian adherents now began to view his cause as desperate, and a great number of them deserted him in his flight, and surrendered themselves to Cœnus. The Scythians, to console themselves for their disaster, plundered the baggage of their allies. Spitamenes, who still accompanied them, was left wholly in their power: they had little to hope for from him, and probably viewed him with an evil eye as the author of their calamities. A report soon reached them, spread perhaps for the purpose by Cœnus, that Alexander himself was on the point of making an expedition against them. To avert this danger, they cut off the head of Spitamenes, and sent it to Alexander.<sup>1</sup> So fell the boldest, most active, and persevering enemy that Alexander had yet encountered in Asia; one of the few men who had displayed a love of independence, which could neither be seduced nor overawed. His death relieved Alexander from his chief anxiety about the countries where he had now been detained nearly two years: though in the upper valleys of the Oxus there were still some refractory chiefs, among them

<sup>1</sup> According to another story, which Curtius relates at great length (VIII. 3.), it was brought by the wife of Spitamenes, who had intreated him to surrender himself to Alexander, and then murdered him to revenge herself for the ill usage she had received from him on account of her advice.

Catanes, who had been an associate of Spitamenes in his treachery to Bessus, Austanes, and Chorienes, who still relied on the security afforded by that mountainous region. Dataphernes, who had taken refuge among the Dahæ, neighbours of the Massagetæ, was sent by them in chains to Alexander, as soon as they heard of the death of Spitamenes.<sup>1</sup>

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It was Alexander's purpose, as soon as the season permitted in the spring of 327, to make an expedition against the chiefs who still held out in the eastern highlands, and then immediately to begin his march toward India. In his winter quarters at Nautaca, where he was joined by Cœnus, as soon as he had discharged the most important part of his commission, he made various regulations concerning the administration of the western provinces, which he was soon to leave at a still greater distance behind him, while he penetrated into the unknown regions of India.

Winter  
quarters  
at Nautaca.

<sup>1</sup> So Curtius, viii. 3. 16. Droysen, I do not know on what authority, describes him as surrendering himself, p. 341. — The order in which the events of the campaign of 328 are related in the text, is only the result of an attempt to combine the accounts of Arrian and Curtius together, in what seemed to me the most probable manner. It differs from Droysen's arrangement in two points. According to his view, Alexander first marched from the Oxus to Maracanda, there gave his orders to Hephæstion about the new Sogdian colonies, then took the Sogdian Rock, returned to Maracanda, and after the death of Cleitus made the expedition against Xenippa and Naura, leaving Cœnus to protect Sogdiana. During his absence on this expedition, Spitamenes made his unsuccessful attempt, and his death took place before Alexander went into winter quarters at Nautaca. It seemed to me necessary to place the capture of the Sogdian Rock earlier in the campaign of 328, on account of the snow which Arrian describes as lying so deep at the time: and I infer from Arrian's language (iv. 17, 18.) about Cœnus, that the death of Spitamenes took place after Alexander had left the vale of the Sogd, for Nautaca. In iv. 17. we read that he left Cœnus commander-in-chief in Sogdiana, and ordered him to *winter there*, both to protect the country, and to draw Spitamenes into an ambush, if he found an opportunity, *in the course of the winter*. These expressions seem to prove that Alexander was at this time on the point of going into winter quarters. Nor can it be considered as an important objection, that Arrian and Curtius both say he was meditating an expedition against the Massagetæ or Dahæ, among whom Spitamenes had taken refuge, when the chief's head was brought to him. It does not follow that he was then near their frontier. Arrian (iv. 18.) seems evidently to allude to the commission which he had mentioned in the preceding chapter, when he says that Cœnus came to Nautaca, as well as Craterus, Phrataphernes, and Stasanor, having accomplished all that had been assigned to them by Alexander to do. The *ἐν τούτῳ* can only refer to the interval between the defeat and the death of Spitamenes. — As to Phrataphernes and Stasanor, I can hardly help suspecting that they have been mentioned here, through some mistake arising from iv. 7.

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Already he had experienced the difficulty of maintaining his authority during a long absence over the remote parts of his dominions. Autophradates, the satrap of Tapuria, had been repeatedly sent for and had not obeyed the summons. Phrataphernes was now despatched to arrest him, and bring him to court. Oxodates, the satrap of Media, had betrayed a want either of zeal or of loyalty, and Atropates was sent to take his place: Stamenes to succeed to the satrapy of Babylon which had become vacant by the decease of Mazæus. Sopolis, Epocillus, and Menidas, were sent to bring fresh recruits from Macedonia.

B. C. 327.

Parætacene.

With the first gleams of spring Alexander left Nautaca, and moved through an Alpine road, in which his troops suffered extreme hardships from tempestuous weather, cold, fatigue, and hunger, toward a country which Arrian calls Parætacene, and which has therefore been commonly supposed to lie to the south of Bactria. A part of Khorasan was undoubtedly called by that name, as well as the district which Alexander conquered on his way from Persepolis to Ecbatana. But it is impossible that either of these should be here meant by Arrian, not only because Alexander could not have taken either of them in his way from Nautaca to Bactra, but because this Parætacene appears from Curtius<sup>1</sup> to have been situate in the vicinity of the Sacæ, whose seats unquestionably lay to the east of Bactria and Sogdiana. The place of greatest strength in this Parætacene was a fortress belonging to Choriene.<sup>2</sup> It stood on a high insulated rock, precipitous on all sides, and completely surrounded by a deep ravine,

Fortress of  
Choriene.

<sup>1</sup> VIII. 4. 20.

<sup>2</sup> In the description which Curtius gives of the fortress of Sysmithres, which in general belongs to this of Choriene, the river or torrent at the bottom of the ravine is a conspicuous feature. But Arrian does not mention it. This therefore cannot help to identify the rock of Choriene with the Hissar Shadman, which Droysen takes for it, though the conjecture, for ought that appears to the contrary, is probable enough.

which served as a natural trench to guard the approach. The ground at the top appears to have been level, and capable of holding a numerous garrison. The only path which led up to it was one which had been cut in the rock, so as to be of difficult ascent, even when not defended, and to allow room in its breadth for no more than one man.<sup>1</sup> It was necessary to fill up a part of the ravine before the first step could be taken toward the storming of the fortress: and this was a work which, to a common eye, would have appeared utterly impracticable; so great was its depth, so precipitous its sides. But Alexander had resolved to become master of the place: and obstacles apparently as great had already yielded to such a resolution. The sides of the neighbouring hills were clothed with fir, which supplied abundant materials. By means of ladders the besiegers descended to the foot of the precipice, where they drove in piles which they overlaid with hurdles, and then heaped up a pile of earth. The work advanced indeed but slowly, though the whole army was employed on it, one half, during the day, under the eye of Alexander himself, the rest by night in three divisions, which relieved each other, under Perdicas, Leonnatus, and Ptolemy. Yet at length it rose to such a height that the arrows of the assailants reached the top of the walls. Choriene, seeing so much that he had supposed impossible already effected, began to tremble lest his remaining defences might prove equally unavailing. He sent a herald to Alexander to request a conference with Oxyartes; and the persuasions and example of Oxyartes induced him to commit himself to Alexander's generosity. He came down with a few of his intimate friends to the

<sup>1</sup> One might suspect from Curtius (VIII. 2. 21.) that it was a gallery cut through the rock, and issuing at the top: *perpetuus cuniculus iter præbens in campos.*

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camp, was graciously received, and, while he himself remained there, sent some of his companions back with orders to the garrison to surrender the fortress. When these orders had been obeyed, the king himself went up with 500 of the hypaspists to view the place. Its strength, and the large stock of provisions which had been laid in, proved either the confidence that had been reposed in him, or the awe he had inspired: and he did not scruple to restore the fortress to Choriene, and to invest him with the government of the surrounding district. Choriene requited this generosity with a munificent present of provisions, sufficient to supply the army for two months; and he admitted that this was not a tenth part of the store which he had collected for the siege.

After the fall of this place, which was the key of the province, there remained no object in this quarter that demanded Alexander's presence. He himself proceeded to Bactra, to make his final preparations for his Indian expedition, and left Craterus, with the divisions of Polysperchon, Attalus, and Alcetas, and 600 of the horse-guard, to complete the reduction of Parætacene, and to crush the remains of the independent party in their last retreats. Craterus brought the two chiefs who still held out to an engagement, in which Catanes fell, and Austanes was taken prisoner. Curtius seems to speak of a distinct expedition made by Polysperchon, in which he overran a region called Bubacene.<sup>1</sup> This has been interpreted as the country now called Badakshan, which stretches eastward to the foot of the mountains (the Belur Tâgh) that contain the sources of the Oxus. But it seems doubtful

<sup>1</sup> Droysen in his paper *On Alexander's Marches through Turan* (Rhein. Mus. 1833, p. 100.) incorrectly represents Curtius as saying, that Catanes and Austanes were conquered by Craterus in *Bubacene*. If so, there could have been no doubt that Bubacene and Parætacene were the same district. But Curtius (VIII. 5. 2.), after he has mentioned the defeat of the two insurgent chiefs, adds: *Polysperchon quoque regionem quæ Bubacene appellatur in ditionem redegit.*

whether Alexander gave any commission to his lieutenants, beyond that which Arrian mentions, of subduing the Bactrian insurgents, and whether they would have ventured on such operations, when they knew that he was waiting for their arrival to set out on his march to India. They had certainly not much time for such conquests, since before the beginning of the summer they had already rejoined the grand army at Bactra.

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During their absence, events had taken place there, which illustrate the condition of Alexander's court, and the footing on which he stood with his Macedonian nobles. He had detected another conspiracy against his life, more certainly attested than that of Philotas, and formed by persons whom he could still less have suspected of such a design. The parties were some of the royal pages, youths selected, as has been already mentioned, from the noblest Macedonian families, to be trained in all the arts of war and peace which might fit them for the highest commands, in the course of their attendance on the king's person. It was among their duties to keep guard at the entrance of the royal apartments, to receive the king's horse from the grooms, and wait on him when he was ready to mount, and to attend him to the chase. They were treated in other respects with the distinction befitting their birth and prospects, and enjoyed the privilege of sitting—like the Roman boys<sup>1</sup>—at table before the king. It had happened that at a hunting-party, perhaps on the road to Bactra, one of these youths, named Hermolaus, heedlessly or officiously had hurled his dart at a wild boar which the king was preparing to strike. Alexander, vexed and offended, ordered the youth to be punished with

Hermolaus.

<sup>1</sup> Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 15. Curtius (viii. 6. 5.) has, *sedentibus vesci cum rege*, but perhaps this was, as according to the Roman usage, *propria et parciore mensa*. Compare Servius on Æn. vii. 176.

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Plot of the  
Pages.

stripes, in the presence of the other pages, and to be deprived of his horse. The chastisement may have been merited and not excessive, and it was of a kind to which according to custom the pages were held to be liable at the king's pleasure. Yet this power may have been so rarely exercised that the infliction was accounted a grievous disgrace, and Hermolaus may not have viewed his own conduct in the light in which it appeared to the king. It is certain that he felt as one who had suffered an atrocious injury. He disclosed his feelings to one of his young comrades, Sostratus, son of Anyntas, and declared that life would be insupportable to him without revenge. Sostratus was easily led to share the resentment, or at least the danger, of one whom he loved; and a plot was soon formed between them to murder the king. So far there is nothing to surprise us in the narrative. But what follows is hardly to be explained as the effect of boyish passion or sympathy. It must have been through other motives that the two friends induced four other youths of their own class, Antipater, the son of Asclepiodorus, who had been satrap of Syria, Epimenes son of Arseas, Anticles son of Theocritus, and Philotas son of Carsis, who is described as a Thracian, to become their accomplices. It seems incredible that they should have taken part in such a plot, without some previous ground of discontent and ill-will toward the king. There is no reason to suppose that he had personally offended them: and we are therefore inclined to suspect, that their youthful indignation had been kindled by the complaints, which they might often have heard from their elders, of Alexander's attempts to degrade his nobles to a level with the conquered people, his adoption of Persian usages, his tyrannical proceedings in the case of Philotas and Parmenio. There could indeed be no doubt that this was the case, if we could rely on the

report, that Hermolaus afterwards pleaded these motives in justification of his conduct ; and even if this was a rhetorical invention, it may truly express the feelings of the greater part of his associates.

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The conspirators determined to take advantage of the opportunity offered by their attendance on the king to effect their purpose. According to one account they waited until in the course of rotation they should be all on duty together at night, and a month elapsed before this combination took place: a remarkable proof undoubtedly, if this was the fact, of the tenacity with which they clung to their design. Arrian however simply relates, that they agreed, when the night watch fell to Antipater's turn, to kill the king in his sleep. Antipater, it may be supposed, was to admit them into the bedchamber. It happened however that on this evening Alexander remained at table longer than usual, and, after he had retired from the banquet-room, was induced to return to it, and to continue there the greater part of the night. There was a story, which was adopted by Aristobulus, that a Syrian woman, who followed the camp, and was believed—apparently because she had lost her senses—to possess the gift of divination, and had access at all hours to the royal apartments, met him as he was withdrawing, and by her intreaties prevailed on him to rejoin the company he had left. Whatever the cause may have been, it is certain that he did not go to rest until the guard had been relieved. The next day Epimenes, moved perhaps by the king's marvellous escape which might seem to indicate a divine interposition, revealed the plot to his bosom friend Charicles, who immediately disclosed it to Eurylochus, another son of Arseas: Eurylochus carried the information to Ptolemy, who reported it to the king. The conspirators were arrested, and all but Epimenes—whose life was spared—put to the torture.

Punish-  
ment of  
the con-  
spirators.



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It seems that they did not deny their guilt: Hermolaus is said to have gloried in the deed which he had meditated, and to have inveighed against Alexander's tyranny in the Macedonian assembly. They were stoned, according to the more probable account<sup>1</sup>, by the army: according to another, their punishment was committed to their comrades, who, to prove their own loyalty, put them to a cruel death.

Callisthenes.

But in the confessions which had been extorted from them some other names had been mentioned, and among them that of the Olynthian Callisthenes, a person who, through the misfortune in which he was thus involved, probably acquired greater celebrity than he would have earned by all the works and actions of his life. Callisthenes was one of the men of letters who followed the court: but he stood on a peculiar footing with the king. He was Aristotle's kinsman, had been educated by him, and, during his residence in Macedonia, had probably been the companion of Alexander's studies<sup>2</sup>: and it seems to have been through Aristotle's recommendation that he was permitted to attach himself to the expedition. The philosopher perhaps hoped that in the camp and the court he would acquire that practical sense in which he knew him to be very deficient, notwithstanding the success with which he cultivated several branches of literature, and his great rhetorical talent. But a

<sup>1</sup> Which would be unquestionably the true one, if the letter from Alexander to Antipater, quoted by Plutarch (Al. 55.), was certainly genuine. But the manner in which the fact is mentioned by Arrian (iv. 14.) throws some suspicion on the letter: and its contents are, to say the least, very strange. It seems hardly credible that he should have thrown out such violent threats, before even an inquiry had been made as to the ground of his suspicions against Aristotle.

<sup>2</sup> Stahr (*Aristotelia*, p. 106.) says that this is *expressly* mentioned by Plutarch and Arrian. But neither Plutarch nor Arrian state that Callisthenes was Alexander's fellow student. They only relate that Callisthenes was brought up by Aristotle. The other assertion is no more than a probable inference from this fact. Stahr is equally inaccurate when he asserts (p. 126.), referring to Arrian (iv. 10.) that Callisthenes *bitterly blamed* the murder of Cleitus. Arrian's *οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν* (which does not imply any bitterness) *ταῦτα*, clearly relates not to the death of Cleitus, but to the innovations which he had just mentioned.

more extensive intercourse with men did not render him fitter for society; but only exposed the defects of his character, and at length rendered them fatal to himself. He still continued to be a mere man of letters, but with an extravagant conceit of the importance of his own pursuits, and of the eminence he had attained in them. Philosophy was, it seems, the study which he professed, as the basis of all his literary accomplishments; and he probably adopted Aristotle's doctrines as far as he was able to comprehend them. But his faculty was not that of an inquirer, but of an expounder. His philosophy only furnished him with subjects for rhetorical exercises. It was probably in the same spirit, and with no higher ambition, that he undertook to record the great events which were passing under his eyes: and, as one who was more conversant with words than with things, he conceived a very high opinion of the merit and value of his own work. It seems that he was even silly enough to boast, that Alexander's fame depended on his pen: and that he had not come to seek reputation from Alexander, but to spread his renown over the world. We might otherwise have put a better sense on another speech which is attributed to him: that Alexander's divinity would rest not on the stories which had been forged to prove it, but on his own history of his actions.<sup>1</sup>

It may have been with a better feeling, though not without a mixture of vanity, that he professed that the chief motive which had brought him to the court, was the hope that he might prevail on the king to rebuild Olynthus, and restore the remains of its scattered population. It was a boon like that which Aristotle had obtained from Philip; and to have

<sup>1</sup> It ought however to be observed, in justice to Callisthenes, that the language in which Arrian speaks of his own performance (i. 12.), might, with very slight exaggeration, be represented as a proof of similar self-conceit.

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become the second founder of his native city—a place so much more famous than Stagira—would no doubt have flattered his pride, as well as gratified his patriotism. There are other indications, that he was keenly conscious of his relation to a city, which had once been mistress of a great part of Macedonia, and had been destroyed by Philip. Alexander, it is said, once requested him at a banquet, where a great number of his nobles were present, to entertain the company with a panegyric on the Macedonians. Callisthenes complied, and declaimed with his usual fluency. When he had perorated, amidst the loud applause of his audience, the king, quoting a verse of Euripides, observed that on a fine theme it was no hard task to speak well, and challenged him to prove his ingenuity by an accusation of the Macedonians, which might point out the failings they had to correct. Alexander was probably quite in earnest, and would have been well pleased to have heard the defects of the national character, and those of his great men, faithfully, though delicately, exposed. It was a step toward the removal of prejudices which interfered with his plans. But Callisthenes took up this subject in a very different spirit and tone from that in which he had handled the last. His panegyric had been a rhetorical exercise: his second speech was a serious invective. He traced the origin of Philip's power to the internal dissensions which had wasted the strength of Greece, and quoted a verse which contained the remark, that *where discord prevails, is a road for the vilest to honour*. And he proceeded to give vent, no doubt, to his real sentiments, in a strain which surprised and deeply offended those who had before applauded him, and which induced the king to observe that he had exhibited to the Macedonians a specimen not of his ability but of his ill-will.

Offends  
Alexander.

It is evident that the arts of a courtier were those

which Callisthenes had studied least, or which were least congenial either to his character or his national prejudices: and Arrian justly remarks, that, since he had chosen to live in a court, he ought to have conformed to its manners, as far as it was possible to do so without personal degradation. Still the bluntness of his deportment, and the freedom of his language, though they provoked enmity, also inspired a certain degree of respect. His company was especially sought by the young Macedonians who had any taste for philosophy or eloquence, and Hermolaus in particular was one of those who most frequently listened to his discourse. Alexander himself seems to have thought that his co-operation, and even his acquiescence, might be of great use for the purpose of reconciling the Macedonians to the innovations which he wished to introduce. The other men of letters, sophists, poets, and rhetoricians, particularly Anaxarchus, readily entered into the king's views, and offered their services to promote them. It was concerted among them, that, at a banquet in the palace, they should bring the subject under discussion, and should exert all their powers of reasoning and persuasion to overcome the reluctance of the Macedonians with respect to the ceremony of adoration; and it seems to have been arranged through the mediation of Hephæstion, that the king should withdraw for a short time from his guests, on the plea of business, and that during his absence Anaxarchus and the rest should propose to salute him after the Persian custom on his return. When the time came, and Alexander had left the table, Anaxarchus turned the conversation on his great qualities and achievements, and endeavoured to convince his hearers, that it was much more fitting for the Macedonians to pay divine honours to such a hero, who was their own king, than to strangers, like Dionysus and Hercules, whose exploits were much less

admirable: and that as it was certain that, whenever he should be taken from them, they would honour him as a god, it was far more reasonable to treat him with the same reverence during his life, than after his death, when it would be of no use to him.

The sophist's arguments were received with silence by the persons to whom they were address: but Callisthenes undertook to refute them: and showed that, according to the established doctrines and practice of the Greek religion, divine honours could only be bestowed on a mortal by the decree of a god delivered through an oracle, and that they had never been conferred on any one except, as in the case of Hercules, after his death. If we might depend on this passage, in Arrian's report of the speech of Callisthenes, we should infer that the story about the oracle of Ammon had not yet been officially sanctioned. But such details are the less to be relied on, as there were two accounts of the conduct of Callisthenes, seemingly both belonging to the same occasion, and quite distinct, though not absolutely inconsistent with each other. That which Arrian gives as the less trustworthy is nevertheless confirmed by authority quite as good in such matters as that of Ptolemy or Aristobulus; by Chares of Mitylene, who filled the high office of Eisangeleus at Alexander's court, when it began to be modelled after the Persian usage. It seems that, according to the arrangement which had been previously made with the Greek courtiers and the Persians who were present, the king sent his golden goblet round among his guests. The first who received it, after he had drunk, performed the Persian ceremony of adoration, and was then permitted to kiss the king. This example was followed by all who were in the secret, and it had been expected, we do not know precisely on what grounds, that Callisthenes was prepared to conform with it.

When it came to his turn however, he drank, but made no obeisance, and immediately advanced to kiss the king. Alexander, who happened to be conversing with Hephæstion, did not perceive the omission<sup>1</sup>; but when it was mentioned to him by one of his attendants, he turned away from Callisthenes when he approached. Callisthenes was heard to say as he retired: *I am going away the poorer by a kiss.*

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Alexander was the more indignant at this language and behaviour, because he was assured by Hephæstion, that Callisthenes had previously promised to perform the ceremony. The man's character renders it extremely improbable that he had ever made such a promise<sup>2</sup>, for which, if he did not mean to keep it, no satisfactory reason can be assigned; though it would not follow that Hephæstion told a wilful falsehood, as Plutarch supposes, for the purpose of exasperating Alexander's resentment. He may only have drawn a hasty inference from the silence of Callisthenes, or from ambiguous expressions which he used, when the affair was discussed. Callisthenes however must have had many enemies, who were eager to widen the breach between him and the king, and who were not scrupulous about the means. To many of the Macedonian generals the whole tribe of literary idlers who hung about the court, must have been odious, as in the time of Perdiccas, even when there was nothing repulsive in their manners. And Alexander now lent a willing ear to the insinuations, which were addressed to him from various quarters, and which were probably corroborated by Hephæstion, who was personally hurt by the breach of faith which he imputed to Callisthenes; that he was setting a per-

<sup>1</sup> Droysen (p. 352.), to show his hero's magnanimity, takes the liberty of representing him as perceiving, but taking no notice of the omission. The statement in the text is that of Arrian and Plutarch, or rather of Chares.

<sup>2</sup> It is clear from Arrian (iv. 10.) that Callisthenes had from the first openly avowed his disapprobation of Alexander's proceedings.

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nicious example by his affectation of independence, and was instilling dangerous maxims into the minds of the youths who flocked to his lessons, and were captivated by his eloquence.

Such was the position in which Callisthenes was standing when the conspiracy of the pages was discovered. Suspicion might naturally have been awakened against him by his familiarity with Hermolaus. But it had been forestalled, as we have just seen, by the suggestions of his enemies; and Alexander was disposed to believe every thing that could be laid to his charge. A strict inquiry was instituted into the language which he had used in his conversations with the young delinquents; and we cannot be surprised that many expressions should have come to light, which appeared conclusive evidence of his guilt to one who was already convinced of it. Those which are reported remind us of the attempts which were made by the accusers of Socrates to convict him of treason against the Athenian commonwealth. Their import could only be determined by the occasion and context of the discourse, as to which we know nothing. Taken by themselves, they are entitled to no weight, except on the supposition that he was acquainted with the plot. As to this point there is a seeming contradiction in the accounts we have remaining from the best authorities, which however it may not be impossible to clear up. The principal object with which the youths were put to the torture, appears to have been to obtain some information against Callisthenes, who had been arrested as soon as the plot was discovered: and it might have been expected that Hephæstion, who had managed that engine so successfully in the case of Philotas, would have been able to draw any confession that he wished from these striplings. Yet we learn from the very best authority, a letter written by Alexander at the time,

and addressed to Craterus and his colleagues<sup>1</sup>: that they continued to the last to deny that any person was privy to their design. On the other hand Arrian mentions that, according to the concurrent testimony of Aristobulus and Ptolemy, they confessed that Callisthenes had instigated them to the deed. On a point so much affecting Alexander's reputation, we might reasonably question the authority of these two writers, and we should not scruple to reject their assertion, if it really contradicted both Alexander's own declaration, and the united evidence of all his other historians. But it seems not at all improbable that the instigation of which they spoke, consisted only in sentiments which might have been very innocently uttered by Callisthenes, though they had the effect of encouraging the conspirators to persevere in their design, and might be construed by his enemies as intended to suggest it.

We have one decisive proof, how incapable Alexander himself was at this time of forming a right judgment on the case. It would have been scarcely credible, if it was not so well attested, that his prejudice against Callisthenes was so strong, as to induce him to harbour a suspicion that Aristotle had some share in his kinsman's treason. Plutarch quotes a letter of the king's to Antipater, in which he expressed his resolution *to punish the sophist, and those who sent him out*. Even if the letter should be thought suspicious, the fact to which it alludes is not the less certain. The fate of Callisthenes furnished a subject for a variety of conflicting anecdotes. Arrian cannot suppress his surprise that Ptolemy and Aristobulus should differ from one another as to the mode of his death, notorious as it must have been. Ptolemy related that he was put to the torture, and afterwards

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<sup>1</sup> Plut. Al. 55.



crucified. Aristobulus that he was carried about in chains, and at last died of disease. This last account is placed beyond dispute by the testimony of Chares, who adds that the purpose for which he was kept in confinement was that he might be finally tried in Aristotle's presence, and that he died seven months after in India, of a loathsome disease, produced it seems by imprisonment in his corpulent frame.

His character is not one which can excite much interest in his behalf, but it is entitled to justice. There appears to be no reason for rejecting the almost unanimous judgment of antiquity, that he was innocent of the offence with which he was charged, and fell a victim to Alexander's preconceived resentment. Some of Alexander's modern apologists have assumed, that the ancients were prejudiced in favour of Callisthenes by his profession of philosopher<sup>1</sup>—as if this had been sufficient to shield Plato or Aristotle from obloquy, and had not rather exposed them to innumerable calumnies: or as if Anaxarchus, sophist as he was, had not been branded with merited infamy. The transaction is memorable, as it exhibits the conqueror of Asia calling in the aid of Greeks to overcome the independent spirit of his own people.

<sup>1</sup> So both Droysen (p. 357.) and Mr. Williams (p. 251.).—It is characteristic of the partiality which Droysen betrays in his account of this transaction, and wherever else his hero's honour is concerned, that he makes no mention of the letter to Craterus—a document, the genuineness of which seems to be placed beyond doubt by its direction, which could hardly have occurred to a forger.—Mr. Williams is equally guarded on this point, and asks: *But why should we doubt the united testimony of Ptolemy and Aristobulus?* &c.—almost as if he knew that the greater part of his readers would not be able to answer the question.

## APPENDIX I.

ON SOME POINTS IN THE GEOGRAPHY OF ALEXANDER'S  
MARCHES.*The Battle of Issus.*

It is not easy to combine the accounts given by Alexander's historians of the operations immediately preceding the battle of Issus, and Xenophon's description of the march of Cyrus out of Cilicia into Syria, with the statements — not to speak of the conjectures — of modern travellers. Colonel Leake (*Journal of a Tour in Asia Minor*, p. 208.) observes: "Strabo, Ptolemy, and the Stadiasmus, agree in naming two pylæ, or passes, fortified with a wall and gate at the head of the gulf (of Issus); namely, the gate of Amanus, which was in Cilicia, and the Cilician gate, which formed the division between Syria and Cilicia. The position of both of these pylæ has been ascertained; the northern or Amanic, between Ayás and Bayás, at the northern or innermost extremity of the gulf, ἐν τῇ κοιλετάτῃ τοῦ κόλπου, as the Stadiasmus has well described it — the southern or Cilician between Bayás and Iskenderun, not far from, if not exactly at, the place where Pococke and other modern travellers observed some ruins vulgarly known by the name of the Pillars of Jonas. The pass of Beilán, leading from Iskenderún over the mountain into the plain of Antioch, was a third pylæ, which has been well distinguished by Ptolemy from the other two, and was justly called the Gate of Syria." Colonel Leake then proceeds to refute an opinion of Major Rennell's as to Strabo's Ἀμανίδες πύλαι, and in the next page adds: "There was a fourth pass, as Major Rennell has justly observed, which, crossing mount Amanus from the eastward, descended upon the centre of the head of the gulf, near Issus. By this pass it was that Darius marched from Sochus, and took up his position on the banks of the Pinarus; by which movement Alexander, who had just before marched from Mallus to Myriandrus, through the two maritime pylæ, was placed between the Persians and Syria. Cicero also alludes to this pass

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when he observes that ‘nothing is stronger than Cilicia on the side of Syria, there being only two narrow entrances into it over the Amanus, the ridge of which mountain divides the two provinces: qui Syriam a Cilicia aquarum divortio dividit.’ The other pass to which he alludes was that of Beilan.”

It might seem therefore that all was clear on this subject. But the fact is that the position of the pylæ, which Colonel Leake says has been *ascertained*, is extremely doubtful. And it is remarkable that one of the travellers to whom he refers in his note as having ascertained the point, Mr. Kinneir, *Journey in Asia Minor*, expresses a very different opinion about the position of one of these pylæ.

Major Rennell (*Illustrations of the History of the Expedition of Cyrus*, p. 52.) had maintained the opinion mentioned by Colonel Leake as to the position of the southern or Cilician pylæ — Xenophon’s Gates of Syria and Cilicia — that it was not far from the so-called Pillars of Jonas. He finds Xenophon’s river *Kersus*, which flowed between the Gates, in the *Mahersy*, and thinks that the castle of *Merkes*, which stands on a commanding eminence over the river, has either communicated its name to the river, or derived its own from it. “One may easily perceive the connection between it and the Kersus of Xenophon, and the *h* of Mahersy is probably guttural.”

C. Niebuhr, in the third volume of his *Travels*, published 1837, speaks of this part of the coast as follows, p. 101.: “From Scanderone to Païas one sees nothing worthy of remark, except Merkes, a small castle on the mountain, and below by the sea-side are here and there traces of ancient castles, and other buildings. Some remains of an old wall in this quarter are called the Pillars of Jonas: and the eastern Christians have a legend, that it was here the prophet was vomited upon the dry land by the fish.”

Mr. Kinneir (*Journey*, p. 138.) also observes in the description of his journey from Pias (Bayas, Païas) to Scanderoon: “At the ninth mile are the ruins of a castle, romantically situated at the foot of the mountains which here approximate the sea, and near it, on a projecting point of land, the remains of a sort of obelisk, apparently ancient. At the twelfth mile a small but rapid river, with steep and high banks, answering the description given by Arrian of the Pinarus, and about half a mile farther, the fragments of massy walls jutting into the sea.” We see that the river which Mr. Kinneir takes for the Pinarus is that which Major Rennell believes to be Xenophon’s Kersus. Mr. Kinneir himself (p. 146.) believed Xenophon’s Kersus to be the torrent which descends down the ravine at Bailan. And he observes (p. 143.) that D’Anville’s opinion, which places the *Portæ Syriæ* close to Pias, and on the road to Scanderoon, appears to him quite erroneous,

*inasmuch as there is no defile or mountain to pass between Ayass and Scanderoon, that he could perceive or hear of.* "But," he proceeds, "to the south and east of the latter we have two defiles, which in my opinion are those alluded to under the designation of the Gates of Syria and Straits of Amanus. The first, on account of the ruinous and deserted state of the towns along the coast, is seldom or never in use, and leads over a range of hills immediately behind Scanderoon. The other is called the pass of Bailan."

The objection here raised against D'Anville's opinion had however been met by Major Rennell,—whose Illustrations, published in 1816, Mr. Kinneir perhaps had not seen in 1818 when his journey was published—in the following passage, p. 53. :—

"It may be proper in this place to add a word respecting Arrian's description of the Strait which Alexander passed through, about 70 years after Cyrus. His description is that of *a narrow passage over hills*; evidently *not a defile*, but that kind of ground which would compel an assailant to form a very straitened front for an attack. But the different sites alluded to by the two historians can hardly be a mile from each other; the ground being particularly described by Dr. Pococke, Mr. Drummond, and others. For within that distance, south of the river Mahersy, the swampy plain is shut up by a narrow tract of hills, which has on the one hand an abrupt descent to the sea; and, on the other, the steep mountain of Amanus, which leaves only a narrow space in the nature of a *shelf*, between its foot and the sea. And this must be conceived to be the pass intended by Arrian; for he describes the advanced guard of the army of Alexander to have taken possession of the *pass*, on the evening before the battle of Issus; and who at day-break began to descend from the hills; being confined to a very narrow front by reason of the straitness of the ground."

I take it for granted the reader is aware, that for the operations of Darius and Alexander before the battle, four passes are required, two maritime, through which the road led out of Cilicia into Syria along the coast; and two inland, which crossed the ridge of mount Amanus, and of which the one lay to the north of the other. So far the ancients and moderns agree. But as to the position of these passes the extracts already given show that there is room for considerable variance of opinions. The northern maritime pass, which is not mentioned by Xenophon, and not distinctly by Arrian, though Curtius (iii. 7. 7.) marks it very clearly as lying between Mallus and Issus, would be the one best ascertained according to either of the views already stated as to the other. There could be no doubt, whether we adopt Major Rennell's opinion or Mr. Kinneir's, that the northern pass must be that of Kara Cape or Demir Kapu, which is mentioned by all travellers who have passed this road, and is described by Mr. Kinneir, p. 135.

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After leaving *Kastanlæ*, which he takes to be the ancient *Castabala*, he says, "Thence we directed our course for the first three miles over a sort of table-land abounding in partridges, hares, and antelopes, when we entered a narrow valley, or rather defile, clothed with thick copse wood and evergreens. At the eighth mile the rocks on either side approached each other, and we passed under an arch of an old gateway, built of black granite, and called *Kara Cape*, or the black gate. . . The pass expanded immediately when we had quitted the gate, and after a gentle descent of about a mile we entered a narrow belt, having the Gulf of Scanderoon close on our right hand, and at the foot of the hills near the shore, the ruined town of *Ayas*." Accordingly Colonel Leake, in his map to his tour in Asia Minor, identifies *Demir Kapu* with the *Pylæ Amanides* of Strabo, which he takes to be the northern maritime pass.

There is however a difficulty which must strike every one who inspects Colonel Leake's map, or reads Mr. Kinneir's account of his own journey: and this is to explain what Alexander was doing at *Myriandrus*, if his object was to seek Darius in Syria. And this difficulty is particularly glaring according to Mr. Kinneir's hypothesis, that Darius crossed *Amanus* by the pass of *Bailan*, while Alexander lay at *Myriandrus*. It may perhaps be observed that Alexander's motive might be, as Flathe suspects, to ensnare Darius, and that he continued his march along the coast in the hope that the enemy would cross the mountains. But it is evident from Arrian that, whatever his intentions or hopes may have been, he had not, when he came to *Myriandrus*, made any movement inconsistent with his professed design of marching by the nearest road to *Sochi*, which according to Mr. Kinneir's hypothesis would have been by *Bailan*. And though Major Rennell and Colonel Leake were aware that it was not by this, but by a northern pass of *Amanus*, that Darius entered *Cilicia*, their statements are exposed to the same objection.

This difficulty and some others would be removed, if we adopt the hypothesis which has been very learnedly and acutely maintained by Mr. Williams in his *Essay on the Geography of the Anabasis*. He conceives (p. 112.) that the gates of Syria and *Cilicia* were situate at the pass of *Demir Kapu*; that this was the pass occupied by Alexander in the night before the battle; that this is one of the two passes mentioned by Cicero, the other being that by which Darius crossed the mountains; and that Mr. Kinneir, if he had been permitted to follow Alexander's route through *Mallus*, instead of taking the upper road by *Messis*, would have found the field of battle about four miles to the south-west of the defile. Mr. Williams also assigns some reasons for believing that no road existed through the pass of *Bailan* in the time of Alex-

ander; and he holds Pias to be the modern representative of Myriandrus, and refers to a map of Syria, published by Arrow-smith, constructed according to actual observations of Captain Corry, in which an opening in mount Amanus, immediately to the east of Pias, is marked as the upper Amanian pass, exactly according to Pococke's description.

It cannot be denied that as this hypothesis would remove the above-mentioned difficulty as to Alexander's presence at Myriandrus—which however may be only an apparent one arising from our want of more exact information—so Mr. Kinneir's description of the Demir Kapu seems to answer better to that which Arrian gives of the pass occupied by Alexander in the night before the battle, and still more to Xenophon's of the Gates of Syria and Cilicia, than any which we find of the country between Baias and Scanderoon. Mr. Williams however, insisting strongly on Mr. Kinneir's assertion, *that there is no defile or mountain to pass between Ayass and Scanderoon*, takes no notice of Major Rennell's observations on this subject. He observes (p. 124.), that "a defile like that of Demir or Cara Cape, in the immediate neighbourhood of the sea, must sooner or later communicate with it." This however depends on the existence of a stream at the bottom, which Mr. Williams assumes, perhaps probably enough, but without any authority from Mr. Kinneir, whom one should have expected to mention it, if he had seen one. Another point which Mr. Williams is obliged to assume, is the existence of a maritime pass on the coast between Demir Kapu and the site of Mallus. This however is not an argument against the hypothesis, but only a subject of curiosity, which might cease to perplex us if we were better acquainted with the features of this corner of the Mediterranean, making allowance for the changes which have taken place since the days of Alexander.

There is another difficulty which is, it must be admitted, a real though not a fatal objection. The position which Mr. Williams assigns to Myriandrus, is at variance with the statements of Strabo and Ptolemy, who both mention it as south of Alexandria (Scanderoon). Mr. Williams however,—who does not believe that this Alexandria was founded by Alexander—contends that Ptolemy's authority is neutralised as to Myriandrus, because he gives it a higher latitude than Alexandria.

On the whole, though of course much less confident than the author appears to feel about his own hypothesis, I am inclined to consider it as the most probable that has yet been proposed on the subject.

## APPENDIX II.

*On the Site of Ecbatana.*APPENDIX  
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It is well known that Mr. Williams has devoted the first of his two Essays on the Geography of Ancient Asia, to the purpose of proving that the site of the ancient capital of Media is occupied, not, as most scholars have believed, by Hamadan, but by Ispahan. It cannot be supposed that a person of his learning and acuteness should have failed to give a specious aspect to his hypothesis, or rather that he should have been so firmly convinced of its truth as he seems to be without some plausible reasons. And, in fact, he has shown that it tallies very happily with the account given by Diodorus (xix. 19.) of the march of Antigonos from the neighbourhood of Susa to Ecbatana, and with the time assigned by Diodorus (xix. 46.) for the march of Antigonos from Ecbatana to Persepolis. I do not say that these are the only arguments which give a colour to this hypothesis: but they seem to me the strongest. Those which are drawn from the marches of Alexander fail, I think, altogether; nor does Mr. Williams appear to me to have been more successful in his attempts to get rid of the testimonies of the ancients which make against him, while he passes in total silence over some of the evidence in favour of Hamadan, which he would probably have found it most difficult to meet.

This silence—as was observed by a writer, evidently conversant with the subject, who reviewed his Essays in the Quarterly Journal of Education, No. IV.—is the more remarkable, because the evidence appears on the face of the map which accompanies the Essays, when taken together with the information afforded by modern travellers, with which Mr. Williams was undoubtedly well acquainted. Isidore of Charax, in his Itinerary, entitled *Σταθμοὶ Περσικοὶ*, mentions a city, *Κογκοβάρ*, where was a temple of Artemis, in Upper Media, nineteen *schœni* from Apobatana. That Isidore's Apobatana is Ecbatana, appears clearly from his description, and is not disputed by Mr. Williams. But in his map, on the road from Kermanshah to Hamadan, appears a place there spelt Kungawur. And when we know that this place, which is about forty-five miles from Hamadan, contains the ruins of a magnificent building (described by Ker Porter, Travels, II. p. 141.), it seems impossible to doubt its identity with Isidore's Concohar. There is moreover a high degree of probability, if not approaching quite so near to certainty, that Besittoon, thirty-two miles to the south-west of Kungawur, on the same line of road, with a high perpendicular rock artificially smoothed, and exhibiting sculptures that appear

to be of the same age and character as those of Persepolis (see Kinneir, *Memoir*, p. 131. 137.; and Ker Porter, II. p. 150. foll.), represents Isidore's Baptana, which stood on a mountain where was a statue of Semiramis and a pillar, though this may not be the pillar which Olivier saw.

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I am not so clearly satisfied that Besittoon is likewise, as Mr. Kinneir and others have supposed, the mount Bagistanum of Diodorus (II. 13.), at the foot of which, in a plain, Semiramis laid out her park, or garden, of twelve stadia in circumference, watered by a great fountain: though at the foot of the rock at Besittoon there bursts, as Ker Porter says, a beautifully clear stream. Notwithstanding this coincidence, his description of the vale of Besittoon does not seem well adapted to the garden of Semiramis. It was waste and stony, a dreary contrast to the luxuriant valley of Kangavar; and at Besittoon itself, all he can say is, that "nature did not look quite so sterile." The description of Diodorus seems to correspond much better to the mountain of Takt-i-Bostan (Kinneir's Taki Bostan), the Throne of the Garden — a part of the range of Besittoon, and only five hours' ride to the south-west, nearly opposite to Kermanshah at five or six miles distance. This mountain, which is, it seems, still more richly adorned with sculptures, is described by Ker Porter (II. p. 169.), as lowering over the blooming vale of Kermanshah. "At the base of this sombre mountain," he says, "bursts forth the most exquisitely pellucid stream that I ever beheld; and to this sparkling fountain the natives have given the name of Shirene. Its bed is rather on a declivity, which gives a rapidity to its current that increases the brilliancy of its waters as they dash along, spreading verdure on every side, and bathing the pendent branches of variously foliaged trees which grow on its banks." Here was a spot which Semiramis might well choose for a garden. V. Hammer observes (*Wien. Jahrb.* VII. p. 267.), that in the Persian and Turkish legends, Schirin (Shirene) has everywhere taken the place of Semiramis. Ker Porter indeed conjectures that the name Besittoon (which signifies *without pillars*, and is satisfactorily explained by Kinneir, as alluding to the overhanging canopy of rock), is "a local corruption of Bagistan, the *place of the garden*." This conjecture, every one must see, is utterly untenable. But that *bagh*, Garden, is the root of the name Bagistanum, is exceedingly probable; and then the modern appellation of the mountain, Takt-i-Bostan, answers very closely to the ancient one.

But to return from this little digression, which is nevertheless not wholly irrelevant. The proofs derived from such coincidences between the line of road described by Isidore and that between Kermanshah and Hamadan, are of a quality so much stronger than any of those which Mr. Williams — who, as he appeals to the



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authority of Isidore, was bound to notice them — has deduced from measurement of distances, according to data, which are after all liable to a suspicion of error, that it may seem almost superfluous to enter any farther into the subject. Still, as Mr. Williams has drawn several of his arguments from Alexander's marches, I am tempted to make a few remarks on some other points in his Essay. Indeed the question whether after the battle of Arbela Darius spent the winter on the site of Hamadan or of Ispahan, is one on which it would be rather painful to remain undecided, and which deserves to be distinctly considered.

Mr. Williams (p. 24.) endeavours to ascertain the time employed by Alexander in his march from Persepolis to Ecbatana. He admits that it is impossible to draw any conclusion as to this point from the account of Arrian alone, because in that account there are two omissions: one of the places from which Arrian reckons as the starting point, when he says (iii. 19.) that Alexander arrived in Media on the twelfth day: the other of the time that had elapsed between his entering Media and his finding himself within three days' march from Ecbatana. But "Quintus Curtius," says Mr. Williams, "enables us to correct the first omission satisfactorily; for he states that an expedition against the mountaineers was finished in thirty days: after which Alexander returned to Persepolis, and commenced his journey into Media." But this *correction* turns upon a supposition which is merely gratuitous: that the expedition against the Mardi, mentioned by Curtius (v. 6.), was the same as that against the Parætacæ spoken of by Arrian (iii. 19.), who clearly supposes it to have been included, as a digression of unknown duration, in the march to Ecbatana. The territory therefore at that time occupied by the Parætacæ, must have been situate between Persia Proper and Media; but it is by no means certain that the seats of the Mardi lay north of Persepolis. Droysen places them in the mountains nearer to the Persian gulf. Whether this be correct or not, it is clear that Mr. Williams has here made a groundless assumption, and that there is as little *remedy* for the first as for the second omission, as to which he merely observes, "it is not probable that it was more than one day: otherwise Arrian would have mentioned it." And on such premises he builds the conclusion, that Alexander's march from Persepolis to Ecbatana occupied sixteen days. This he thinks is not more than the time which would have been necessary for Alexander, though he marched unincumbered, and increased his rapidity during the last four days, to reach the neighbourhood of Ecbatana.

Let us however compare the account of one of Timour's marches given by an author with whose accuracy Mr. Williams professes (p. 19.) that he has many reasons to be satisfied. Cherefeddin

begins the 27th chapter of his third book with the following description of his hero's march from Shiraz toward Ispahan. "Timour partit de Chiraz le vingt-sept de Jumaziulakher, l'an 795 (18th June, 1403). Il prit la route d'Ispahan toujours en chassant, et dépeuplant les campagnes de gibier, qui ordinairement y est en abondance. Il campa à Coumcha après douze jours de marche." Coumcha, or Komesha, which Petis de la Croix erroneously describes as *village près d'Ispahan*, is forty miles south of Ispahan (Morie, Journey, p. 156—160.). On the other hand Shiraz is thirty miles south of Persepolis (Kinneir, p. 76.); so that Timour's march was ten miles shorter than Alexander's. It appears however from the description to have been very much less rapid. Mr. Williams assumes (again gratuitously) that Alexander's march was retarded by the winter. Even if that was the case, we might fairly suppose that his rate of marching compensated for this disadvantage, and that he could very well have traversed the distance between Persepolis and Ispahan in twelve days.

And here a question might be raised, whether it is credible that Alexander should have remained four months so near to Ecbatana, without making any attempt to disturb Darius—even if he did not during that time make an expedition, as Mr. Williams supposes, toward the north: and on the other hand whether it is probable that Darius should have taken up his residence after the battle so near to Persepolis. This consideration might perhaps be fairly opposed to another which impressed Mr. Williams "with a conviction depending on moral grounds, as strong as if grounded on scientific deductions, that had Hamadan been Ecbatana, Alexander would never have approached it, but by a cross road have gained at least two days' march upon the royal fugitive." (p. 27.) This consideration was, that Alexander, when three days' march distant from Ecbatana, heard of the escape of Darius five days before in the direction of the Caspian Gates. But it may be doubted whether Alexander's character is so inconsistent with the route which he is generally believed to have taken, as Mr. Williams supposes. It must be remembered that the cross road would have traversed a part of the Great Salt Desert: that Alexander could not have known the exact direction of the march of Darius, who had the choice either of crossing the chain of Elburz to the shores of the Caspian, or of skirting the northern edge of the desert: that he might wish to fall into the road where he would be sure of tracking the fugitive: and in fine that we cannot pretend to know all the reasons which might render it advisable for him to pass through Ecbatana. According to the common opinion indeed as to the route by which he pursued Darius, it would follow from Mr. Williams's reasoning, that he did not pass through Rhagæ. Or rather, if Rhagæ lay where it is commonly placed, that is, about fifty

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miles north of the Caspian Gates — since Alexander certainly halted there in his pursuit of Darius, it would be quite evident that Ecbatana was not Ispahan. Of this Mr. Williams is fully aware: but he has been lucky enough to find a passage, where Strabo, quoting Apollodorus of Artemita, mentions Arsacia, which was built near Rhagæ, and originally called Rhageia, as 500 stadia to the south of the Caspian Gates. Mr. Williams is bold as well as lucky: for, though he does not touch on this point in his Essay, he has ventured in the little map which accompanies his Life of Alexander to lay down a Rhagæ between his Ecbatana and the Caspian Gates. And in the text (p. 180.) he coolly observes of Alexander's march: "In eleven days he reached Rhagæ, placed by Strabo about thirty miles south of the Caspian Gates, and consequently not to be confounded with the Arabian Rey, more than fifty miles to the northward of them." It was indeed a question of life or death to the hypothesis: and parental affection frequently inspires unwonted courage. An unbiassed critic would certainly have hesitated on such authority to assume the existence of a second Rhagæ, otherwise utterly unknown: he would have thought it easier and safer to suppose a mistake in Strabo or his author: he would have doubted whether, as the northern Rhagæ was at least the more notorious, any body would have thought of mentioning the other without some mark to distinguish it. And he would not have neglected to compare another passage, in which Strabo speaks of the same Rhagæ, also quoting Apollodorus as to its distance from the Caspian Gates. There (xi. p. 435. Tauch.) describing the extent of Parthia, he says that it included the country as far as the Caspian Gates and Rhagæ, and the Tapyrians, which formerly belonged to Media (*σχεδὸν δ' ἔτι καὶ τὰ μέχρι πυλῶν Κασπίων, καὶ Παγῶν, καὶ Ταπύρων, ὄντα τῆς Μηδίας πρότερον*). Can any one who knows the situation of the Tapyrians, doubt whether this Rhagæ was north or south of the Caspian Gates?

The journey of Tobias from the Tigris through Ecbatana to Rhagæ, coinciding with the line of Isidore's Itinerary, might also have seemed very difficult to reconcile with the situation of either Rhagæ, if Ecbatana was Ispahan. But Mr. Williams may perhaps dispose of this objection by an expedient which we must consider among some others with which he meets certain testimonies of the ancients as to the site of Ecbatana, which he acknowledges (p. 10.) are more favourable to the established theory than to his own.

Before I proceed to notice them, I will just observe that Mr. Williams has very dexterously contrived to extract evidence in favour of his hypothesis from a passage of Ammianus Marcellinus, which, when examined by an advocate on the other side, would appear to be directly opposed to it. Ammianus (xxiii. 6. 39.) de-

scribes Ecbatana as *sub Jasonio Monte in terris sitæ Syromedorum*. One would have thought that in this description the situation of the *Mons Jasonius* was more likely to throw light upon that of Ecbatana, than the territory of the Syro-Medians, the precise extent of which, according to the ideas of Ammianus, it might be difficult to ascertain. Now Strabo (xi. p. 454. Tauch.) describes mount Jasonium as a great mountain above the Caspian Gates on the left hand (ὄρος μέγα ὑπὲρ τῶν Κασπίων πυλῶν ἔν ἀριστέρῃ, καλούμενον Ἰασόνιον). The name itself sufficiently proves that it was in the north of Media. Mr. Williams notwithstanding numbers Ammianus among the authorities which favour his hypothesis, because "Ptolemy expressly asserts that Syro-Media was the southern district of Media running parallel with Persia." Now this reference to Ptolemy is a specimen of the almost uniform inaccuracy with which Mr. Williams quotes the ancient authors, whenever a literal translation of their language would not support his argument. Ptolemy, who just before describes the position of mount Jasonium in perfect accordance with Strabo, as near to the district of Rhagæ (ἡ Παγιάνη· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ὑπὸ τὸ Ἰασόνιον ὄρος οἱ τε Οὐάδδασοι καὶ ἡ Δαρεΐτις χώρα), concludes his account of Media with the words, καὶ παρ' ἄλλην τὴν Περσίδα ἡ Συρομηδία. This Mr. Williams calls expressly asserting that Syro-Media was the southern district of Media. Ptolemy here says no more of Syro-Media than he might have said of Media. There is not a word to mark the northern limits of the country he mentions. His observation therefore can throw no light whatever on the language of Ammianus. Nor was any wanted: since the mount Jasonius sufficiently marked the position of Ecbatana.

This however is by no means the most remarkable instance of the inaccuracy I have mentioned. One was noticed by the Reviewer in the Quarterly Journal of Education, who justly complains that Mr. Williams, for the sake of his argument, has mistranslated Strabo (xvi. 744. Casaub.) πρὸς ἔω τὸ πλεόν, *nearly direct east*. As I have asserted that this inaccuracy is almost uniform when it happens to be convenient, I am bound to point out other instances. Mr. Williams wishes to prove that the mutiny which, according to Arrian, broke out at Opis, really happened, as Diodorus relates, at Susa: and he endeavours to show that this appears from the words which Arrian himself (vii. 10.) puts into Alexander's mouth, and which Mr. Williams (p. 32.) translates as follows: "Go, and announce that after Alexander, your king . . . had been safely conducted by you to Susa, you *there* deserted him." Mr. Williams prints the word *there* in italics; but I am afraid not for the same purpose that words are so printed in our translation of the Bible. For on this word *there* the whole of his argument depends, and yet there is nothing answering to it in Arrian's text, who simply says

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ὡς εἰς Σούσα ἐπαρηγάγετε, ἀπολιπόντες οἴχεσθε. The reason why Susa, and not Opis, is here mentioned is evident enough from the context; and the introduction of ἐνταῦθα in the original would have implied a falsehood, namely, that his soldiers had been on the point of leaving him on his first return to Susa.

Mr. Williams concludes his essay with an "attempt to account for the errors that have partially prevailed on this subject for the last two thousand years;" "and it grieves" him "to begin with Polybius." This sensibility is however a little misplaced: it might have been spared, if he had not himself done Polybius a wrong. He translates a passage of a fragment of the tenth book of Polybius as follows: "Media is encircled with Grecian cities after the plan of Alexander, in order to guard it against the neighbouring barbarians, with the exception of Ecbatana. It (should be *this city*, αὕτη) is placed in the northern parts of Asia (a misprint probably for Media), but it lies near (or overhangs) those parts of Asia which are round Mæotis and the Euxine." And he then proceeds to observe that "if this passage be not deplorably corrupted, it proves that Polybius must have been totally ignorant of the geography of Upper Asia; for on no supposed latitude of construction can it be allowed, that the Ecbatana even of Ptolemy was placed near, or overhung, the districts round the Mæotis and the Euxine." The phrase which Mr. Williams translates *lies near, or overhangs*, is ἐπικεῖται. But he seems to have overlooked the meaning of Polybius, which, if Ecbatana lay in the north-west of Media, is neither unintelligible nor absurd. Having mentioned the Greek cities which had been planted round Media by Alexander's direction on account of the neighbouring barbarians, he distinguishes, Ecbatana as the ancient capital (βασιλεῖον ἐξ ἀρχῆς Μήδων), but describes it with reference to the same political object which he had noticed in the case of the Greek cities. It lay in the north of Media, and was opposed to the inroads of the barbarians from the side of the Mæotis and the Euxine. This I believe to be the meaning of ἐπικεῖται. Polybius may have been thinking of the ancient eruption of the Scythians. But at all events the word does not necessarily imply any close vicinity.

Mr. Williams proceeds to observe: "That it is either a corruption of the text or a mistake of the author is evident from the subsequent history compared with the map." Now what is this history? According to Mr. Williams it is this: which he means for a translation of Polybius. "Arsaces expected that Antiochus would have reached Ecbatana, but that he would not dare, at the head of so large an army, to advance through the desert which bordered upon it." Now Ispahan does lie comparatively near to the Great Desert: Hamadan is at a great distance from it. It cannot therefore stand on the site of Ecbatana. Such is the rea-

soning which Mr. Williams builds on this passage ; and very fair it would have been, *if Polybius had indeed mentioned Ecbatana*. But he has not done so. In c. 24. he describes Media in general, and makes a little digression to notice the splendour of Ecbatana, and thence proceeds, c. 25. "Ἐως μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἤλπισεν αὐτὸν ἔξειν Ἀρσάκης. This Mr. Williams translates *Arsaces expected that he would have reached Ecbatana*.

Strabo's turn comes next. Mr. Williams doubts, whether he was acquainted with the true position of Ecbatana, or not. Here for instance is a passage which will suit Ispahan. "Media for the most part is high and cold ; such are the mountains to the east of Ecbatana, the mountains near Rhagæ and the Caspian Gates, and thence to Matiana and Armenia." Mr. Williams observes that "this arrangement commencing to the east, circling round to the north as far as the Caspian Gates, then trending westward to Matiana and Armenia, will suit Ispahan, and no other place." For "as to the existence of a range of hills (which of course must be high and cold) running southward from the Caspian Gates skirting the east (west ?) of the Great Desert, and joining that part of mount Zagros which separates Media from Persia, it was never doubted but by the shallow and blundering Pinkerton." Let us then turn from this shallow blunderer to the Greek text, which describes these *mountains to the east of Ecbatana*, and we shall find that the words which Mr. Williams so translates, are : τὰ ὑπερκείμενα τῶν Ἐκβαράνων ὄρη : the mountains which lie *above* Ecbatana, that is, to the north of it, as mount Jasonius lay *above* the Caspian Gates.

But there are other passages in Strabo which might lead us to look for Ecbatana in a very different quarter from Ispahan. For instance mount Abos, a part of Taurus, which contains the sources of the Euphrates and the Araxes, is said (XI. p. 464. Tauch.) to be near the road leading to Ecbatana. Again Strabo (XVI. p. 342. Tauch.) cites Polycleitus, who said that the highest mountains were in the northern parts above Ecbatana (here therefore it seems, *above* does not signify to the east). Mr. Williams candidly owns that "these two passages clearly indicate that there must have been an Ecbatana somewhere in the vicinity of these mountains ;" and then he proceeds to unfold one of the main causes "of the errors that have prevailed on this subject for the last two thousand years."

"The geographers describe three cities of the name of Ecbatana, — the Median, the Persian, and the Syrian." To this list Mr. Williams adds another, "an Ecbatana between the Tigris and the mountains to the east in the vicinity of the Caprus." This is that Ecbatana which Plutarch mentions (Alex. 35.) as a place in Babylonian, where there was a spring of fire, and Mr. Williams believes

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that it is the same which Ammianus meant (xxiii. 6. 22.) when he numbered Ecbatana with Ninus, Arbela, and Gaugamela, among the cities of Adiabene. And he makes use of the same hypothesis to explain a passage of Strabo (ii. p. 126. Tauch.), which had been thought to show that Eratosthenes placed Ecbatana nearly in the same latitude with Arbela and the Caspian Gates. Happily it is not necessary for our present argument to discuss the passages of Ammianus and Strabo, nor even to inquire how Plutarch's description of the Babylonian Ecbatana is to be reconciled with the other two, if they all refer to the same place. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe — what nothing but the enthusiasm which a beloved hypothesis inspires could have caused Mr. Williams to overlook — that even if his interpretation of Ammianus and Strabo were admitted to be correct, it would not in the least affect the conclusion which would otherwise flow from the two passages of Strabo, which, as he himself admits, clearly indicate that there must have been an Ecbatana somewhere in the vicinity of the northern mountains. The question seems to be simply this: whether, when Ecbatana is mentioned by itself, without any distinguishing epithet or mark, any other than the famous capital of Media can be meant? Could Polycleitus, or the author whom he followed, if he was himself ignorant of the subject he treated of, have described the high mountains in the north by a reference to Ecbatana, meaning a place which very few of his readers had ever heard of, and which they would be sure to confound with another, one of the most celebrated cities of Asia, and in a totally different position?

There are other points in Mr. Williams's argument perhaps equally vulnerable. His remarks on the situation of the Nisæan plain appear to me extremely sophistical: and it would not be difficult to show, that Strabo's description of the *λειμών ὑπὸ Ἑσπερίῳ* (xi. p. 453. Tauch.), compared with Diodorus (xvii. 110.) and Arrian (vii. 13.), clearly prove that the Nisæan plain which Alexander viewed on his way to Ecbatana, lay near the road to Hamadan. But if what has been said is not sufficient to prove that Ecbatana was not Ispahan, I should despair of showing where it is to be found.

## APPENDIX III.

*The Persian Gates.*

As it can hardly be doubted that the road by which Alexander marched from Susa to Persepolis, was that which is so minutely described by Cherefeddin, III. 24., it has naturally been supposed, that the Persian Gates were the Kelah-i-Sefid which arrested Timour's progress. So Droysen and Mr. Williams, who entertains his readers with a description of this celebrated hill fortress from Cherefeddin and Kinneir. (Mr. Williams is mistaken about the meaning of the name. It does not mean *the Castle of the Dæmons*, but *the White Castle*, though it was also called Kelah-i-Dive-Sefid, the Castle of the White Dæmon, in allusion to a legend of a combat between this Dæmon and Rustam.) There is however a difficulty about the exact position of the Gates, which does not seem to have been sufficiently noticed, or at all explained. Yet it must strike every one who attends to the descriptions of the Kelah-i-Sefid, given by Cherefeddin and Kinneir, and compares them with Arrian's account of Alexander's attack on the Persian Gates. I will transcribe a few sentences from the later authors. Cherefeddin says, *Cette place est située sur le sommet d'une montagne fort escarpée, où il n'y avoit pour monter qu'un petit chemin glissant et difficile. Au sommet de cette montagne il y a une belle plaine, égale et unie par-tout, qui a plus d'une lieue de longueur et autant de largeur. L'on y voit couler de tous côtés des ruisseaux et des fontaines, on y voit des arbres fruitiers, et des terres cultivées remplies de toutes sortes de bêtes et d'oiseaux. Le chemin qui conduit au haut de la montagne est pratiqué en sorte qu'en quelque endroit, que trois hommes se veuillent tenir fermes, ils peuvent en arrêter cent mille, et les empêcher d'y monter. . . . Le rapport de ces champs cultivés est suffisant pour la nourriture des habitans, et un grand nombre de troupeaux, de bestiaux, et de gibier y trouvent de quoi paître et se nourrir.* Mr. Kinneir's description (Memoir, p. 73.) of the Kelah Suffeed perfectly agrees with Cherefeddin's: but he adds, *A deep and romantic glen overtopped by high and barren rocks, and about three miles and a half in length, separates this fortress from the Kotuli Sucreab (V. Hammer conjectures Sohrab), one of the longest and most difficult passes I have seen in Persia. It was in many parts so steep and so slippery, that we were under the necessity of unloading the mules and dragging the baggage up the sides of the precipices. The mountain is covered*

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*with wood; and a thick forest extends for eight fursungs on the S. E. side. This is without doubt the pass mentioned by Arrian and other writers, under the appellation of the Persian Straits.*

If then the Kotul is the pass defended by Ariobarzanes, what use did he make of the Kelah i-Sefid? How has it happened that Arrian's authors made no mention of the peculiar features of this remarkable fortress? How did Alexander's victory at the pass put him in possession of this place, which assuredly he did not leave in the enemy's hands? I am unable to answer these questions, and merely throw them out to promote further inquiry. I observe that Mr. Long, in his Map of Ancient Persia, intimates a doubt as to the position of the Pylæ Persicæ.

This place suggests another remark. I have called the Araxes of Persepolis the modern Bendemir. I did not know there was a doubt as to this point, till I saw the following remark in a popular work, of, I believe, a learned author (Secret Societies of the Middle Ages, in the Library of Entertaining Knowledge, p. 135.): "Azad-dowlat had a dyke constructed across the river Kur, near the ruins of Persepolis. It was called the Bund-Ameer (Prince's Dyke), and travellers ignorant of the Persian language have given this name to the river itself. We must not therefore be surprised to find in Lalla Rookh a lady singing

'There's a bower of roses by Bendameer's stream;'

and asking

'Do the roses still bloom by the calm Bendameer?'

Calm and still, beyond doubt, is the Bendameer."

Never was ridicule more unfortunately applied. Von Hammer, whose knowledge of Persian the author of this remark certainly would not question, calls the river the Bend Emir, at the same time that he explains the meaning of the name. *The greatest, he observes (Wien. Jahrb. viii. p. 311.), of all the rivers of Fars is the Kur, exactly coinciding in name with the Kur of northern Persia, but for distinction's sake also called Bend Emir, the Prince's Dyke.* What in fact could be more natural than to designate the river by the name of this remarkable object? So, as Baber informs us, the river of Samarcand was called the Kohik from a hillock near that city. I will add V. Hammer's remark, that the Greeks called the river of Persepolis the Araxes, that of Pasargada the Cyrus, which flowed into the Persian Gulf. Hence he concludes that Pasargada lay to the south-east of Persepolis.

## APPENDIX IV.

*The Sogdian Rock and the Fortress of Chorienes.*

MR. WILLIAMS (Life of Alexander, p. 238.) finds a difficulty in conceiving that a Bactrian chief could have anything to do with Sogdiana, or should have looked for a refuge beyond the Oxus, when the Paropamisus, with its summits and recesses, presented a natural retreat for the insurgent natives. He is therefore strongly inclined to believe, that the rock where Roxana was captured, was not in Sogdiana, but in Bactria, where Strabo places it (xi. p. 440. Tauch. that is, the rock of Sysimithres). *If therefore, he concludes, it was in Bactria, there can be no doubt that it was the same hill fortress which was captured by Timour previous to his expedition into India, and the description of which answers exactly to the rock of Oxyartes. According to the tradition of the natives, it had been besieged in vain by the great Iskender.*

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The difficulty which Mr. Williams here raises seems exceedingly slight. For surely it was natural enough that Oxyartes should commit his family to the protection of an ally in a remarkably strong fortress, though it happened to be north of the Oxus. But his conjecture as to its position, if it was in Bactria, about which he thinks there can be no doubt, is extravagantly improbable. The hill fortress he alludes to is no other than that of Ketuar or Kettore, described by Cherefeddin, iv. 3. A glance at the map, and at Cherefeddin's account of the manner in which Timour penetrated to it, should suffice to satisfy every one that this could not be the rock where Roxana was captured, the description of which answers to it no more than must be the case with any two hill fortresses.

Mr. Williams also thinks that the Marginia of Curtius (vii. 10.) is Margiana, and his Ochus the Tedjen, and that *as we find the Parætacæ and the Mardi continually confounded with each other, it may fairly be inferred that the Parætacæ in the vicinity of Bactria* (Arrian, iv. 21.) *were the Mardi of Margiana.* Hence he is led to conjecture that the fortress of Chorienes is Nadir Shah's favourite stronghold, the modern Kelat.

I have only to remark that, whatever may be thought of the expedition to Margiana, this conjecture is utterly untenable. Whoever has read the description of Kelat in Fraser's Khorasan, (Appendix, p. [53.] foll.), which may be compared with Cherefeddin (ii. 37.), knows that it is a valley closely resembling the Grande

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Chartreuse. No description can be less applicable to the rock of Chorienes.

It may perhaps just deserve to be noticed that Marghinan (Fraser, Appendix, p. 126.), is the chief city of Ferghana, and that, according to Waddington's map to Baber, it lies to the north-east of the Ak-su.

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